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Abstract 
All of us occasionally remember information or personal events that occurred a long time ago. Many 
of us sometimes wonder how our brain encodes and stores such sensory information for a long time 
period. Whilst a myriad of researches enlightened some of the mechanisms of long-term memory 
formation in human adults, little is known about the mechanisms implemented in young children and 
distantly related animals. Do young children and animals also form memories that can last in time? 
And if so, does memory formation rely on the same principles than those established in human adults? 
Although these questions may seem trivial, they are far from being resolved. As evidenced, our 
inability to recall personal events that occurred during the first years of our lives – a phenomenon 
known as infantile amnesia – is counterintuitive given the extraordinary ability of infants and young 
children to acquire novel information on a daily basis. It might be that memory requires repetitions to 
be maintained durably, and this, especially for early-developing brain systems. On the basis of an 
abstract concept, the fact that words can refer to objects, I showed in this thesis that the ability of 
children to remember object names was positively correlated to the number of times they encountered 
these objects during the learning phase, whatever their age (18 months, 24 months, 4 years of age). 
Surprisingly, I also found that from 2 years of age, a single learning trial was sufficient to promote the 
retention of the name of objects after a 30min delay. It is the first time that such a demonstration has 
been possible. Finally, I highlighted the efficacy of two different learning strategies (“ostensive 
labeling”: i.e. passive learning implemented by an unambiguous naming of the objects; “fast-
mapping”: i.e. active learning requiring the use of a logical deductive reasoning) in memorizing object 
names at these different ages. 
During my thesis, I also intended to know whether some of these rules also apply to genetically distant 
animals. I chose the domestic dog as animal model. This species, largely unknown within the scientific 
community less than 20 years ago, is currently a privileged animal model given his incredible skills to 
communicate and cooperate with humans. Moreover, recent studies revealed the remarkable ability of 
some dogs in comprehending hundreds, even a thousand object names. Thanks to a partnership with 
the National Veterinary School of Toulouse and a professional dog trainer, I recruited and trained 40 
dogs to acquire the word-referent concept. I demonstrated that acquiring such a complex task was age-
dependent in dogs, just like the ability to recall object names after an intervening period of several 
months. A series of exploratory experiments conducted with the most expert dog of the cohort enabled 
me to show (i) that this dog required multiple trials to reliably learn the name of a novel object; (ii) 
that “ostensive labeling” was not an adequate learning method for him; (iii) that he was able to fast-
map a novel word to its referent by exclusion despite his low “lexical repertoire”; and (iv) that learning 
from his own errors by a process of positive reinforcement was the most robust way to acquire and 
store durably novel information. Despite these notable learning divergences with humans, the accuracy 
of this dog to remember object names was highly significant even after several months of delay, 
suggesting that once information is learned, it can be stored in memory and remain “dormant” for 
months, maybe even years without decaying, as demonstrated in humans.  
Key words: long-term memory; associative learning; word-referent concept; learning strategies; 
development; young children; dogs 
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Résumé 
Nous faisons tous l’expérience de nous souvenirs d’informations ou d’épisodes de vie vécus il y a fort 
longtemps. Nombreux sommes-nous à nous demander comment nous encodons et stockons de telles 
informations sensorielles de façon durable dans le temps. A l’heure où les mécanismes de formation 
de mémoires à long terme trouvent de plus en plus d’éclaircissements chez l’Homme adulte, qu’en est-
il pour nos jeunes enfants et pour les espèces animales génétiquement éloignées de nous ? Les enfants 
et les animaux forment-ils également des souvenirs qui peuvent demeurer intacts durant de longues 
périodes ? Et si tel est le cas, la formation de leurs souvenirs dépend-elle des mêmes règles que celles 
actuellement établies chez l’Homme adulte ? Ces questions, aussi triviales puissent-elles paraitre, sont 
loin d’avoir été résolues. Pour preuve, l’incapacité à nous remémorer des évènements vécus durant nos 
premières années de vie – phénomène connu sous le terme d’amnésie infantile – est contre intuitive 
avec l’incroyable capacité qu’ont les nourrissons et jeunes enfants à acquérir quotidiennement une 
multitude d’information. Il se pourrait qu’une mémoire ait besoin de répétitions pour s’établir de façon 
pérenne, et ce notamment pour un organisme en développement. En me basant sur un concept abstrait, 
celui que des mots peuvent désigner des objets, j’ai pu montrer que la capacité d’un enfant à se 
souvenir du nom d’un objet était en effet corrélée au nombre de fois que cet objet lui avait été présenté 
au cours d’une phase d’apprentissage, et ce quel que soit son d’âge (18 mois, 24 mois, 4 ans). Chose 
surprenante, j’ai également mis en évidence qu’un apprentissage en un seul essai était suffisant pour 
qu’un enfant âgé de seulement 2 ans se souvienne d’associations mot-objet apprises 30 minutes 
auparavant. C’est la première fois qu’une telle démonstration a pu être faite. Enfin, j’ai pu établir 
l’efficacité de deux stratégies d’apprentissage (« ostensive labeling »: apprentissage passif via une 
dénomination non ambigüe des objets ;  « fast-mapping »: apprentissage actif via l’utilisation d’un 
raisonnement de déduction logique) sur la mémorisation de noms d’objets à ces différents âges.  
Au cours de ma thèse, je ne suis également demandée si certaines de ces règles étaient transposables à 
des animaux génétiquement distants de nous. J’ai choisi pour modèle d’étude le chien domestique. 
Cette espèce, encore méconnue de la communauté scientifique il y a seulement 20ans de cela, est 
aujourd’hui un modèle de choix en cognition animale grâce à ses incroyables aptitudes à communiquer 
et coopérer avec l’Homme. De plus, des études récentes ont révélé la capacité remarquable de certains 
chiens à comprendre des centaines voire un millier de noms d’objets. En créant un partenariat avec 
l’Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse et une éducatrice canine professionnelle, j’ai entrainé 40 
chiens à acquérir le concept mot-objet. J’ai pu démontrer que l’acquisition d’une telle tâche complexe 
est âge dépendante chez le chien, tout comme la capacité à se remémorer des noms d’objets après une 
latence de plusieurs mois. A l’issue d’une série d’études exploratoires menées avec le chien le plus 
expert de la cohorte, j’ai pu montrer (i) que l’apprentissage d’un nouveau nom d’objet nécessitait un 
grand nombre d’essais chez ce chien ; (ii) que « l’ostensive labeling » n’était pas une méthode 
adéquate pour lui; (iii) que ce dernier pouvait inférer un nouveau nom à l’objet référent par exclusion 
(« fast-mapping ») malgré son faible « répertoire lexical »; et (iv) qu’apprendre de ses erreurs par 
renforcement positif était la manière la plus robuste pour acquérir et retenir durablement des 
informations. Malgré ces divergences d’apprentissage notable avec l’humain, la performance de ce 
chien à retenir des noms d’objets était très significative même après plusieurs mois de latence, ce qui 
suggère, qu’une fois l’information acquise, elle serait stockée et pourrait rester en dormance des mois, 
voire années, sans être altérée, comme démontré chez l’Homme. 
Mots clefs : mémoire à long terme ; apprentissage associatif ; concept mot-objet ; stratégies 
d’apprentissage ; développement ; jeunes enfants ; chiens.  
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Preamble 
Recently, my little boy of almost 3 years of age asked me while looking at his dish: 
He: « Mum, what is that? » 
Me:  « Mushrooms! » 
He:  « The mushrooms we picked yesterday? » 
Me: « I don’t know what you are talking about? We haven’t been picking mushrooms 
yesterday! » 
He:  «Yes, we did! The mushrooms we found in the forest with Flo and Alexandra…» 
I was speechless. This anecdotal event happened once, 8 months ago and we never talked about it 
since. 
I bet all parents have experienced such type of episode with their child. 
Paradoxically, there is very few evidence in the scientific literature that children under 3-4 years 
of age form memories than can last in time. Paradoxically too, my son will normally not be able to 
recall this event as an adult. Turned the other way round, adults do generally not remember any 
personal event they experienced early in life, a phenomenon defined as infantile (and juvenile) 
amnesia. So makes the difference between an early-developing brain system and an adult mature 
brain in the ability to sustain a memory trace after a substantial delay? 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Life is everywhere. From the simplest unicellular organism to the most complex creature, life is 
present. But life is also complex. To live, organisms must interact and evolve in an extraneous and 
potentially dangerous environment. Via the process of natural selection, some species will arise 
and develop while others will decay. To survive, compete and reproduce, a large part of the living 
creatures are provided with a fascinating capability of adaptation. Behavioral adaptation, which 
can be implemented consciously or reflexively, requires animals to “learn” from their 
environment. Animals continuously process multiple sensory inputs and when endowed with this 
capability, integrate that information for later use. Being equipped with the ability to store 
information in memory gives the living beings an extraordinary advantage to survive in the wild. 
But how do diverse and distantly related species learn and potentially memorize information? Are 
there some standard principles and/or mechanisms that govern learning? And how can we, human 
beings, explore these rules and mechanisms in a broad range of species to better comprehend how 
learning and memory functions? It’s been decades or even centuries since these fundamental 
questions have captivated researchers. However, understanding how information is physically 
processed and stored is challenging. Researchers are attempting to explore these issues at multiple 
levels of organization, from the molecular, cellular, tissue, behavioral and recently even 
computational levels. They also examine these questions from very simple to very complex 
systems and try to figure out whether they share common features or whether evolution shaped 
heterogeneous learning and memorizing modalities. On one hand, some researchers are interested 
in investigating animal models that best fit the human model, especially for clinical purposes (e.g. 
developing a convincing animal model to study Alzheimer’s disease). On the other hand, other 
researchers aim to better comprehend whether the principles and mechanisms that guide learning 
and memory formation in humans, are unique to humans or conversely largely widespread within 
the animal kingdom. In this second case, from an evolutionary perspective, it may help 
understanding how these mechanisms have evolved and perhaps became more complex during 
evolution. In this thesis, we were interested in examining if some of the principles that govern the 
establishment of long-term memories in adult humans would also apply to an unrelated animal 
species and to an early human developing brain system. The domestic dog appeared to us as an 
interesting species since a myriad of recent researches have highlighted its impressive 
communicative skills with humans, suggesting that despite strong anatomical, morphological and 
functional differences with us, this species has developed some surprising cognitive traits that are 
perhaps not so remote from our own. Furthermore, how human beings learn and store information 
early in life remains poorly elucidated. Do babies and young children already learn and memorize 
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sensory inputs in a similar way than adults? Or conversely, are learning and memory formation 
cognitive skills that slowly improve during development and that depend on specific and mature 
brain correlates?  
By exposing young children and domestic dogs to similar complex cross-modal sensory inputs, 
we have tried to shed light on the expansionist aspect of some principles that underlie learning and 
memory formation. This thesis does not aim to simply compare the performance of an animal 
model to that of a young child on a given task, but instead to understand whether they share some 
basic principles with adult humans.  
These principles originate from the M4 project (Memory Mechanisms in Man and Machine) 
initiated by Simon Thorpe in 2012 and will be mainly investigated at a behavioral level. However, 
in this thesis we will try to relate our findings to the general knowledge provided by the literature 
about the underlying brain mechanisms and putative neural correlates. Thus, this thesis is at the 
edge between behavior, cognition and neurosciences.  
1 How is information processed and stored?  
 
1.1 A little bit of history 
It was originally believed that learning required the formation of new neurons. In 1894, S. Ramon 
y Cajal, a Spanish neuroanatomist, was the first to suggest that learning novel information might 
rather be caused by a process of strengthening connections between existing neurons to improve 
the effectiveness of their communication at the synapse. His idea was theorized and further 
developed by Donald Hebb in 1949. At that time, neuroscientists were not equipped with 
neurophysiological techniques needed to determine if their theory applies at a biological level. 
The first empirical evidence of this postulate came from electrophysiological recordings within 
isolated neurons using a reductionist approach. This research was conducted by Eric Kandel in 
the years 1960-70s on Aplysia, a gastropod mollusk. At the same time, a second empirical 
demonstration arose from the work of Terje Lomo and Tim Bliss who were at the origin of the 
elucidation of the phenomena of long-term potentiation and long-term depression, 
subsequently to investigations in the hippocampus of rabbits. Nowadays, advanced techniques 
allow researchers to better characterize the processes underlying learning and memory formation 
in more complex organisms like primates (including humans). Computational models also help 
refining the original theories. 
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1.2 From reductionist approaches to computational models... 
 Hebbian theory 1.2.1
The Hebbian theory was introduced by Donald Hebb in 1949 and is also sometimes called Hebb’s 
rule or Hebb’s postulate. This theory postulates that a repeated stimulation of a presynaptic cell 
on a postsynaptic cell would result in an increased synaptic efficacy between these cells (Hebb, 
1949).  
 
This postulate is often summarized as “cells that fire together wire together”, which is a 
misleading restatement of Hebb’s theory. Indeed, Hebb pointed out that the presynaptic neuron 
(cell A) needs to “take part in firing” the postsynaptic neuron (cell B). In other words, he implied 
the notion of causality and temporal precedence: the fact that cell B can only fire if cell A fired 
before, not at the same time. 
According to Hebb, this mechanism would allow the increase of the synaptic strength between 
recruited neurons. He also assumed that this strengthening process helps form highly connected 
assemblies of neurons that could be the neuronal support of engrams1.   
 
 
Unfortunately, at that time, Donald Hebb could not verify if his theory was truthfully the one 
implemented in a living organism. About 20 years later, the pioneering laboratory work of Eric 
Kandel provided for the first time strong evidence of the involvement of the Hebbian theory as a 
learning mechanism in a simple-organized animal model.  
“Let us assume that the persistence or repetition of a reverberatory activity (or “trace”) tends to 
induce lasting cellular changes that add to its stability. […] When an axon of cell A is near enough 
to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or 
metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such as A’s efficiency, as one of the cells firing 
B, is increased” (Hebb, 1949). 
“Any two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly active at the same time will tend to become 
“associated” so that activity in one facilitates activity in the other. […] When one cell repeatedly 
assists in firing another, the axon of the first cell develops synaptic knobs (or enlarges them if they 
already exist) in contact with the soma of the second cell” (Hebb, 1949). 
1
Engram: a theorized biophysical or biochemical change in the brain in response to external stimuli 
as a means of storing memories. 
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 Aplysia californica: a great model for the study of neuronal plasticity 1.2.2
Investigating the Hebbian theory and more generally how sensory information is processed in a 
billion of neurons brain organism is challenging. Moreover, highlighting the brain mechanisms 
underlying a given behavior in a complex mammalian brain is an extreme difficult task. Eric 
Kandel, recipient of the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine in 2000, used a reductionist 
approach to tackle these challenging questions. He used an invertebrate animal model, the Aplysia 
californica, which is a marine gastropod mollusk. This organism is an advantageous model for 
neurobiologists, because it has only about 20,000 neurons. Moreover, the gill and siphon 
withdrawal reflex is an involuntary, defensive reflex that causes the retraction of the siphon and 
gill each time the animal is disturbed. This reflex undergoes classical conditioning, in a way that 
is comparable to classical conditioning described in other animals like mammals (i.e. stimulus-
response, temporal specificity, effect of context, etc.). Furthermore, this reflex is mediated for 
one-third by monosynaptic connections between sensory neurons and motor neurons. 
Consequently, using a preparation of an isolated abdominal ganglion of the Aplysia connected to 
a piece of skin from the tactile receptive field of the reflex, Kandel and coworkers were able to 
relatively easily investigate the cellular bases of this behavior by recording the intracellular 
activity of identified sensory and motor neurons, simultaneously with behavior.  
During conditioning, a weak tactile stimulation administrated to the siphon automatically elicits 
the retraction of the gill [Figure 1]. After repeated exposures, the gill progressively stops 
retracting. This progressive decrease in response to a particular (and weak) stimulus is called 
habituation. Now, if the animal is presented to another novel stimulus or to a stimulation on 
another part of the body, the automated behavior (gill retraction) is partially or completely 
restored (i.e. dishabituation). Finally, if the animal is presented with a novel strong and noxious 
stimulus (e.g. an electrical choc), an increased response occurs (i.e. sensitization). 
At a neuronal level, the authors found that the synapses that connect the sensory neurons to the 
motor neurons underwent plasticity that was activity-dependent (Castellucci, Pinsker, 
Kupfermann, & Kandel, 1970). Specifically, they found that the excitatory post-synaptic potential 
(EPSP) exhibited a low-frequency depression when repeatedly stimulated [Figure 1], and a 
facilitation after application of a novel stimulus to another pathway. Consequently, the authors 
concluded that both habituation and dishabituation can be explained by changes in the efficacy of 
specific excitatory synapses. Such plastic changes in the functional effectiveness of synapses 
have been suggested as the neuronal mechanism of a behavioral modification at short-term and is 
in agreement with Hebb’s postulate. 
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Figure 1 – A. Illustration of the gill and siphon withdrawal reflex before (left) and after conditioning (right). When habituated to an 
external stimulus, the system results in a depressed efficacy of the synapses between the sensory and motor neurons. B. Illustration of the 
electrophysiological recordings within the sensory neuron and the motor neuron, as well as the amplitude of retraction of the gill during a 
repeated stimulation of the siphon. From Neurosurgery; cellular mechanisms of implicit memory storage and the biological basis of 
individuality, 2017. 
Later on, Kandel and coworkers identified proteins that, when synthetized, mainly contribute to 
convert short-term memories into long-lasting memories (namely CREB: cAMP Response 
Element Binding Protein). The activation of this protein results in an increase in the number of 
synaptic connections.  
Taken together, their work led to the discovery that short-term memory is primarily shaped by 
functional changes in the effectiveness of existing synapses (increased or reduced activity in 
response to stimulus repetition), while long-term memory requires a restructuration of the 
synaptic connections such as a change in the number of synaptic connections. Their work was the 
first empirical evidence of Donald Hebb’s theory in a living animal. Since that time, evidence of 
synaptic plasticity - either transiently or durably – and of an adaptation of the spiking activity in 
response to repeated external stimulations has been reported in more complex organisms 
including monkeys (e.g. De Baene & Vogels, 2010), and humans (e.g. Pedreira et al., 2010), 
thanks to the development of neuroimaging techniques for instance. 
The pioneering findings about the learning mechanisms gave rise to investigations at a molecular 
level and probably contributed to the elucidation of the now well-defined long-term 
potentiation2 and long-term depression2 mechanisms that mainly occur in the medial temporal 
lobe (Lomo, 1971, 2003).  
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At the same time too, other groundbreaking experiments highlighted other effects of repetitive 
sensory processing on changes at a neuronal level. Indeed, being repeatedly exposed to a given 
stimulus not only strengthens or weakens the connections between the neurons; it also leads to 
neuronal selectivity. In the 50s, David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel recorded the activity of 
neurons thanks to microelectrodes implanted in the primary visual cortex of anesthetized cats 
while they projected patterns of light and dark on a screen in front of the cat (Hubel & Wiesel, 
1959). They found that some neurons fired rapidly and consistently when presented with distinct 
line orientations, while other neurons discharged only when presented with another angle of light 
(their work introduced the notion of receptive field). They also established that “complex” 
neurons responded preferentially to moving lines of light displayed in a certain angle, suggesting 
that there might be a hierarchy in the integration of sensory information and that the brain 
2
Long-term potentiation (LTP): persistent increase in synaptic strength (or potentiation) 
following high-frequency stimulations and caused by an enhancement in signal transmission 
between two neurons. Unlike other processes of synaptic plasticity, LTP lasts a (very) long 
time (from minutes to months, even years). This durable modification at the synapses 
contributes to the learning process and to the maintenance of a memory at long-term.  
An early form of LTP (E-LTP) depends on a transient activation of protein kinases (CaMKII 
and PKC) that are autonomously able to carry out the phosphorylation events that underlie 
this potentiation (note: phosphorylation consists of adding a phosphate to a molecule in 
order to change its activity). This E-LTP transiently increases the effectiveness of the 
connection at the synapse. A late form of LTP (L-LTP) requires gene expression and/or the 
synthesis of proteins in the postsynaptic cell, which is caused by a persistent activation of 
protein kinases during E-LTP. It has also been shown that the induction of L-LTP coincides 
with the activation of CREB (a transcription factor) responsible for the long-term synthesis 
of proteins at the synapse (i.e. maintenance of the structural changes operated at the 
synapse). This L-LTP is required for the persistence of a memory at (very) long-term. 
LTP is often studied in the hippocampus of several animals, including humans, but is also 
observed in other neural structures, including the cerebral cortex, cerebellum and amygdala.  
Long-term depression (LTD): activity-dependent reduction in the efficacy of neuronal 
synapses following a prolonged presentation of a stimulus. It selectively weakens specific 
synapses. It is assumed that LTD prevents synapses from reaching a ceiling level of efficacy, 
which would prohibit the encoding of new information (i.e. the formation of novel memories). 
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constructs complex representations on the basis of simple sensory information (Rose & 
Blakemore, 1974). Their work introduced the notion of experience dependent selectivity, a point 
that will be further developed below. Note that these two neuropsychologists were also awarded 
in 1981 (Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine) for their discovery of the ocular dominance 
columns in kittens as a consequence of visual deprivation in one eye early in life.  
 Spike-Time Dependent Plasticity: a refined form of Hebb’s learning rule 1.2.3
Donald Hebb’s original assumption about synaptic plasticity, followed by several empirical 
demonstrations of its involvement in simple or complex living organisms, is still the foundation of 
current theory about learning and memory formation. Hebb’s postulate was later refined and gave 
rise to the ideas that (1) synaptic weights are only modified when the postsynaptic neuron 
fires a spike and that (2) the induction of synaptic modification depends on the temporal 
order in the pre- and postsynaptic spiking (Bi & Poo, 2001; Markram, Lubke, Frotscher, & 
Sakmann, 1997). These ideas were recapitulated in the Spike-Time Dependent Plasticity (STDP) 
theory (Markram et al., 1997). In its classical version, the STDP theory postulates that the 
synapse of an afferent neuron that fires before a given neuron will be strengthened (in this 
case, LTP is observed). In contrast, if the inputs of a neuron arrive after the given neuron 
fired, the synapse gets weakened (in this case, LTD is observed) [Figure 2].  
 
Figure 2 – Graph illustrating different versions of the STDP learning rule. Classically, synapses activated before the spiking activity of a 
given neuron are potentiated (LTP, solid red line) as a function of the time difference between input and output spikes ( curving shape of the 
solid red line). In contrast, synapses activated after the spiking activity of a given neuron are depressed (LTD, blue solid line) as a function of 
the time difference between input and output spikes (curving shape of the solid blue line). These curves were based on the experimental data 
of Bi and Poo, 2001 (circles). In another STDP version, synapses are potentiated provided that the spiking activity of the incoming neuron is 
very close in time to the spiking activity of the given neuron (red hatched region); in any other cases synapses are depressed (blue hatched 
region). From Bichler et al. 2012. 
In a revised STDP version, some researchers emphasize the importance of temporal contiguity 
suggesting that synapses get systematically weakened (depressed) except if the afferent neuron 
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fires in a narrowed time-window before the postsynaptic spike (Bichler et al., 2012; Guyonneau, 
VanRullen, & Thorpe, 2005). It stresses the importance of temporal coding constraints for the 
strengthening process to occur (i.e. a “critical time window”) [Figure 2].  
In sum, repeated exposures to an external sensory stimulus (e.g. image, sound, etc.) will result in a 
strengthened neural network involving only the neurons that were the first to fire in response to 
this specific stimulus and whose firing activities were temporally close to each other. Such 
mechanism would prevent all the cells from learning the same pattern. Consequently, neurons 
equipped with such STDP-learning rules will naturally become selective to a given repeated 
external pattern (Masquelier & Thorpe, 2007) as mentioned above. 
 Theory of neuronal selectivity 1.2.4
By using a feedforward computational network implementing an unsupervised3 STDP-based 
learning algorithm, Masquelier et al. found that neurons (that mimicked neurons in higher order 
visual areas) gradually became selective to frequently occurring features (stimuli consisted of 
pictures from the Caltech Dataset). Less than one hundred presentations were enough for neurons 
in the network to start becoming selective to given patterns. Moreover, the responses of the 
neurons became also more and more rapid (i.e. a given image was more rapidly processed over 
the course of presentation of the images). Even more intriguing, by using the simplified STDP 
learning rule described above, computational studies found that neurons became selective to any 
repeating stimuli and only after a ten of repetitions (Bichler et al., 2012).  
 
These findings established at a computational level are supported by research in humans using a 
Stereotaxic Electro Encephalography method (intracranial single unit recording) implemented in 
epileptic patients suffering from intractable epilepsy, and Electro Encephalography (EEG) 
methods in healthy participants. Humans seem indeed able to form selective neurons for arbitrary 
patterns (at least from the visual and auditory domains), simply as the consequence of repeated 
exposures (Agus, Thorpe, & Pressnitzer, 2010). Moreover, evidence for rapid and sharp 
selectivity has been found in participants who incidentally learnt acoustic patterns (Andrillon, 
Kouider, Agus, & Pressnitzer, 2015). In their supplements, the authors showed that only five 
presentations sufficed to observe neuronal selectivity. Neurons selective for complex and high-
order patterns have essentially been found in the medial temporal lobe of humans - a brain 
region that only receives highly integrated information4 and that is known to be involved in 
memory processes (see Chapter I) – as well as in neocortical regions, thought to be the final 
3
Unsupervised learning: No instructions are given to the network about what should be learned 
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repositories of long-term memories (e.g. Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2000). Some authors proposed 
that the selectivity of neurons within the medial temporal lobe is only transient while long-lasting 
selectivity would be specific to neocortical neurons (see Chapter I).  
 
Selective neurons can be seen as highly local representations of specific 
features/stimuli/information. Specifically, it has been shown that a selective neuron only fires 
when the stimulus for which it is selective is present (Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, & 
Fried, 2005). For example, researchers reported the cases of neurons that were specifically 
selective to faces of Jennifer Anniston, Halle Berry or Oprah Winfrey (Quiroga et al., 2005). 
Similar findings were reported for particular places such as the Sydney Opera or the Taj Mahal 
(Quiroga et al., 2005) [Figure 3]. Interestingly, the same authors showed that a given neuron not 
only responded to images of its favorite percept but also to stimuli from other modalities linked to 
this percept (e.g. text (the word form of the person or place), auditory (the person’s voice), 
4
How is information processed in the brain? To briefly summarize: The sensory organs first 
transform physical external stimuli (e.g. chemical molecules, sound waves, photons, etc.) into 
electrical signals: action potential. The spikes first reach the primary sensory cortices (e.g. 
V1 for the visual domain) where only basic unimodal features are processed (e.g. cells only 
code for lines orientation or edges, etc.). Bottom-up (i.e. feedforward) processes then enable 
the integration of multiple low-level features to create coherent and more complex 
representations (i.e. inputs from the different sensory cortices are then sent to other brain 
regions along the hierarchy of processing where higher-level processing occur – e.g. cells 
from V2, V4, IT for the visual domain are respectively selective to shapes, full objects and 
distinct faces). Ultimately, inputs reach association cortices and finally the medial temporal 
lobes where highly integrated polysensory information are related together to form concepts 
and whole representations (e.g. the name of an object). Note that top-down (i.e. feedback) 
processes are also often implemented and seed-up the recognition of some features. 
 
 
From Herzog & Clarke, 2014 
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etc.)(Quiroga, Kraskov, Koch, & Fried, 2009). Hence, single neurons in the human medial 
temporal lobe respond selectively to representations of the same percept across different 
sensory modalities. This finding gave rise to the idea of highly-integrated “concept neurons”.  
 
Figure 3 – A single unit in the left posterior hippocampus activated exclusively by different views of the actress Jennifer Anniston. 
Responses to 30 of the 87 images are shown. For each picture, the corresponding raster plots and post-stimulus time histograms are given. 
Vertical dashed lines indicate image onset and offset. From Quiroga et al. 2005. 
1.3 Information storage 
 Sparse coding theory and “grandmother” cells 1.3.1
These groundbreaking findings led to the assumption that such highly selective neurons should 
play a critical role in memory functions. On one hand, some researchers claimed that relatively 
few neurons – thousands or less - that store information in such a highly specific manner may be 
the repositories for any particular concept (e.g. a person, a thing, etc.). According to this sparse 
coding theory, the information in its complete form is supported by (relatively) few specialized 
neurons locally settled (i.e. a “node”) [Figure 4]. If so, reactivating these neurons would be 
sufficient to trigger recall.  
25 
 
 
Figure 4 – Illustration of two alternative theories about how memories are stored in the brain. The distributed coding theory claims that 
information/concepts are stored as bits and pieces distributed across millions or billions or neurons. The sparse coding theory argues that a 
(relatively) few neurons (thousands or even less) constitute a “sparse” representation of an information/concept. From Quiroga et al 2013. 
This theory gave weight to the controversial concept of “grandmother cells” claiming that highly 
selective neurons in the neocortex are the neuronal support for (very) long-term memories. The 
postulate is the following: given that a selective neuron only fires when the 
stimulus/concept/information for which it is selective is present, in the absence of this 
stimulus/concept/information, the neuron should not fire at all. If so, the selective neuron may 
preserve its pattern of selectivity and connectivity within the network for the entire period of 
absence of the stimulus. It was proposed that the neuron may remain “dormant” months, years 
or even decades later, ready to fire again if the stimulus appears again (Thorpe, 2011b, 
2011a). In a radical way of considering the “grandmother cell” hypothesis, only one neuron would 
respond to one specific stimulus or concept. In other word, each stimulus or concept would be 
coded by a different neuron. According to some authors, such a mechanism would not be 
biologically relevant, because it would imply that if the single neuron responsible for a given 
concept dies or becomes damaged, the whole trace of this concept would vanish from memory 
(Quiroga, Fried, & Koch, 2013). Therefore, it may be more likely that more than a solitary neuron 
is specialized in any concept. It might also be that neurons are specialized in more than a single 
concept (Quiroga, Fried, & Koch, 2013). Thus, there is a debate about whether these neurons 
should be called “grandmother cells” or “concept neurons” (Quiroga, Fried, & Koch, 2013). 
Finally, note that there is a substantial difference in the theorized localization of “grandmother” 
neurons and “concept” neurons. Indeed, “grandmother” cells are believed to be situated in cortical 
regions (neocortex), whereas “concept cells” as defined by Q.Quiroga were essentially found in 
the medial temporal lobe of humans. As mentioned above and as it will be larger reviewed later 
on in this thesis, it is now well-established that the shift from mildly long to very long-term 
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memory is characterized by a transfer of the information from the MTL regions to cortical regions 
(see Chapter 1). Therefore, it was proposed that a neuron from the hippocampus (i.e. one 
component of the MTL, see Chapter 1) that for example selectively responds to “Halle Berry” at 
t0, might respond to something completely different few years later (i.e. transient selectivity). One 
way to reconcile these divergences is to imagine that the specialization property of neurons within 
the MTL is different from that of neurons from the neocortex. Hippocampal neurons may be 
selective for more than a unique concept, while cortical neurons, which are much more numerous, 
may be effectively specialized for unique information/concepts. 
 Distributed coding theory 1.3.2
On the other hand, according to an alternative viewpoint, storing any specific concept or random 
stimulus can only be permitted by the collective activity of millions or even billions of neurons 
distributed widely throughout the brain. According to this distributed coding theory, no few 
neurons support the entire information but multiple neurons that store a small independent part of 
the information [Figure 4]. A concept/information (e.g. “Halle Berry”) would then be the sum of 
individual neurons. Recall would be the result of activating all these distributed neurons. The 
major argument of proponents of this theory against a sparse coding hypothesis is that we may not 
have enough neurons to represent all possible concepts and external stimuli. However, it is argued 
that a typical person remembers about 10,000 concepts, not more, which is far below the number 
of neurons available. 
To summarize 
We started this introduction from a theory that gave rise to a simple behavioral observation – the 
fact that a gastropod that reflexively retracts his gill in response to an external stimulation 
progressively reduces this pattern of response if the harmless stimulation is repeated – and ended 
with the idea that repeated exposures to external stimuli or concepts induce the emergence of 
highly selective cells following processes of synaptic plasticity. We discussed that these changes 
at the synapses can last in time and consequently that a given neuron can maintain its selectivity 
for a long time period even if the stimulus is not presented again (though there is a transfer of the 
information from the MTL to cortical regions). Altogether, this highlights the powerful role of 
repetition in the formation of memories. Repetition would be necessary for a neuron to become 
selective. Repetition would be necessary for the information to be maintained in the brain 
for a long time period. In other words, repetition would be necessary for the information not to 
be “lost” (or at least inaccessible).  
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But what is repetition? How do we define it? Should repetition necessarily be close in time for a 
neuron to become selective or can it also be distributed in time? In a later discussion, we will 
discuss the fact that repetition is not as easy to define and that its temporal boundaries (especially 
in the visual domain) are often vague. Moreover, as it will also be discussed later on, repetition 
can be either directly or indirectly provided. In the case of personal events, although we usually 
experience them only once, there are several ways to indirectly rehearse them: dreams, mental 
rehearsal, narration to a tierce person, photos, videos, etc. Each of these rehearsals may contribute 
to the maintenance of the memory trace at very long term. But how many times should a human 
being be either directly or indirectly exposed to an information/stimulus/concept to keep a 
trace of it during a long period of time? This is a challenging question, especially since 
“indirect” repetitions are impossible to control.  
2 The M4 project  
2.1 Ten “provocative claims” 
The questions addressed above along with what has already been reviewed above, are at the heart 
of a project initiated by Simon Thorpe who received a European Grant to test these issues. This 
project, the M4 project (Memory Mechanisms in Man and Machine, http://m4.ups-tlse.fr/), is 
articulated around 10 “provocative claims” regarding how information is encoded and stored. 
These claims are as follows: 
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To further appraise the role of repetition in the formation and maintenance of sensory memories, 
below I wanted to review the research conducted by colleagues of the M4 team who investigated 
some of the 10 claims at a behavioral level, since this level of investigation is the one that 
interests us in this thesis. Thus, we would like to leave the neuronal theories for a moment to 
come back to behavior.  
2.2 From neuron to behavior 
 “Bringing very Long-Term Memories back to life” 2.2.1
During her thesis, my colleague Christelle Larzabal, investigated the retrieval of memories that 
were kept inactive since many decades. In one study, adult participants watched short cuts of TV 
programs that were broadcasted on average 44 years ago (Larzabal, Bacon-macé, Muratot, & 
Thorpe, 2017). In this experiment, she rigorously controlled that participants could not have re-
experienced the material during this long time period by selecting TV programs that had never 
been rebroadcasted since and that were not available anywhere (internet, public domain). She 
found that 6 TV programs among 50 were particularly well identified by the majority of the 
participants (using a four title propositions forced-choice procedure, 4 AFC). Interestingly, two 
#1. Humans can recognize visual and auditory stimuli that they have not experienced for 
decades 
#2. Recognition after very long delays is possible without ever reactivating the memory trace in 
the intervening period 
#3. These very long term memories require an initial memorization phase, during which 
memory strength increases roughly linearly with the number of presentations 
#4. A few tens of presentations can be enough to form a memory that can last a lifetime 
#5. Attention-based oscillatory brain activity can help store memories efficiently and rapidly 
#6. Storing such very long-term memories involves the creation of highly selective 
“grandmother” cells that only fire if the original training stimulus is experienced again 
#7. The neocortex contains large numbers of totally silent cells (“Neocortical Dark Matter”) 
that constitute the long-term memory store 
#8. Grandmother Cells can be produced using simple neural network models with Spike-Time 
Dependent Plasticity (STDP) and competitive inhibitory lateral connections 
#9. This selectivity only requires binary synaptic weights that are either “on” or “off”, greatly 
simplifying the problem of maintaining the memory over long periods 
#10. Artificial systems using memristor-like devices can implement the same principles, 
allowing the development of powerful new processing architectures that could replace conventional 
computing hardware 
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participants spontaneously retrieved the title of one TV program before the forced-choice task. 
Finally, some participants were able to recall information related to the video clips (e.g. day of the 
week it was broadcasted, duration of the episode, etc.). Taken together, her findings suggest that 
re-exposures to the stimuli are not necessary to maintain information in memory for a 
lifetime. 
In another study, she tested participants’ ability to recognize pictures (drawings) they saw very 
few times (one to three times, 2s each) 12 years earlier (Larzabal, Tramoni, Muratot, Barbeau, & 
Thorpe, 2018). Memory was assessed using recognition memory tasks (a forced-choice task and a 
yes/no task). Surprisingly, on average participants successfully recognized the stimuli during 
testing. The participants who saw the drawings more times (three times) than the others (only 
once) were systematically among the best subjects. This study showed that very few exposures 
(three) to a material seem to be sufficient to recall that information at least a decade later. 
 Long-term memory for noise 2.2.2
Another of my colleagues from the M4 team, Jaya Viswanathan, investigated memory formation 
within the auditory domain by using meaningless auditory stimuli (Gaussian noise). Such stimuli 
are particularly interesting because they cannot be consciously rehearsed. A previous study 
showed that humans, who repeatedly listened to meaningless auditory patterns during a learning 
session, greatly remembered these patterns over several weeks without conscious rehearsal (Agus, 
Thorpe & Pressnitzer, 2010). It provided strong evidence that, even in the auditory domain, a 
sensory stimulus can be memorized over an extended period without the possibility of 
rehearsal.  
During her thesis, Jaya replicated this experiment but used modified versions of the learned noises 
at test. Specifically, she exposed participants to looped and scrambled versions (at 10 or 20ms bin 
size) of learned cyclic noises 4 weeks after learning. She demonstrated that participants were 
significantly better at recognizing the Gaussian noises, whatever their versions (original, looped or 
scrambled), compared to novel cyclic noises (discrimination tasks) (Viswanathan, Rémy, Bacon-
Macé, & Thorpe, 2016). She provided further evidence that information can be stored implicitly 
and suggested that in the auditory domain, neurons might be encoding small bits of 
information (10-20ms bits) separately. 
 Memory for repeated images via RSVP 2.2.3
Back to the visual domain, a post-doctoral student of our M4 team investigated the effect of 
repetition on the recognition of images that were briefly presented in very rapid succession (rapid 
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serial visual presentation, RSVP) (Thunell & Thorpe, 2019a, 2019b). Adult participants had to 
detect repetitions in streams of thousands of natural images presented on a tactile screen and then 
to identify the repeated image among a choice of two (2-AFC). During the encoding phase, the 
images reoccurred a certain number of times (the framerate varied between 2 to 120 images a 
second) interleaved with a varying number of distractors (from 1 to 5). Her results showed that the 
performance of adults in detecting the repeated images increased with the number of presentations 
of the repeated images up to ceiling level around seven (Thunell & Thorpe, 2019a). She also 
established that performance was well above chance level even with only two presentations. 
Interestingly, she demonstrated that the ability of participants to detect and memorize repeated 
images was preserved even with irregular sequences (i.e. varying number of distractors between 
two presentations of the target image) (Thunell & Thorpe, 2019b). 
Taken together, the authors reported impressive abilities of adult humans in detecting and 
remembering repeated images presented in RSVP streams over a time-course of few 
minutes and showed that only 2 presentations of an image sufficed for participants to 
recognize that image. Their findings also indicate that temporal regularity is not necessary to 
form a memory trace for repeating images in RSVP streams and that the target images can be 
spaced in time during the learning session (i.e. they do not need to be presented in succession). 
To summarize 
Altogether, these findings give weight to the claim that, in adult humans, the strength of the 
memory does increase roughly linearly with the number of presentations, as suggested in the 
M4 project (claim #3) (Thunell & Thorpe, 2019a, 2019b). These studies also provided clear 
evidence that a memory can be formed despite a very low number of exposures to the sensory 
inputs (claim #4) (Larzabal et al., 2018, Thunell & Thorpe, 2019a) and that a memory can 
sustain very long delays without being reactivated in-between (claim #1 and 2) (Agus et al., 
2010; Larzabal et al., 2017; Viswanathan et al., 2016). The authors proposed that such impressive 
skills should depend on highly selective neurons that were generated during learning and that 
remained “dormant” during the entire period of rest (claim #6). This suggests that a very 
small number of presentations of the sensory inputs would be enough for neurons to become 
selective and to maintain a trace of the memory for a long time period. 
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3 Presentation of the thesis 
In this thesis, we were interested in examining if some of these claims that are already partly 
elucidated in adult humans would also apply to humans early in life as well as to a non-
primate animal model. 
Selective neurons have been identified in a wide range of animal species using electrophysiology 
methods (e.g. place cells, grid cells, etc.). Moreover, as reviewed above, empirical demonstrations 
of the Hebbian theory as well as the discovery of synaptic plasticity, LTP and LTP were allowed 
thanks to animal models. Therefore, there are great reasons to believe that these processes are the 
ones implemented in the formation of memories in animals (including humans). However, 
whether selective neurons can sustain a memory trace for a long time period in animals as 
well as in young children is still unclear. In other words, it is not established that a neuron of an 
early developing brain system and of a non-primate animal can remain “dormant” for months or 
even years. To the best of our knowledge, the concept of “grandmother” cells has never been 
investigated apart from adult humans. And this is not the purpose of this thesis either, since we 
were not recording the activity of unitary cells. However, even at a behavioral level, there is 
relatively few evidence that animals can form long lasting memories for arbitrary sensory 
information, as it will be reviewed later on in this manuscript (note that we are not talking about 
noxious stimuli (e.g. electric chocks) in the context of fear conditioning for example, but we are 
simply talking about ordinary sensory stimuli (e.g. images, sound patterns, etc.)). Similarly, 
whether long-term sensory memories exist early during childhood is still debated, especially 
regarding the different types of memories (a point that will be reviewed later on) and regarding 
the phenomena of infantile and juvenile amnesia.   
3.1 Objectives of this thesis 
Therefore, the first challenge of this thesis was to explore whether long-term memories for 
arbitrary and complex but realistic stimuli exist in animals other than primates as well as 
early during the development of humans. Along with findings from the literature, this would 
help understanding if the predictions of the models and theories fit with the observations at a 
behavioral level. The second challenge was to examine the conditions required for the 
formation of these long-term memories. This could have direct implications for educational 
purposes.  
In order to investigate these questions, we specifically focused on four of the M4 claims that were 
slightly reformulated according to the populations we studied and to temporal constraints:  
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3.2 Models of research of this thesis 
In this thesis, we concentrated our investigations on two models of research: young children (of 3 
different age groups: 18-month-olds, 24-month-olds and 4-year-olds) and a non-primate model; 
the domestic dog (2 different age categories: puppies and adults).  
As mentioned above, what is intriguing and fascinating with human memory is that adults 
typically remember nothing about personal experiences that occurred during their first years of 
life (a phenomenon called infantile amnesia). Paradoxically, babies, infants and children must be 
learning a lot. As it will be reviewed in this thesis, babies learn to recognize people, objects, 
odors, sounds, etc. They also acquire procedural memories (e.g. walk) and of course, language. 
Interestingly, these learnings are achieved before they are able to recall specific episodic 
memories and interestingly too, most of these learnings will last their lifetime which is not the 
case for episodic memories. One explanation is that the establishment of long lasting memories 
may require repetitions as suggested by one of the M4 claims, even early during childhood. As it 
will be discussed in this thesis, personal experiences occur only once and may require the child to 
rehearse the event internally to keep a trace of that event, an ability that is missing early in life. 
So, multiple repetitions of the information/events/stimuli may be all that is needed for young 
children to create long lasting memories. We also suggest that the strategies implemented during 
learning play a role in the storage of the information. To test these claims, we conducted a series 
of experiments involving cross-modal sensory inputs: object names. We tested the number of 
repetitions required to form a memory trace of the name of a novel object at different ages during 
development. We tested children after a 30min delay and were able to bring some participants 
back to the lab after 1 month or 6 months without rehearsal in between, to test if the memory trace 
lasted in time. We also tested the efficacy of two main learning strategies.  
#1. Young children and dogs can recognize visual 
and auditory stimuli that they have not experienced for 
months 
#2. Recognition after very long delays is possible 
without ever reactivating the memory trace in the 
intervening period 
#3. These very long term memories require an initial 
memorization phase, during which memory strength 
increases roughly linearly with the number of 
presentations 
#4. A few tens of presentations can be enough to 
form a memory that can last a delay 
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As a direct extension of the claims of the M4 project, we sought to examine the generality of the 
repetition-based learning process in a non-primate animal: the domestic dog. As it will be 
reviewed in this thesis, thanks to their impressive skills to communicate and cooperate with 
humans, dogs are now widely used in animal cognition. Moreover, recent studies revealed that 
individual dogs were capable of learning to fetch hundreds, even a thousand of objects by name. 
To do this, dogs must have formed memories of the associations. However, the question of how 
long these individual dogs were capable of retaining the information without rehearsal in between 
had not yet been addressed. Moreover, these studies have not investigated how many repetitions 
were required to form these memories. Finally, whether the learning strategies implemented to 
reach such impressive sills are similar to those used by humans is also still unclear. These were 
the main questions we focused on in this thesis. We recruited 40 dogs who were naïve about the 
word-referent concept. Thus, the first challenging step was to train these dogs on that task during 
a 6-month period. Then, only dogs who were reliably familiar with the fact that word forms can 
refer to objects could be used to investigate the issues addressed above. Unfortunately, well below 
our expectations, only one dog mastered the task after the training phase, and we therefore ran our 
series of experiment only with that dog subject. We were able to explicitly test the number of 
exposures to novel pairings that were necessary for him to remember these associations after a 
delay. We were able to examine if the memory trace decayed with time or remained relatively 
stable months after learning without rehearsal. Finally, we also attempted to identify how this dog 
learned novel word-object associations, i.e. what was the strategy that was the most efficient for 
him to acquire the name of a novel object. We assumed that having a better comprehension of the 
processes underlying learning in dogs can have implications for dog trainers.  
In sum, this thesis should help understand if some of the claims of the M4 project also apply to 
other living organisms that have less complex or less mature brains.  
3.3 Our experimental paradigm 
The paradigm implemented in this thesis was the word-referent paradigm, that is, the fact that 
word forms can refer to specific items (or category of items). This paradigm involves two sensory 
modalities: the auditory and the visual domains. This paradigm is relevant for humans since 
humans are early in life accustomed to attribute a word form to each specific item of the 
environment. We will see in this thesis that word learning is also ecologically relevant for dogs 
who share our daily life and who also, more or less naturally, learn the meaning of specific words 
(e.g. words referring to specific actions: sit, turn left, stop here, bring back, etc.). However, this 
paradigm is a highly demanding task because it requires participants (1) to encode the visual 
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features of the objects (i.e. to create a representation of the objects), (2) to encode the 
auditory properties of the sound patterns (i.e. to create a representation of the word forms) 
and (3) to link the two representations together. At a neuronal level, regarding the theories and 
models mentioned above, this paradigm would imply the formation of selective neurons within 
the visual brain areas (i.e. selective neurons to each novel object), selective neurons within the 
auditory pathways (i.e. selective neurons to each novel word form), and highly integrated 
selective neurons in multimodal association areas that are high up in the brain system (i.e. 
“concept” neurons for each word-object pair). 
In this thesis, we used objects and labels that were unknown to the participants to ensure that at 
the time of the experiment, they did not already have internal representations of these stimuli 
(note: we cannot exclude the possibility that the objects or word forms may evoked something to 
the participants, but with our method we were 100% sure that participants had never encountered 
the arbitrary associations as unitary “concepts” prior to the task (e.g. they could not have 
experienced the “rivou” as the label for a jumping green monster-like object before)). The second 
reason was to control that no re-exposure with these stimuli happened during the intervening 
periods, which would have reactivated the memory trace.  
Finally, using such a difficult task involving complex bimodal stimuli enabled us to highlight 
differences across developmental, which would probably not have been the case with mere 
isolated images or isolated sound patterns or even with easier paradigms. 
Definition clarification: 
Most of our experiments about long-term memory in young children implemented a 30min delay 
between the learning and the testing phases. One could wonder whether it is really fair to talk 
about a ‘memory trace’ after a 30-minute delay? In the literature, “long-term memory” is not 
clearly defined. The traditional models about memory consider that the duration of a “short-term 
memory” ranges from few seconds to a minute. Short-term memory is sometimes distinguished 
from working memory that requires the individual to temporarily and actively hold and/or 
manipulate the information. As soon as the information persists after longer delays, and is 
accompanied by physiological changes and/or the synthesis of new proteins, the memory is 
considered as “long-term”, although there is no consensus about the exact timeframe (some 
researchers talk about minutes, other hours, others a night of sleep, etc.). In our protocols, the 
option of maintaining the information in working-memory was ruled out by the distractive 
activities performed by the children during the 30 minute delay. Therefore, it can be reasonably 
assumed that the participants had already started to consolidate the information into more 
permanent representations.  
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PART I 
  
LEARNING STRATEGIES AND LONG-TERM 
MEMORY OF WORD-OBJECT PAIRS IN 
YOUNG CHILDREN 
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Abstract 
In this part of the thesis, we will examine the question of long-term memory formation in young 
children in the context of a complex bimodal sensory concept: the word-object concept. This 
concept refers to the idea that word forms can designate specific items of the environment. Thus, 
this thesis will be tightly related to the development of the human being and will be at the 
interface between memory formation and word learning.  
Therefore, it seemed essential to me to first provide the reader with substantial knowledge about 
the development of the human brain (Chapter 1), about memory formation during development 
from both a neural (Chapter 1) and a behavioral (Chapter 2) perspective and about the word-
object concept (Chapter 3). 
Precisely, we will start this “journey” with the earliest stages of brain development, from gestation 
to early childhood, but we will pay special attention to the development of the neural structures 
that encompass the mnesic system (Chapter 1). In this first chapter, we will focus on the different 
types of memory, the different brain components that constitute each type of memory and their 
presumed roles, and finally their development during childhood. Different viewpoints, models and 
theories will come to support the state-of-the-art. In a second chapter, we will try to correlate the 
development of these neural structures with the onset and development of declarative memory, as 
assessed by behavioral studies. We will see that rudimentary forms of memory already emerge 
very early in life and then progressively improve with age. We will focus on some of these 
memory skills and will address the question of whether they truly tap into declarative memory or 
not. In a third chapter, our “journey” into the literature will take the path of the semantic memory 
branch of the declarative memory. We will specifically update our knowledge about word 
learning during childhood by reporting both ancient and recent studies, theories and 
computational models that should help the reader comprehend how children rapidly and 
fascinatingly acquire language. Next, we will be particularly interested in the word-referent 
concept that will be at the heart of the experimental work of this thesis. We will mainly focus on 
two word-learning strategies: ostensive labeling and inferential reasoning (i.e. “fast-mapping”). 
For both strategies, we will review how and when word learning translates into word retention. 
Finally, we will try to understand which brain structures may be involved in each of these learning 
strategies and how they may be responsible for the discrepancy of these two learning methods to 
induce long-term retention. 
Next, we will get to the heart of the matter by presenting in detail the six experiments I carried out 
during my thesis. Throughout these experiments, we sought to shed light on some of the factors 
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and conditions necessary for the formation of long-term memories for word-object pairs in early 
childhood. This experimental part tested whether some of the provocative claims of the M4 
project already apply to early developing brain systems. Specifically, we addressed the question 
of whether recognition after a delay is possible without reactivating the memory trace in the 
intervening period (recognition tests were performed after a 30-min distractive period and again 
after one month or 6 months for some participants) (#claim N°2). We also attempted to 
understand whether the memory strength increases roughly linearly with the number of 
presentations (#claim N°3). To answer that question, word-object pairs were presented a variable 
number of times to the participants and we explored whether there was a correlation between the 
number of presentations of the pairs during learning and the performance for each pair during 
testing. We also investigated the minimal number of presentations that were sufficient to form a 
memory trace that could survive a delay (#claim N°4).  
In this experimental part, we also addressed questions that were outside the scope of the M4 
project. Precisely, we wanted to better understand the effect of different learning conditions and 
learning strategies on the retention of object names. Specifically, we developed a tightly 
controlled procedure, which enabled us to compare the effect of ostensive naming and inferential 
reasoning on word retention at key stages of development. We also examined the effect of various 
variables on the formation of a memory for word-object pairs (e.g. attentiveness during learning, 
language level, exposure to another language, etc.). Finally, we tried to link our findings to the 
existing knowledge about the putative brain mechanisms provided by the literature as reviewed in 
the three first chapters, in order to merge our behavioral observations with neuroscientific 
processes. 
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CHAPTER I. 
NEURAL SUBSTRATE OF THE HUMAN MNESIC 
SYSTEM DURING DEVELOPMENT 
 
1 Brain development from gestation to early adulthood 
 
The nervous system develops via the interaction of several synchronized processes, some of 
which are completed before birth, while others continue into adulthood. Data from animal and 
post-mortem studies tell us much about these processes. More recently, magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) has opened the field of investigations of brain changes during development in 
living people, which considerably improved our knowledge about the main developmental events 
a human undergoes before reaching adulthood.  
1.1 Prenatal brain development 
The sequence of events during the prenatal development of the human brain closely resembles 
that of many other vertebrates. The nervous system begins with a process of neurulation, which 
is a folding process of the ectodermal tissue onto itself to form a hollow cylinder called the neural 
tube (completion by 3-4 weeks of gestation). From 4 to 12 weeks, the neural tube differentiates 
along three dimensions: length, circumference and radius. The length dimension gives rise to the 
major subdivisions of the central nervous system: the forebrain and the midbrain, both arising at 
one end of the neural tube, and the spinal cord at the other end [Figure 5]. The front end of the 
neural tube progressively forms bulges and convolutions. The first bulge (from the frontal part) 
mutates into the cortex (telencephalon), the second starts to differentiate into the thalamus and 
hypothalamus (diencephalon), while the third turns into the midbrain (mesencephalon). The other 
bulges give rise to the cerebellum (metencephalon) and to the medulla (myelencephalon) (e.g. 
Dehaene-Lambertz & Spelke, 2015; Johnson & De Haan, 2015).  
Meanwhile, sensory and motor systems originate from the circumferential dimension of the neural 
tube. On the top side, the sensory cortex can be distinguished while the bottom side roughly 
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corresponds to the motor cortex. In between, the various association cortices and the higher 
sensory and motor cortices are aligned.  
Finally, the complex layering patterns and cell types are differentiated along the radial dimension 
of the neural tube. Moreover, within proliferative zones - close to the hollow portion of the 
neural tube (which will become the ventricles of the brain) - cells proliferate, migrate from their 
origins and journey to destinations within the cortex where they then differentiate into particular 
neuron types. These proliferative zones correspond to the ventricular zone (the first to be formed) 
and the subventricular zone (contributes to the development of the neocortex). Prior to birth, 
neurons are generated at a rate of more than 250,000 per minute (e.g. Dehaene-Labertz & Spelke, 
2015; Johnson & De Haan, 2015; Lenroot & Giedd, 2006).  
 
Figure 5 - Drawings of the human prenatal brain development (embryonic and fetal stages). The forebrain, midbrain and hindbrain 
originate as swelling at the head end of the neural tube. From Johnson & De Haan, 2015. 
From this early stage, interactions between cells are critical, such as the transmission of electrical 
signals between neurons. It is assumed that the waves of neural activity intrinsic to the 
developing organism might play an important role in the emergence of brain structures before the 
individual is confronted to the sensory inputs from the external world (Shatz, 1996). Moreover, 
the assumption that the newborn brain may be structurally more developed than previously 
thought is currently a matter of debate. Initial studies of neonatal neural networks reported only a 
dense local connectivity within sparse segregated modules and few long-distance connections, 
suggesting that the neural connectivity essentially undergoes substantial remodeling after birth. 
For instance, a study examined the maturational changes of the cortical connectome in subjects 
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(premature neonates, term-born neonates, six-month-old infants and adult subjects), using 
diffusion tensor MRI (Tymofiyeva et al., 2013). They found basic modular network topology in 
newborn brains but observed increasing brain network integration and decreasing segregation 
with age in term-born subjects. In contrast, other studies revealed large-scale dynamic functional 
networks analogous to those seen in adults that would already be effective at birth. Precisely, a 
“rich club” of interconnected cortical hubs (in regions including the dorsal, medial frontal and 
parietal cortex, precuneus, hippocampus and insula), previously reported in adults, would already 
be present by 30 weeks of gestation (Ball et al., 2014). According to those authors, the number of 
connections between “rich-club” regions and the rest of the cortex increases significantly during 
30 and 40 weeks of gestation, allowing information transfer across the cerebral network. They 
assumed that “rich-club” organization precedes the emergence of complex neurological functions, 
and that environmental stress alters the network architecture of premature extra-uterine life (Ball 
et al., 2014).   
1.2 Postnatal brain development 
One of the major postnatal developmental characteristics is the imposing increase in the total 
volume of the human brain from birth to early adulthood. This is unlikely to be due to additional 
neurons since the genesis of a vast part of them (except in the dentate gyrus) and their migration 
to their corresponding brain areas takes place predominantly during the prenatal developmental 
period (around the seventh month of gestation) (Rakic, 1995). Moreover, after migrating, a period 
a rapid cell death is observed, reducing the neural number by half from 24 weeks of gestation to 4 
weeks after birth (Lenroot & Giedd, 2006). Only a comparatively reduced number of neurons will 
originate postnatally, primarily within the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus.  
 Synaptogenesis 1.2.1
Beginning around the 20th week of gestation, the increase in volume is already mainly 
attributable to a substantial growth of synapses, dendrites and fiber bundles [Figure 5]. Neurons’ 
dendritic trees increase in size and complexity which gives the neurons their specificity and 
specialization. Additionally, a significant proliferation of the density of synaptic contacts between 
cells contributes to refine the organization of the neuronal network. Using a phosphotungstic acid 
method which stains synaptic profiles selectively (fixed in tissues up to 36h postmortem), 
Huttenlocher and co. reported for the first time a considerable growth in the postnatal density of 
synapses regionally within the human cerebral cortex (Huttenlocher, 1979). This synaptogenesis 
boost begins around birth in all cortical areas, but the most rapid bursts of increase and the peak of 
density occur at different ages in different brain regions. For example, while the visual cortex’s 
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maximum density is reached between 4-12 months of age, the synaptic density of the prefrontal 
cortex increases very slowly and only reaches its peak after four years of age. Overall, by 2 years 
of age the level of synapses is on average approximately 50% greater than that typically measured 
in adults (Huttenlocher, 1979). This latter postmortem finding was confirmed by recent MRI 
studies (Lenroot & Giedd, 2006).  
 
Figure 6 - Drawings of the cellular structure of the human visual cortex on Golgi stain preparations from Conel (1939-1967). From 
Johnson & De Haan, 2015. 
 Myelination 1.2.2
Another additive process that contributes to the brain’s bulk is myelination [Figure 7]. 
Myelination is an increase in the fatty sheath that surrounds the neuronal pathways – and therefore 
the nerve fibers - and constitutes the white matter. Myelin is known to efficiently increase the 
speed of transmission of the electric signal (by as much as 100 times) between neurons. Sensory 
areas tend to myelinate earlier than motor areas. Cortical association regions myelinate last and 
the myelination process continues into the second decade of life. Even if most major tracts are 
myelinated by early childhood, axons within the cortex (and in some regions such as the arcuate 
fasciculus located near the temporal lobe) continue to myelinate into the second and third decades 
of life (Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). Although the rate of white matter increase varies with age, 
there is no apparent reduction of it in any brain region until the fourth decade (e.g. Giedd & 
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Blumenthal, 1999; Johnson & De Haan, 2015). Nonetheless, under-myelinated connections in the 
young human brain are still capable of transmitting signals.  
 
Figure 7 - The expansion of myelinated fibers over early postnatal development as revealed by a new structural MRI technique. From 
Johnson & De Haan, 2015. 
 Brain metabolism: glucose uptake 1.2.3
Finally, studies using positron emission tomography (PET) techniques reported a sharp rise in 
overall resting brain metabolism (uptake of glucose) after the first year of life (e.g. Chugani, 
Phelps, & Mazziotta, 1987). This increasing rate of glucose metabolism around 4-5 years of age 
for some cortical areas even exceeds adult levels (approximately 150% above adult levels). 
 Regressive events 1.2.4
Human postnatal brain development is also characterized by dramatic regressive events. Among 
them, the glucose metabolism described above reduces to adult levels after about 9 years of age 
for most cortical regions. For some brain areas, this decrease of glucose uptake may be caused 
by the decline of the synaptic contacts. Indeed, the rise in synaptic density is also subsequently 
followed by a period of synaptic loss (i.e. synaptic pruning), for which the timing varies 
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between cortical regions [Figure 8]. For example, synaptic density in the visual cortex returns to 
adult levels between 2 and 4 years, whereas regions of the prefrontal cortex do not reach adult 
levels before 10-20 years of age (Huttenlocher, 1979). It is suggested that the initial 
overproduction of synapses plays a critical role in the apparent plasticity of the young brain. This 
rise and fall pattern of synaptic density is likely unique to primates (M. H. Johnson & De Haan, 
2015). The synaptic pruning observed between 2-20 years old is accompanied by a slight 
decrease in neuronal density (Huttenlocher, 1979). In contrast to the synaptic density, this event 
is largely distributed among animals. In rodents and other vertebrates neuronal loss is shown to be 
even more significant than in humans.  
Finally, numerous neurotransmitters also show this additive and subtractive developmental 
pattern, specifically the excitatory intrinsic glutamate transmitter, the inhibitory intrinsic 
transmitter (GABA) and the extrinsic serotonin transmitter (M. H. Johnson & De Haan, 2015). 
 
Figure 8 – Illustration of the approximate timeline for some of the most important events in human brain development, 
including the characteristic rise and fall of synaptic density. From Johnson & De Haan, 2015 
To conclude, it is important to stress that these rise and fall developmental patterns first do not 
encompass all events (e.g. myelination is not affected by a subsequent fall), and second that they 
are dynamic processes; in other words that these processes are not distinct and separate 
progressive and regressive phases. Alternatively, the dynamic interplay between progressive and 
regressive events largely account for the relatively rapid brain growth in the first 2 years of life. 
At this age, an infant’s brain has achieved 80% of its adult weight. Around 5 years of age, brain 
size is approximately 90% of adult size and at age six years, 95% (Lenroot & Giedd, 2006). 
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Finally, one should keep in mind that these overall developmental events are highly variable 
across individuals. Indeed, current sophisticated brain imaging techniques (e.g. MRI) evidenced 
that there is considerable variation in structure and function in normal adult subjects (e.g. Tramo 
et al., 1995). For example, healthy children of the same age may have 50% differences in brain 
volume, which supports the need to be cautious when linking functional implications with 
absolute brain size (Johnson & De Haan, 2015; Lenroot & Giedd, 2006). The lateral ventricle 
volumes are reported as showing the highest variability of brain morphometric measures. Sexual 
dimorphism is also markedly observed during brain development, for example there is a higher 
increase of white matter with age in males than in females (Giedd & Blumenthal, 1999). 
Amygdala volume increases significantly with age only in males whereas hippocampal volume 
increases significantly with age only in females (Lenroot & Giedd, 2006).  
The following section will focus specifically on the development of the brain systems involved in 
long-term memory formation. Clearly, elucidating the postnatal structural development of the 
brain components assigned to memory formation would allow a greater understanding of the 
emergence of the different forms of memory across the life span.  
2 The mnesic system and its development 
 
The neural basis underlying memory began to be elucidated in the 1950s with clinical stories of 
single individuals, such as the well-known case of HM (a pseudonym for Henry Gustav 
Molaison). HM suffered from severe memory loss subsequently after treatment for medication-
resistant epilepsy in which he had a surgical resection of a large part of both temporal lobes 
(Scoville & Milner, 1957). Following the surgery, HM was unable to form new memories for 
events and had no recollection of his everyday life. He no longer remembered people he just met, 
couldn’t recognize the route that led to his new house, and read books or magazines over and over 
again without any sense of familiarity. Surprisingly, however he remained fully capable of 
recalling remote events from well before his surgery (e.g. incidents from his early school years) 
but for the two years preceding the operation, the memories he had were only vague (Milner, 
1968). Also unexpectedly, he was able to learn and form new memories for new perceptual-motor 
skills (e.g. acquire a mirror-reading skill with a tracing rate comparable to that of control 
subjects). Finally, his comprehension of language was undisturbed; he could even get the 
punchline of jokes that played with semantic ambiguity (Milner, 1968). Among others, this 
unfortunate clinical case had a historical repercussion on the understanding of memory. This 
specific pattern of amnesia associated with temporal lobes removal illustrated that memory is 
perhaps not a unitary function as previously thought and that different types of memory might be 
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subserved by different brain systems (Tulving, 1972). Specifically, noted clinical cases 
highlighted the distinction between declarative memories (also often called explicit memories, 
or relational memories) and procedural memories (also often called implicit memories, non-
declarative memories or unconscious memories) (Cohen & Squire, 1980).  
On one hand, declarative memory refers to memories that can be brought to mind and that can be 
explicitly and consciously recollected (“knowing what”). It primarily relies on the medial 
temporal lobe (MTL).  
On the other hand, procedural memories are typically expressed as changes in perceptual and 
motor performances, for which it is difficult to put words on (“knowing how”). They are mediated 
by different and sometimes overlapping brain circuits, such as the striatum, cerebellum, basal 
ganglia and brain stem. 
 
Other researches refined the knowledge about long-term memory by implementing additional 
divisions within the declarative and procedural forms of memory (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). 
On one hand, declarative memory encompasses semantic memories for decontextualized facts 
and general knowledge which could be defined as an individual’s mental thesaurus that comprised 
organized knowledge, meaning and referents for words, symbols or dates, rules, formulas, 
concepts, etc. (e.g. the name of a monument, the date of birth of a celebrity, etc.); and episodic 
memories for faithful personal events that can be dated temporally and that spatially and 
temporally rely on the context during which those memories were formed [Figure 9] (Tulving, 
1972). Thus for this latter type of memory, an individual should be able to recall details about 
“what”, “where” and “when” the event took place as well as being capable of giving precise 
information about the specific “source” of the event. Episodic memory also enables an individual 
to be consciously aware of the event, as well as being gifted to mentally travel through the 
episode.  
On the other hand, procedural memory involves a range of different skills including motor 
learning (e.g. learning to play a musical instrument), conditioning (e.g. associational learning), 
visual discrimination learning (e.g. puzzle-solving skills) and perceptual priming (i.e. priming 
cues) [Figure 9] (Squire, 1992; Squire & Zola-morgan, 1991).  
“Explicit memory is roughly equivalent to ‘memory with consciousness’ or ‘memory with 
awareness’. Implicit memory, on the other hand, refers to situations in which previous experiences 
facilitate performance on tests that do not require intentional or deliberate remembering” 
(Schacter, 1989) 
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Figure 9 – Classification of long-term memory developed by Squire and Zola-Morgan. Declarative (explicit) memory refers 
to conscious recollection of facts and events and depends on the integrity of the medial temporal lobe. Non-declarative 
(implicit) memory refers to a collection of abilities and is independent of the medial temporal lobe. Non-associative learning 
includes habituation and sensitization. From Squire & Zola-morgan, 1991 
Nevertheless, this classification is not universally admitted and there are currently still some 
debates regarding different memory models, different definitions about the various memory types 
and even different terms to adopt (e.g. for some authors autobiographic memory refers to episodic 
memory while for others it is a distinct type of memory).  
For instance, another influential theory (the complementary learning system, “CLS”) postulates 
that declarative memory is primarily made of two differentially specialized memory systems that 
do not differ in the kind of information processed but rather in the time of integration: a system 
specialized in rapid acquisition of specific events (~episodic memory) and a system that slowly 
extracts and integrates statistical regularities across those events (~semantic memory) (e.g. 
McClelland, McNaughton, & Reilly, 1995). This theory holds that the slow integration process of 
arbitrary new information is necessary to prevent “catastrophic interferences” with existing 
knowledge networks (represented by synaptic connections among neocortical neurons). 
Therefore, this theory postulates that interwoven experiences are specifically required for the 
formation of “semantic memories” (note that general knowledge that makes up semantic memory 
can be based on multiple learning events). However, it admits that new information which is 
consistent with prior knowledge can still be learned rapidly without interfering with the existing 
structures (Mcclelland, 2013; Sharon, Moscovitch, & Gilboa, 2011). 
 
Finally, it is a matter of debate whether applying the same frameworks to early-developing human 
beings is really appropriate. For developmental scientists, the distinction between declarative and 
“If empirical dissociations were the criterion for differentiating memory systems, our field of 
memory might soon become a taxonomic science resembling botany” (R.G. Crowder, Varieties of 
Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving) 
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non-declarative memory and their traditional definitions are untenable from developmental and 
comparative perspectives (Rovee-collier, 1997). A major reason arises from the fact that it is not 
clear how to assess conscious recollection of information in an organism that is not yet able to 
talk. Thus, researchers must indirectly infer memory from changes in infants’ behavior as a 
function of their experience. Many researchers tried to determine the earliest age at which infants 
could perform tasks qualified as measuring declarative memory. Consequently, this paradigm-
driven approach essentially focused on determining the start point of performance on a given task 
but put to rest the neuroscientific processes underlying developmental changes. 
 
2.1 Procedural (implicit) memory 
 The neural substrate of procedural memory 2.1.1
Procedural memories rely on various brain areas. For example, motor skills and conditioning are 
supported by the basal ganglia, the cerebellum and other motor structures. Instead, perceptual 
priming (i.e. the increased ease with which a perceptual stimulus is processed) has been linked to 
the sensory cortex.  
 Development of the neural bases of procedural memory 2.1.2
Most researchers agree that procedural memory is in place within the first months of postnatal 
life, with only little development in performance beyond 3 years of age. 
For instance, 3-year-olds demonstrated evidence of implicit priming by identifying blurred images 
of animals they have seen on a children’s book 3 months earlier quicker (perceptual facilitation) 
than control children who had not previously read the book (Bullock Drummey & Newcombe, 
1995). In contrast, no evidence of explicit recognition of the pictures of animals could be 
established. In a second experiment, the authors showed that explicit memory significantly 
improved between 3 and 5 years, whereas priming did not. Investigators concluded that 
procedural memory develops earlier than declarative memory in humans. 
Neuroimaging studies revealed that areas of the striatum, cerebellum, basal ganglia and brain stem 
are activated during non-declarative memory tasks and are functionally mature early in life 
(Thomas et al., 2004). However, children (7- to 11-year-olds) showed greater subcortical 
“One of the unmistakable characteristics of an immature science is the looseness of definition and 
use of its major concepts. In experimental psychology, […] we can measure our progress by the 
number and generality of empirical facts and the power and scope of our theories, and we can 
assess the lack of progress by the degree of ambiguity of our most popular terms.” (Tulving, 1972) 
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activation while adults mostly activated cortical regions during implicit memory tasks, supporting 
evidence for developmental differences in the recruitment of brain structures (Thomas et al., 
2004). 
2.2 Declarative (or explicit) memory 
 The neural substrate of declarative memory 2.2.1
In adult humans, declarative memory depends on a multi-component network recruiting temporal 
structures, namely the medial temporal lobe (MTL). The MTL operates with cortical systems to 
maintain long-term memories and to retrieve those memories. This temporal-cortical network 
consists of anatomically related structures [Figure 10]: the hippocampal system (i.e. CA1, CA2, 
CA3 and CA4 subfields, dentate gyrus and subicular complex, [Figure 12]), the adjacent 
perirhinal, entorhinal and parahippocampal cortices, along with the cortical diencephalon 
(i.e. thalamus and hypothalamus) and regions of the prefrontal cortex (e.g. Cohen & Squire, 
1980; Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Squire & Zola-morgan, 1991).  
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Figure 10 – Illustration of the medial temporal lobe. It consists of the hippocampus (blue-green: CA fields, dentate gyrus and subicular 
complex) superiorly and the parahippocampal gyrus inferiorly. The entorhinal (brown) and perirhinal (yellow) cortices form the medial and 
lateral components, respectively of the anterior portion of the parahippocampal gyrus, while the parahippocampal cortex (off-white) forms 
the posterior portion. From Raslau et al., 2015 (adapted from Purves D. et al. Principles of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2008). 
The prefrontal cortex and the diencephalon are responsible for the retrieval process of memory 
formation. Diencephalic structures, such as the medial thalamus and mammillary bodies, play a 
critical role in the process of recognition, for example (e.g. Aggleton, Dumont, & Warburton, 
2011 for a review). 
For its part, the MTL appears to be particularly involved in the consolidation process of 
information in higher-order associational cortices, through feedback projections. More precisely, 
the hippocampus lies at the end of a cortical processing hierarchy and is the ultimate recipient of 
convergent inputs from all sensory modalities [Figure 11] (Lavenex & Amaral, 2000, see also 
box 4 in the general introduction of this thesis). Indeed, it receives only highly polysensory 
integrated information originating from associational connections within the perirhinal, 
parahippocampal and entorhinal cortices. These areas themselves have already significantly 
integrated information from unimodal and polymodal cortical inputs (e.g. temporal, frontal, 
parietal lobes). The information processed in the hippocampus is then projected back to its 
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adjacent cortices (entorhinal cortex first and perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices thereafter), 
that in turn spread out to the neocortical association areas that gave rise to their inputs (Lavenex & 
Amaral, 2000). Thus, these cortical regions would serve as the final repositories of highly 
selective neurons that are the neuronal support of long-term memories, as mentioned in the 
introduction of this thesis (Squire & Alvarez, 1995).  
 
Figure 11 – The net flow of information arises from the perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices to the entorhinal cortex and 
then to the hippocampal formation (CA fields, dentate gyrus and subiculum). Considerable information processing occurs 
within and among the subregions of the parahippocampal gyrus before hippocampal formation involvement. From Raslau et 
al., 2015 (adapted from Lavenex & Amaral, 2000). 
The MTL circuitry would only play a temporary role in the establishment of long-term memories 
within the neocortex (Squire, 1992). According to some authors, this would concern both 
semantic and episodic memories as recapitulated in the so-called Standard Model (Squire & 
Alvarez, 1995). Note that there is an alternative theory, postulating that only semantic information 
no longer depend on the hippocampus at long-term (Nadel & Moscovitcht, 1997). This theory is 
defined as the Multiple Trace Theory. The debate is still not closed today. 
Moreover, the complementary learning system (CLS) framework introduced earlier, similarly 
postulates that novel information would always depend initially on the hippocampus, and then 
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gradually be integrated into networks within the neocortex (McClelland et al., 1995). As 
previously stated, this mechanism is supposed to be slow and gradual to avoid incorporation of 
novel information in the neocortex interfering with existing knowledge already hosted by the 
neocortex (“catastrophic interference”). Consequently, new memories (i) would first be stored via 
synaptic changes in the hippocampal system (i.e. synaptic consolidation); (ii) these changes would 
then support reinstatement of recent memories in the neocortex; (iii) neocortical synapses would 
change slightly on each reinstatement and; (iv) remote memory would finally be based on 
accumulated neocortical changes (McClelland et al., 1995). Accordingly, memories would 
become hippocampus-independent over periods of time that range from weeks to years. Recently, 
the CLS model has been refined and claims that neocortical circuits can also rapidly acquire new 
information provided that they are consistent with prior knowledge (McClelland, 2013). In this 
case, the information would be rapidly and directly stored in the neocortex independently of the 
hippocampus. 
What are the roles of the different protagonists of the consolidation process? 
As explained above, the consolidation process of declarative memory is predominately a slow 
process that relies on a complex temporal-cortical network. But what do we know about the role 
of the different components of this circuitry?  
Although the cortices adjacent to the hippocampus are certainly more than interfaces funneling 
information within the neocortical-hippocampal loop, the exact functions of each component of 
the MTL system in the memorization process are still not totally well established and sometimes 
give rise to conflicting and contradictory results, as it will be reviewed below. 
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Figure 12 – Schematic representation of the main serial and parallel pathways within the hippocampal formation and 
surrounding the hippocampal system. EC: entorhinal cortex; DG: dentate gyrus; CA3, CA2, CA1: fields of the hippocampus; 
Sub: subiculum; PrS: presubiculum; PaS: parasubiculum. Scale bar=1mm.   
But in the first place, it is largely admitted that the hippocampal system plays a crucial role in 
relating or combining together information from multiple sources (e.g. Eichenbaum, 
Schoenbaum, Young, & Bunsey, 1996; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). For example, associating a 
stimulus within a spatial and temporal context - thus representing a new event (i.e. episodic 
memory) - or relating different elements to be remembered as a pair (e.g. a name and a face) are 
strongly supposed to be hippocampus-dependent (Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004). To do so, each 
field of the hippocampus has attributed a specific function attributed to it [Figure 12].  
Since O’Keefe’s pioneering discovery that CA1 place-cells fired according to a rat’s location in 
the environment (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971), it is now largely admitted that the CA1 field of 
the hippocampus is implicated in spatial memory. Moreover, CA1 field would play a critical role 
in integrating several inputs into a unitary crystallized representation (Ribordy, Jabès, Banta 
Lavenex, & Lavenex, 2013; Rolls, 2010). For its part, the CA3 field and its associated network is 
assumed to store the different parts of a representation separately, so that activation of only a 
small part of the network would facilitate the retrieval of the whole representation (a phenomenon 
known as pattern completion5) (Gold & Kesner, 2005). The different parts of a representation are 
associated into a network but remain distinct from each other, allowing a large number of 
memories to be stored but avoiding interference between memories (Rolls, 2010). This 
mechanism would implement temporal order in memories and prevent an individual from memory 
loss (Morris, 2007). Finally, the dentate gyrus and its projections to CA3 have been shown to be 
responsible for the pattern separation5 phenomenon (Morris, 2007). 
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Whilst essentially all theories agree to say that the hippocampal system is strictly mandatory for 
the formation of episodic memories, there are conflicting viewpoints about its implication into 
the formation of semantic memories. This conflict first arose from patients with damages or even 
a resection of this area (e.g. H.M.) who exhibited only mild impairment on semantic knowledge 
tests (e.g. Milner, 1968; Vargha-Khadem, 1997). Instead, it appeared that the severity of their 
impaired semantic knowledge was related to the extent of anterolateral temporal damages 
(Schmolck, Kensinger, Corkin, & Squire, 2002). In parallel, some researchers showed that 
knowledge about general facts or judgments of familiarity about recently presented items, was 
rather supported by the cortices adjacent to the hippocampus, particularly the perirhinal and 
entorhinal cortices (Brown & Aggleton, 2001). Specifically, the anterolateral entorhinal cortex 
and the perirhinal cortex would function as a hub allowing integrated conjunction of features. The 
perirhinal cortex would be involved in the recognition process of an object as a known identity. 
Finally, others proposed that the anterior temporal lobe serves as a representational hub for 
linking associative semantic knowledge together and may be critical for supporting unique 
semantic associations (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Sharon et al., 2011).  
According to these viewpoints, the episodic and semantic components of long-term declarative 
memory are partly dissociable, with only the context-rich episodic component being fully 
dependent on the hippocampus and the context-free semantic component being definitely stored 
independently of episodic memories (Squire et al., 2004 for a review). 
Unlike this assumption, few other studies revealed that patients with damage limited to the 
hippocampus had marked deficits in knowledge about general facts that occurred after the onset of 
the lesions (Squire et al., 2004 for a review). Therefore, in an opposed viewpoint, semantic and 
5
Pattern completion: ability to retrieve a complete memory when only a part of the information is 
available. Lesion or inactivation of NMDA receptors in the CA3 region of rodents disrupts their 
ability to retrieve information necessary to navigate in the environment when only a subset of 
environmental cues present during training is available during testing (Gold & Kesner, 2005). 
Pattern separation: encoding of information as distinct from similar or closely related 
information. Damage limited to the dentate gyrus disrupts the ability of rats to distinguish or 
separate sensory inputs that are very similar, such as the spatial information about two food 
dishes located very close to each other (Gilbert, 2001). There is recent evidence of the implication 
of the dentate gyrus and its projections to CA3 in the process of pattern separation in humans 
(Bakker, 2008). 
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episodic memory seem both dependent on the hippocampal system. An explanation to the 
impressive semantic knowledge of patients with developmental amnesia, who sustained limited 
hippocampal damage early in life and suffered from a severe loss of episodic memory, could arise 
from functional reorganization or compensation through learned strategies (Vargha-Khadem, 
1997). 
To summarize, nowadays most of the components of the medial temporal lobe are assigned a 
function in the memorization process, although there are still some debates. Recent neuroimaging 
studies along with stereo-electroencephalography (single cells recordings from pharmacology-
resistant epileptic patients) opened a fruitful area of research that will undoubtedly refine our 
knowledge about the exact role that should be attributed to the numerous actors of memory 
formation. However, while those studies are difficult to be carried out in human adults or even in 
nonhuman primates, exploring the ontogeny of the human memory through the functional 
development of the underlying brain components is an even harder challenge. 
 Development of the neural bases of declarative memory 2.2.2
The ontogeny of the different components of the declarative memory of humans is not well 
elucidated. The lack of neuroimaging studies on babies and young infants are largely responsible 
for this caveat. Indeed, it remains very difficult to image infants as they engage in cognitive tasks. 
These difficulties stem in part from the low compliance of young subjects, the impracticality of 
studies involving extensive training of infants and the impossibility of giving verbal instructions 
(Dehaene-Lambertz & Spelke, 2015). Further difficulties arise from the small size and immaturity 
of the infant brain, which affects the characteristics of MRI images and of electrical activity. 
Actual knowledge about the emergence and development of the structures described above are 
partly based on studies conducted on non-human primates as well as on behavioral studies. The 
theory is simple: the onset of a cognitive trait should coincide with the emergence in functionality 
of the brain structure responsible for this trait. 
Originally, Schacter and Moscovitch speculated that the MTL is not functional for the first or first 
and second years of life (Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984). They hypothesized that infants initially 
rely on procedural memories, with precocious declarative memory emerging only when the neural 
system matures (around 8-10 months of age). This proposal was further supported by studies 
conducted on infant monkeys, showing that they failed to learn a cognitive task (namely the 
delayed non-match to sample task, i.e. DNMS) until they were 4 months old and did not reach 
adult levels of accuracy by the end of the first year. In contrast, infant monkeys of 3 or 4 months 
of age were able to learn “visual habits” as easily as adults (Bachevalier & Mishkin, 1984). A 
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similar experiment was conducted on human infants (12-32 months old) and adults, and 
demonstrated that the dissociation in ability of infants on the DNMS task versus discrimination 
tasks closely resembled the dissociation previously reported with infant monkeys (Overman et al., 
1992). Twelve to fifteen month-old infants required extensive training to perform the DNMS task 
(no infants did so until 15 months) and participants even had troubles reaching adult levels of 
performance at 6 years of age. These findings fortified Schacter and Moscovitch’s assumption that 
the performance of human infants on “early-system tasks” (i.e. habituation/novelty preference and 
conditioning) precedes their ability to perform “late-system tasks” (e.g. DNMS, object search, 
cross-modal recognition).  
In a similar theoretical vein, Nelson (1995) suggested that the striatum, cerebellum and brain stem 
- which are already functional at birth as reviewed above - allow very young infants to 
demonstrate procedural learning such as visual expectation, operant and classical conditioning 
tasks (Nelson, 1995). He also proposed that an immature form of explicit memory mainly reliant 
on the hippocampus - what he called a “pre-explicit” memory system - would already develop in 
the first few months and would confer some adult-like memory abilities, such as novelty 
preferences in the visual-paired comparison (VPC) procedure. He argued that maturation of the 
medial temporal lobe system, the surrounding cortical areas and the projections between these 
areas, and their targets in the prefrontal cortex are required for more sophisticated forms of 
explicit memory, such as solving DNMS tasks, deferred imitation and cross-modal recognition 
memory. He suggested that around 8-10 postnatal months, the performance on these tasks 
corresponds with a transition from reliance on a pre-explicit immature system to an adult-like 
declarative memory system, probably involving the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus. 
In contrast, other studies contradicted these protracted MTL maturational theories. Researchers 
proposed that many of the medial temporal lobe components already develop early. According to 
these authors, the cells that make up most of the hippocampus (except the dentate gyrus) are 
formed in the first half of gestation and presumably journeyed to their adult locations by the end 
of the prenatal period (Seress, 2001). Moreover, at birth, the cytoarchitecture of the hippocampal 
formation already resembles that of an adult since neurons began to connect by the end of the 
second trimester.  
Other opponents to the stepwise maturational theory argued that there is no evident qualitative 
change in the nature of infants’ memory late in the first year of life. For instance, Rovee-Collier 
and coworkers claimed that only little evidence of a sudden improvement in performance after the 
proposed critical age period (around 8-10 months) is generally observed (Hartshorn et al., 1998). 
They showed that long-term memory improvement during early childhood increases 
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monotonically and suggested that it is rather a continuous and unitary process which does not 
consist of multiple systems that develop at different rates (Rovee-collier & Cuevas, 2009). Their 
proposal is based on their studies using the mobile or train conjugate reinforcement task [Figure 
14 & Figure 15]. This procedure is however refuted by the proponents of the multisystem view, 
who are reluctant to accept it as reflecting declarative memory. They argued that the mobile 
conjugate reinforcement task is a motor skill and thus a procedural memory task reliant merely on 
the cerebellum and subcortical structures (see Johnson & De Haan, 2015 for a review). 
Despite this disagreement, there is a larger consensus about a protracted maturation of one 
component of the MTL, namely the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus (e.g. Jabès & Nelson, 
2015 for a review). Indeed, neuroanatomical studies conducted on monkeys first showed patterns 
of dissociated hippocampal development, with some areas (specifically the CA2, subiculum and 
their associated subcortical connections) developing first, whilst the CA1 field of the 
hippocampus followed by the CA3 field and finally the dentate gyrus along with their associated 
cortical projections, mature progressively and only later on (Bachevalier, 2015; Jabès & Nelson, 
2015; Lavenex, Banta Lavenex, & Amaral, 2006). Although the granule cell layer (where 
excitatory neurons are generated) of the dentate gyrus is present by the 12th week of gestation, 
neurogenesis and cell migration continue until after birth [Figure 13] (Eckenhoff & Rakic, 
1988). Indeed, at birth, the dentate gyrus includes only about 70% of the adult number of cells, 
thus roughly 30% of the neurons are generated postnatally (Lavenex et al., 2006). The volumetric 
expansion due to a considerable increase of synaptic density of the dentate gyrus is also 
dramatically delayed in human infants, beginning at 8-12 months after birth and reaching a peak 
at 16-20 postnatal months (e.g. Seress, 2001 for a review). Successively to a relatively short 
period of stability, excess synapses are pruned and adult levels are only reached at about 4-5 years 
of age (see Bauer, 2004 for a review). Moreover, the direct or indirect projections from the 
dentate gyrus to the hippocampal regions exhibit equally protracted developmental profiles. 
Consequently, the whole circuitry is presumably only functional when the connections are 
efficient (around 4-5 years in humans), which could explain the late emergence of certain types of 
hippocampus-dependent memory functions (e.g. spatial and non-spatial relation memory, 
episodic memory, etc.) (Jabès & Nelson, 2015). 
Furthermore, inhibitory interneurons from the dentate gyrus resemble those of adults very late 
in development (not before 2- to sometimes 8-years of age) (Lavenex et al., 2006; Richmond & 
Nelson, 2007; Seress & Abraham, 2008 for reviews). However, it is assumed that these 
GABAergic interneurons play a critical role in memory processes, attention and broadly cognitive 
functions since these cells are implicated in gamma oscillations (e.g. Richmond & Nelson, 2007). 
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Indeed, the high-frequency gamma-band oscillatory activity (30-80 Hz) has been shown to 
increase during completion of cognitive tasks, such as DMS (delayed-match-to-sample) or 
working-memory tasks  (Kahana, 2006). It has also been reported that increased gamma 
synchrony between the rhinal cortices and hippocampus during the encoding phase could predict 
subsequent recall (Kahana, 2006). Consequently, it can be easily claimed that the prolonged 
development of the dentate gyrus and of inhibitory interneurons precludes, to some extent, adult-
like cognitive functions, such as memory or attention, during infancy and early childhood. 
In addition to the protracted development of the dentate gyrus, the prefrontal cortex, largely 
responsible in the retrieval process of memory formation, also develops slowly and later on. 
For instance, the density of synapses in the prefrontal cortex increases roughly at about 8 months 
after birth and reaches a peak around 15-24 months of age. Synapses do not adopt adult 
morphologies until 24 months. Synaptic pruning to adult levels is extended until puberty (Bauer, 
2004 for a review; Huttenlocher, 1979). Additionally, myelination in the frontal cortex continues 
into adolescence and adult levels of some neurotransmitters are not measured until the second or 
third decades of life (Bauer, 2004 for a review). 
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Figure 13- A. Coronal Nissl-stained sections through the brain of a 3-week-old (left) and a 7-year-old (right) monkey at comparable mid-
rostro-caudal levels of the hippocampus. B. Higher-magnification photomicrographs at the same level illustrating four major subdivisions of 
the monkey hippocampal formation (DG= Dentate gyrus; CA3, CA2, CA1 = fields of the hippocampus; Sub=subiculum). Note in particular 
the large increase in size and complexity of the dentate gyrus between 3 weeks and 7 years of age. C. Schematic drawing of the 
developmental changes in the hippocampal dentate gyrus between birth and 2-years of age. Newborns: granule cells (red dots) express the 
calbindin binding protein (CaBP-D28k) within the granule cell layer. Hilus (h): migration of the granule cells toward their final position 
through the hilus. Mossy cells (excitatory cells, black) have few spines and no thorny excrescences, indicating sparse connection with 
granule cells. The mossy fiber bundle is also sparse (red line). The axon arborization of the inhibitory basket cells (blue) is sparse. 2-year-
olds: the axons of the granule cells (red dots) form a rich collateral network with the hilus (h). The mossy fiber bundles (red lines) innervate 
both inhibitory (blue) and excitatory cells (black). The morphology of the mossy cells (black) displays complex spines with thorny 
excrescences (which is a characteristic of mossy cells in adults). The axons of the basket cells (blue lines) form a rich network among 
excitatory cells. Note that the hippocampal dentate gyrus is much larger in the 2-year-old than in the newborn. Source: Figure courtesy of 
Laszlo Seress & Hajnalka Abraham. Adapted from Richmond & Nelson, 2007.  
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In conclusion, since the network that supports long-term declarative memory in humans involves 
medial temporal and cortical structures, the current predominant view emphasizes that its 
functionality depends on the maturational processes of its underlying components along with the 
functional maturity of the synaptic connections. It has been proposed that the hippocampal-
subcortical circuits involving specifically the CA2 and subiculum mature the earliest, at birth or 
shortly after, and would subserve the emergence of the earliest “hippocampus-dependent” 
memory functions, what Nelson originally called “pre-explicit memory” (Jabès & Nelson, 2015). 
However, regarding the relatively late functional maturity of the prefrontal components and of the 
dentate gyrus of the hippocampus, as well as the prolonged maturation of the connections between 
those brain areas, declarative memory in young infants is supposed to be mostly rudimentary, with 
significant development occurring only from second year onwards (the most important 
morphological changes occur around the 4th year of age in humans).  
Consequently, it can be argued that the increased improvements of long-term retention skills 
during childhood coincide with the gradual and prolonged maturation of the underlying 
components and networks. Nevertheless, it is important to remain cautious since those theories 
tend to transfer the organization of the memory systems of adults and non-human primates onto 
infants and young children, which may be a limitation. Neuroimaging studies should allow a 
better characterization of the brain memory systems that support cognitive functions during 
development. Indeed, memory tasks likely engage multiple memory systems. Thus, a lack of 
maturity of one distinct pathway may be masked in some tasks by a compensatory activity 
involving other pathways, especially in young children. 
In the next section, we will try to link the development of the brain components that mediate 
memory formation with the development of specific memory functions during the first years of 
life.  
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CHAPTER II:  
RELATION BETWEEN BRAIN AND LONG-TERM 
MEMORY DEVELOPMENT: A FOCUS ON 
DECLARATIVE MEMORY 
 
The brain is the physical substrate for cognition and behavior. Nevertheless, correlating particular 
brain areas with specific cognitive functions is rarely straightforward, as evidenced by the 
complexity of interactions between brain regions, neurons, neurotransmitters systems, dynamic 
synapses, etc. This is even more challenging with a developing brain system. This section will try 
to enlighten the effects of maturation of the neural structures during development on the 
emergence of long-term declarative memory. Studying when and how declarative memory 
emerges during development is of central interest since it is suggested that the late development of 
declarative memory provides an explanation for the phenomenon of infantile amnesia6. 
 
However, as it will be discussed below, some primitive forms of declarative memory seem to be 
already established early in life. A major challenge in the study of declarative memory is to 
determine whether infant memory tasks truly into tap declarative memory or instead procedural 
memory.  
 
6
Infantile amnesia: children under 2-years of age are unable to form or store episodic memories for 
recall later in life. Consequently, adults do not have access to personal memories dating from their 
first two years of life.  
Childhood amnesia: during the next 3 to 5 years, only few episodic memories will survive until 
adulthood (e.g. Bachevalier 1992, Bauer 2007; Nadel & zola Morgan 1984, Newcombe, 2007). 
“Tasks require recall (i.e. declarative memory) when the events/information tested are entirely 
novel at the time of the learning session, the subjects are not allowed to practice before they are 
tested and the actions/information are not modeled/repeated again after the initial learning session” 
(McDonough, Mandler, et al., 1995). 
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A little bit of history… 
The study of memory development was initiated with Piaget in the 1950s. Piagetian theories 
made a strong prediction about a lack of mental representations of objects and events by 18-24 
month of age. Instead, they proposed that infants were living in a “here and now” world that 
included physically present entities that had neither futures nor pasts. Indirectly, they implied that 
infants lacked declarative memory. Even for older children, who should have the capacity to 
construct mental representations, Piaget assumed that they required the cognitive structures to 
make those representations memorable. To illustrate his claim, he argued that seven year olds 
made errors in temporal sequencing, which suggested that they could not organize information 
temporally, and thus must be incapable at that age of telling a story from beginning to end 
appropriately.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, researchers studied cognition in more ecologically valid 
conditions, and found that children as young as 3 years of age provided brief but well-organized 
reports of their own recent activities (K. Nelson & Gruendel, 1981, 1986). These findings opened 
the door for research on memory in children, even younger than age three years. It was claimed 
that if three-year olds already have well organized representations of past events, the capacity to 
construct those internal representation must have developed even earlier.   
In this section, we will focus on the main cognitive paradigms and techniques used to assess the 
emergence and development of long-term memory (especially declarative memory) in human 
infants and young children. Some of the main paradigms will be reported below although many 
more should be added to the following overview. The hypothesized neural correlates underlying 
each cognitive function will also be reported. 
1 Mobile conjugate reinforcement task: an operant conditioning 
task? 
 
The mobile conjugate reinforcement task is at the center of a debate attempting to determine 
whether it taps into declarative or procedural memory. 
This paradigm consists of two phases. During a learning phase, a ribbon connects the infant’s 
ankle to a mobile, so that the mobile moves when the infant kicks [Figure 14]. After a delay, 
changes in the kicking response are used as a way of assessing what the infant remembered, that 
is, more kicking than in baseline indicates the infant recognized the mobile (during baseline and 
memory tests, the ribbon is disconnected).  
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Figure 14 – Experimental design used with 2- to 6-month-olds in the mobile conjugate task, shown here with a 3-month-old. From left to 
right: (a) Baseline – the ankle ribbon and mobile are connected to different hooks, and kicks do not move the mobile; (b) Acquisition – kicks 
conjugately move the mobile via an ankle ribbon connected to the mobile hook; (c) Immediate retention/long-term retention test – the ankle 
ribbon and mobile are again connected to different hooks. During the test, infants who recognize the mobile, kick to move it even though 
they cannot. From Rovee-Collier & Cuevas, 2009. 
A modified version of the task for older infants was developed, precisely a lever that moved a toy 
train for 2s each time the child pressed it [Figure 15]. Overall, Rovee-Collier and co. found a 
linear increase in the length of retention over the first 18 months of postnatal life (Hartshorn et al., 
1998).  
 
Figure 15 - Experimental arrangement used with 6- to 24-month-olds in the operant train task, shown here with a 6-month-old. Each lever 
press moves the toy train for 2 sec (1s for older infants) during acquisition; during baseline and all retention tests, the lever is deactivated, 
and presses do not move the train. From Rovee-collier & Cuevas, 2009. 
This mobile conjugate reinforcement task has been largely labeled as a procedural memory task 
(e.g. Bauer, 1996; Mcdonough, Mandler, Mckeet, & Squire, 1995) and was attributed to the early 
63 
 
developing cerebellum and certain deep nuclei of the brainstem (e.g. Nelson, 1995). Rovee-
Collier counter-argued that procedural learning is characterized by a gradual and incremental 
learning resulting from a reinforced and/or prolonged practice (Rovee-collier & Cuevas, 2009). 
She claimed that in the mobile task, learning is instead rapid rather than gradual or incremental. 
For instance, both 3- and 6-month-olds typically doubled or tripled their baseline response rate 
within a few minutes (Hartshorn et al., 1998) and exhibited significant retention for 3 days at 3 
months of age (after 9 min of training) and for 5 days at 6 months of age (after 6 min of training).  
Since the neurological correlates underlying this task have not been directly studied, the debate 
about whether structures from the MTL are recruited to solve the task or whether it is simply 
mediated by motor skill regions remains unresolved. 
 
2 Recognition memory: Visual Paired Comparison (VPC) tasks 
 
One of the earliest-emerging memory functions is visual recognition memory, precisely, the 
process by which an item is recognized as having previously been seen.  
This procedure was originally developed by Fantz as a method of examining early perceptual 
functions (Fantz, 1956). In 1956, Fantz discovered that infants had a proclivity to respond to novel 
stimuli; that is, when given a choice between a familiar stimulus and a novel one, infants older 
than 2-3 months would look at the unfamiliar stimulus for longer, which could reflect their 
“preference” for this one over the familiar one. This discovery quickly blossomed into a major 
tool for studying early memory (Fagan, 1973) and has been a mainstay ever since. 
In the Visual Paired Paradigm (VPC)7, the participant is first familiarized to a stimulus for a set 
period of time, and their memory is tested after a delay by presenting the familiar stimulus 
alongside a novel one (the participant remains entirely uninstructed about the subsequent “test”). 
During this test trial, preferential looking (measured as the total looking time toward one 
stimulus compared to the second) is used to assess recognition memory [Figure 16].  
“Support for a developmental hierarchy has only been inferred from the memory performance of 
adults with amnesia on priming and recognition/recall tests in response to manipulations of 
different independent variables.[…] Implicit and explicit memory follow the same developmental 
timetable and challenge the utility of conscious recollection as the defining characteristic of 
explicit memory” (Rovee-Collier, 1997). 
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Figure 16 – (A) Example of the experimental setting. The infant is watching pictures; a camera located above the screen record the eye 
movements. (B) Example of stimuli used in the VPC task. The infant is presented with the sample for a familiarization period. Thereafter, the 
participant is confronted with the familiar stimulus and a new stimulus. The time spent fixating on each stimulus is recorded. Position of the 
novel stimuli in the recognition test is counterbalanced between left and right. (C) Videoframes (3/100 sec) of an infant’s eye movements 
during the retention tests of the VPC task. Corneal reflections were used to determine positioning of gaze: the child looked at the stimulus on 
their right (left panel), in the center (middle panel) and at the stimulus on the left (right panel). Adapted from Pascalis & De Haan, 2003. 
7This paradigm resembles the DNMS task, although great performance on the VPC task 
has been shown to emerge earlier in life than on the DNMS tasks, and monkeys with 
neonatal hippocampal lesions performed accurately on the DNMS task but not on the 
VPC task (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1999). Similar results were provided by human 
patients, such as patient YR, who suffered from discrete hippocampal damage and who 
demonstrated impaired novelty preference after delays of 5 and 10s but who successfully 
recognized the same types of stimuli in DMS tasks following delays up to 10s (Pascalis, 
Hunkin, Holdstock, Isaac, & Mayes, 2004). Thus, it has been speculated that only the 
VPC task is fully reliant on the hippocampus and that DNMS tasks are perhaps mediated 
by alternate strategies that are independent of the hippocampus (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 
1999). 
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It has been found that 3-to-4-day-old infants looked preferentially at a novel face than at a familiar 
one after a two minute delay (Pascalis & De Schonen, 1994), and 3-month-olds (males but not 
females who were delayed in their face-processing ability) exhibited the same pattern over a 24-
hour delay (Pascalis et al., 1998), indicating in both cases recognition of the familiar face. Similar 
results were established in 15-to-30-day-old rhesus monkeys (Bachevalier, Brickson, & Hagger, 
1993) but not in monkeys with neonatal lesions of the hippocampal formation and 
parahippocampal cortex (after delays of 30s to 24h) (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1999). This suggests 
that medial temporal structures significantly contribute to visual recognition memory at this very 
early age in monkeys. Likewise, adult amnesic patients did show visual recognition abilities after 
a 2-min delay but not after a 1 hour interval, when tested with similar preferential visual looking 
paradigms (Mckee & Squire, 1993; see also Pascalis et al., 2004). In addition, human patients 
with developmental amnesia caused by bilateral hippocampal damage sustained early in life 
showed reduced looking at novel stimuli following delays of 30 sec and 120 sec, which indicates 
a deficient novelty preference especially when a delay is introduced between familiarization and 
test (Munoz, Chadwick, Perez-Hernandez, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2011). Toddlers who 
experienced prolonged febrile seizures (which severely injured their hippocampus) demonstrated 
a hippocampal integrity-related degree of novelty preference after a 5-min delay (i.e. participants 
with the smallest mean hippocampal volumes revealed the most dramatic drop in novelty 
preference) (Martinos et al., 2012). The authors controlled and demonstrated that the impairments 
were not due to a transient effect of the seizure. Together, these results suggest the existence of a 
primitive visual recognition memory shortly after birth while a more adult-like recognition 
memory system would only emerge after a few months of life. These findings are in line with 
Nelson’s assumption of a “pre-explicit” memory, which he believed to be different from 
procedural memory and already present after three postnatal months at least in human infants 
(Nelson, 1995). It also suggests that the hippocampus and surrounding tissues likely contribute to 
recognition memory and consequently that the MTL memory circuitry is functioning to some 
extent during early infancy. Researchers correlated the early emergence of incidental recognition 
memory with the early maturation of the subiculum – a hippocampal field - (Jabès & Nelson, 
2015), whereas others suggested that novelty preference is, rather, mediated by the perirhinal 
and parahippocampal cortex – cortices surrounding the hippocampus - (Bachevalier, 2015), 
which are thought to be critical for familiarity judgments in adults (e.g. Brown & Aggleton, 
2001). Somehow consistent with this latter idea, some authors advised to remain cautious about a 
conclusive role of the hippocampus in recognition memory since some variables in VPC task, 
such as the extended period of stimulus encoding during familiarization, could have overridden its 
incidental nature (Munoz et al., 2011). Consequently, an extensive familiarization could have 
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promoted strength-based recognition or even perhaps recollection, which logically rendered the 
task hippocampal-dependent. Another explanation could be that VPC, rather than providing a 
measure of incidental recognition, assesses an implicit, information-gathering process modulated 
by habituation, for which the hippocampus is also partly responsible, independent of its role in 
recognition (Munoz et al., 2011). Despite the need for additional data to determine the precise 
neural correlates of recognition memory across development, the hypothesis that at least part of 
the hippocampal circuitry is relatively mature soon after birth seems less controversial (Jabès & 
Nelson, 2015).  
3 Basic relational memory functions 
 
3.1 Spatial relational memory 
Relational memory refers to the representation of arbitrary or accidental relations among the 
constituent elements of an event (e.g. the relation between different objects on a picture or the 
temporal relations between actions (i.e. deferred imitation)). Relational memory seems to emerge 
later than recognition memory, depending on the type of relational memory.  
For example, spatial relational memory (or allocentric spatial memory), the ability to remember 
locations in relation to distant environmental cues (thus in the absence of local cues marking the 
location), is already present in 9-month-old macaque monkeys (Lavenex & Lavenex, 2006) but 
only emerges during the second or third year of life in human children. For instance, the ability of 
children to locate a hidden toy in a sandbox when only distant environmental cues are available 
has been reported to emerge at around 21 months of age (N. Newcombe, Huttenlocher, Drummey, 
& Wiley, 1998). Moreover, children have been shown able to find one reward location among 
four possible locations in an open-field arena in the absence of local cues by 25-39 months of age 
(Ribordy et al., 2013). In contrast, 18-23-month-olds did not perform well on that task and 25-42-
months-old were not capable of discriminating three reward locations among 18 possibilities in 
absence of local cues. Together, this finding show that allocentric spatial memory is only 
rudimentary in children under 3.5 years of age and absent before 2 years of age. Given that 
spatial relational memory is a fundamental component of episodic memory (i.e. the “where” 
component of episodic memory), the authors suggested that the delayed ability to remember 
closely related spatial information of the environment coincides temporally with the phenomena 
of infantile and childhood amnesia (Ribordy et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the fragile improvement 
observed between 2 and 3.5 years of age could be linked to the maturation of the CA1 field of the 
hippocampus. Indeed, it has been suggested that the gradual maturation of CA1 might subserve 
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the incremental emergence of basic relational memory functions (such as spatial and nonspatial 
relational memory) observed between the second and third year of age in human children (Jabès 
& Nelson, 2015). 
3.2 Deferred imitation 
Deferred imitation is another type of basic relational memory. It corresponds to the ability to 
reproduce actions previously performed by an experimenter, that is, the ability to process 
relational information to create a representation of novel unrelated actions. 
Precisely, in this paradigm, participants are first given a set of objects to play with for a baseline 
assessment of spontaneous actions. Then, an adult uses the objects to model a specific sequence of 
target actions to produce an interesting result (e.g. construction of a rattle) [Figure 17]. After a 
delay, the objects are re-presented to the participant and the number of target actions 
spontaneously produced and in the correct order is reported. This number is compared to the 
baseline to evidence memory.  
 
Figure 17 – Example of a deferred imitation task used with 18- to 30-month-olds: infants are shown how to make a rattle. 
There are three target actions: put the ball into the container, put the handle on the top of the container, and shake the handle. 
Infants don’t have the opportunity to copy the actions immediately after they saw them being demonstrated. From Herbert & 
Hayne, 2000. 
It has been demonstrated that deferred imitation already emerges between 6 and 12 months of 
age and gradually improves during the second year of life. Indeed, 6-month-old infants were able 
to reproduce after a 24-h delay, a sequence of three actions that they have previously seen a 
substantial number of times (Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996). Conversely, when the experimenter 
only briefly demonstrated the actions with the puppet, 6-month-olds exhibited only immediate 
imitation (i.e. they did not demonstrate retention after a 24h delay) whereas 12-month-olds 
reproduced the actions significantly above chance after a 24h delay (Barr et al., 1996). A striking 
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improvement in deferred imitation memory skills are demonstrated around 8-10 months. For 
instance, Carver and Bauer showed that 9-month-olds as a group were capable of remembering 
target actions after a delay of one month (infants had a total of 3 pre-exposure sessions spaced in 
time (43h in mean between sessions) with the experimenter modelling the sequence of events 
twice in succession during each session and 1 re-exposure session one week later) (Carver & 
Bauer, 1999). However, only 45% of the infants recalled the temporal order of the events after 
this one month delay (Carver & Bauer, 1999) and no retention was observed over longer delays 
(Carver & Bauer, 2001). In contrast, 10-month olds seemed able to encode and retrieve some 
event representations over delays of up to 3 and even 6 months (thus retention was tested when 
they were 13 or 16 months old) (Carver & Bauer, 2001). This sharp improvement supports the 
idea that the system underlying long-term ordered recall emerges near the end of the first year of 
life. 
But what type of memory is involved in deferred imitation tasks? 
Overall it is proposed that deferred imitation tasks rely on declarative memory. Alternatively, one 
could have speculated that subjects simply learned a sensorimotor association between an object 
and an action by observation alone, so that presentation of the object might prime the production 
of the target actions (see Mcdonough, Mandler, Mckeet, & Squire, 1995 for an interesting 
discussion). In this case, deferred imitation might be similar to skill learning or conditioning 
which would not depend on the MTL circuitry. To determine whether deferred imitation is 
mediated by priming effects, by a stimulus-response association between an object and an action,  
or truly by declarative memory processes, amnesic patients with a damaged hippocampal system 
underwent deferred imitation tasks (that consisted of three actions as it is commonly used with 
infants) (Mcdonough et al., 1995). Following a delay of 24h, the impaired performance of those 
adult-onset cases of amnesia along with relatively similar deficiencies observed in patients with 
developmental amnesia (although some residual memory remained) (Adlam, Vargha-khadem, 
Mishkin, & De Haan, 2005) reinforced the assumption that deferred imitation is well and truly a 
hippocampal-driven paradigm. Hence, these findings suggest that the hippocampus is already 
functioning, in part, at the ages when children succeed on deferred imitation tasks. 
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4 Beyond long-term memory development: do infants and young 
children generalize? 
As illustrated above, some forms of rudimentary declarative memory seem to be already 
implemented in early childhood. It has also been shown that across development, memory skills 
increase - sometimes linearly, sometimes brutally - as reflected by the delay between last learning 
(or practice) and testing, the number of exposures (or looking time) necessary to encode the 
information and obviously the level of accuracy reached during testing. We discussed above the 
maturational processes that might be responsible for these improvements and exposed how recent 
research came to the assessment that the human hippocampus may be more mature earlier in life 
than previously thought. Here, we would like to go further in our understanding of long-term 
memory development during childhood by questioning the flexibility of learning, that is, the 
ability to generalize learning to novel situations. Flexibility is fundamental since it allows an 
individual to extend their learning to novel instances of the environment or to novel situations of 
their everyday life. Moreover, being able to generalize suggests that learning is not limited to the 
specific context encountered during learning. Since the flexible use of memory is an ability 
attributed to the hippocampal formation, the onset of flexibility should strengthen our 
understanding of its maturational stages during development.  
In the case of the mobile conjugate task, a study showed that 3-month-olds exhibited retention 
after a delay of 24h provided that the mobile was the same as that used during original training 
(Greco, Rovee-collier, Hayne, Griesler, & Earley, 1986). However, no retention was demonstrated 
if more than one object was substituted into the mobile during the delayed recognition test 
(Hayne, Greco, Earley, Griesler, & Rovee-collier, 1986). Similarly, if either the color or the form 
of the alphanumeric characters (e.g. “2” category vs “A” category, Figure 18) that composed the 
mobile were changed between learning and testing, no evidence of retention was apparent in 3-
month-olds (but if learning encompassed those dissimilar stimuli, performances were preserved) 
(Hayne, Rovee-collier, & Perris, 1987). Likewise, 6- to 7-month-olds exhibited no forgetting after 
a delay of 14 days when the training and test mobiles were the same (Hill, Borovsky, & Rovee-
collier, 1988). However, memory retrieval was precluded by changes in the mobile after this delay 
(Hill et al., 1988). Together, these studies show that the retrieval of memories in infants below 1 
year of age is dependent on the context in which the memory was formed and that flexibility in 
learning is sparse at that age.  
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Figure 18 – Left panel: Reinforcement phase during initial training with an exemplar from the « 2 » category. Right panel: exemplar from 
the “A” category used as the memory prime. From Hayne et al., 1987. 
Relatively similar patterns of impairment were reported in regard to deferred imitation. It has been 
shown that although 12-month-olds were able to accurately reproduce the three actions after a 24-
h delay (Barr et al., 1996), their performance was disrupted if the puppet used to learn the 
sequence of actions was different from the one used during the testing phase (e.g. a pastel pink 
rabbit puppet vs a pale gray mouse puppet) (Hayne, MacDonald, & Barr, 1997). Similar findings 
were reported in 18-month-olds; however 21-month-olds performed equivalently whatever the 
degree of dissimilarity (Hayne et al., 1997; see also Hayne et al., 2000 for similar results). On the 
other hand, changing the test stimulus had no effect on performance at 18 months of age. 
Together, these findings suggest that over the course of their second year of life, infants become 
increasingly able to use novel cues to retrieve their memory of a prior event.  
Finally, similar observations have been made with respect to recognition memory tasks. For 
example, a change in context (e.g. a different colored background, Figure 19) during testing 
disrupted recognition of the images (i.e. no novelty preference was reported) at 6 and 12 months 
of age, but not at 18 and 24 months of age (Robinson & Pascalis, 2004). However, if infants were 
familiarized with a picture on multiple backgrounds, infants as young as 6 months of age 
demonstrated recognition despite a change in background at test (Jones, Pascalis, Eacott, & 
Herbert, 2011). This supports the idea that dissociating an item from its context (or encountering 
an item in many different contexts) during encoding may be critical for visual recognition to be 
flexible during infancy.  
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Figure 19 – Example of the stimuli used in the VPC paradigm to examine the effect of a background change on visual recognition memory. 
If the color of the background is changed from familiarization to test, 6- and 12-month-old infants showed no sign of remembering. From 
Robinson & Pascalis, 2004. 
Additionally, when the familiarization and testing phases occurred in two different rooms, 6- to 9-
month-olds exhibited impaired recognition of the images, but not 12- to 18-month-olds (Jones et 
al., 2011). Thus, representational flexibility in visual recognition memory, as measured with the 
VPC paradigm, is not present until 18 months of age regarding changes in color of the 
background but seems to emerge earlier – around 12 months of age - with respect to a change of 
experimental room. 
Overall, these findings support the idea that before 1 year of age, memory is extremely specific to 
the context in which learning occurred and then gradually becomes flexible, allowing 
generalization to novel instances, conditions and situations (Jabès & Nelson, 2015). This flexible 
use of memory is thought to depend on the hippocampal formation as evidenced by clinic cases 
of adult patients with hippocampal lesions and monkeys with neonatal hippocampal lesions 
(including the dentate gyrus and a portion of the parahippocampal region) (Pascalis, Hunkin, 
Bachevalier, & Mayes, 2009). As already described above, the maturational stages of the different 
components within the hippocampal formation are time lagged. It might be that the progressive 
improvement in the ability to generalize is closely correlated to the development of the different 
components of the hippocampal formation, especially the CA3 field of the hippocampus and the 
dentate gyrus, respectively responsible for the pattern completion and pattern separation 
phenomena. 
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To summarize  
Data from behavioral and neurobiological studies suggest that the differential maturation of 
specific brain circuits subserve the gradual emergence of declarative memory functions across 
development (Jabès & Nelson, 2015 for a review). Some hippocampal circuits are relatively 
mature at birth (e.g. the subiculum) and could subserve a “pre-explicit” form of declarative 
memory (e.g. recognition memory) until the end of the first year of life (~10 months). The 
protracted maturation of the CA1 field of the hippocampus and its related circuits might subserve 
the emergence of basic, context-specific relational memories (e.g. non-spatial and spatial 
relational memory) during the second or third year of life (Ribordy et al., 2013). This rudimentary 
form of declarative memory will gradually become flexible, complex and context-independent 
(e.g. representational flexibility) which may be a consequence of the later maturation of the CA3 
field and the dentate gyrus as well as their associated circuits (Jabès & Nelson, 2015). Ultimately, 
when the declarative memory circuitry as a whole has reached a certain level of maturation, 
building and maintaining long term representations of everyday experiences should be possible. 
In fact, the formation of a memory after a single event critically depends on the integrity and 
functionality of the MTL structures, in particular the hippocampus. This is coherent with the fact 
that the onset of long-lasting episodic memories and likewise the offset of childhood amnesia is 
thought to occur during the 3rd year of life (Hayne et al., 2000).  
Nonetheless, some authors advised to remain cautious about the assumption that changes in 
cognitive skills may reflect a change in the maturity of the hippocampus or surrounding cortices. 
They argued that the changes in performance could also be due to the maturation of the pathways 
leading to these structures or simply to a change in the manner infants process information 
(Robinson & Pascalis, 2004). Behavioral data in conjunction with neuroimaging measures applied 
to very young infants (e.g. EEG (electroencephalography), fNIRS (functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy), MEG (magnetoencephalography)) will certainly further our comprehension of 
memory development in the close future. 
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CHAPTER III:  
RELATION BETWEEN BRAIN AND SEMANTIC 
MEMORY DEVELOPMENT: A FOCUS ON WORD 
LEARNING 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we exposed in detail how brain maturation, especially maturation of the 
medial temporal lobe and its projections, may subserve the gradual development of long-term 
declarative memories. However, across the various protocols they utilized, authors rarely 
addressed the question of what kind of declarative memory was postulated (see Newcombe, 
2015), possibly because the definitions do not properly apply to non-verbal populations as already 
mentioned. As introduced earlier, declarative memory consists of two separable subtypes: 
episodic memory (or personal context-related memories) and semantic memory (or 
decontextualized information about general facts and knowledge). We introduced the phenomena 
of infantile and childhood amnesia, namely the fact that memories for personal events (episodic 
memory) formed during the first years of life do not (or poorly) persist until adulthood. At first 
glance, those phenomena appear to be contradictory to the findings that are in favor of an early 
establishment of declarative memory (e.g. Jabès & Nelson, 2015). Therefore, it has been argued 
that declarative memory is primarily semantic whereas episodic memory would develop later, 
perhaps only after the second year of life (Newcombe, 2015). This claim, at least, reconciles early 
declarative memory establishment with infantile amnesia since semantic memories do not seem to 
be (or at least seem to be less) concerned by the infantile and childhood amnesia phenomena. But 
what accounts for the memory loss (or memory inaccessibility) of personal events? 
Many explanations can be given, such as the developmental regressive events described in the 
first chapter, the immaturity of some brain components that mediate episodic memory, the 
inability for preverbal infants to verbalize the episodes (Simcock & Hayne, 2002), and obviously 
the uniqueness of the event, that is, the fact that it occurred only once in the infant’s life. As 
reviewed previously, memory requires repetition to be maintained at long (or even very long) 
term. This repetition-driven mechanism strengthens the neuronal connections between neurons 
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involved in the integration of the information, allowing a better access to that information but also 
preventing those synapses from being pruned. In the case of episodic memory, adults and older 
children often narrate their personal experiences to other people, or sometimes actively retrieve 
their memory; for example, when looking at a photo of the event, or mentally replaying the 
episode, etc. Ultimately, even if the event occurred only once, those repetitive reactivations 
contribute, in a similar way to direct re-exposures to the sensory inputs, to the (re-)consolidation 
processes that are critical in the update and maintenance at long-term of the episodic memory. 
Pre-verbal children are basically not, or less, subjected to such “indirect reactivations”, which may 
also explain the discrepancy between pre-verbal children and adults to recall personal events at 
long-term. In contrast to episodic memory, repetition (in the sense here of direct re-exposure to 
the sensory information) is usually abundant in semantic learnings. Semantic learning consists of 
general knowledge, facts, dates, definitions, vocabularies, etc. Typically, across repetitive 
exposures to the information, an individual will isolate the specific information from the details 
that make up the context. The information will gradually become context-independent and the 
individual unable to recall when and where he/she acquired that knowledge as well as incapable of 
recollecting details about the context. As a consequence, semantic information that is repeated 
during childhood should survive the pruning and regressive events and should be durably 
maintained in the brain. As evidenced, one major constituent of semantic memory, word 
learning, emerges very early in life and survives until adulthood. Word learning represents the 
arbitrary mapping of phonological and semantic representations, that is, the knowledge about the 
meaning of words. Word learning is a fundamental building block in the acquisition of language. 
1 Generalities about language acquisition 
 
Language enables people to communicate between each other using a code composed of sounds, 
symbols and words to express meanings, ideas or thoughts. (Kuhl, 2004). The world’s languages 
consist of around 600 consonants and 200 vowels. Each language uses a unique set of about 40 
distinct elements, called phonemes, which change the meaning of a word (e.g. “bat” vs “pat”) 
(Ladefoged, 2004). During the first 18 years of their life, a human being will acquire about 60,000 
words, but the major steps of language acquisition mainly occur early in life. Language includes 
primary functions, such as perception and processing of incoming speech (i.e. discrimination, 
analysis and comprehension of the meaning of an incoming sound pattern) and production of 
meaningful speech output. Language also encompasses secondary functions such as reading and 
writing (M. H. Johnson & De Haan, 2015). So, the primary roles of language are to receive, 
comprehend (i.e. word reception) and produce audible sound patterns (i.e. word production).  
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1.1 Word reception 
Word comprehension involves the brain area Wernicke – named after the neurologist who 
discovered it in the years 1870s -, located in the posterior portion of the left temporal lobe [Figure 
20]. People with damage in this area can usually speak but their speech is often incoherent and 
deprived of sense (Johnson & De Haan, 2015 for a review). Wernicke’s area is responsible for the 
processing of speech-relevant sounds (i.e. words) that one hears. It is highly connected to Broca’s 
brain area, the structure specifically involved in word production, by the arcuate fasciculus (a 
large bundle of nerve fibers). 
 
Figure 20 – Illustration displaying the Broca’s and Wernicke’s brain areas, as well as the primary auditory areas and the motor areas. They 
form a loop that is fundamental in language (reception and production). Not to scale. From Courtesy of Neuroscience & Cloud 
The emergence of this primary language function occurs very early in life as attested by parental 
reports, observational studies and experimental studies on word comprehension. Generally, 
infants manifest the first signs of word comprehension at around the middle of their first year 
of life (Benedict, 1979; Bergelson & Swingley, 2012; Fenson et al., 1994; Friedrich & Friederici, 
2011; Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, Cauley, & Gordon, 1987; Tincoff & Jusczyk, 1999). At this stage, 
they start figuring out that words can specifically refer to people or objects from their 
surrounding environment (Bergelson & Swingley, 2012; Kuhl, 2004; Tincoff & Jusczyk, 1999; 
Oviatt, 1980). Typically, word comprehension increases gradually and linearly during the 
second year of life [Figure 21]. Children comprehend about 50 words at 11 months of age, and 
by 16 months, their receptive vocabulary repertoire has increased to 170 words (Fenson et al., 
1994). From that age and until their sixth year of age, children learn an average of 5 new words a 
day; and thereafter more than 10 new words a day (P. Bloom, 2000). Importantly, studies reported 
large variabilities in the onset and development of word comprehension. Reports from parental 
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vocabularies inventories (MCDI, namely MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories) 
revealed that this variability increases dramatically with age. 
1.2 Word production 
As recently introduced, language production is mediated by a specific brain area, Broca’s area 
[Figure 20]. This brain region was discovered in 1861 by Paul Broca, a French neurosurgeon, and 
it was the first area of the brain to be associated with a specific function. This discovery originated 
from patients who were able to understand spoken language and who did not suffer from any 
motor impairments of the tongue or mouth but were affected in their ability to speak. They could 
not produce complete sentences nor express their thoughts in writing. Autopsies of their brains 
revealed sizable lesions in the left inferior frontal cortex, a distinct region that Paul Broca 
identified as the “language center”. Broca and Wernicke regions form a highly connected loop, 
located in the majority of the cases in the left hemisphere.  
Contrary to vocabulary reception, spontaneous word production is minimal before 12 months of 
age, even if babbling generally arises around 6 months of age [Figure 22]. The infant’s first 
words are seen as “proto-words8” because they are deprived of a referential link between a 
phonologically specified word form and the representation of a semantic meaning (Nazzi & 
Bertoncini, 2003). The first “genuine words8” are usually produced around the child’s first 
birthday [Figure 22] and encompass names for people and objects. Then, children exhibit a slow 
increase in word production, from fewer than 10 words at 12 months, to an average of 40 words at 
16 months [Figure 21] (Fenson et al., 1994). Typically, children produce only one or two new 
words a week. Word production is then generally characterized by a sharp acceleration around 
18 months of age (a phenomenon called “vocabulary spurt”, “vocabulary burst”, “naming 
explosion” or “lexical boom”), that typically occurs when the cumulative vocabulary production 
exceeds 50 words (Benedict, 1979; Goldfield & Reznick, 1990). Other studies showed that the 
vocabulary burst is not a universal phenomenon. Some “late talkers” display a slow monotonic 
rise in vocabulary that is best fit by a linear function, while other children are reported to show a 
series of small bursts, resulting in a step function (Goldfield & Reznick, 1990). Authors proposed 
that children who learn words at a more gradual pace may be using a strategy that attempts to 
encode broad ranges of experiences (i.e. lexicons are distributed to nouns, verbs, modifiers, 
pronouns rather than restricted to nouns as is the case for children with a typical vocabulary spurt 
profile).  
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Figure 21 – Left (blue frame): fitted values of the number of words of the Infant form (MDCI) reported to be comprehended by children at 
each month; middle and right (red frame): fitted values of the number of words of the Infant form (MDCI) reported to be produced by 
children at each month. On each graph, median values are spread of score distributions. Adapted from Fenson et al., 1994. 
Despite this, it has been suggested that strong maturational constraints may mediate the onset 
of speech production (e.g. Fenson et al., 1994). Indeed, the acceleration in vocabulary 
production may be related to the increase in synaptic connectivity and to changes of the 
cortical activity pattern that is known to occur in the same period of time (~17-20 months after 
birth) (Bates et al., 1992).  
 
After the vocabulary spurt, word production exhibits a regular pattern of growth across the 16-
30 months of age [Figure 21]. Between 18-20 months, children generally produce their first word 
combinations. At this time, these combinations are restricted to “telegraphic speech”, namely, few 
content words devoid of inflectional marking (e.g. “mommy sock”, meaning “mommy’s sock”) or 
grammatical function words (e.g. “give me cookie”, meaning “give me a cookie”) (Fenson et al., 
1994). Around 30 months of age, a tenfold increase in productive vocabulary over the last 15-
month period (i.e. 16-30 months) is observed, with 30-month-olds producing nearly 400 words. 
By 3 years of age, most normal children have mastered the basic morphological and syntactic 
structures of their native language (Fenson et al., 1994). When reaching adulthood, humans’ 
lexical repertoire encompasses about 60,000 words. The extraordinary speed of language 
acquisition by young children was puzzling for traditional theories of learning.  
8
“Proto-words”: pairing phonetically underspecified sound patterns to specific objects following 
repeated simultaneous presentations. Proto-words are characterized by pure associative links 
(Nazzi & Bertoncini, 2003). 
“Genuine words”: pairing phonetically specified sound patterns to distinct object categories (at the 
child-basic level at first). Genuine words are characterized by a referential understanding and the 
representation of semantic categories (Nazzi & Bertoncini, 2003). 
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1.3  Theoretical and computational models to explain early word 
learning 
For many decades, researchers have tackled the question of how infants effortlessly solve the 
complex task of word learning, a task that even recent artificial intelligence approaches struggle to 
encrypt. Impressively, infants develop strategies that were unpredictable by the main historical 
theorists. It is now established that infants use computational strategies to detect the statistical 
regularities and prosodic patterns of language inputs (i.e. invariant sequences within domains, 
e.g. phonemes) (Kuhl, 2004). Precisely, infants first approach language with a set of initial 
perceptual abilities. Then, they are “primed” to learn the regularities of linguistic inputs 
directly from social exchanges, by combining pattern detection and computational abilities 
(also called statistical learning9) [Figure 22]. Nevertheless, infants’ perceptual and learning 
abilities are also constrained, since they cannot perceive all physical differences in speech sounds 
and are not capable of learning all possible stochastic patterns in language input (Kuhl, 2004). 
Despite all of this, they develop a remarkable sensitivity to acoustic patterns that are important for 
language. 
 
The neural networks of early word learners become rapidly sensitive and selective to patterns that 
reflect native language (a phenomenon called neural commitment10) (Kuhl, 2004). In this way, 
exposure to a specific language sharpens infants’ perception of auditory stimuli near phonetic 
boundaries in that language. It proposes that the initial coding of native-language patterns may 
interfere with the learning of new patterns (e.g. a foreign language) because they do not conform 
to the neural pathways already established [Figure 22] (Bates et al., 1992; Kuhl, 2004).  
 
 
9
Statistical learning: Acquisition of knowledge through the computation of information about the 
distributional frequency with which certain items occur in relation to others, or probabilistic 
information in sequences of stimuli, such as the odds (transitional probabilities) that one unit will 
follow another in a given language (Kuhl, 2004). 
10
Neural commitment: Learning results in a commitment of the brain’s neural networks to the 
patterns of variation that describe a particular language. This learning promotes further learning of 
patterns that conform to those initially learned, while interfering with the learning of patterns that do 
not conform to those initially learned (Kuhl, 2004). 
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Figure 22 – The universal language timeline of speech-perception and speech-production development. This figure shows the changes that 
occur in speech perception and production in typically developing human infants during their first year of life.  From Kuhl, 2004. 
Specifically, by about 10 months, infants’ ability to discriminate nonnative contrasts diminishes, 
as revealed by electrophysiological studies (Event Related Potentials (ERP) studies). It has been 
shown that American infants showed discrimination of both English (native) and Spanish (non-
native) consonant contrast at 7 months in the N250-550 response11, whereas 11-month-olds did so 
only for native contrasts (Rivera-Gaxiola, Silva-Pereyra, & Kuhl, 2005). Earlier exposure to 
speech does not preclude nor delay neural commitment (Pena, Werker, & Dehaene-lambertz, 
2012). Indeed, it has been demonstrated that pre-terms do not appear to benefit from their earlier 
exposure to speech. Thus, the change in response to native and non-native speech depends rather 
on maturational age than on duration of experience (Pena et al., 2012). This finding suggests that 
the impact of speech exposure depends primarily on the state of the brain at the time of the 
experience. 
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In brief, early learning promotes future learning that builds on the patterns already encoded, but 
limits future learning of patterns that do not conform to those already encoded. A computational 
approach modeled early word-learning from a neuronal perspective.  
The model uses the simplest form of associative learning, i.e. Hebbian learning. According to this 
connectionist model, sound patterns (word forms) and visual displays (objects) are initially 
randomly and weakly connected (Mcmurray, Horst, & Samuelson, 2012) [Figure 24, top]. In 
other words, connection weights start from small random values (e.g. when a child hears a novel 
word and is confronted to a multitude of unknown objects). Over time (i.e. across multiple 
learning experiences) the spurious connections will be pruned, while the genuine ones will be 
strengthened [Figure 24, bottom]. Precisely, inputs (words and objects) will be associated with an 
internal lexical unit if both are active in a temporal contiguity; otherwise the connection will 
decay. For example, repeated simultaneous exposition to a word (e.g. “dog”) and an object (a 
dog) will strengthen the connection between these two inputs while at the same time, the 
connection between the word “dog” and the object tree (which are not, or less, present 
simultaneously) will be weakened. Pruning prevents potential connections between unrelated 
11
Specific ERPs markers of particular aspects of word learning (Friedrich & Friederici, 
2011, 2015):  
P200-400: positive component within 200 to 400ms evoked by visual stimuli, over posterior 
brain regions. In infants, this neural signature would reflect either experience-related ease to 
process visual stimuli or visual expectancy. 
N200-500: perceptual priming effect. Lateral-frontal increased negativity (or reduced 
positivity) indicating perceptual familiarity to a spoken word (i.e. mental representation of a 
word form). In the context of cross-modal word-picture priming: both pictures and words can 
facilitate the perceptual processing of contextually expected words, which implies the presence 
of a neural connection between the object representation and its labeling word. Note that this 
effect is delayed in younger children whose neuronal network is less myelinated (~N300-800) 
N400: semantic priming effect (i.e. word comprehension). Centro-parietal distributed 
negativity. Incongruous priming enhances negativity. In the context of cross-modal word-
picture priming: the meaning of the word is pre-activated by the picture content, which implies 
the presence of referential connections between words and their meanings, and thus, the 
existence of at least simple genuine words. Note that this effect is delayed in younger children 
whose neuronal network is less myelinated (~N600-1200). 
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word forms and referents to be maintained at long term and simultaneously refines the 
connectivity between related words and referents. Over time, such changes build a system of links 
that encompass many words and objects. If a linkage becomes sufficiently reinforced, the pathway 
will be activated each time the word form (e.g. “dog”) is heard again, allowing the word  to 
activate the appropriate concept without external support. However, even within this simple 
approach, the connectionist model assumes that there are layers of complexity. According to this 
computational model, auditory and visual inputs are indirectly connected between each other via 
lexical concepts (McMurray et al., 2012) [Figure 24, bottom].. These lexical concepts work like 
lemmas (i.e. abstract representations that connect other representations). Their presence means 
that learning requires at least two connections (word → lexicon; lexicon → object).  
 
Figure 23 – Architecture of the connectionist model, before (A) and after (B) learning. From McMurray et al., 2012 
In sum, the extraordinary and mainly effortless aptitude young humans have to acquire language 
is a fascinating topic. This becomes even more interesting when one considers the fact that their 
brain systems are engaged in dramatic changes and maturational processes. Researchers showed 
that language development is shaped by a sequence of age-based trends that are presumably 
constrained by maturational factors and refinement of the neural pathways. Substantial progress 
has been made in understanding the initial phases of language acquisition, at a behavioral, neural 
and computational level.  
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2 The word-referent concept 
 
As indicated earlier, one of the first stages of language acquisition is the comprehension that 
phonetically specified sound patterns (words) can refer to item-unique things or to categories of 
things of the external environment (Quine, 1960). Such acquisition of genuine words constitutes a 
part of the semantic knowledge of infants. In this section, we will review studies related to the 
word-referent concept and we will specifically focus on the effect of two word learning strategies 
to promote long-term retention of novel word-object pairs. But first of all, we wanted to make 
precisions about the onset of the word-referent concept during childhood since recent studies have 
brought substantial insight into this field. 
It has been shown that 10-14-month old infants attend more to objects when language (e.g. 
labeling) accompanies their inspection of those things (Baldwin & Markman, 1989). This 
tendency for language to sustain infants’ attention and examination of objects helps to explain 
how infants take the first step in establishing word-object relations, i.e. the step of linking the 
language sounds they hear to the objects they see. Pioneer studies demonstrated that infants begin 
to treat words and objects as related by 11-12 months of age (Oviatt, 1980).  
More recently, using a “looking-while-listening12” method (see Fernald, Zangl, Portillo, & 
Marchman, 2008 for the method), researchers established that around the middle of their first 
year, infants already comprehend the meaning of several words, specifically a range of food and 
body-part terms (Bergelson & Swingley, 2012). As evidenced, when hearing their parents labeling 
an object of a picture book, children tended to direct their gaze to the correct picture of the set of 
pictures. Does all of this mean that a 6-month-old child can already understand the genuine sense 
of a word?  
 
12
Looking-while-listening (LWL): methodology that uses real-time measures of the time course of 
infants’ or young children’s gaze patterns in response to speech for assessing word 
comprehension. Typically, infants are presented with visual displays, usually two discrete images, 
one of which is labeled in a spoken sentence such as “look at the [label]”. Eye movements are 
analyzed off-line, frame by frame, from the videotapes by trained coders who are naïve about the 
stimuli. Similarly to “preferential looking”, this method does not require automated eye-tracking 
technology. However, on the contrary to “preferential looking”, LWL yields high-resolution 
measures of speech processing from moment to moment, rather than relying on summary measures 
of looking preference. Specifically, children’s gaze patterns are time-locked to the speech signal 
(Fernald et al., 2008).  
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The answer to that question arises from recent ERP studies. Indeed, the specific N400 semantic 
priming effect11 was truthfully observed in infants as young as 6-month-olds who were exposed 
to pictures of novel objects repeatedly paired to pseudo-words during a learning session (Friedrich 
& Friederici, 2011). However, when testing this lexical knowledge the next day, this neural 
signature disappeared, indicating that the memory trace didn’t survive 24h (it is only from 
14months of age that this neural signature survives a delay of 24hours). Interestingly, the N400 
was not reported in infants of age 3 months who underwent the same task (Friedrich & Friederici, 
2015). Instead, the N200-50011 brain correlate indicating familiarity to perceptual word forms was 
already found in these 3-month-old participants (Friedrich & Friederici, 2015). This finding 
supports evidence for a precocious establishment of mental representations of word sounds, of 
visual displays and of neural-based connections between them. However, it also indicates that at 3 
months of age, a semantic processing stage is not yet reached. The authors are in favor of an 
associationist view, assuming that the ability of 3-month-olds to link words and visual displays 
together is caused by a primary learning mechanism. This mechanism would enable the creation 
of associative connections between the perceptual representations of objects and words but not of 
referential connections with a semantic component. This would constitute the neural base of the 
“proto-words” originally described by Nazzi and Bertoncini (Nazzi & Bertoncini, 2003). On the 
other hand, the base of “genuine” word comprehension arises around 6 months of age and would 
be characterized by tangible referential connections.  
Once children expect words to be related to things in the world - in other words, once they 
acquired the word-referent concept - their receptive vocabulary increases gradually and linearly as 
described previously. However, we will see below that in this first stage of word acquisition, 
learning the name of a new object is a slow and time-consuming process. In the following 
section, we will focus on the different word learning strategies children rely on to build their 
receptive vocabulary repertoire and we will expose how these strategies may evolve across time. 
In this thesis, since we were particularly interested in two learning strategies (ostensive labeling 
and “fast-mapping”) the following review will mainly focus on these procedures. For each of 
these strategies, we will review how word comprehension translates into word retention and we 
will examine the putative underlying (brain) mechanisms. 
2.1  Word learning strategies 
When a young word learner is confronted with a scene that comprises multiple items, they may 
map a novel word they hear to any element of the scene. Thus, they face a large number of 
possible referents. How will they determine the referent (or more so the meaning) of the new 
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word? To illustrate this point, Quine imagined a stranger who hears a native say “gavagai” while 
pointing to a scene. To what does “gavagai” refer: the rabbit, the grass, a tree, the rabbit’s ears, or 
perhaps the beauty of the whole (Quine, 1960) ? 
There are at least three main ways to solve this referential indeterminacy problem, which 
correspond to the main word learning strategies known to induce receptive lexical knowledge in 
young children. 
More precisely, if the child encounters multiple situations where “gavagai” is heard and one 
element of the scene is the only constant element among the alternatives, then they may be able to 
detect this regularity (i.e. co-occurrence frequency) across these multiple individually 
ambiguous scenes. Ultimately, via cross-situational statistics they may be capable of identifying 
the right meaning for the word “gavagai” (Smith & Yu, 2008). If the word learner is now 
provided with a larger knowledge about several elements of the scene, they might then use an 
elimination process to solve the problem (also called disjunctive syllogism (Halberda, 2006)). 
Specifically, they should logically exclude the elements of the scene for which they already know 
the names and infer that novel word relates to the sole unnamed item. This strategy is well-known 
under the term of “referent selection”, which consists of the first step of the “fast-mapping” 
paradigm initiated by Carey and Bartlett (Carey & Bartlett, 1978). Lastly, the adult may offer 
overt social cues indicating unambiguously to which element of the scene the “gavagai” refers. 
For example, they may ostensively point at the corresponding item of the scene while saying 
“gavagai”. The onset and efficiency of these three strategies will be detailed below. 
 Cross-statistical word learning (or cross-situational word learning) 2.1.1
In their very first stages of receptive vocabulary learning, infants are similar to strangers who do 
not know the native language. In everyday contexts, children encounter many words, many 
potential referents but often limited cues indicating which word goes with which referent (Smith 
& Yu, 2008). In such highly ambiguous learning contexts, some young learners may just ignore 
the information and wait for contexts containing more explicit information about the referential 
bindings. In contrast, other young learners may take advantage of the information available to 
them, to use in the future when faced with subsequent ambiguous contexts (Smith & Yu, 2008). 
Smith and Yu reported for the first time that infants are capable of learning word-object pairs 
simply by tracking statistical regularities across multiple and individually ambiguous word-
scene pairings. They showed that the indeterminacy problem is not solved in a single experience 
but across multiple experiences, not for a single word-object pair but for a set of many pairings. In 
their experiment, 12- and 14-month-old infants were taught 6 word-referent pairs via a series of 
85 
 
30 individually ambiguous trials. On each trial, two word forms and two potential referents were 
presented with no information about which word went with which referent, as illustrated by the 
following example [Figure 24]. Note that in this paradigm, word-object pairs were consistent 
across trials, meaning that the referent assigned to a given word was constant. In total, each 
correct pairing occurred 10 times. Immediately after learning, infants underwent 12 test trials (2 
test trials per word). Testing word learning typically consists of providing the child with 2 (or 
more) objects (or images of the objects) and measuring the percentage of time the child spends 
looking at each object after label onset (i.e. preferential looking after label onset). In older 
children, it is rather a measure of preferential reaching that is employed (e.g. “show me (or give 
me) the [label]”). In this study, the percentage of looking time toward each object was measured 
at each trial and revealed a significantly greater looking time at targets than at distractors. 
The following example illustrates the cross-statistical learning paradigm used by Smith & Yu 
[Figure 24]: the child hears the unknown words “bat” and “ball” while looking at a scene that 
involves a BAT and a BALL. In the absence of any other information, the young word learner 
cannot know to which of the two items the “ball” refers. However, if they subsequently view 
another scene containing a BALL and a DOG while hearing the words “ball” and “dog”, and if 
they registered the information from the previous trial, they should be able to combine the co-
occurrence frequencies from the two streams of data, to correctly map “ball” to BALL.  
 
Figure 24 – Associations among words and referents across two individually ambiguous scenes. If a young learner calculates co-
occurrence frequencies across these two trials, they can identify the proper mapping of “ball” to BALL. From Smith & Yu, 2008. 
This word learning strategy is totally implicit and passive because it does not require the child to  
determine the referent; the  child  implicitly accumulates  co-occurrence  statistics  to learn  the  
mappings (McMurray et al., 2012). 
According to the authors, this cross-situational learning mechanism is rapid and efficient, and 
may play a substantial role in early lexical learning (Smith & Yu, 2008). However, a recent work 
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showed that if a young word learner makes an initial false hypothesis about the possible referent 
of a given word, they will not perform better than chance when selecting among potential 
referents on a subsequent trial (Aravind et al., 2018). The authors argued that learners manifest a 
strong tendency to retain information about their initial hypothesis. So, if their initial hypothesis is 
erroneous, they will struggle to recognize the missed alternative on a following trial. In other 
words, they will struggle to recover. According to these authors, cross-situational learning is not a 
rapid word learning process and children require multiple instances of co-occurring frequencies to 
verify their initial associative hypothesis (Aravind et al., 2018). 
 Ostensive labeling (“ostensive naming”, or “unambiguous naming”) 2.1.2
In everyday life, children not only encounter ambiguous word learning situations, they also often 
face situations where the name of an object is explicitly given to them; a word learning process 
called “ostensive labeling”. Parents frequently provide ostensive definitions for their infants when 
they are about 9 months of age, because from this age, infants begin to look in the direction 
indicated by their parents (e.g. a parent pointing at the moon while saying “look this is the moon”) 
(Murphy & Messer, 1977). Ostensive labeling typically includes at least two components: non-
verbal external cues (e.g. eye-gaze toward the referent, pointing or holding-up the object, etc.), 
and labeling (Baldwin & Markman, 1989). Sometimes, the object is presented in isolation from 
any potential distractor. In this case, labeling alone is sufficient to unambiguously induce the 
referential linkage. Hence, it goes without saying that ostensive labeling corresponds to an 
unambiguous word learning strategy. This procedure enables a great ease in figuring out the 
specific referent of a given label, which is presumed to considerably help increase children’s 
lexical repertoires (Baldwin & Markman, 1989).  
Nevertheless, even if the word-object association is unambiguously given to the child, this latter 
also requires a lot of exposures to both the novel word and to the novel object to exhibit 
comprehension on test immediate trials (Oviatt, 1980).  
For instance, 13-month-olds have been shown to be able to successfully associate the name of a 
novel object to the pairing after nine exposures but only if favorable circumstances were provided 
during learning (i.e. absence of preferential trials that tested for a possible innate preference for 
the target, presentations made in a bloc rather than in interspaced trials, etc.) (Woodward et al., 
1994; see also Hollich et al., 2000 for similar results). Moreover, since children in these 
experiments had only one novel object name to learn, it is not clear whether the accuracy 
measured during testing truly demonstrates word learning or merely children’s ability to recall 
which object was given a special treatment (see Axelsson & Horst, 2013). When controlling for 
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this potential confounding factor by teaching children two novel word-object pairs, it has been 
demonstrated that 13- to 17-month-olds but not 8- to 12-month-olds, recognized the pairings, 
provided that they were taught at least 10 to 12 times each (Gurteen, Horne, & Erjavec, 2011; 
Werker et al., 1998). The same results were found when stimuli consisted of abstract images 
displayed on a screen (rather than 3D objects) (Schafer & Plunkett, 1998). Overall, these studies 
indicate that before 18-months of age, learning the name of a new object via ostensive labeling is 
a slow and repetition-based process. Indeed, children seem to require at least ten or more 
unambiguous repetitions of the linkages in order to manifest word comprehension on immediate 
test trials.  
Intriguingly, this repetition-driven pattern seems to be no longer vital anymore after 18 months of 
life. Indeed, 18-month-olds showed comprehension on immediate looking-while-listening test 
trials after being presented with only three* (Houston-Price, Plunkett, & Harris, 2005) or four 
(Bion, Borovsky, & Fernald, 2013) ostensive teaching trials that encompassed two word-object 
pairs. *(in this study, only the labels were novel; objects were already familiar to the 
participants).  
This finding is particularly interesting given that around 18 months of age children undergo the 
developmental phenomenon of vocabulary spurt, that is, the onset of the extraordinary 
productive vocabulary burst described previously. One may speculate that both patterns are 
correlated: the change in lexical production (vocabulary burst) would accompany changes in 
lexical comprehension. Moreover, vocabulary spurt and rapid word comprehension also coincide 
in time with changes at the neural level and with a reorganization of the neural substrate of 
language processing brain regions. Indeed, this time period is characterized by a steep increase in 
synaptic density in many relevant cortical regions (Bates et al., 1992). According to the authors, 
this would enable a larger capacity for information processing and storing. Consequently, the 
quantitative shifts in word learning observable at a behavioral level (vocabulary spurt and 
improvements in vocabulary reception) may be caused by a qualitative shift of the mechanisms 
responsible for word learning at the neural level.  
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the neural system mediating early language 
comprehension (and perhaps production) may be distinct from later emerging lateralized systems 
whose engagement may only be necessary for more advanced linguistic skills (Dapretto & Bjork, 
2000; Mervis & Bertrand, 1994). In other words, the hemispheric lateralization of the neural 
substrates responsible for language functions coincides with the striking improvements in word 
comprehension and production. Precisely, a study using ERP investigated the neural correlates of 
processing known and unknown words in children before and after the vocabulary spurt 
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phenomenon (Mills, Coffey-Corina, & Neville, 1993). Results showed that the amplitude of ERPs 
from 200 to 400ms of pre-vocabulary spurt children were significantly larger for known than 
unknown words. These differences in amplitude were broadly distributed over anterior and 
posterior regions of both left and right hemispheres. In contrast, in children who underwent 
vocabulary spurt (i.e. for 20-month-olds who had vocabularies of over 150 words), ERP 
differences from 200 to 400ms were more focally distributed over temporal and parietal 
regions of the left hemisphere. A subsequent analysis comparing children with different 
vocabulary sizes at an equal age demonstrated that this shift in brain response was related to 
vocabulary, not to age (Mills et al., 1993).  
To summarize, despite a large diversity of the methodologies used (e.g. looking-while-listening, 
preferential reaching, forced-choice tasks, etc.) and of the parameters manipulated across studies 
(e.g. age, number of word-object pairs to learn, number of exposures to each pair, etc.), the 
literature clearly suggests that there is a noteworthy developmental step in the child’s ability to 
master word learning processes that encompass ostensive labeling during the second year of 
life (Gurteen et al., 2011; Hollich et al., 2000; McMurray, 2007; Reznick, 1990; Werker, Cohen, 
Lloyd, Casasola, & Stager, 1998; Woodward et al., 1994). This improvement in vocabulary 
comprehension coincides with the phenomenon of vocabulary spurt, and both may depend on 
maturational advances such as reorganization of the cortical structures and lateralization of the 
functions devoted to language. Researchers suggested that the regions responsible for first-
language learning in young children are not necessarily the ones responsible for language use and 
maintenance in adulthood (see also Johnson & De Haan, 2015). The interactive specialization 
view proposes that the brain activity underlying language functions becomes more focal with 
experience, as language skills become more efficient and automated. Alternatively, it can be 
suggested that children may need to have undergone advanced maturational processes to rapidly 
and more efficiently incorporate new words in their lexicon. 
Also intriguingly, around this same age period, another language-related skill emerges: the ability 
to infer a novel word to its referent by logically excluding familiar items, a phenomenon known as 
“referent selection” or “disambiguation ability” (Halberda, 2003). 
 Referent selection (or “disambiguation ability”) 2.1.3
In 1978, Carey and Bartlett’s pioneering study revealed that 3-4 year old preschoolers could infer 
the referent (an unfamiliar color) from an unknown word (a new color name) when hearing their 
teacher ask them: “go and get the chromium tray, not the blue one, the chromium one” (Carey & 
Bartlett, 1978). More surprising, subsequently to this one-trial lexical experience, children 
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remembered this semantic information (the chromium color) more than 1 week later, when they 
had to recall which one of a set of six unfamiliar color chips was the chromium color (Carey & 
Bartlett, 1978). The authors named this remarkable skill “fast-mapping”, given the extreme 
rapidity with which children linked the novel word to its referent and retained this mapping over 
time. This discovery inspired a proliferation of research that has tried, for many decades, to 
discover the underlying mechanisms of this learning procedure, in children but also in adults and 
more recently in unrelated animals (e.g. the domestic dog). 
In Carey and Bartlett’s pioneer study, children were provided with an explicit lexical contrast 
(“the chromium tray, not the blue one”). In contrast, the current majority of studies investigating 
“fast-mapping” use only a familiarity contrast. Specifically, children are presented with a novel 
object and one (or more) familiar object(s) when they hear the novel word [Figure 25]. They tend 
to logically exclude the already named object(s), and by deduction select the unfamiliar item as 
the referent. This procedure is called “referent selection” (or “disambiguation ability”) and 
constitutes the first step of the whole “fast-mapping” procedure that requires children to retain the 
information at long term (i.e. “referent retention”, a point that will be detailed later). Thus, 
disambiguating a situation is only the first step in apprehending the meaning of a new word. 
 
Figure 25 – Example of stimuli used by Horst & Samuelson on the “referent selection” trials. From Horst and Samuelson, 2008. 
One overwhelming question is when exactly does this capability emerge during development? 
Researchers all agree that disambiguation biases are not present at the very onset of lexical 
development, precisely not before the vocabulary spurt phenomenon, as initially demonstrated 
by Mervis and Bertrand (Mervis & Bertrand, 1994). However, there are conflicting findings in the 
literature about the exact onset of the disambiguation ability. Halberda was the first to use online 
90 
 
looking-time measures to study referent selection by 14- to 18-months old and concluded that 
children were successful in disambiguation by the age of 17 months (Halberda, 2003), a result 
supported by other studies using comparable measures (e.g. Houston-Price, Caloghiris, & 
Raviglione, 2010; White & Morgan, 2008). On the contrary, other studies failed to demonstrate an 
increase in looking at the novel object after hearing a novel label in children participants of 16- to 
23-months of age (Bion et al., 2013; Mather & Plunkett, 2009, 2011). In spite of this, in Mather & 
Plunkett’s research, 16-month-olds could map a novel label onto a novel object, provided that the 
novel label had no familiar phonological neighbors, suggesting that linguistic principles may 
govern “referent selection” abilities (Mather & Plunkett, 2011). Indeed, it is argued that the ability 
of mapping novel labels onto novel objects is constrained by (perhaps innate) linguistic heuristics. 
The main principles governing this constraint approach described in the literature are the 
following: Mutual Exclusivity13 (Markman & Wachtel, 1988), Contrast14 (Clark, 1988), Whole 
Object Assumption15 (Markman & Wachtel, 1988), Pragmatic Account16 (Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001) and the Novel-Name Nameless-Category Principle (N3C)17 (Golinkoff, Hirsh-
Pasek, Bailey, & Wenger, 1992; Mervis & Bertrand, 1994). Some of these principles are not 
available in the first stages of language acquisition, suggesting that a minimum experience with 
language is required to solve the “referent selection” by exclusion trials. This may help to explain 
why the onset of this ability is shown to be closely correlated to vocabulary spurt, thus also to a 
substantial size of the receptive lexical repertoire. As already described above, the increased 
lexical repertoire and the vocabulary spurt phenomenon are themselves supposed to be mediated 
by changes and reorganization within the underlying brain structures. Note that around two years 
of age, children who are mostly post-vocabulary spurt word-learners all generally exhibit 
excellent disambiguation abilities (e.g. Bion et al., 2013; Horst & Samuelson, 2008). 
Note also that the constraint approach has limits and is still largely debated. Despite this, at least 
it raises fundamental questions that go beyond the frames of this thesis. For example, once 
children master basic-level terms, how is the taxonomic constraint relaxed to learn 
superordinates? When and how do children violate the whole-object assumption to learn object-
related properties? How do children ignore mutual exclusivity to learn synonyms or 
superordinates?  (see Mcmurray et al., 2012 for a review). 
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To summarize, in this section, we stressed the gradual nature of word learning and provided 
evidence from the overall literature that the strategies that shape word learning have different 
developmental onsets. The comprehension that everything has a name, the impressive gains in 
understanding spoken words as well as the rise in disambiguation abilities may coincide with 
vocabulary growth and maturational processes during the second year of life. In spite of this, for 
word learning to be truly efficient, children must be capable of retaining and recalling the words 
acquired through these different learning strategies after substantial delays. 
 
13
Mutual exclusivity (ME): assumption that every object has just one name. In other words, 
words do not have overlapping references (Markman & Wachtel, 1988). Upon hearing a 
novel label, ME motivates a word-learner to reject objects that already have a known label. 
14
Contrast: principle that all lexical entries contrast in meaning (Clark, 1988). A word-
learner using Contrast would avoid taking the novel word to be synonymous with the lexical 
entry for the known object. 
15
Whole Object Assumption: assumption that the novel word refers to the whole entity rather 
than to a part or attribute of it (Markman & Wachtel, 1988).  
16
Pragmatic Account: hypothesis that the speaker should use familiar terms when available. 
When presented with a familiar (e.g. a brush) and a novel object and asked for the novel item 
(e.g. “show me the dax”), a word-learner utilizing Pragmatics would reason as follow: “if 
the experimenter had wanted me to pick up the [brush], they would have asked me to show 
them the [brush]. Given that they asked me for a dax, they must have wanted me to give them 
the other object” (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). 
17
Novel-Name Nameless-Category Principle: the N3C is the principle that word-learners 
are positively motivated to map novel labels to objects that do not yet have a name (Golinkoff 
et al., 1992). It postulates the strategy of “Map-Novelty-to-Novelty” (Mervis & Bertrand, 
1994). This principle predicts that children tend to select the unnamed object “for the 
positive reason that children seek names for objects that are previously unnamed” (Golinkoff 
et al., 1992). 
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2.2 Long-term storage of word-referent pairs in young children 
For word learning to be successful, children not only need to understand the meaning of a new 
word or to disambiguate a language-related situation, they also need to retain this knowledge for 
later use (Wojcik, 2013 for a review). In this thesis, again, since we were mostly interested in 
ostensive naming and referent selection, the following section will only focus on the effect of 
these two learning strategies in retaining the names of novel objects (i.e. we will not discuss the 
cross-situational learning strategy). 
Unfortunately, only a handful of studies have investigated how word learning translates into more 
permanent memory traces. In the literature, testing mostly occurs immediately after learning. 
Therefore it cannot be considered as measuring word retention, but rather word comprehension. 
Word retention was demonstrated in 3 and 4 year-old children for up to a week (Carey & 
Bartlett, 1978; Markson & Bloom, 1997; Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012; Waxman & Booth, 2000) or a 
month (Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Markson & Bloom, 1997; Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012). However, 
in these studies, children were only taught one novel word-object association. Previous studies 
have demonstrated that labeling an object during training increases its salience and thus enhances 
its chances of being chosen by the child in subsequent tests (Baldwin & Markman, 1989). As 
already argued above, the accuracy reported during these long-term memory tests may simply 
reflect recalling which object was given a special treatment during the encoding phase rather than 
demonstrating actual word retention (Axelsson & Horst, 2013).  
 Ostensive labeling: long-term retention of ostensively labeled objects 2.2.1
In the context of ostensive labeling, there is no clear evidence from the overall literature that 
children who were taught at least two novel associations simultaneously demonstrated retention 
after a delay (Wojcik, 2013 for a review). To the best of our knowledge, only one recent study has 
addressed this question. In this study, the author demonstrated that 30- to 34-month-olds had 
significant retention and generalization abilities when tested 1 min plus 1 week after learning 
(Wojcik, 2017). Precisely, participants were trained on four novel objects, each of which was 
displayed in isolation four times on a screen (it consisted of 4 blocks of 4 exposures) and word 
labels were spoken in carrier phrases (one labeling par visual exposure). About one minute after 
training, children underwent a first encoding test. It consisted of 4 blocks of 4 test trials (i.e. each 
pair was tested 4 times) and looking behaviors were measured to assess comprehension. 
Participants then performed retention and generalization tests one minute after the encoding test 
(for a subgroup of subjects) or one week after the encoding test (for a second subgroup of 
subjects). Performance was significantly above chance after both delays and generalization 
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accuracy was overall significantly lower than retention accuracy. Here, the author showed for the 
first time that few ostensive labeling trials were sufficient to promote a long-term storage of the 
information in 30-month-olds (Wojcik, 2017). Nonetheless, it might be that the encoding test 
performed immediately after learning induced a rehearsal of the information which consequently 
reinforced the mappings, independently of the labeling trials. It is in fact well established that 
retrieval greatly strengthens memory representations (Roediger & Butler, 2011 for a review). 
Overall, there is a serious lack of research into the question of whether and how ostensive labeling 
promotes the long-term retention of new word-object associations in childhood. The studies 
performed in this thesis aim to fill this gap. 
 “Fast-mapping”: referent retention 2.2.2
In the context of “fast-mapping”, were the objects correctly mapped by exclusion by the subjects 
also later correctly recognized (i.e. “referent retention”)? From the overall literature, 24-month-
olds systematically failed to demonstrate retention of the fast-mapped words after a five-minute 
delay (e.g. Horst & Samuelson, 2008) or even immediately after learning (e.g. Bion, Borovsky, & 
Fernald, 2013). 24-month-olds could retain the mappings for 5 minutes, provided that (i) the 
objects were inferred by logical exclusion and deliberately labeled several times (i.e. ostensively 
named) by an experimenter holding them up (Experiment 2, Horst & Samuelson, 2008); or that 
(ii) ostensive naming was provided in addition to the logical selection and the children’s attention 
drawn toward the referent by illuminating the target and/or covering the familiar competitors 
[Figure 26] (Axelsson et al., 2012); or finally that (iii) the objects were already familiar to the 
participants prior to the learning phase (Kucker & Samuelson, 2012, see also Houston-Price, 
Plunkett & Harris, 2005 for a discussion).  
In one study, 24- and 30-month-olds demonstrated successful retention after a 24h delay, but the 
pairings were reviewed with ostensive labeling after the “referent selection” trials. So, it is unclear 
whether the inferential process itself sufficed to promote retention or whether the success was 
mainly attributable to the revised trials (Goodman, McDonough, & Brown, 1998). Overall, there 
is a consensus that around two years of age, a single disambiguation situation is not enough to 
induce retention of the name of an object, even after a minimal delay. There is no clear evidence 
about the number of times 2-year-olds should disambiguate a situation encompassing the same 
novel object to retain the name of that object. 
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Figure 26 –Examples of feedback that followed the referent selections: (A) highlight-target/dampen-competitors, (B) highlight-target, (C) 
dampen-competitors, (D) control (pointing). From Axelsson et al., 2012 
Why are fast-mapped objects not retained by 2-year-olds? 
One explanation is that during the “referent selection” trials, the attention of child participants has 
to be shared between the referent and the familiar objects (i.e. the competitors), which may not 
allow a proper encoding of the physical properties of the referent itself (Horst & Samuelson, 
2008). Worse, children may determine the referent by paying exclusively attention at the familiar 
objects, though this hypothesis has not yet been investigated. However, what has been shown is 
that the number of competitors didn’t affect the ability of 30 months old children to form the 
initial mappings; however only those who encountered fewer competitors during “referent 
selection” (a maximum of 2 competitors) exhibited retention after a 5-min delay (Horst, Scott, & 
Pollard, 2010). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the saliency of the target needs to be 
increased to attract participants’ attention toward it during learning. Holding up, playing with, or 
pointing to the target as well as labeling it, illuminating it, covering the competitors or reducing 
the number of competitors, etc., likely help sustain children’s attention on the target object. In 
turn, it may facilitate the encoding process of the visual features of the target, of the auditory 
properties of the label and of the relational link between the two, so that the information could be 
recalled after a few-minutes delay. 
An alternative explanation is that referent selection is not isomorphic to learning. It may only 
constitute an online process that is independent of long-term word learning. Perhaps all that 
counts for children is to arrive rapidly at the right inference for their immediate communicative 
requirement without the need of learning and remembering the linkages (McMurray et al., 2012). 
According to their dynamic associative word learning model, the authors compared the referential 
ambiguity to a situation-time problem that must be solved within the context of a single inferential 
95 
 
event, but building long lasting linkages would only be solved over developmental time as 
children encounter multiple presentations of the elements to be mapped (McMurray et al 2012).  
Overall, it appears that the term “fast-mapping” initially adopted by Carey and Bartlett may truly 
help young children understanding a live conversation by disambiguating word-related situations 
but is definitely not synonymous with “fast-learning”. At least, this definition does not apply for 
children around 2 years of age. Improvement seems to occur at the end of the second year of life. 
Indeed, Bion et al. found that 30-month-olds, but not 24-month-olds, showed a fragile evidence of 
retention during “referent retention” tests carried out just after the disambiguation trials (Bion et 
al., 2013). The authors employed the looking-while-listening paradigm to assess retention and 
found that 30-month-olds looked nearly above chance to the targets on those test trials. However, 
in this study, children underwent 4 “referent selection” trials for each of the two pairs, which may 
explain the discrepancy with previous findings (where children underwent a unique “referent 
selection” trial per pair). Moreover, participants had only two pairs to retain compared to four in 
Horst and Samuelson’s experiments. In another study, Zosh et al. demonstrated that older children 
(36-42-month-olds) successfully recognized the names of the objects learned via inferential 
reasoning (Zosh, Brinster, & Halberda, 2013). However, since participants were tested 
immediately after learning, this finding is not conclusive about an actual storage of the 
information at long-term. It only provides evidence about the emergence of retention abilities for 
fast-mapped objects. Interestingly, in this study, the authors also showed that the retention rate 
was higher for the objects learned via inferential reasoning than for objects learned via instruction 
(i.e. ostensive labeling) (Zosh et al., 2013). This finding suggests the possibility of a 
developmental shift in the strategies that support word learning (Zosh et al., 2013).  
2.3 Which neural bases support the formation of a memory for 
ostensively-named and fast-mapped words? 
Earlier, we reviewed contradictory points of view about the involvement of the hippocampus in 
the formation of semantic memories. On one hand, some researchers and clinicians claim that 
semantic memory is stored by the same brain systems involved in episodic memory (i.e. the 
hippocampal system and the MTL)(see Squire, 2004 for a review). However, the dominant 
viewpoint is that the consolidation process of semantic knowledge is only supported by the brain 
structures surrounding the hippocampal system (the entorhinal and perirhinal cortices) (Brown & 
Aggleton, 2001; Schmolck et al., 2002). On the other hand, other researchers and theories assume 
that rapid acquisition of new words may not even necessitate the involvement of the MTL 
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structures at all (e.g. Mcclelland, 2013; Sharon et al., 2011). According to this alternative 
viewpoint, new knowledge would be directly stored into the neocortex. 
To further emphasize the debate, one may wonder if ostensively named objects and fast-mapped 
objects depend on the same brain structures? To date, there is very little evidence of this and the 
rare studies that addressed that question are mainly based on works involving amnesic patients.  
In one study, four adult amnesic patients with hippocampal system damage showed severe 
impairments on “explicit associative tasks” (~ostensive labeling) but demonstrated restored 
performance to the level of age-matched healthy controls when a “fast-mapping” (~referent 
selection) procedure was used (Sharon et al., 2011). When tested after a delay of one week, the 
amnesic patients recognized the associations acquired via “referential selections” but were around 
chance level on the standard “explicit task”. Conversely, control subjects performed better on the 
“explicit associative memory task” (Sharon et al., 2011). However, note that the learning 
procedures employed by the authors were slightly different from those typically used with 
children. Indeed, “explicit associative tasks” consisted of displaying and labeling objects in 
isolation but participants (patients and healthy controls) were deliberately instructed to retain the 
associations [Figure 27]. For their part, “referent selection” trials required participants to answer 
questions that allowed them to infer which object corresponded to a particular name (e.g. adults: 
“is the [label]’s tail pointed up?”; children: “where is the [label]?”) [Figure 27]. This is why 
authors argue that their word learning procedures encompass explicit learning in the first case and 
implicit learning in the second. 
 
Figure 27 – Examples of stimuli used in the fast-mapping (FM) and explicit experiments. (A): previously unknown target study phase trial 
in the FM experiment. (B): Recognition test trial in the FM experiments. (C): Previously unknown target study phase trial in the explicit 
experiment. (D): Recognition test trial in the explicit experiment. From Sharon et al, 2011. 
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The authors then included two additional patients with unilateral damage to the anterior temporal 
neocortex. These patients showed impairments on “referent retention” test trials, suggesting that 
associative learning through inferential reasoning would rather depend on extrahippocampal 
neocortical regions, such as the lateral and anterior temporal lobes. 
In a following fMRI study using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA)18 and involving healthy 
adults, the same first author found that “fast-mapping” induced memory performance through 
greater activity within the anterior temporal lobe, the lateral occipito-temporal, the parieto-
temporal neocortex, and ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex (Atir-sharon, Gilboa, Hazan, Koilis, 
& Manevitz, 2015) [Figure 28]. By contrast, memory performance following explicit encoding 
elicited activity in medial and dorsolateral prefrontal and parahippocampal cortices [Figure 
28]. The authors claimed that the performance obtained in their experiments could not be due to 
non-declarative mechanisms, such as priming, because testing typically consisted of an explicit 
recognition test (3-alternatives forced-choice trials, i.e. 3AFC), whereas priming is rather revealed 
by indirect implicit measures of improved performance across time.  
 
To summarize, these authors showed that four hippocampal-damaged patients were no longer 
“amnesic” when learning consisted of a “fast-mapping” procedure, suggesting that “fast-
mapping” might bypass the hippocampal system, and in contrast to explicit learning, allows a 
rapid incorporation of new knowledge into existing cortical memory networks (see also 
Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2014). In other words, this claim of a non-hippocampal learning 
supports the idea that rapidly acquired information can be supported by structures outside the 
MTL, especially in the anterior temporal lobe, when an incidental learning procedure is used 
(Sharon et al., 2011).  
18
MVPA=Multivariate pattern analysis: method to analyze neural responses as patterns of activity 
reflecting the varying brain states. In contrast to simpler univariate measures, the MVPA method 
increases the amount of information that can be decoded from brain activity. Specifically, it 
encompasses a pattern recognition algorithm (a machine-learning classifier) that “learns” a 
functional relationship between brain response patterns and specific sensory inputs (i.e. stimuli) 
(values can be either discrete (classification) or continuous (regression)). This learned functional 
relationship is then used to predict unseen stimuli from a new dataset (“brain reading”). 
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Figure 28 – Searchlight results (two-way classification between successful vs failed recognition conditions) for the explicit encoding 
condition (a) and “fast-mapping” (FM) condition (b) across participants. Explicit encoding (a) is associated with regions in the MTL 
including the hippocampus; bilateral ventral medial prefrontal cortices (VMPFC); right lateral prefrontal cortex; anterior cingulate and right 
posterior lateral temporal neocortex. FM (b) is associated with bilateral anterior temporal lobe; posterior lateral and inferior temporal 
neocortical regions; posterior inferior occipital cortices and frontal lobe involvement (orbitofrontal, dorsolateral, ventrolateral PFC but no 
VMPFC). From Atir-sharon, Gilboa, Hazan, Koilis, & Manevitz, 2015. 
On the other hand, other studies severely contradicted this evidence. First, another study involving 
seven memory-impaired patients with hippocampal (N=6) or larger MTL (N=1) lesions failed to 
replicate the results obtained by Sharon et al., (they used the exact same paradigm and stimuli) 
(Smith, Urgolites, Hopkins, & Squire, 2014). In this study, patients were markedly impaired 
relative to age-matched healthy controls in both “fast-mapping” and explicit learning conditions 
(i.e. they did not benefit from a “fast-mapping” learning procedure). In another study, during 
which the “referent selection” trials mimicked protocols used with children (e.g. “click on the 
numbat”), hippocampal-damaged patients performed as well as healthy controls in inferring the 
their targets from the unknown words, but in contrast to the control subjects, these patients no 
longer retained the associations after a delay (Warren & Duff, 2014). The authors claimed that the 
hippocampus is not essential for on-line “fast-mapping” of novel words (i.e. referent 
selections), but is necessary for the maintenance of arbitrary relational information.  
Second, it has been shown that aged participants with reduced hippocampal grey-matter 
volume (revealed by fMRI scans) manifested poorer retention for associations acquired through 
“fast-mapping” compared to associations acquired through explicit instructions (paradigm and 
stimuli identical to the one used by Sharon et al.) (Greve, Cooper, & Henson, 2014). The authors 
found that hippocampal volumes predicted memory performance in both the “fast-mapping” and 
explicit conditions, suggesting that both learning procedures were supported by the same 
MTL structures assumed to enable rapid associative learning. On the contrary to Sharon’s 
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evidence that the anterior temporal lobe would support fast-mapping, here the authors found no 
evidence that the volumes of this brain structure predicted memory performance in either “fast-
mapping” or explicit learning (Greve et al., 2014).  
Finally, patients with Down syndrome characterized by hippocampal dysfunctions and memory 
and learning impairments did not benefit from a “fast-mapping” learning method compared to 
healthy controls nor compared to an explicit encoding method (Sakhon, Edwards, Luongo, 
Murphy, & Edgin, 2018).  
The discrepancy in the findings might arise from the fact that the populations studied are simply 
“functionally” not equivalent. For the same reason, it would be too prejudicial to infer early 
developing brain systems from the properties observed in either amnesic patients, patients with 
Down syndrome or old people. Moreover, since the “fast-mapping” and explicit encoding 
paradigms developed for adults differ from those employed with children, direct comparisons are 
unlikely. 
Conclusion 
In the first stages of language acquisition, word learning may be mediated by procedural memory 
or basic associational mechanisms and is deprived of any semantic content. From 6 months of 
age, learning a new word is associated with a referential (i.e. a meaning) component but the 
semantic priming effect disappears after a 24h delay, indicating that at that age, although word 
learning becomes semantic the knowledge no longer survives. Around 14-months of age, the 
referential connections between arbitrary sound patterns and visual displays seem to be 
maintained after a certain delay. Nonetheless, at a behavioral level, 14-month-old word learners 
require a bunch of presentations of the pairings to recall the information after a minimum delay.  
A striking developmental switch is observed between 18 and 20 months of age, which is reflected 
by (i) the vocabulary spurt phenomenon, (ii) a rapid incorporation of novel words into the 
receptive lexicon and (iii) the emergence of inferential reasoning abilities in the context of word 
learning. Maturational processes accompany those cognitive changes (e.g. increased connectivity 
within the hippocampus, reorganization of the cortical structures, onset of the lateralization 
process, etc.) but there is no consensus about which the cause is and which the consequence effect 
is.  
Moreover, word retention is still fragile at that age and has essentially been investigated 
immediately after learning. Thus, while around their second birthday children demonstrate the 
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ability to rapidly comprehend the meaning of a new word and to easily map labels onto referents, 
the memory processes underlying word learning and their development are still poorly studied and 
poorly understood. As a matter of fact, there are still conflicting discussions in the literature about 
the brain areas that underlie word learning and word retention. On one hand, theories and 
researches conducted on amnesic patients claim that the hippocampus only supports the 
memorization process of information acquired explicitly while words learned incidentally would 
be directly stored within neocortical structures. If so, why would 2-year-olds not be capable of 
recognizing fast-mapped words after a minimal delay, and conversely seemingly capable of 
retaining ostensively named words that would depend on less mature brain systems? On the other 
hand, it has been proposed that the protracted maturation of the hippocampus is mainly 
responsible for the delayed ability of children to maintain semantic (as well as episodic) 
knowledge at long-term, whatever the learning method. For semantic information to survive 
longer delays, children would rely on multiple repetitions which would strengthen the neural 
pathways. If so, what would be the minimum number of exposures to a novel word-object pair 
and the learning conditions required for the association to survive after a delay?  
The findings of previous research also indicate how crucial adequate learning conditions are for 
memories to be formed. Indeed, they suggest the aptness of ostensively naming the objects as well 
as using external cues such as pointing or holding up the objects, to foster pairing recall in 24-
month-olds after a minimum delay (see also Booth, Mcgregor, & Rohlfing, 2008). Nonetheless, 
how this fertile ground evolves during the third and fourth year of life is still another open 
question. Related to this issue, little is known about a potential gradual shift in efficiency of the 
word learning strategies presented above throughout development. Is “fast-mapping” still a “slow-
learning” process later in development? The high variability in the methods used to measure word 
retention makes it difficult to compare the findings obtained by the different researches and thus, 
to draw the developmental history of long-term memory for word-object pairs following various 
learning strategies. This constitutes one of the challenges of this thesis.  
By using a uniform and highly controlled methodology applied to child populations ranging from 
18 months to 4 years of age, we will be allowed to directly compare the efficiency of two learning 
strategies (ostensive labeling and inferential reasoning (i.e. “fast-mapping”)) on memory 
formation at different stages of the development. This will also enable us to investigate the 
minimum number of exposures required at a given age to form a memory trace, which should 
indirectly, reveal much about the putative underlying brain mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER IV. 
 EXPERIMENTAL PROJECTS 
 
1 Presentation of the project 
In this thesis, we aimed to better understand the learning conditions and principles that govern the 
formation of a memory trace for cross-modal stimuli, such as word-object pairs, during early 
childhood. We also aimed to comprehend whether and how memory formation for semantic 
knowledge evolves during development. Finally, we liked to know how long young children 
could maintain “dormant” in memory, semantic information to which they were exposed again.  
To address these questions, three children populations reflecting strategic developmental stages 
underwent different learning procedures and their knowledge for the newly acquired word-object 
associations was tested after a distractive period of 30-min, and re-tested after delays of either 1 
month or 6 months (only for subgroups of subjects). Precisely, the populations consisted of 18-
month-olds (i.e. mainly pre-vocabulary spurt children with immature hippocampal systems), 24-
month-olds (i.e. mainly post-vocabulary spurt children with immature hippocampal systems) and 
4-year-olds (i.e. children who typically speak well, have a more mature hippocampal system and 
reach the offset of the infantile amnesia phenomenon). The accuracy of each age group in 
recognizing the pairings was compared to the other age groups, to a group of adult participants 
who underwent the same teaching methods under the same conditions, and to levels expected by 
chance. 
The effect of different word learning procedures on retention was tested in this thesis. We 
especially focused on ostensive labeling and inferential reasoning (i.e. “fast-mapping”). For 
these two word learning methods, we attempted to investigate the minimal number of exposures 
that was required to trigger successful retention and intended to know whether accuracy was 
positively correlated to the number of presentations during learning.  
In order to better understand how memories for sensory information are formed during childhood 
(and adulthood), for each type of learning, we also investigated the effect of various variables on 
the retention rates (e.g. vocabulary production scores, attentiveness during learning, age and socio 
professional status (for adults), gender, etc.).  
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Finally, for each experiment, we also tried to link our findings to the existing knowledge about the 
putative brain mechanisms provided by the literature as reviewed in the last three chapters, in 
order to merge behavioral observations with neurosciences. Unfortunately, studies on behavioral 
research during development rarely address the question of the underlying mechanism, for the 
simple reason that neuroimaging investigations on young children are sparse, as explained earlier. 
Developmental researchers can primarily speculate on the basis of discoveries made on adult 
populations, like amnesic patients or healthy elderly persons. Here, we similarly attempted to find 
rational explanations for the results we obtained on the basis of current knowledge predominantly 
gained from non-children populations.  
2 Overall materials and methods 
This part of the thesis consists of 6 experiments; three are achieved, and three are ongoing 
projects. Since the same methodology and apparatus are implemented throughout the different 
experiments, an overall methodological section is developed below. The specificity of the 
methods for each individual experiment will be recapitulated along with each corresponding 
experiment.  
2.1 Collaborations 
This thesis was carried out in collaboration with Olivier Pascalis and Hélène Loevenbruck, two 
researchers working at the LPNC (Laboratoire de Psychologie et NeuroCognition, CNRS, 
UMR5105) of Grenoble. Olivier and Hélène provided their useful expertise and advice which 
helped in designing the experiments. They also gave precious feedback about the results and 
proposed perspectives to the work. Each time I visited them, they put their Babylab at my disposal 
to facilitate the execution of the experiments. About half of the recruited participants underwent 
our experiments in the Babylab of the LPNC and the second half in the Babylab of CerCo as soon 
as the ethical committee for the protection of human (Comité de Protection des Personnes, CPP) 
gave its consent for starting the experiments at CerCo (12/2017). To avoid biases due to the 
experimenter, the same investigator (myself) ran all experiments. The apparatus and procedure 
were identical in the two localities and the experimental room and conditions were highly similar 
(small and cozy rooms adapted for children, toys available in a box for playing during the 
distractive phase, etc.). Each study involved participants from both localities. Since no differences 
in performance were found between the two places, we grouped the subjects into a same sample 
and did not further distinguish this variable in the analyses.  
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2.2 Participants 
Overall, 278 children and 89 adults were recruited and underwent one of the six following 
experiments. Child participants consisted of 29 eighteen-month-olds, 145 twenty-four-month-
olds and 104 four-year-olds. In Toulouse, children were recruited in child-care centers and 
preschools. In Grenoble, children were recruited from the LPNC’s internal Babylab dataset of 
parents who have consented for their children to participate in research studies. For each 
experiment, a certain number of children could not be included in the analyses for diverse reasons 
(that will be reported separately for each experiment). Eighteen-month-olds’ and twenty-four-
month-olds’ receptive and productive vocabularies were measured using a French-word checklist 
(IFDC, a French adaptation of the short MCDI MacArthur-Bates devised by Kern, Langue, 
Zesiger, & Bovet, 2010). Adults constituted a control group, and were naïve to the purpose of the 
study to enable comparison with the groups of children. To that aim, adults were initially recruited 
as survey participants to evaluate the use of touch-screens in preschools. At the end of the 
experiment, adult subjects were asked whether they had anticipated the final retention test. In 
total, twelve out of the 89 subjects claimed they did. Their data were not included in the final 
analyses and additional participants were recruited. The children and adult participants were all 
native French speakers. Some participants were exposed to a second language in a regular or 
irregular frequency (that will also be detailed separately for each experiment). 
2.3 Ethics 
The project as a whole was approved by the French ethical committee for the protection of human 
subjects (CPP, IdRCB n°2017-A03515-48), and by two local Ethics Committees for Non-
Interventional Research (Grenoble: CERNI, IRB00010290-2018-02-06-39; Toulouse: CERNI, 
2017-059). All participants and their legal care-takers respectively gave oral and informed written 
consent before experimentation. 
2.4 Stimuli 
Prior to the task, color photographs of five familiar and eight novel stimuli were shown to the 
participant’s parents to ensure that the child was familiar with the known objects and completely 
unfamiliar and unable to label the novel ones. Objects that did not respect these criteria were 
removed from the set. Familiar objects consisted of a cup, a spoon, a book, a hammer and a car. 
Novel stimuli consisted of manually modified toys, which do not have a proper label in French. 
The investigator randomly chose three familiar and three novel objects from the remaining set.  
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Auditory stimuli consisted of pre-recorded labeling phrases ending with a bi-syllabic pseudo-word 
repeated three times in a row. A list of twelve child-adequate pseudo-words was generated based 
on the work by Dohen et al. (2016). These pseudo-words were built so as to include sequences of 
syllables (each pseudo-word was composed of two syllables; each of them with a different first 
and second syllable) with high phonotactical probability in French children directed speech. 
Phonotactical probability was computed based on the methods of French child-directed speech 
corpora described in Monnin (2010). Pseudo-words were always preceded by an indefinite article 
(“un” or “une”, meaning “a”). This list of pseudo-words was also given to the parents prior to the 
task for novelty approval. Auditory stimuli were recorded by a female native French speaker and 
normalized for intensity using Audacity®, a free, Cross-Platform Sound Editor. The durations of 
all pseudo-words were highly similar (M: 490.17 ms, SD: 62.17 ms). The investigator randomly 
assigned a pseudo-word to each novel object to learn. Pairings of pseudo-words and objects were 
counterbalanced across participants.  
 Learning stimuli 2.4.1
During the learning session, stimuli were presented in short video sequences, each lasting 
precisely 15s, during which the object was briefly manipulated by an experimenter’s hand and 
labeled three times in a row before disappearing [Figure 29]. The first utterance was a simple 
carrier phrase designed to focus the attention of the child to the object. The following two 
utterances simply consisted of the pseudo-word preceded by its randomly chosen indefinite article 
(e.g. “Regarde! Ça c’est un rivou, un rivou, un rivou”; meaning “Look! This is a rivou, a rivou, a 
rivou”). Since many 18- and 24-month-olds were easily distracted during the learning phase, 
pronouncing the label 3 times in a row insured that young participants heard the name of each 
object properly. Moreover, when a child was not focused on the video-clip, the investigator draws 
his/her attention back to the screen by saying “hey look at here”. Only the hand of the 
experimenter was seen in the video, manipulating and leaving the object static on the table. The 
female voice was played when the object was static on the table. 
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Figure 29 - Illustration of a video sequence used for the learning phase. During the video clip, the novel object was manually displayed,  
briefly manipulated by the hand of an experimenter, and labelled three times in a row in an ecological utterance while remaining static on the 
table (e.g., “Regarde! Ça c’est un rivou, un rivou, un rivou”; meaning “Look! This is a rivou, a rivou, a rivou”). The object was removed 
after being labelled. Video duration: 15s. 
 Testing stimuli 2.4.2
During the retention session, stimuli consisted of static color photographs of the three objects, 
simultaneously displayed on the screen. So, testing consisted of 3-Alternative Forced-Choice 
(3AFC) trials. For each trial, participants heard audio recordings of the same female speaker, 
asking to touch the image corresponding to the newly learned pseudo-words. The utterances used 
simple syntactic constructions with a definite determiner preceding the pseudo- words, which are 
typical of child-adult interactive play in French. The audio recording was played 2100ms after 
trial onset. One out of three pre-recorded utterances was selected for each child (e.g., “Il est où le 
rivou?”; meaning “Where is the rivou?”). 
2.5 Apparatus 
The experiment was run using a Windows Surface Pro 4 (display size 12.3”, display resolution 
2736 x 1824 (5MP)) and generated from a self-developed program under Python software. The 
touch-screen was placed at arm-distance, facing the child using an articulated mount securely 
attached on a table. 
2.6 Procedure 
During the experiment, children sat on a booster seat next to their parents or on their parent’s lap, 
facing the touch-screen placed at a 70 cm distance to facilitate pointing [Figure 30]. Participants 
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provided answers by touching on the screen. Parents were instructed to avoid interactions with 
their children but could encourage them to respond if necessary. To avoid any bias, the 
investigator stood behind the participant. For the adult group, subjects were instructed to test and 
evaluate an application designed for children.  
 
Figure 30 – Photograph of a child participant performing the experiment 
The study began with three warm-up trials [Figure 31]. During this familiarization training phase, 
each familiar object was introduced to the participants in short video sequences of 15s duration. 
During a follow-up 3AFC testing phase, color photographs of the three familiar objects were 
presented simultaneously on the screen in a triangular configuration, each familiar object serving 
as target once. As some pilot experiments found that some children could demonstrate a strong 
bias toward a specific position or object irrespective of the label pronounced, each of these 3 
warm-up test trials was correct-answer-blocked, in the sense that only a correct answer could 
launch the following trial. This warm-up session was immediately followed by the novel word-
object pairs learning phase [Figure 31 & Figure 32]. Each novel object was introduced to the 
participants a variable number of times. This learning phase followed the same procedure as 
previously described for familiar items.  
 
Figure 31  - Schematic of the learning and testing sequences 
After learning, children were allowed to play in the experimental room for a 30-min period while 
their parents completed the IFDC, the French productive vocabulary checklist. During the 
corresponding period, adult participants were asked to fill in a survey about their general opinion 
on the use of touch-screens in preschools. Then, they completed 5 different neuropsychological 
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tests (MOCA, “Fluence verbale”, fNART, “Codes”, and “Figures”) to keep them busy for the 
entire time interval.  
 
Figure 32 - Illustration of the learning and testing procedures for novel objects. Participants were presented with 3 novel objects paired to 
arbitrary chosen labels. Participants initiated each learning trial themselves by pressing a red button on the center of the touch screen. During 
learning, each object appeared in a short video sequence of 15s duration. After a 30-min distractive period, retention was tested using a 3 
alternative forced-choice (3AFC) procedure consisting of 9 trials. No feedback was provided but to keep participants focused and to 
encourage them to continue, each test trial was followed by a 3s GIF animation showing a moving penguin accompanied by a stimulating 
sentence such as “on continue?” (meaning: “should we continue?”).  
Retention test trials for novel objects implemented the same 3 AFC task procedure as with the 
familiar warm-up trials, except that each novel object served as target three times in an 
interspersed fashion (testing session = 9 trials) and any answer could trigger the following trial 
(trials were not correct-answer-blocked in this case) [Figure 31 & Figure 32]. This repeated 
testing procedure is largely employed in the literature, especially in ostensive naming paradigms 
(e.g. Bion et al., 2013c; Gurteen, Horne, & Erjavec, 2011a; Hollich et al., 2000; Houston-Price et 
al., 2005; L. Smith & Yu, 2008; Wojcik, 2017; Woodward, Markman, & Fitzsimmons, 1994a). 
For both familiar and novel objects’ test trials, the position of the target object was pseudo-
randomized with the constraint that the target could not appear at the same screen position for 
more than two consecutive trials. There were no time constraints for responding but to avoid 
impulsive responses to be recorded as answers, a minimum delay of 500ms after label onset was 
required to record the participants’ touching response. Moreover, the verbal instruction was 
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repeated after a 6s interval if no answer was given. Participants had no feedback on their 
responses but a neutral GIF animation encouraged them to continue [Figure 32].   
2.7 Analyses 
 Accuracy during testing 2.7.1
Tactile touching responses during the retention test trials were automatically recorded and 
analyzed as a measure of retention. For each age group, the level of performance, calculated as the 
proportion of hits (i.e. trials for which each participant correctly identified the referent), was 
compared to levels expected by chance, i.e. 33% (the three newly learned objects appeared 
simultaneously on the screen at each test trial) in binomial tests. In some cases, one-tailed 
univariate t-tests against chance (33%) were additionally conducted to enable comparison with 
studies that only use this statistical measurement. Note that this statistical analysis gives a less 
refined overview of the results as it considers the mean performance instead of individual 
performance. For each age group, the effect size (Cohen’s D) of the performance was also 
calculated. This quantitative measure of the amplitude of the effect, evaluating the strength of the 
statistical claim, represents a more refined interpretation of the results. The magnitude of the 
effect sizes given by the values of the Cohen’s D, suggested by Cohen (1988) and later expanded 
by Sawilowsky (2009) are the following: very small, 0 ≤ d ≤ 0.01; small, 0.01 ≤ d ≤ 0.2; medium, 
0.2 ≤ d ≤ 0.5; large, 0.5 ≤ d ≤ 0.8; very large, 0.8 ≤ d ≤ 1.2 and huge, d ≥ 1.2 .  
 Differences between groups 2.7.2
Next, to assess whether there were differences in performance between groups, generalized linear 
mixed-models (GLMM) were performed, including “age group” (or “learning condition”) as the 
fixed effect, repeated measures on individuals as a random effect and the hit rate (i.e. the 
dependent variable) as binomial data (0 or 1). This model compares the performance of the 
different groups between each other while preserving the data of each test trial of each subject and 
considering repeated measurements (each participant underwent multiple test trials) as random 
effects. A GLMM model is the one that best fits binomial data. 
Our device also recorded the time participants took to response after label onset (i.e. delay 
between label onset and tactile response). One-way ANOVAs were used to assess mean time 
differences between groups. Follow-up Tuckey post-hoc tests indicated where the significant 
differences originated from. 
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 Effect of the language level 2.7.3
For the younger age groups, we collected their receptive (only for 18-month-olds) and productive 
vocabulary scores (for 18-month-olds and 24-month-olds) on the basis of the IFDC checklist. In 
order to examine whether there was a correlation between the mean performance score of 
participants during testing and their level of language in reception and/or production, we 
conducted linear regressions that kept the continuous gradient of the IFDC scores (i.e. from 0 to 
100%). Next, we assigned five language-level categories according to the IFDC scores. Precisely, 
we allocated the categories as following:  
- Pre-vocabulary spurt: 0 ≤ IFDC production score (%) ≤ 20  
- Begin vocabulary spurt: 20 ≤ IFDC production score (%) ≤ 40 
- Vocabulary spurt: 40 ≤ IFDC production  (%) ≤ 60 
- Advanced vocabulary spurt: 60 ≤ IFDC production score (%) ≤ 80 
- Post-vocabulary spurt: 80 ≤ IFDC production score (%) ≤ 100 
One-way ANOVAs were used to assess whether there were differences in accuracy between 
language-level categories. Follow-up Tuckey post-hoc tests were used to determine the origin(s) 
of the difference(s). 
 Effect of attentiveness  2.7.4
The experiments were videotaped (camera centered on the participants’ eyes), which enabled us to 
measure for each participant his/her score of attentiveness during learning. Using the VPVideoLab 
software developed by researchers of the LPNC research center of Grenoble, two coders reported 
the number of times children looked away from the screen during the presentations of the videos. 
In addition, for each participant, they also measured the total looking time outside of the screen, 
transcribed in percentage (% distractibility). From this value a score of attentiveness could be 
established. Linear regressions were conducted in order to determine whether accuracy and 
attentiveness during learning were correlated.  
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3 FIRST EXPERIMENT. Ostensive labeling: effect of the number 
of presentations on word retention 
3.1 Introduction 
One claim at the heart of the M4 project is that the memory strength increases roughly linearly 
with the number of presentations during the initial encoding phase (#claim N°3). As detailed in 
the beginning on this manuscript, it is assumed that a strengthening process of activated neural 
networks across repeatedly presented stimuli would result in highly selective neurons (Masquelier 
& Thorpe, 2007). The connections between the recruited synapses would be reinforced and 
stabilized across the repeated exposures whereas unreinforced synaptic connections would 
degrade. It has been claimed that such a biological mechanism would enable long-term memories 
to remain intact in the absence of reactivation during the intervening period (Larzabal, Bacon-
macé, Muratot, & Thorpe, 2017; Thorpe, 2011). At a behavioral level, this claim posits that the 
more a pattern is repeated during learning, the better would an individual be at remembering it 
after a delay. In adults, it has indeed been evidenced that performance increased with the number 
of repetitions of images briefly presented in a stream of hundreds or thousands of visual stimuli 
displayed in very rapid succession (RSVP, i.e. rapid serial visual presentation) (Thunell & 
Thorpe, 2019a). Interestingly, the authors found that even only two presentations were sufficient 
to enable recalling above chance levels after a brief delay of minutes (Thunell & Thorpe, 2019a). 
In this experiment, we aimed to know if such a rule would also apply to an early-developing brain 
system. One might hypothesize that infants and young children are perhaps similarly reliant on 
repetition to acquire and store knowledge about their surrounding environment. A repetition-based 
learning mechanism may even be more crucial for infants and young children since their neural 
system matures und undergoes heavy structural changes during the first years of life, such as 
dramatic synaptic pruning as reviewed in the previous chapter. In the context of word learning, 
similar connectionist and associative Hebbian theories have indeed been proposed to support 
retention of receptive vocabularies (McMurray et al 2012). As detailed earlier, those theories posit 
that over the course of appearance of bimodal sensory inputs in a temporal contiguity, the 
connection weights that are originally random and weak may either become strengthened (if 
recruited) or pruned (if spurious connections) (McMurray et al 2012). 
Moreover, considering repetition as a key component of memory formation during childhood also 
makes sense regarding the developmental segregation between the onset of semantic memories 
(basically build upon repetitive learning events) and episodic memories (unitary personal events). 
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As reviewed previously, some authors suggested that declarative memory is primarily semantic, 
whereas long-lasting episodic memory presumably only emerges after the second year of life, as 
reflected by the phenomenon of infantile amnesia (Newcombe, 2015). The underlying question is 
how many exposures to the sensory inputs a young child would require for forming a memory that 
would survive after a delay. This question, as well as the claim that memory is positively 
correlated to the number of exposures during encoding, have never been directly tested in children 
with complex cross-modal stimuli, such as word-object pairs. In the context of ostensive labeling, 
from the overall literature reviewed above, it can be suggested that the number of exposures 
necessary to induce comprehension on immediate test trials tends to decrease during development 
(e.g. Gurteen et al, 2011; Schafer & Plunkett, 1998; Woodward et al, 1994; Bion et al, 2013). 
Nonetheless, since most of those studies investigated word learning immediately after learning, it 
is not clear whether the immediate understanding of a word’s meaning would have translated into 
durable memory traces. It might be that the number of exposures required to induce immediate 
word comprehension may not be sufficient to promote a longer retention.  
In this first experiment, we aimed to investigate developmental retention abilities after a 30-min 
delay, according to a varying number of exposures to the cross-sensory inputs during learning. 
Specifically, we exposed 18-month-olds, 24-month-olds, 4-year-olds, and adults (control group) 
to three word-object pairs that were ostensively presented 1, 3 or 5 times each. Retention was 
measured using a 3AFC procedure after a 30-min distractive period. Children (and adult) 
participants were kept busy during the entire distractive period (playing, drawing, eating, filling-in 
a survey, etc.) to minimize the possibility that they would have internally rehearsed the knowledge 
they just acquired. It is assumed that young children are not able to actively maintain information 
in their working-memory as adults can do. First of all, because the prefrontal cortex is the latest 
brain region to mature and is still in a profound maturational stage in children under 5 years of age 
(see chapter 1 for more details), and second because our young participants were not aware about 
the following test, and thus had no obvious reason to maintain the information active for a near 
future use. Therefore, we assume that if retention is observed after a 30-min distractive period, 
consolidation processes should have already begun during this intervening period.  
We hypothesized that children’s accuracy to remember the names of objects after this time delay 
may be positively correlated to the number of times they saw those associations during learning. 
We also expected differences between age groups, namely the older age groups should perform 
better than the younger ones. We had no serious expectation about the minimal number of 
presentation that would be necessary to induce word retention after this 30-min delay, but we 
112 
 
supposed that the older age groups (4-y-olds and adults) would require fewer exposures than the 
younger age groups (18- and 24-month-olds) to demonstrate retention.  
3.2 Methods 
 Participants 3.2.1
Participants consisted of 26 eighteen-month-olds, 36 twenty-four-month-olds, 28 four-year-olds 
and 20 adults. Data from 7 eighteen-month-olds were not included in the analyses due to fussiness 
(n=5), technical problems (n=1), or parental support (n=1). Data from 15 twenty-four-month-olds 
could not be included in the analyses due to fussiness (n=10), technical problems (n=2), object 
bias (i.e. selection of the same object on all test trials, n=1), side bias (i.e. selection of the same 
position of the screen on all test trials, n=1) and failure to engage in the task (n=1). Finally, data 
from 8 four-year-olds also had to be excluded from the analyses, due to technical problems (i.e. 
the sound system did not work; n=4), suspected audition troubles (n=1), side bias (n=1) and 
fussiness (n=2). Details about the final sample are represented in the Table 1.  
 Procedure 3.2.2
The methodology corresponded to the description provided in the section “Materials and 
Methods” with the precision that each object appeared a different number of times, interspersed. 
Specifically, one object appeared only once (i.e. participants watched a unique 15s video-clip 
during which the object was briefly manipulated and labeled 3 times in a row), another appeared 
three times and the last one five times interspersed. In total, the learning phase consisted of 9 
video-clips presented in a random order. The number of presentations (1, 3 or 5) was randomly 
attributed to each object. In this within-subjects procedure, participants were their own controls. 
Testing occurred after a 30-min distractive period and consisted of 9 trials (3 test trials/object) as 
described in the “Materials and Methods” section.  
3.3 Results 
 Main results 3.3.1
In order to determine whether the number of presentations of cross-modal sensory inputs during 
learning affects later retention, participants was taught 3 novel word-object pairs to which they 
were exposed a varying number of times. Each subject saw one object only once, another one 
three times and the last one five times, interspersed.  
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Table 1 – Details about the composition and results of each age group. 
Age groups 18-Mo 24-Mo 4-Y Adults 
N subjects 19 20 20 20 
N females 11 10 9 10 
Mean age (±SD) 18.23 Mo (±0.98) 24.03 Mo (±0.62) 4.24 Y (±0.31) 31.21 Y (±11.13) 
N subjects with older siblings 
at home 
9 7 9 - 
N subjects exposed to 
another language at home 
5 7 1 3 
Mean overall accuracy 
(% correct trials) (±SD) 
39.4 (±17.46) 58.9 (±25) 67.2 (±22.3) 92.8 (±16.6) 
P (exact binomial tests) 0.22 1.45e-12 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 
Cohen’s  D 0.37 1.04 1.53 3.6 
Mean RT (sec) (±SD) 6.65 (±3.9) 4.28 (±2.13) 2.63 (±0.76) 1.65 (±0.75) 
Mean attentiveness during 
learning (%) (±SD) 
88.13 (±6.99) 93.31 (±5.72) 98.69 (±0.59) - 
IFDC score (voc in reception) 
(%) (±SD) 
81.9 (±11.7) - - - 
IFDC score (voc in 
production) (%) (±SD) 
24.8 (±20.1) 69.4 (±25.6)   
Neuropsycho-tests scores (%) 
(±SD) 
- - - 80.23 (±7.91) 
Mean Accuracy 1 REP 
(% correct trials) [CI95%] 
29.8 [18.4-43.4] 46.7 [33.7-60.0] 53.3 [39.9-66.3] 88.3 [77.4-95.2] 
P 1 REP (binomial tests) 0.67 0.028 0.0013 <2.2e
-16 
Mean Accuracy 3 REP 
(% correct trials) [CI95%] 
41.1 [28.1-55.0] 61.7 [48.2-73.9] 70.0 [56.8-81.1] 93.3 [83.8-98.1] 
P 3 REP (binomial tests) 0.20 6.26e
-06 6.26e-09 <2.2e-16 
Mean Accuracy 5 REP 
(% correct trials) [CI95%] 
47.4 [34.0-61.0] 68.3 [55.0-79.7] 78.3 [65.8-87.9] 96.6 [88.5-99.6] 
P 5 REP (binomial tests) 0.02 4.04e
-08 7.65e-13 <2.2e-16 
Mean RT 1 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
7.48 (±8.84) 4.7 (±3.72) 3.29 (±2.12) 1.87 (±1.45) 
Mean RT 3 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
7.63 (±5.53) 4.44 (±2.89) 2.5 (±0.83) 1.96 (±0.91) 
Mean RT 5 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
5.95 (±4.65) 3.35 (±1.61) 2.76 (±0.98) 1.57 (±0.54) 
 
Overall results  
Overall results demonstrate that 18-month-olds did not choose the targets greater than chance 
levels (M= 39.4%, CI95% = [30.3-45.3], exact binomial p=0.37) [Table 1 & Figure 33, A].  In 
contrast, 24-month-olds performed significantly above chance level on this task (M= 58.9%, CI95% 
= [51.3-66.1], exact binomial p<0.001***) with a very large effect size [Table 1 & Figure 33, 
A]. Children of 4-years of age similarly chose the target object significantly more often than 
would have been expected by chance (M= 67.2%, CI95% = [59.8-74], exact binomial p<0.001***) 
with a huge effect size [Table 1 & Figure 33, A]. As expected, adults performed highly above 
chance level (M= 92.8%, CI95% = [74-86.5], exact binomial p<0.001***) again with a huge effect 
size [Table 1 & Figure 33, A]. To summarize, our results show that all age groups except the 18-
month-old age group successfully recognized the newly learned word-object pairs after a 30-min 
delay.  
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Our apparatus also recorded the time participants took to respond after they heard the label (i.e. 
time elapsed between label onset and tactile response; Response Time (RT)). Logically, if an 
individual can recognize a stimulus well, he/she might be expected to respond faster when 
encountering this stimulus again compared to a poorly retained one. As suggested by the Figure 
34, for all age groups except for the 18-month-old age group, there seems to be a correlation 
between the performance of participants and the time they needed to respond [Figure 34]. 
Specifically, the more accurate were the participants, the faster they seemed to respond during 
testing. However, simple linear regressions did not establish any significant correlation between 
the hit rate and the RT of 18-month-olds (F(1,17)=0.69, R2=0.04, p=0.4). Despite the strong 
trends observable on the graphs, significant correlations could neither be identified for the 24-
month-old group (F(1,18)=3.16, R2=0.15, p=0.09) nor for the adult group (F(1,18)=0.87, R2=0.04, 
Figure 33 – A. Boxplots representing the performance of 
the 4 age groups during the 3AFC retention task. Boxplots 
show the median (full-line). Dashed lines represent the 33% 
chance level (dark grey) and the 95% confidence interval 
around chance (light grey). Individual mean performances are 
depicted in circles. B. Heatmap recapitulating the statistical 
values of the performance of each age group compared to 
chance level (0.33; binomial tests), and between age groups 
(GLMMs) The color scale indicates the p-values given by the 
statistical tests from not significant (n.s.; p>0.05; light blue), 
significant (0.05≤p≤0.01; light yellow), very significant 
(0.01≤p≤0.001; orange) to highly significant (p<0.001; red). 
The exact p-values are indicated in each cell of the matrix. 
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p=0.36). A significant correlation was only established for the participants of the 4-year-old group 
(F(1,18)=6.89, R2=0.27, p=0.017*). 
 
Figure 34 – Graphs showing the mean performance of each individual during testing according to his/her Response Time (RT). The four 
age groups are represented (18-month-olds (yellow); 24-month-olds (red); 4-year-olds (green); adults (blue)). Each filled circle represents an 
individual. Lines represent the linear regressions and the grey shadows indicate the 95% confident intervals around mean. 
Next, we aimed to determine if the performance and the Response Time significantly differed 
between groups.  
First, a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) was conducted to investigate whether there were 
significant differences in performance between age groups. The heatmap of the Figure 33 (B.) 
summarizes the p-values revealed by the model, and uses a color scale to better visualize the 
significant differences. Overall, the model indicates that adults significantly outperformed the 
three child groups. No significant difference was measured between 24-month-olds and 4-year-
olds. Finally, the model shows that 18-month-olds performed significantly worse than the older 
age groups. Further analyses were conducted in order to better understand why 18-month-olds had 
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overall poorer retention scores than 24-month-olds. These analyses are reported in the 
“complementary analyses” below. 
Second, a one-way ANOVA revealed significant RT differences between age groups 
(F(3,75)=18.13, p=6.03e-09). Follow-up Tuckey post-hoc tests indicated that the mean Response 
Time of the 18-month-old participants was significantly longer than for 24-month-olds (adjusted 
p=0.008**), 4-year-olds (adjusted p<0.001***) and adult participants (adjusted p<0.001***). 
Twenty-four-month-olds required significantly more time to respond than adults (adjusted 
p=0.002**) but not more than 4-year-olds (adjusted p=0.1). Finally, the overall RT of the 4-year-
old group did not significantly differ from that of the adult group (adjusted p=0.5).  
Minimal number of presentations to induce retention 
Next, in order to examine the minimal number of exposures that induced a significant retention, 
binomial tests for each age group and for each pair separately were conducted (see Table 1 for the 
detailed statistical values). Interestingly, results showed that the pair presented only once trigged 
significant retention scores in 24-month-olds, 4-year-olds and adults [Table 1 & Figure 35]. 
Eighteen-month-olds performed greater than chance levels only for the pair presented five times 
[Table 1 & Figure 35]. 
Effect of the number of presentations on memory 
We also investigated whether the performance of each age group was correlated to the number of 
presentations of the pairings during learning [Table 1 & Figure 35]. At first glance, and across 
the different age groups, the ability of participants to recognize the associated name after a 30-min 
delay does appear to improve and become faster when the object is presented more times during 
learning. For each age group separately, a GLMM was conducted in order to examine if the 
performance improved significantly with the number of presentations. For those GLMMs, the 
“number of presentations” corresponded to the fixed effect (1, 3 and 5). For the 18-month-old 
group, the model revealed a slightly significant increase of the performance for the pair seen 5 
times compared to the pair seen only once (GLMM, Z-value=1.91, p=0.05*). No significant 
differences were established between the conditions 1-3 presentations (GLMM, Z-value=1.25, 
p=0.2) and 3-5 presentations (GLMM, Z-value=0.67, p=0.5). Similarly, the model indicated that 
24-month-olds performed greater for the pair seen 5 times compared to the pair seen only once 
(GLMM, Z-value=2.58, p=0.01**) but no significant differences were established by the model 
between the conditions 1-3 presentations (GLMM, Z-value=1.8, p=0.07) and 3-5 presentations 
(GLMM, Z-value=0.8, p=0.42). For the 4-year-old group, the model revealed significant 
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differences in the performance between the conditions 1-3 presentations (GLMM, Z-value=2.0, 
p=0.04*) and 1-5 presentations (GLMM, Z-value=3.01, p=0.003**), but not between the 
conditions 3-5 presentations (GLMM, Z-value=1.11, p=0.26). For the adult group, significant 
differences were only established between the conditions 1-5 presentations (GLMMs, Z-value1-
3=1.23, p=0.2; Z-value3-5=1.02, p=0.3; Z-value1-5=2.02, p=0.04*).  
Overall, in accordance with our expectations, repeated presentations of the word-object pairs 
positively influenced retention in all age groups, especially when the pairs were presented five 
times compared to a unique presentation. Only in the 4-year-old group was there clear evidence 
for an increase of performance between the pair seen only once and the one seen three times.  
In addition, for each age group, we examined if the number of presentations influenced the RT 
[Table 1 & Figure 35]. Again, except for the 4-year-old group, the number of presentations did 
appear to result in faster responses during testing. However, none of these tendencies reached 
significant levels, indicating in the end that we cannot conclude that participants really responded 
faster for the pairs seen a higher number of times.  
 
Figure 35 – Graphics representing the mean performance (% of correct touching responses, ± SEM) (A) and the mean Response Time (RT, 
± SEM) (B) of each age group according to the number of presentations of the pairs during learning (1, 3 and 5 presentations). On graphical 
A dashed lines represent the 33% chance level (dark grey) and the 95% confidence interval around chance (light grey). 
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 Complementary analyses  3.3.2
Language level 
To go further, we sought to determine the source of the difference in overall performance between 
the 18-month group and the 24-month group. First, we hypothesized that the language level may 
play an important role in the ability of children to learn and memorize new words after very few 
exposures. 
We found a significant difference in the mean scores of verbal production between 18-month-olds 
(M=24.8, SD=20.1) and 24-month-olds (M=69.4, SD=25.6; t=-6.07, p=5.75e-7***) [Figure 36]. 
Table 2 – Summary of the number of subjects and mean accuracy of the two younger age groups (18- and 24-month-olds) according to the 
five language-level categories.  
 
When assigning the verbal production score of each participant to its corresponding language-
level category (see “Materials and methods”), we observed that none of the 18-month-old 
participants reached the ‘post-vocabulary spurt” category and that most of them were in the “pre-
vocabulary spurt” category by the day of the experiment (11 out of 19 subjects) [Table 2]. In 
contrast, most 24-month-old participants reached the “post-vocabulary spurt’ category (9 out of 
20) and none of them had a production rate inferior to 20 words (i.e. “pre-vocabulary spurt” 
category).  
In sum, by the day of the experiment, most of the 18-month-old subjects we recruited were pre-
vocabulary spurts whereas most of the 24-month-olds yet underwent the vocabulary spurt 
phenomenon, which is in accordance with the literature. 
We were not able to evaluate whether there was also a discrepancy in the lexical receptive scores 
between the two age groups since the IFDC checklist does not include this measurement for 24-
month-olds. 
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Figure 36 – Graphical representing the mean performance of each individual during testing according to his/her IFDC productive 
vocabulary score (i.e. a 100-word French checklist). Each individual is depicted in a filled circle (18-month-olds (yellow); 24-month-olds 
(red)). Lines represent the linear regression calculated by the model for each age group separately (18-month-olds (yellow); 24-month-olds 
(red)) and the transparent curves indicate the 95% confident intervals around mean. 
Next, in order to assess whether receptive and/or productive scores influenced word learning, 
linear regressions were conducted for the 18- and 24-month-old groups separately (continuous 
gradient of IFDC scores). For the 18-month-old group, there was nearly a significant correlation 
between the verbal production score of children participants and their mean performance to 
recognize word-object pairs (F(1,17)=3.87, R2=0.19, p=0.06) [Figure 36]. However, no 
significant correlation was established between their receptive score and their mean performance 
during testing (F(1,17)=0.7, R2=0.03, p=0.41). Note that 18-month-olds’ receptive scores were on 
average very high (M=81.96%, SD=11.7) and close to the maximal score attainable (100%) which 
may explain the absence of correlation. For the 24-month-old group, there was no significant 
correlation between the verbal production score and the mean retention score of participants 
during testing (F(1,18)=0.62, R2=0.03, p=0.44) [Figure 36].  
When analyzing the data according to the five language-level categories, we found a significant 
effect of the language level on performance in the 18-month group (AOV, F(3,15)=5.7, 
p=0.008**) [Table 2]. Tuckey post-hoc tests indicated that participants from the “vocabulary 
spurt” category performed significantly better than those from the “pre-vocabulary spurt” 
category (adjusted p=0.005**), the “begin vocabulary spurt” category (adjusted p=0.02*) and 
curiously the “advanced vocabulary spurt” category (adjusted p=0.03*). Note however that the 
vocabulary spurt group consisted of a single subject (an outlier) and the advanced vocabulary 
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spurt group of only two subjects; thus these results cannot give rise to objective interpretations. 
For the 24-month group, no significant differences in performance could be established between 
the subjects allocated to the various language-level categories (AOV, F(3,16)=1.96, p=0.16). 
Attentiveness during learning 
We also hypothesized that the difference in performance between 18- and 24-month-olds could 
arise from differences in their capability to remain concentrated during learning. Specifically, we 
suspected that18-month-olds were more distracted during learning than 24-month-olds, which 
could have affected their ability to retain the associations. To investigate this hypothesis, we 
measured the percentage of time participants looked away from the screen during learning 
(analysis of the eye movements). We were then able to calculate a score of attentiveness during 
learning. We found that 18-month-olds as a group (M=88.13%; SD=6.99) were indeed 
significantly less attentive than 24-month-olds (M=93.31%; SD=5.72) (Wilcoxon, W=185.5, 
p=0.029*) [Figure 36]. 
 
Figure 37 - Graphical representing the mean performance of each individual during testing according to his/her score of attentiveness 
during learning (in %). Each individual is depicted in a filled circle (18-month-olds (yellow); 24-month-olds (red)). Lines represent the linear 
regression calculated by the model for each age group separately (18-month-olds (yellow); 24-month-olds (red)) and the transparent curves 
indicate the 95% confident intervals around mean. 
Next, we investigated whether differences in attentiveness affected retention within each age 
group. Although higher the scores of attentiveness seemed to be associated with higher accuracy 
in the  24-month-olds, linear regressions did not reveal significant correlations between 
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participants’ scores of attentiveness during learning and their following performance at 
remembering the names of the objects during testing (F18-Mo(1,13)=0.05, R
2=0.004, p=0.82; F24-
Mo(1,15)=0.87, R
2=0.055, p=0.36) [Figure 37]. Note that the overall scores of attentiveness of 
both samples were very high (≥88% in mean) which may explain the absence of significant 
differences. Note that participants who were clearly not concentrated during learning were not 
included in the final sample (they were categorized as “fussiness” participants in the methods) as 
it is commonly done in the literature. 
Inter-individual variability within age groups 
Within each age group, our overall results show a high inter-subject variability in performance 
during testing [Figure 33]. As demonstrated above, for the 18- and 24-month-old groups 
independently, this variability does not arise from differences in attention during learning, neither 
from differences in language skills. Linear models that included these two variables 
concomitantly (“attentiveness” and “language level” (continuous variables)) did not establish any 
significant interactions between those two variables (F18-Mo(3,11)=0.9, R
2=0.2, p=0.46 ; F24-
Mo(3,13)=0.2, R
2=0.05, p=0.84). 
Moreover, in no age group did we find a gender effect or an age effect. Living with older siblings 
(i.e. only siblings a few years older were considered) [Table 1] did not appear to influence word 
learning (GLMM, Z18-Mo=-0.7, p=0.46; Z24-Mo=0.69, p=0.48; Z4Y=0.79, p=0.43). In 24-month-
olds, we found a significant effect of being regularly exposed to a second language at home* 
(GLMM, Z24-Mo=2.07, p=0.038*). In adults, there was no correlation between the scores obtained 
on the neuropsychological tests performed during the distractive period [Table 1] and the 
retention rates (GLMM, Z=1.77, p=0.07). In addition, within the adult group we did not find an 
age effect (R2=0.01, p=0.67), and nor was there an effect of the socio-professional status 
(“students” vs “workers”). Overall, the various variables we explored did not allow us to 
accurately determine the source(s) of the inter-individual variability observed within each age 
group. We only found that being regularly exposed to a second language seems to positively 
influence word learning in 2-year-olds.  
*Note that participants were all native French speakers and that French had to be the dominant 
language to be included in our study. Before the experiment, we gathered information from the 
caregivers, in particular the presence of older siblings (and their age) and the exposure rate to 
another language (e.g. a nanny speaking another language, regular contact with members of the 
family speaking another language, regular exposure to TV clips in another language, etc.). 
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Children with an estimated exposure rate of at least 30% (but less than 50%) to another language 
constituted the subgroup “second language” of the “language” variable.  
3.4 Discussion 
In this first experiment, we aimed to investigate whether memory for novel word-object pairs 
could be correlated to the number of times participants encountered the sensory inputs during 
encoding. We also attempted to determine the minimal number of exposures participants would 
require to exhibit retention after a 30-min delay, across development. To address these questions, 
18-month-olds, 24-month-olds, 4-year-olds and adults underwent a learning procedure that 
consisted of 3 novel word-object pairs: one being presented only once, another three times and the 
last one five times, in an interspersed fashion. Participants’ knowledge about the names of the 
newly introduced objects was tested after a 30-min distractive period using a 3-alternatives 
forced-choice task.  
First of all, it is important to remind the reader that this study is the first to have exposed 
participants from such a large developmental scale (18-months to 4-years of age, plus adults) to 
the same protocol. This enabled us to make fair comparisons between age groups. Indeed, in the 
literature, most studies focused on only one (or two closed) age groups (e.g. Bion et al., 2013; 
Gurteen, Horne, & Erjavec, 2011; Horst & Samuelson, 2008; Kucker & Samuelson, 2012; 
Woodward et al., 1994, etc.). Moreover, given the large diversity of the methodologies used (e.g. 
forced-choice tasks vs. habituation switch paradigms; looking while listening vs. preferential 
reaching; real objects vs. static images vs. video clips, etc.) and the parameters manipulated across 
studies (e.g. number of word-object pairs to learn; number of presentation of each pair; delay 
between learning and testing, etc.), it is very difficult to impartially compare the results obtained 
by those isolated studies between each other. Here, we tried to enlighten for the first time, large 
developmental changes in children’s ability to retain novel information, such as object names, on 
the basis of a protocol that was equivalent for all.  
Ostensive labeling: an influent strategy to promote word retention? 
Our overall results demonstrate that all age groups except the 18-month-old group successfully 
completed the task. Eighteen-month-olds performed on average worse and required more time to 
respond than the three other age groups. Not surprisingly, adults were on average the most 
accurate and the fastest to respond during testing. Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, 
4-year-olds did not show better nor faster retention scores than participants two years younger 
than them. This result is particularly interesting given that in the context of inferential reasoning, 
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4-year-olds are generally reported capable of learning and remembering the name of a novel 
object over a long time period (e.g. Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Markson & Bloom, 1997; Waxman & 
Booth, 2000), whereas in contrast, 2-year-olds commonly fail to recognize the associations on 
immediate or relatively short-term (~5min) test trials (Horst & Samuelson, 2008). Here, we show 
that in the context of ostensive naming, 4-year-olds performed in a similar way than 2-year-olds, 
not better, not faster. In other words, 2-year-olds performed as great as 4-year-olds, indicating that 
ostensive naming of objects is an influential way to acquire new vocabularies at 2 years of age.  
The underlying question is what accounted for these results and for the fact that we highlight a 
gap between the ability of children aged 18 months and 2 years to remember object names but not 
between children of 2 and 4 years old? Our complementary analyses provided evidence that 18-
month-olds had poorer vocabulary production rates than 2-year-olds and were also significantly 
more distracted during learning. Even if we could not establish a correlation between language 
level neither attentiveness during learning and accuracy during testing within each age group 
separately, our findings strongly suggest that the difference between 18- and 24-month-olds arose 
from a part from those cognitive variables. Children may need to have undergone the vocabulary 
spurt phenomenon to rapidly acquire and incorporate new words in their lexicon. As a matter of 
fact, researchers assumed that lexical growth plays a critical role in the encoding process of word 
learning (Mervis & Bertrand, 1994). It is also largely admitted that attention positively influences 
encoding and that this cognitive skill is mediated by the prefrontal cortex, a structure that matures 
only progressively during development (see Chapter 1 for a review). In line with this idea, we 
observed that younger children had also generally more difficulty in understanding the 
instructions (e.g. “touch the object”, “press the button”, etc.). Finally, our apparatus (a touch-
screen) was perhaps less adapted for a population of 18 months of age, who often tried to play 
with it in another way than the purpose we originally intended. Taken together, it is not surprising 
that the 18-month-olds from our experiment were on average more distracted during learning than 
the 24-month-olds. Consequently, the failure of the 18-month-olds in demonstrating retention 
after a 30-min delay may primarily come from a default in their encoding abilities. 
In contrast, 2-year-olds reached an attentiveness score of almost 100%, exactly as 4-year-olds. 
Hence, the comparable retention abilities of 2 and 4 years old may partly be attributable to similar 
concentration skills. It might also be explained by the fact that most individuals from both age 
groups were post-vocabulary spurt participants. It might be that a minimal verbal production rate 
is required for the encoding process but perhaps not for the following consolidation process. For 
all that, in the first place, we assume that the absence of difference could arise from the learning 
method itself. As reviewed in Chapter 3, 2-year-olds were not able to retain the names of objects 
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they fast-mapped by exclusion 5-minutes prior to the test, except if the objects were additionally 
explicitly labeled a few times by an experimenter holding them or pointing at them (Expe 2, Horst 
& Samuelson, 2008), or if their attention was drawn toward the referents by illuminating the 
target and by covering the familiar competitors (Axelsson et al., 2012). Here, our current finding 
provides strong evidence that ostensive labeling represents a powerful word learning mechanism 
in 2-year-olds. Since we did not establish any significant difference in the ability of  2- and 4-
year-olds to remember object names in the context of ostensive labeling, it can be proposed that 
older children rely on more refined word learning strategies to rapidly and efficiently increase 
their vocabularies, including, for example logical exclusion (Bion et al., 2013). This hypothesis 
will be tested in Study N°3. A last hypothesis is that memory formation of ostensively named 
objects is supported by brain structures (see Chapter 1), whose maturational stage is not different 
enough between the ages of 2 and 4 years to trigger a noticeable improvement in word retention 
following very few exposures. As reviewed earlier (see Chapter 3), it is not clear if semantic 
knowledge recruits the hippocampal system or the cortices surrounding the hippocampus 
(entorhinal, perirhinal cortices) or perhaps even only neocortical structures. Although the 
hippocampus is undoubtedly more mature at 4 years of age than at 2 years, it is possible that the 
30min delay implemented in our design does not allow differences to be established. It would be 
interesting to increase the latency between learning and testing (ideally 24 hours) to see whether 
in this case 4-year-olds would outperform 2-year-olds. 
To conclude on this first part of the discussion, we showed that from 2 years of age, ostensive 
labeling is an efficient word learning strategy to induce word retention. We demonstrated that 
very few exposures to objects and their corresponding labels were sufficient to promote 
recognition after 30 minutes, which is a much longer latency than that used in most previous 
studies. Since it is unlikely that during the 30min break our young participants internally 
rehearsed the associations they just acquired, consolidation processes should have begun during 
the distractive phase. In other words, the results we report here cannot be simply explained by a 
precocious ability to mentally rehearse the information. This suggests that the synaptic 
strengthening process would already be operant after very few exposures and very early in life.   
Effect of the number of presentations on word retention  
In this study, we also addressed the question of whether an individual’s ability to recall 
information after a delay is correlated to the number of times he/she previously encountered that 
information. This claim has recently been demonstrated in adults using visual stimuli displayed in 
very rapid succession (Thunell & Thorpe, 2019a). Here, we aimed to know if this claim could also 
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be fulfilled in a young population, whose brain systems still undergo heavy developmental 
changes. 
In this study, in accordance with our expectations, we showed that the object seen five times was 
significantly better remembered by all age groups than the object seen only once. Four-year-olds 
showed better retention scores for the object seen five times compared to the one seen three times, 
and this latter was also better remembered than the one seen only once.  
In adults, in typical psychophysics studies on memory, accuracy is not only measured by a 
percentage of correct responses, it is also commonly determined by the participants’ reaction time. 
Naturally, the better the subjects remember a stimulus, the faster they respond to this stimulus. 
Nonetheless, this measure is rarely employed in studies involving young children for the simple 
reason that this population requires long time ranges to respond and that most protocols are not 
equipped to record this variable properly (e.g. a live experimenter interacting with the child; a 
story book as learning support, etc.). Here, one advantage of using a such stringent home-made 
software coupled with a touch-screen apparatus, is that it precisely and automatically recorded the 
time that elapsed between the label onsets and the touching responses. Although, we could not 
establish significant effects, it seemed that participants (in general) responded faster to the most 
encountered associations.  
One might argue that the effect of the number of presentations on word retention that we report in 
this study can simply be explained by an effect of familiarity. Indeed, the more an object was seen 
during learning, the more familiar it became for the participants and the more often it could have 
been chosen by the participants irrespective of the label requests. Hence, participants may have 
simply better recognized the pair seen five times just because they developed a higher sense of 
familiarity toward this object. To rigorously rule out this possibility, a control experiment 
implementing a between-subjects condition may be required. Nonetheless, our within-subjects 
design has also its advantage because each subject is his own control which wouldn’t have been 
the case with a between-subjects design. Moreover, this issue would truly be acceptable if 
participants would have failed in the two other conditions, which was not the case here. Since all 
age groups (except the 18-month-old age group) also successfully recognized the associations 
encountered only 1 and 3 times, this suspicion can be easily discarded. For the 18-month-olds, 
there is indeed an uncertainty about this potential confounding factor that should be elucidated in 
future research.  
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Minimal number of presentations 
This experiment was also designed to investigate the minimal number of times an individual 
should encounter a cross-modal sensory input to remember it after a delay during development. In 
a previous study carried out with adults, the authors found that only two presentations of an image 
briefly flashed among a stream of hundreds or thousands of other images (RSVP) were sufficient 
to enable recalling after a brief delay of minutes (Thunell & Thorpe, 2019a). This study supports 
the idea that the human brain can form a memory after a minimal number of exposures to the 
sensory stimulus. During early childhood, in the context of word learning, the overall literature 
suggests that the number of times young children should be exposed to the novel sensory inputs to 
demonstrate retention after a minimal delay decreases with age (see Chapter 3). For instance, Bion 
et al. showed that 18-month-olds successfully recognized two word-object pairs, which were 
ostensively taught to them four times each just before the test (Bion et al., 2013), whereas younger 
children required at least a dozen of presentations to demonstrate immediate word comprehension 
(e.g. Gurteen et al., 2011; Schafer & Plunkett, 1998). Thus, from the overall literature, it can be 
claimed that a repetition-dependent learning process seems to be less vital from 18 months of life, 
which coincides with the onset of the vocabulary spurt phenomenon. Nonetheless, these studies 
tested their participants immediately after learning. Little is known about the number of 
presentations young children would require to manifest retention after a delay. 
Here, we implemented a 30-min distractive period during which children were not re-exposed to 
the three word-object associations. We showed that only the object presented five times during 
learning allowed significant retention in 18-month-olds. Since most of our 18-month-olds were 
pre-vocabulary spurt participants, our finding fortifies the idea that a repetition-based learning is 
required for children younger than the age 1.5 year to maintain a memory after a certain latency 
and that the vocabulary burst is perhaps an initiator phenomenon for a rapid vocabulary increase. 
Nonetheless, as already discussed above, we cannot exclude the possibility that 18-month-olds 
chose the object seen five times significantly greater than chance just because it was the most 
familiar item. We can only conclude that a unique or even three repetitions of cross-modal inputs 
were not enough to induce a memory trace in 18-month-olds. 
On the other hand, our results indicate that 2- and 4-year olds, as well as adults, performed above 
chance levels even for the object presented only once. Nevertheless, this result does not prove that 
a single presentation was sufficient to trigger a significant retention in these age groups. 
Alternatively, participants may have only well-remembered the names of the objects seen three 
and five times and simply used a deduction strategy to logically infer the sole item they did not  
properly remember the allocated name of from the un-retained label. In other words, they may 
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simply have applied a “referent selection” strategy. As reviewed in Chapter 3, this skill has been 
shown to emerge between 18- and 24-months of age, specifically after the vocabulary spurt 
phenomenon (Bion et al., 2013; Halberda, 2003; Mather & Plunkett, 2011; Mather & Plunkett, 
2009; Mervis et al. 1994). Thus, on the basis of this study, we cannot conclude about the minimal 
number of presentations necessary for a memory of novel object names to survive after a 30-min 
delay. We can only attest that in the context of ostensive labeling, 3 presentations were enough to 
form a memory trace in children as young as 2 years of age.  
In order to disentangle whether participants from 2 years of age can truly memorize the name of 
an object seen only once, or if they simply use a “referent selection” by exclusion strategy to 
disambiguate this type of situation, we developed the two following studies. The second study 
replicates the current one with the specificity that the three novel word-object pairs were all 
presented a unique time to the participants. This study should objectively assess whether children 
as young as 2 years of age can learn and remember the names of objects encountered only once. 
In a third study, we tested the reasoning abilities of 2-year-olds, 4-year-olds and adults to fast-map 
words to their corresponding referents by exclusion. To that aim, we used a rigorous 
methodological approach (i.e. the same touch-screen apparatus and the same stimuli). Then we 
also tested participants’ memory abilities after an equivalent 30-min distractive period.  
4 SECOND EXPERIMENT. 24-month-olds and above remember 
novel object names after a single learning event 
This experiment constitutes an article currently in revision in the journal Cognition 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous study, we attempted to examine the minimal number of exposures an early-
developing brain system would require to form and maintain after a delay a memory trace 
between both a novel label and its referent. We showed that retention was positively correlated to 
the number of presentations participants encountered during learning, and we also found that from 
2 years of age, a single presentation triggered significant performance rates. Nonetheless, this 
study did not allow us to conclude that 2-year-olds effectively remembered the name of the object 
they saw only once. The alternative option is that they only remembered the names of the two 
other objects (seen 3 and 5 times) and that they logically inferred the identity of the third item 
without actually remembering its name. If so, a single learning trial may not be sufficient to 
induce a memory trace in an immature brain, and it that case, a repetition-based process may still 
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be the required mechanism for a memory involving complex bi-modal sensory inputs to be 
formed and to last in time. At first glance, this hypothesis seem quite plausible given that 24-
month-olds in previous studies failed to demonstrate retention of object names encountered only 
once after a five-minute delay (Horst & Samuelson, 2008) or even immediately after learning 
(Bion, Borovsky, & Fernald, 2013). Nonetheless, in these studies learning consisted of “referent 
selection” trials, which is a radically different word learning strategy. These studies demonstrated 
that 2-year-olds cannot form a memory of an object name from a unique “referent selection” trial. 
However, authors showed that 2-year-olds could retain the mappings for 5 minutes, provided that 
the objects could be inferred by logical exclusion and in addition deliberately labeled several 
times by an experimenter holding them up (Expe 2, Horst & Samuelson, 2008). This last finding 
suggests the aptness of ostensively naming the objects to foster 24-month-olds pairing recall after 
a minimum delay. Sadly, in the literature, this word learning strategy alone has received much less 
attention in children above 2 years of age in comparison to typical “fast-mapping” tasks.  
It has been claimed that the onset of the disambiguation ability allows children to rapidly acquire 
new words and increase their lexical repertoire (e.g. Spiegel & Halberda 2011). However, even if 
ostensive naming has been much less investigated in children above 2 years of age, such children 
can presumably continue to acquire vocabularies through unambiguous learning situations. 
Moreover, since 2-year-olds were shown able to solve the mapping problems but no longer to 
remember the object names, it has been proposed that the referential ambiguity represents a 
situation-time problem that must be solved within the context of a single inferential event but that 
building long lasting linkages would only be solved over developmental time as children 
encounter multiple presentations of the elements to be mapped (Mcmurray et al., 2012, plus see 
Chapter 3 of our review) . In other words, word learning from ambiguous situations would be a 
slow process (Bion et al., 2013).  
In the light of these questions, does it mean that forming long lasting memories between sound 
patterns (words) and visual stimuli (objects) is necessarily a slow, repetition-dependent 
mechanism? Given the inspiring findings we obtained in our previous study and given the 
presumed influential efficiency of the ostensive naming learning procedure, we hypothesize that 
this word learning strategy may be more efficient than “referent selections” to induce actual word 
learning in 2-year-olds. If so, we hypothesize that whilst a one-trial “referent selection” learning 
event has been shown unlikely to yield retention at that age, in the context of ostensive labeling, a 
one-trial learning event should induce word retention after a 30-min delay in 2-year-olds.  
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4.2 Methods 
 Participants 4.2.1
Twenty-three 24-month-old children (14 females; M: 24 months 2 days, SD: 20.13 days; range: 22 
months 17 days - 25 months 6 days) with a mean productive vocabulary score of 73.5% on the 
100-word IFDC checklist (range: 10-99%) completed this study. Data from 4 additional children 
were not included in the analyses due to fussiness (n = 3), and failure to engage in the task (n = 1). 
Twenty 4-year-old children (8 females, M: 4 years 2 months, SD: 3.96 months; range: 3 years 9 
months - 4 years 11 months) were also included. One additional 4-year-old child was excluded 
from the analyses due to a systematic response bias (selection of the image on top of the layout on 
all test trials). A control group composed of 20 adult participants (13 females, M: 31 years 4 
months, SD: 10.12 years; range: 21 years 11 months - 55 years 9 months) who were naïve to the 
purpose of the study, was used for comparison with the children. 
 Procedure 4.2.2
The stimuli and overall procedure were identical to the descriptions made in the section 
“Materials and Methods”. In this second experiment, each of the three objects appeared only once. 
Hence, learning consisted of three trials (i.e. participants watched one video-clip per object). 
Testing occurred after a 30-min distractive period and consisted of 9 trials (3 test-trials per object 
interspersed) exactly as described in the “Materials and Methods” section.  
4.3 Results 
 Mains results 4.3.1
In order to determine whether children were able to form a reliable memory trace of randomly 
paired word-object associations after a single exposure to each object, we tested performance in a 
retention test session performed 30 min after the learning session. Touching responses on the 
screen during the retention test trials were automatically recorded and analyzed as a measure of 
retention. Among all 63 subjects, two 24-month-olds and one 4-year-old failed to complete the 
task (8 trials out of 9, N24-Mo = 1; 4 trials out of 9, N24-Mo = 1; 7 trials out of 9, N4Y = 1), but as each 
novel object appeared as target at least once, we did not exclude their data from the analyses. For 
each age group, the hit rate, calculated as the proportion of trials for which each child correctly 
identifies the referent, was compared to levels expected by chance, (i.e. 33%) in binomial tests 
[Table 3].  
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Table 3 - Details about the composition and results of each age group. 
Age groups 24-Mo 4-Y Adults 
N subjects 
 
23 20 20 
N females 
 
14 8 13 
Mean age (±SD) 
 
24.14 Mo (±0.68) 4.19 Y (±0.33) 31.34 Y (±10.12) 
N subjects with older 
siblings at home 
11 5 - 
N subjects exposed to 
another language at home 
2 6 8 
Mean overall accuracy 
(% correct trials) (±SD) 
43.9 (±18.28) 44.3 (±20.99) 73.9 (±33.87) 
P (exact binomial tests) 
 
0.002 0.004 <0.0001 
Cohen’s D 0.60 0.54 1.21 
Mean RT (sec) (±SD) 5.98 (±5.33) 3.14 (±1.65) 2.65 (±2.03) 
Mean attentiveness during 
learning (%) (±SD) 
96.67 (±7.43) 96.9 (±3.30) - 
IFDC voc in production) (%) 
(±SD) 
73.5 (±26.3)   
Neuropsycho-tests scores (%) 
(±SD) 
- - 79.46 (±7.40) 
 
Accuracy during testing 
The results show that 24-month-olds performed significantly above chance (M= 43.9%, SD= 
18.28, CI95% = [36.81-50.93]), exact binomial p=0.002** with a medium effect size (Cohen’s d 
=0.60) [Table 3 & Figure 38]. Children of 4-years of age similarly chose the target object 
significantly more often than would be expected by chance (M= 44.3%, SD= 20.99, CI95% = 
[36.41-51.44]), exact binomial p=0.004**, with a medium effect size (Cohen’s d=0.54). As 
expected, adults performed well above chance level (M= 73.89%, SD=33.87, CI95% = [66.83-
80.14]), exact binomial p<2.2e-16 ***, with a large effect size (Cohen’s d=1.21) confirming the 
feasibility of this task [Table 3 & Figure 38]. Similarly, using one-tailed univariate t-tests against 
chance (33%) for each age group independently, the mean performance of each age group were 
significantly above chance level indicating successful retention (2-year-olds: t(22)=2.77, 
p=0.009**; 4-y-olds: t(19)=2.4, p=0.02*; adults: t(19)=5.4, p=3.3e-5***). Altogether, our results 
show that participants in the three age groups successfully remembered the novel word-object 
pairs for which they only had a single learning experience.  
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We also examined the Response Time (RT) participants required to make their choices. For each 
age group, we aimed to know whether there was a correlation between accuracy and RT during 
testing. As in the previous study a trend can be observed: the more accurate a participant was, the 
faster he/she tended to respond [Figure 39]. Simple linear regressions were conducted in order to 
determine whether these tendencies were significant. A significant effect could only be 
established in the adult group (F(1,18)=4.46, R2=0.20, p=0.049*). 
Figure 38– A. Boxplots representing the performance of the 
3 age groups during the 3AFC retention task. Boxplots show 
the median (full-line). Dashed lines represent the 33% chance 
level (dark grey) and the 95% confidence interval around 
chance (light grey). Individual mean performances are 
depicted in circles. B. Heatmap recapitulating the statistical 
values of the performance of each age group compared to 
chance level (0.33; binomial tests), and between age groups 
(GLMMs) The color scale indicates the p-values given by the 
statistical tests from no significant (n.s.; p>0.05; light blue), 
significant (0.05≤p≤0.01; light yellow), very significant 
(0.01≤p≤0.001; orange) to highly significant (p<0.001; red). 
The exact p-values are indicated in each cell of the matrix. 
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Figure 39 - Graphical representing the mean performance of each individual during testing according to his/her mean Response Time (RT). 
The three age groups are represented (24-month-olds (red); 4-year-olds (green); adults (blue)). Each filled circle represents an individual. 
Lines represent the linear regressions and the grey shadows indicate the 95% confident intervals around mean.  
Between-groups differences 
Next, to assess whether performance improved with age a generalized linear mixed-model 
(GLMM) was conducted, including age as fixed effect (2-year-olds vs. 4-year-olds vs. adults). 
The model indicates that adults significantly outperformed 2- and 4-year-olds (GLMM, Z-
value=4.75, p<0.001) but no significant difference was observed between the 2- and 4-year-old 
groups (GLMM, Z-value=0.2, p>0.05) [Figure 38, B.].  
Finally, we investigated whether differences in RT could be evidenced between age groups 
[Figure 38]. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant RT differences between age groups 
(F(2,60)=13.8, p=1.17e-5). Follow-up Tukey post-hoc test indicated that all age groups differed 
between each other in their mean time to respond except between 4-year-olds and adults (adjusted 
p=0.64).  
In sum, our results demonstrate that 2- and 4-year-olds performed similarly and significantly 
above chance level, although 4-year-olds were in mean significantly faster than the 2-year-olds. 
Adults exhibited the highest retention rate and were in mean as fast as the 4-year-olds to make 
their touching choices. 
Inter-studies comparison 
A related aim of the current experiment was to find out if participants from our previous study 
could have truly learned the name of the object seen once or simply applied an elimination 
process to solve the task. To address this question from another angle, we compared the current 
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results with the results obtained for the word-object pair seen only once by the participants of the 
previous experiment. In other words, we sought to determine whether current participants were as 
accurate at remembering three word-object pairs to which they were exposed only once as the 
participants from the previous study who had only one pair to recognize. In none of the three age 
groups were we able to establish significant differences, although 4-year-olds and adults from the 
previous experiment seemed to have outperformed those from the current experiment (2-Y-olds: 
M1pair=46.6%, SD1pair=36.51, M3pairs=43.9%, SD3pairs=18.29, t=-0.31, p=0.7 ; 4-Y-olds: 
M1pair=53.3%, SD1pair=36.21, M3pairs=44.3%, SD3pairs=20.98, t=-0.96, p=0.3 ; Adults: 
M1pair=88.3%, SD1pair=24.83, M3pairs=73.9%, SD3pairs=33.87, t=-1.54, p=0.1).                
 Complementary analyses  4.3.2
Two-year-olds: language level 
To go further, we aimed to determine whether children with larger vocabularies showed better 
retention than children who speak less (thus who have poorer vocabularies). No significant linear 
relationship between participants’ verbal production score and performance was found (R2=0.05, 
p=0.32) [Figure 40]. Note that most participants were advanced or post-vocabulary spurt children 
by the day of the experiment (i.e. 16 out of the 23 subjects had an IFDC score superior to 60%) 
which explains the absence of correlation. 
 
Figure 40 – Graphical showing the mean performance of each 24-month-old individual during testing according to his/her IFDC score (% 
verbal production). Each individual is depicted in a red filled circle. The line represents the linear regression calculated by the model and the 
shadow indicates the 95% confident interval around mean. 
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Two- and 4-year-olds: attentiveness during learning 
As in the previous study, in order to assess whether attentional resources during encoding 
benefited memory formation, we measured the percentage of time 2- and 4-year olds looked away 
from the screen during learning which then enabled us to calculate their score of attentiveness. As 
it can be seen, participants in both age groups were on average very attentive in this short 
experiment (remember that the learning phase consisted of three 15-sec video clips, i.e. less than 1 
minute in total; and note also that any child who was too distracted during learning was not 
included in the analyses). The mean scores of attentiveness were comprised between 90-100% 
except for one 2-year-old [Table 3 & Figure 41]. There was no significant difference between the 
two groups. There were no significant correlations between performance and attentiveness in 
either of the two groups (F2Y(1,12)=0.3, R
2=0.02, p=0.59; F4Y(1,13)=1.95, R
2=0.13, p=0.18), 
which can be easily explained by the overall high level of attentiveness of the participants. 
 
Figure 41 - Graphical representing the mean performance of each participant during testing according to his/her score of attentiveness 
during learning (in %). Each subject is depicted in a filled circle (2-year-olds (red); 4-year-olds (green)). Lines represent the linear 
regressions of each age group and the transparent curves indicate the 95% confident intervals around mean.  
Inter-individual variability within age groups 
Finally, we attempted to highlight the source(s) of the inter-participant variability. As shown 
above, this variability does not appear to arise from a difference in attention during learning, nor 
from a difference in verbal production skills in 2-year-olds who were predominantly advanced or 
post-vocabulary spurt participants. For the 2-year-olds from this experiment, living with older 
siblings at home also had no significant influence on word learning (t=1.44, p=0.17). In 4-year-
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olds, we were also unable to establish any significant effect of being regularly exposed to another 
language (t=0.97, p=0.34). In adults, we found a nearly significant effect of age: in this 
experiment, mean performance had a strong tendency to diminish with age, and almost 20% of the 
inter-individual variability could be explained by this age variable (F(1,18)=4, R2=0.18, p=0.06) 
[Figure 42]. Note however that this tendency is essentially due to few “old” individuals who did 
not succeed at testing. 
 
Figure 42 - Graphical showing the mean performance of each adult participant during testing according to his/her age (in years). Each 
participant is depicted in a blue filled circle. The line represents the linear regression for and the transparent curve indicates the 95% 
confident interval around mean. 
4.4 Discussion 
This study asked whether adults and children of 2- and 4-years of age can remember the names of 
newly learned objects after a 30-minute delay, following a single learning experience. To this 
purpose, participants were ostensively taught three novel word-object pairs using short video 
sequences. More precisely, for each pair, participants watched a 15s video sequence during which 
the object was manually displayed, briefly manipulated and explicitly labeled 3 times in a row in 
an ecologically valid sentence before disappearing. Retention was measured using a 3-alternative 
forced-choice task paradigm, which offered a straightforward measure of whether the name of the 
object has been retained.  
Using this design, our results demonstrate successful retention in children as young as 2 years of 
age, supporting evidence that a unique learning event involving ostensive naming is sufficient for 
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a memory between both an object and its associated label to be formed and to survive a delay. We 
also found that overall, 2- and 4-year old children performed equally well, although 4-year-olds 
were significantly faster. These two age groups were highly and similarly attentive during 
learning and this component did not appear to affect later retention. Moreover, there was no effect 
of productive vocabulary in 2-year-olds, although most had already undergone the vocabulary 
spurt before being tested. As one would expect, adults performed significantly better than children 
but were not faster than 4-year-olds.  
Overall, our findings suggest that under adequate age-fitted learning strategies, an extremely rapid 
and successful word learning, similar to that previously described in preschoolers, can already 
occur in younger children. Consequently, our results highlight the high efficiency of the ostensive 
naming paradigm if compared to inferential reasoning learning methods (“referent selection” 
trials) in 2-year-olds. 
Ostensive naming vs. “referent selection” by exclusion in 2-year-olds 
Previous research showed that when 2-year-olds were facing a learning procedure that involved 
mapping a novel word to its referent by logically excluding familiar objects (i.e. “referent 
selection”), they failed to retrieve the fast-mapped words 5 minutes after learning except if the 
targets were additionally deliberately taught to the children by an experimenter holding them up 
and pointing at them (Horst & Samuelson, 2008). While word learning from ambiguous situations 
like “referent selections” have been modeled as being slow processes in 2-year-olds (Bion et al., 
2013; McMurray et al., 2012), our finding demonstrates that word learning from unambiguous 
situations provided with explicit naming is rapid and efficient in children of that age. We 
demonstrate here that from 2 years of age, a single ostensive learning event is sufficient to form 
and maintain in memory the association between both a novel word and a novel object, providing 
the first evidence against a slow, repetition-based word learning mechanism.  
Together with previous studies (Axelsson et al., 2012; Horst & Samuelson, 2008), it validates the 
idea that ostensive naming is an influential learning procedure to promote word retention at that 
age. Nonetheless, the efficiency of this word learning strategy may evolve during development. 
One may have expected, for instance, that the ability to encode and retrieve information would 
have increased with age. On the contrary, the ostensive naming procedure employed in the current 
experiment did not reveal any significant difference between 2- and 4-year-olds’ capacity to 
remember object names, although 4-year-olds did have shorter response times during the test trials 
compared to 2-year-olds. To explain this intriguing finding, the same explanations as those 
provided in the discussion of the previous experiment can be advanced. Among them, the 
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possibility that 4-year-olds rely on more refined strategies such as disambiguating language-
related situations is the most likely. Indeed, although significant levels were not reached, it 
seemed that the 4-year-old participants from the previous study were better at recognizing one 
pair seen once than the participants from the current experiment who had three pairs seen once to 
retain. Such a difference was not apparent for the 2-year-old group. Consequently, we propose 
that the 4-year-olds from the previous experiment had a greater ease to use a deductive process to 
solve the task than 2-year-olds who perhaps only relied on their memory.  
In order to examine whether ostensive labeling is effectively more efficient to induce word 
learning than inferential reasoning at 2 years of age and whether there is a shift in efficiency in 
these word learning strategies throughout development, we designed the experiment N°4. 
Underlying mechanisms 
Our work also provides insights about the gradual increase in efficiency of the ostensive naming 
procedure throughout development. Specifically, it suggests that word learning via ostensive 
naming gradually shifts from a slow repetition-based process at ages 1-1.5 years (e.g. Gurteen et 
al., 2011; Schafer & Plunkett, 1998; Woodward et al., 1994) to an extremely rapid and efficient 
process around two years of age.  
This finding raises questions about the putative underlying mechanisms. We hypothesize that this 
fast learning phenomenon induced by ostensive naming might be attributable to brain 
maturational processes (peak of synaptic density in the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus reached 
around two years of age (e.g. Jabès & Nelson, 2015; Seress, 2001)) and/or to general 
improvements in attention and language acquisition since most 2-year-olds have already 
undergone the vocabulary spurt and are provided with substantial large receptive vocabularies 
(see Fenson et al., 1994; Kuhl, 2004). As we have shown, most of the 2-year-olds who 
participated in this experiment were advanced or post-vocabulary spurt children, and exhibited 
very high scores of attentiveness during learning, which allowed them to exceed the scores of 18-
month-olds of our previous experiment who required at least five exposures to the pairs to 
demonstrate retention after the same time interval. Note that language and attentional resources 
are also brain maturational-dependent cognitive functions; therefore improvements of these skills 
are logically also direct consequences of the maturation of the underlying brain areas and 
circuitries.   
Apart from the brain maturation hypothesis, the finding that declarative memories can be formed 
and survive without the need of repetition during early childhood is very intriguing given that 
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repetition has been shown to be a central mechanism of memory formation and maintenance as 
evidenced by Hebbian and STDP (Spike-Time-Dependent-Plasticity) theories. Remember that 
those theories are in favor of a strengthening process of activated neural networks across 
repeatedly presented stimuli, resulting in highly selective neurons and in the reinforcement of the 
recruited synapses (Masquelier & Thorpe, 2007). Earlier, we hypothesized that children may even 
be more reliant on repetition, to prevent the synaptic connections responsible for the treatment of 
the novel sensory input from being pruned. Moreover, it has been suggested that declarative 
memory is at first essentially build upon repetitive learning events, thus that memory would 
primarily be semantic (Newcombe, 2015). We also reviewed earlier that in the context of word 
learning, similar associative Hebbian theories have indeed been proposed to support retention of 
receptive vocabularies (McMurray et al., 2012). So, what accounted for the results obtained here? 
What is repetition? 
As a first food for thought, one should address the fundamental following question: what does 
repetition mean and how do we measure it? Or in other words, what does an event mean and how 
do we define it in a timeframe? Does repetition imply a succession in time of comparable 
situations or does it correspond to the number of times one encounters similar sensory inputs? Do 
we, for example, consider that a 6sec continuous presentation of a visual stimulus is different 
from three brief presentations of 2sec scattered in time? And if so, should we talk about a single 
event in the first case and three events in the second? Obviously, repetition (or an event) is 
subjective, reliant on the context and very difficult to define. An event has a time component with 
both a beginning and an end. Here the whole learning sequence occurred only once for each 
object. Nevertheless, during the 15s video clip, participants will almost certainly have switched 
their eye-gazes many times to explore the whole scene (e.g. they looked at the whole object, then 
at the experimenter’s arm, then focused their attention on the manipulation act, then perhaps 
focused on a specific detail about the object, etc.). Thus, it might be that the 15s learning event 
was actually constituted of multiple brief visual repetitions and that each of them contributed to 
the strengthening process. It would be interesting to investigate whether a shorter visual exposure 
to each object would have yield the same result. For all that, what we demonstrate here is that 
word learning during early childhood clearly does not need to be distributed in time to induce 
memory. However, repetition (in the sense of multiple exposures to the information spaced in 
time, or simply multiple internal reactivations of the information) may be required for the memory 
trace to be maintained over longer delays. Further research is required to investigate whether 
recall can survive with longer delays, including overnight, without any rehearsal in young 
children. A recent study demonstrated that 30-month-old children were able to retain the names of 
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objects presented four times each, over a week (Wojcik, 2017). But the participants performed an 
encoding test immediately after learning which itself induced a rehearsal of the information and 
thus reinforced the mappings (see Roediger & Butler, 2011 for a review). To look at this question, 
in another experiment (experiment N°6), we examined the retention skills of some of the 4-year-
olds who participated in this experiment after a month delay.   
Ecological validity of the methodology 
Finally, we would like to emphasize that in the context of ostensive naming, the discrepancy 
between our finding and the findings of previous studies may arise from the ecological validity of 
our set up. In the literature, the majority of the studies that employed ostensive labeling as a 
learning method, used either static images displayed on a screen (e.g. Bion et al., 2013; Schafer & 
Plunkett, 1998; Schwab & Lew-Williams, 2016; Wojcik, 2017; Zosh et al., 2013) or static objects 
presented on a tray (e.g. Gurteen et al., 2011), coupled with auditory labels pronounced either in 
isolation (e.g. Schafer & Plunkett, 1998; Werker et al., 1998) or embedded in a structurally 
identical phrase (the same carrier frame was used for each stimulus) (e.g. Zosh et al., 2013). In a 
few studies, word labels were spoken in various carrier phrases (Bion et al., 2013; Wojcik, 2017).  
However, in real-life, auditory labels are rarely or never pronounced in isolation, and a child 
generally manipulates the object that his/her parent refers to, or sees the adult manipulating the 
targeted object (e.g. “look, I will use this blender to mix your soup”). Previous studies have 
indeed revealed the importance of providing functional or causal information about the object 
being labeled to foster later retention (Booth, 2009a; Booth, Mcgregor, et al., 2008; Markson & 
Bloom, 1997a). Therefore, the impressive results that we report here can also be explained by the 
superiority of the ecological nature of our task (although we employed a touch-screen apparatus) 
compared to participants from previous ostensive naming studies who necessitated more 
exposures during learning to demonstrate retention.  
Overall, we designed an experiment that is a trade-off between (i) a rigorous control of the 
parameters known to influence learning (especially the external cues) and (ii) an ecologically 
valid ostensive naming procedure that somehow mimics real-life experiences. On one hand, all 
participants encountered the exact same learning conditions (e.g. intonation of the speaker’s 
voice, duration of the learning trials, similar access to the objects’ functions, etc.) that could only 
be controlled by a computer-based program. On the other hand, the ecological nature of our task 
relies in the use of video sequences that allowed an access to the potential functions of the objects 
since they were manipulated. We also recorded several different carrier sentences that used 
children-directed speech. Finally, our stimuli were 3D objects resembling toys, which may be 
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more attractive for children than meaningless abstract forms. Consequently, our findings also 
highlight the extreme importance of the methodological choices when designing an experiment.  
4.5 Conclusion  
To conclude, we showed that forming a memory trace for associated cross-modal sensory inputs 
following a single learning experience is possible in children as young as age 2 years. To the best 
of our knowledge, it is the first time that a demonstration of a declarative memory that is not 
reliant on repetition has been seen so early in human development. We discussed the possibility 
that repetition could however be provided by the participants themselves during the 15s video 
clip. As a perspective work related to this issue, it would be interesting to explore whether the 
memory trace could survive longer delays without rehearsal. Finally, given the absence of 
increased performance in 4-year-olds, we proposed that the word learning strategies may evolve 
during development and that ostensive labeling may not be the sole efficient method to induce 
retention in older children.   
5 THIRD EXPERIMENT. “fast-mapping”: an influent strategy to 
promote word retention in 4-year-olds  
5.1 Introduction 
In the first experiment, we demonstrated that children of 2-years of age but not of 18-months of 
age were able to learn and retain object names after a 30-min delay following very few exposures. 
There was however an uncertainty about the actual retention of the pair presented only once. 
Children may have effectively stored the name of this object seen once and properly retrieved it 
during testing. Alternatively, they may have simply applied an elimination process to solve the 
task. The second experiment showed that 2-year-olds are in fact capable of retaining the names of 
objects to which they had a single learning experience. It suggests that participants from our first 
experiment may indeed have remembered the name of the object that was presented only once. 
Nevertheless, this finding does not completely eliminate the alternative option that children 
utilized a deductive strategy. In the literature, it has been demonstrated that around 18-months of 
age children start to disambiguate language-related situations. For example, a previous study 
measured 14-, 16- and 17-month-olds’ preferential looking behaviors when presented a familiar 
and a novel object and asked to look at the [label] (Halberda, 2003). Results revealed that only 
17-month-olds increased looking to the novel object in response to hearing the novel label, 
141 
 
suggesting that the word-learning principles that drive fast-mapping (see Chapter 3) are not 
operative before this age (Golinkoff et al., 1992; Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Mervis & Bertrand, 
1994). In another preferential looking paradigm, Bion et al. showed that 24-month-olds but not 
18-month-olds manifested a reliable preference for the novel object on disambiguation trials (Bion 
et al., 2013). The authors proposed that the emergence of the disambiguation ability coincides 
with the vocabulary spurt phenomenon (Bion et al., 2013). If so, 2-year-olds from our first 
experiment - who were predominantly post-vocabulary spurt children - could just as well have 
used this elimination process. In order to verify if the findings supported by those studies would 
also apply to our touch-screen apparatus, we confronted 2-year-olds, 4-year-olds and adults with 
ambiguous word-related situations. Specifically, learning consisted of mapping novel labels to 
unfamiliar objects presented among known distractors. 
The second purpose of the current experiment was to investigate whether this learning strategy 
can induce retention after a 30-min distractive period. Remember that previous studies showed 
that 24-month-olds were able to fast-map labels to novel objects but not to recall the associations 
after a 5-min break (Horst & Samuelson, 2008) nor immediately after learning (Bion et al., 2013). 
Consequently, the dynamic associative word learning model proposed that the referential 
ambiguity is not isomorphic to learning at that age (McMurray et al., 2012). It may only constitute 
an online process for immediate communicative requirements without the need for young children 
to remember the linkages. The authors claimed that building long lasting linkages would only be 
solved across multiple presentations of the fast-mapped elements (McMurray et al 2012). Here, 
we wondered whether multiple “referent selection” trials would enable 2-year-olds to retain the 
associations after a delay. And if so, what would be the minimal number of presentations required 
to induce retention? To address these questions, participants were exposed to a varying number of 
repeats of the ambiguous situations. As in our first experiment, one pair appeared only once (i.e. 
participants had to fast-map that pair only once), another one three times and the last one five 
times, in an interspersed fashion. 
Since not only 2-year-olds but also 4-year-olds and adults were recruited for this experiment, we 
should also shed light on the suitability of this inferential learning method in promoting word 
learning later in development. Previous studies showed that actual learning from a single “referent 
selection” trial is nearly operative at 30-months of age (Bion et al., 2013) and clearly established 
in 3- and 4-year-olds (Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Markson & Bloom, 1997; Vlach & Sandhofer, 
2012; Waxman & Booth, 2000; Zosh et al., 2013). Thus, in contrast our previous ostensive 
naming paradigm here we expect 4-year-olds to outperform 2-year-olds. 
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5.2 Methods 
 Participants 5.2.1
Participants consisted of 29 twenty-four-month-olds, 26 four-year-olds and 21 adults (plus 3 
eighteen-month-old pilot participants). Data from 6 twenty-four-month-olds could not be included 
in the analyses due to fussiness (n=1), technical problems (n=2), failure to engage in the task 
(n=1), and age limit exceeding (n=2). Finally, data from 1 four-year-old was discarded from the 
analyses, due to systematic response bias (selection of the same object on all test trials). Details 
about the final sample are represented in the Table 4.  
 Stimuli 5.2.2
Stimuli consisted of images of three unknown objects and three familiar objects. The objects were 
randomly chosen but in accordance with the judgment of the caregiver (i.e. familiar objects had to 
be truly familiar and novel objects truly unknown to the participant). Caregivers also verified that 
none of the 12 pseudo-words could evoke anything to their child. Three pseudo-words were then 
randomly chosen by the experimenter and assigned to the three novel objects. Objects and 
pseudo-words were the same as those utilized in the two previous experiments. 
 Procedure 5.2.3
In this experiment, learning consisted of disambiguating word-related situations. Specifically, 
participants underwent multiple 3 alternatives forced-choice trials during which they had to map 
labels onto their referents (i.e. “referent selection” trials). During these trials, the image of a novel 
object, as well as two images of familiar objects were simultaneously displayed on the screen 
[Figure 43].  
Exactly 1500ms after trial onset, a pre-recorded voice asked participants to touch an image: for 4 
trials, a familiar item was requested, and for 9 trials the novel object was requested (the requests 
for familiar and novel objects were interspersed). This procedure was essential to ensure that 
children’s choices were not simply based on novelty preference. For each trial, the label was 
embedded in a child-directed carrier phrase randomly chosen among three different pre-recorded 
carrier sentences: “touche le/la [label]”; “montre le/la [label]”; “il/elle est où le/la [label]”. In this 
experiment, the label was pronounced only once (rather than three times in a row like in the 
previous ostensive naming paradigms). There were no time constraints for responding but the 
whole instruction was automatically repeated every 6sec if the participant did not make his/her 
choice during this time interval. In order to avoid impulsive responses to be recorded as answers, 
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a minimum delay of 500ms after label onset was required to record the participants’ touching 
response. Moreover, for participants not to learn mistaken associations, those trials were correct-
answer-blocked, in the sense that only a correct response could launch the following trial. 
Participants had no feedback on their responses but a neutral GIF animation encouraged them to 
continue [Figure 43]. A video camera mounted on a tripod was situated behind the participant’s 
shoulder and recorded the touching responses in order to analyze a posteriori the number of 
correct “referent selections”. Since trials were correct-answer-blocked, two coders analyzed the 
video recordings retrospectively and indicated as incorrect each trial for which the participants did 
not touch the target first. The intercoder-reliability was superior to 95%.  
 
Figure 43 – Illustration of the learning procedure employed in the « fast-mapping » experiment. Participants initiated themselves each 
“referent selection” trial by pressing a red button on the center of the touch screen. Participants were then presented with 2 familiar objects 
(randomly chosen among three) and one novel object. Participants were asked to touch either a familiar object (4 trials) or the novel object 
when hearing an unknown label (9 trials). One novel object served as target on 1 trial, another novel object on 3 trials and the last one on 5 
trials, interspersed. No feedback was provided but to keep participants focused and to encourage them to continue, each “referent selection” 
trial was followed by a 3s GIF animation showing a moving penguin accompanied by a stimulating sentence such as “on continue?” 
(meaning “should we continue?”). 
The experiment began with three warm-up trials. During this familiarization phase, only familiar 
objects were involved. Each familiar object was targeted once. This familiarization phase was 
immediately followed by the learning phase per se. One of the three novel objects (N°1) was the 
target on one trial, another one (N°2) on 3 trials and the last one (N°3) on 5 trials. Overall, the 
learning phase consisted of 13 “referent selection” trials (1 trial involving object N°1, 3 trials 
involving object N°2, 5 trials involving object N°3 and 4 trials involving familiar objects) that 
appeared in an interspersed fashion. 
After learning, children participants played in the experimental room for a 30-min period. For the 
same time period, adult participants completed the neuro-psychological tests and were asked to 
fill in a survey about their general opinion on the use of touch-screens in preschools.  
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Testing consisted of 3AFC “referent retention” trials that involved the three novel objects. Novel 
objects served as target three times in an interspersed manner (testing session = 9 trials) and any 
answer could trigger the following trial (trials were not correct-answer-blocked in this case). 
5.3 Results 
 Main results 5.3.1
Table 4 - Details about the composition and results of each age group. 
Age groups 2-Y 4-Y Adults 
N subjects 23 25 21 
N females 13 10 12 
Mean age (±SD) 24.63 Mo (±0.74) 4.31 Y (±0.39) 34.14 Y (±14.42) 
N subjects with older siblings at home 14 7 - 
N subjects exposed to another language at 
home 
4 5 3 
IFDC score (voc in production) (%)(±SD) 72 (±22.9) - - 
Neuropsycho-tests scores (%) (±SD) - - 78.79 (±6.41) 
REFERENT SELECTION    
Mean  overall accuracy (% correct trials) 
[95%CI] 
75.69 [69-81.4] 100 (±0) 100 (±0) 
P (exact binomial tests) <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 
Cohen’s D 2.55 - - 
Mean overall RT  
(sec) (±SD) 
6.76 (±6.2) 2.10 (±0.54) 2.23 (±1.24) 
Mean RT 1 REP  
(sec) (±SD) 
6.97 (±9.5) 2.52(±0.71) 2.89 (±1.75) 
Mean RT 3 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
6.61 (±4.48) 2.01(±0.36) 2.01 (±0.8) 
Mean RT 5 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
6.73 (±4.22) 1.89(±0.35) 1.95 (±0.97) 
REFERENT RETENTION    
Mean  overall accuracy (% correct trials) 
(±SD) 
40.05 (±17.3) 63.55 (±29) 81.48 (±29.2) 
P (exact binomial tests) 0.06 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 
Cohen’s D 0.39 1.04 1.65 
Mean RT  
(sec) (±SD) 
4.10 (±2.9) 2.42 (±0.69) 2.02 (±0.65) 
Mean Accuracy 1 REP 
(% correct trials) [95%CI] 
38.09 [26.1-51.2] 58.6 [46.7-69.9] 80.95 [69.1-89.7] 
P 1 REP (binomial tests) 0.42 6.06e
-6 6.8e-15 
Mean Accuracy 3 REP 
(% correct trials) [95%CI] 
31.74 [20.6-44.7] 62.6 [50.7-73.6] 84.13 [72.7-92.1] 
P 3 REP (binomial tests) 0.89 1.9e
-7 <2.2e-16 
Mean Accuracy 5 REP 
(% correct trials) [95%CI] 
46.03 [33.3-59.1] 69.3 [57.6-79.5] 79.36 [67.3-88.5] 
P 5 REP (binomial tests) 0.03 2.02e
-10 5.2e-14 
Mean RT 1 REP  
(sec) (±SD) 
3.6 (±2.69) 2.49 (±0.78) 2.22 (±0.45) 
Mean RT 3 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
4.51 (±3.48) 2.46 (±0.64) 2.04 (±0.77) 
Mean RT 5 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
4.2 (±2.53) 2.32 (±0.65) 1.79 (±0.62) 
  
In order to determine if during development children are able to disambiguate word-related 
contexts by mapping new words to their referents by elimination, and whether they can retain the 
mappings for a latency of 30-min, 2-year-olds, 4-year-olds and adults were firstly exposed to 
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“referent selection” trials (i.e. learning phase) and then to “referent retention” trials (i.e. testing 
phase).  
Referent selection 
The three age groups selected the target objects significantly above chance level, with huge effect 
sizes (Cohen’s d > 2) [Table 4 & Figure 45]. There were no significant differences between age 
groups in their capability to select the novel objects by exclusion (GLMM, Z=0.015, p=0.9). 
However, 2-year-olds were significantly slower to complete the “referent selection” trials than the 
two other age groups (AOV, F(2,189)=13.6, p=3.9e-13***; Tukey post-hoc, adjusted p(2Y-
4Y)<0.001***, adjusted p(2Y-Ad)<0.001***) [Figure 44]. In contrast, four-year-olds and adults were 
equally fast in their mean time to select the targets (adjusted p=0.98) [Figure 44]. 
When analyzing the mean Response Time (RT) according to the number of presentations of the 
pairs during learning, we found that 4-year-olds and adults responded on average significantly 
faster for the pair they fast-mapped five times compared to the pair they fast-mapped only once 
(4-year-olds: AOV, F(2,66)=9.94, p=0.00017***; Tukey post-hoc; adj p(1-5)=0.00018*** ; adults: 
AOV; F(2,55)=3.38, p=0.04*; Tukey post-hoc; adj p(1-5)=0.05*). In contrast, 2-year-olds were 
equally fast irrespective of the number of times they had to disambiguate the situations [Figure 
44]. Finally, we found that 2-year-olds were on average significantly slower to respond than the 
two other age groups whatever the number of presentations, and that 4-year-olds and adults had 
similar RTs (AOVs, 1 PRESENTATION: F(2,51)=3.44, p=0.039*, Tuckey post-hoc, adj p(2Y-
4Y)=0.05*, p(2Y-Ad) =0.1, p(4Y-Ad) =0.97  ; 3 PRESENTATIONS: F(2,66)=23.3, p=2.21e
-8***, Tuckey 
post-hoc, adj p(2Y-4Y)<0.001***, p(2Y-Ad) <0.001***, p(4Y-Ad) =0.99  ; 5 PRESENTATIONS: 
F(2,66)=28.18, p=1.43e-9***, Tuckey post-hoc, adj p(2Y-4Y)<0.001***, p(2Y-Ad)<0.001***, p(4Y-Ad) 
=0.99). 
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Figure 44 - Graph representing the mean Response Time (RT, ± SEM) of each age group to select the target objects according to the 
number of presentations of the word-object pairs during learning (1, 3 and 5 presentations). 
In sum, the three age groups successfully achieved the “referent selection” learning phase, with 
the particularity that 4-year-olds and adults did not make a single error and required the same time 
delay to respond. Two-year olds were in contrast significantly slower to respond, and this, 
whatever the number of times they disambiguated the same word-related problems. We started to 
include 18-month-olds as well, but the data from three pilot participants revealed that they all 
failed to solve this mapping phase (M=29.16%). 
Referent retention 
The memory of the three age groups was tested after a 30-min distractive period. Among all 69 
subjects, two 2-year-olds failed to complete the testing phase (6 trials out of 9, N = 1; 5 trials out 
of 9, N = 1), but as each novel object appeared as target at least once, we did not exclude their 
data from the analyses. 
Results show that 2-year-olds did not perform significantly above chance (M=40.05%, SD=17, 
exact binomial p=0.06) [Table 4 & Figure 45]. In contrast, children of 4-years of age and adults 
often recognized the fast-mapped associations (4-year-olds: M=63.55, SD=29, very large effect 
size (d=1.04), exact binomial p<0.001***; adults: M=81.48, SD=29.2, huge effect size (d=1.65), 
exact binomial p<0.001***) [Table 4 & Figure 45]. When using one-tailed univariate t-tests 
against chance (for comparison ease with studies from the literature that only use this statistical 
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tool), the same degrees of significance were found (2-year-olds: t(22)=1.95, p=0.065; 4-year-olds: 
t(24)=5.27, p=2.07e-5***; adults: t(20)=7.59, p=2.58e-7***). 
 
Then, a generalized linear mixed-model was conducted in order to examine whether differences in 
performance could be established between age groups. The model indicated that 4-year-olds 
outperformed 2-year-olds (GLMM, Z=2.76, p=0.005**) [Figure 45, B.]. Adults similarly 
outperformed 2-year-olds (GLMM, Z=5.03, p=4.8e-7***) but also 4-year-olds (GLMM, Z=2.75, 
p=0.006**) [Figure 45, B.]. Note than when using a one-way ANOVA (which considers the 
Figure 45– A. Boxplots representing the performance of the 
3 age groups to select the targets during the “referent 
selection” learning trials (3AFC) and during the “referent 
retention” testing trials (3AFC). Boxplots show the median 
(full-line). Dashed lines represent the 33% chance level (dark 
grey) and the 95% confidence interval around chance (light 
grey). Individual mean performances are depicted in circles. 
B. Heatmap recapitulating the statistical values of the 
performance of each age group compared to chance level 
(0.33; binomial tests), and between age groups (GLMMs) The 
color scale indicates the p-values given by the statistical tests 
from no significant (n.s.; p>0.05; light blue), significant 
(0.05≤p≤0.01; light yellow), very significant (0.01≤p≤0.001; 
orange) to highly significant (p<0.001; red). The exact p-
values are indicated in each cell of the matrix. 
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mean accuracy of each individual rather than the accuracy of each single trial of each individual 
and which doesn’t take into account the repeated measurements on individuals), significant 
differences were only established between 2- and 4-year-olds (F(1,66)=14.35, p=6.7e-6; Tukey 
post-hoc, adj p(2Y-4Y)=0.0067**) and between 2-year-olds and adults (adj p(2Y-Ad)<0.001***). The 
mean accuracy of 4-year-olds was not significantly different from that of adults (adj p(Ad-4Y)=0.06) 
with this statistical tool. 
Moreover, 2-year-olds were significantly slower to complete the “referent retention” trials than 4-
year-olds and adults (AOV, F(2,203)=26.4, p=6.6e-11, Tukey post-hoc, adjusted p(2Y-4Y)<0.001***, 
adjusted p(2Y-Ad)<0.001***). On the other hand, four-year-olds responded as fast as adults 
(adjusted p=0.37) [Table 4]. 
In sum, although the three age groups were similarly successful at disambiguating the contexts 
during learning, only 4-year-olds and adults successfully remembered the associations after a 30-
min delay. Furthermore, 4-year-olds and adults required an equivalent RT during testing that was 
significantly below the time 2-year-olds needed to make their touching responses.   
Minimal number of presentations to induce retention 
Next, we aimed to know if the number of times each object was fast-mapped by exclusion during 
learning influenced the subsequent retention of the associations. Specifically, we first attempted to 
determine whether a minimum number of presentations was necessary to promote retention, 
especially for 2-year-olds who failed on the whole to solve the “referent retention” task. 
Our results reveal that when 2-year-olds fast-mapped a label onto its referent only once (M=38.1, 
exact binomial p=0.42) or even three times (M=31.7, exact binomial p=0.89), they were unlikely 
to recognize the associations after the 30min break [Table 4 & Figure 46]. However, five 
“referent selection” trials involving the same target induced retention in 2-year-olds (M=46.03, 
exact binomial p=0.03*). In contrast, 4-year-olds and adults demonstrated significant retention 
regardless of the number of times the objects were selected during the learning phase. In other 
words, for these two groups, a significant level of performance was reached even for the object 
that was fast-mapped only once during the previous “referent selection” trials [Table 4 & Figure 
46].  
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Results according to the varying number of times each pair was fast-mapped during 
learning 
Second, we aimed to know whether retention was positively correlated to the number of times 
participants fast-mapped each label onto its corresponding referent. Generalized linear mixed-
model were conducted and did not establish any significant relation between the accuracy and the 
number of presentations in any of the three age groups (2-year-olds: Z1-3=0.75, p=0.5; Z1-5=0.9, 
p=0.4; Z3-5=1.64, p=0.09 ; 4-year-olds: Z1-3=0.59, p=0.5; Z1-5=1.6, p=0.1; Z3-5=1.02, p=0.3 ; 
adults: Z1-3=0.64, p=0.5; Z1-5=0.32, p=0.8; Z3-5=-0.96, p=0.3) [Table 4 & Figure 46]. 
 
Figure 46 - Graphs representing the mean performance (% of correct touching responses, ± SEM) (A) and the mean Response Time (RT, ± 
SEM) (B) of each age group according to the number of selections of each object during learning (1, 3 and 5 “referent selection” trials). On 
the graph A dashed lines represent the 33% chance level (light grey) and the 95% confidence interval around chance (dark grey). 
Moreover, rehearsing the mappings during learning had no effect on the response time 
participants required to make their choices during testing; i.e. participants did not respond faster 
for the pair mapped 3 or 5 times compared to the pair mapped only once  (AOVs, 2-year-olds: 
F(2,72)=0.57, p=0.56 ; 4-year-olds: F(2,72)=0.45, p=0.64 ; adults: F(2,60)=2.43, p=0.09) [Table 
4 & Figure 46]. Nonetheless, 4-year-olds and adults were significantly faster to respond than 2-
year-olds whatever the number of presentations of the pairings encountered during learning 
(AOVs, 1 PRESENTATION: F(2,66)=4.47, p=0.015*, Tuckey post-hoc, adj p(2Y-4Y)=0.05*, p(2Y-
Ad)=0.018*, p(4Y-Ad)=0.84 ; 3 PRESENTATIONS: F(2,66)=9.07, p=0.0003***, Tuckey post-hoc, 
adj p(2Y-4Y)=0.003**, p(2Y-Ad)=0.0006***, p(4Y-Ad)=0.77 ; 5 PRESENTATIONS: F(2,65)=14.86, 
p=4.84e-6***, Tuckey post-hoc, adj p(2Y-4Y)=0.0002***, p(2Y-Ad) <0.001***, p(4Y-Ad) =0.49) [Figure 
46]. 
150 
 
 Complementary analyses  5.3.2
Two-year-olds: language level  
We conducted linear models in order to assess if 2-year-olds’ verbal production skills influenced 
their capability to select the novel object during the “referent selection” trials and to remember the 
associations during the following retention trials. Despite the noticeable trend [Figure 47], no 
significant correlations between IFDC productive scores and “referent selection” skills 
(F(1,19)=1.53, R2=0.07, p=0.2) neither between IFDC productive scores and “referent retention” 
skills (F(1,20)=0.4, R2=0.02, p=0.5) could be established. Note that this absence of significant 
correlation is probably due to the fact that most 2-year-olds participants were already advanced 
(N=4) or post-vocabulary spurt (N=12) children. Only three participants were either pre-
vocabulary spurt children (N=1) or at the onset of this phenomenon (N=2). The three pilot 
participants of 18-months of age had verbal production scores of less than 10% (M=7%). 
 
Figure 47 - Graph showing the mean performance of 2-year-old participants to select the referents by exclusion during learning 
(“selection”, violet) and to remember the names of the referents during testing (“retention”, turquoise-blue) according to their IFDC 
productive scores (%). Each individual is depicted in a filled circle. The lines represent the linear regressions calculated by the models and 
the shadows indicate the 95% confident interval around mean. 
Two-year-olds: correlation between “referent selection” and “referent retention”? 
To foster our comprehension about the mechanisms that drive learning through ambiguous 
contexts, we attempted to know if the child’s ability to store and remember the linkages after a 
delay is directly linked to their capacity to disambiguate the word-referent situations during 
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learning. Since 4-year-olds and adults were 100% accurate during learning, we could not address 
this question to these 2 age groups. However, we wanted to explore if the 2-year-olds who 
exhibited the highest fast-mapping accuracies were those that were best at recalling the names of 
these objects during the following test. As it can clearly be noticed on the graph, there was no 
significant correlation between 2-year-olds’ ability to infer words to their referents by exclusion 
and the retention of these associations (F(1,20)=0.059, R2=0.0027, p=0.8) [Figure 48]. Note that 
this result may be explained by the fact that most 2-year-olds very well completed the “referent 
selection” learning phase (mean performance>50%) [Figure 48]. 
 
Figure 48 - Graph illustrating 2-year-olds’ performance during testing (% of correct responses) according to their ability at disambiguating 
word-referent contexts during learning (% of correct responses). Each individual is depicted in a pink filled circle. The line represents the 
linear regression calculated by the model and the shadow indicates the 95% confident interval around mean.  
Two-year-olds: looking behaviors during learning 
Furthermore, we also investigated the source of the difference in performance during testing 
between 2- and 4-year-olds. Specifically, we hypothesized that the difference in performance 
might arise from differences in attending at the images during learning. Previously, we showed 
that 2-year-olds required significantly more time to make their touching responses during 
learning. Despite this, is this RT increase due to an increased time spending to look at the target or 
primarily at the distractors? 
To address this question, five 2-year-old and five 4-year-old participants were videotaped from 
the front (rather than from the back). This allowed us to record their eye movements and thus to 
measure a posteriori their preferential looking behaviors toward each object during learning (see 
Zosh et al., 2013 for similar procedure). Precisely, we used the VPVideoLab software developed 
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by the LPNC research center, to measure the exact time spent looking at each image during each 
“referent selection” trial. In total, 85 “referent selection” trials were analyzed (42 involving 2-
year-old participants and 43 involving 4-year-olds participants).  
We found that 2-year-olds spent on average 55% of their total looking time attending at the target, 
against 60.7% for the 4-year-olds. We also established that the 2-year-olds looked on average 1 
second longer at the target images than the 4-year-olds, which is significant (M2Y=3.77, SD2Y=2.4; 
M4Y=2.71, SD4Y=0.9; t(52)=2.6, p=0.01*) [Figure 49]. Furthermore, our analyses revealed that 
they spent significantly more time looking at the distractors relative to the 4-year-olds; 
specifically 2-year-olds looked almost twice as long as the 4-year-olds at the distractors before 
touching the screen (M2Y=3.03, SD2Y=2.69; M4Y=1.75, SD4Y=0.88; t(50)=2.9, p=0.005**) [Figure 
49]. However, 2- and 4-year-olds made on average a comparable number of visual saccades 
during the “referent selection” trials (M2Y=4.38, SD2Y=4.4; M4Y=4.09, SD4Y=2.03; t(57)=0.38, 
p=0.7) [Figure 49].  
 
Figure 49 – A. Barplots indicating the mean looking time (in sec, ±SEM) 2- and 4-year-old participants spent at looking at the distractors 
and at the targets during the “referent selection” trials. B. Barplot representing the mean (±SEM) number of visual saccades executed by the 
two age groups during the “referent selection” trials. 
Consequently, the difference in RT between the two age groups stands essentially in the fact that 
2-year-olds spent on average more time attending at an image before switching their eye-gaze 
irrespective of the image type (target or distractor), although the highest difference between the 
two groups arose with the looking time toward the distractive images.  
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To go further, in both age groups, we looked for significant correlation between the mean looking 
time at the target during learning and the performance during testing. Intriguingly, the less time 
the 4-year-olds spent looking at the targets during learning, the better they seemed to have 
remembered the names of these objects, as attested by the multiple R-squared and the near 
significant p-value (2-year-olds: F(1,3)=0.14, R2=0.05, p=0.7; 4-year-olds: F(1,3)=8.05, R2=0.72, 
p=0.06). Similarly, we did not find any correlation between the mean looking time at the 
distractors during learning and the performance during testing, or between the number of visual 
saccades made during learning and memory performance. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that the amount of time participants spent looking 
at the novel object during the selection phase does not influence the later retention of the 
name of that object. Hence, it can be strongly suggested that the difference in retention between 
2- and 4-year-olds does not arise from the differences in their looking behaviors during 
learning. 
Adults: the effect of age 
In children, none of the various variables that could have influenced the storage of the names of 
the objects (e.g. living with older siblings, being exposed to another language, etc.) appeared to 
produce a significant effect. However, we found a significant effect of age in adults. Specifically, 
older adults appear significantly worse at remembering the names of objects acquired through an 
exclusion process (F(1,19)=8, R2=0.30, p=0.01*) [Figure 49]. 
In adults, we also found a significant effect of the socio-professional status because students were 
significantly better at remembering the object names than workers (Mstudents=96.9, SDstudents=5.1; 
Mworkers=64.4, SDworkers=35.4; t(9)=2.87, p=0.017*). Even though we took a special care in 
recruiting several young workers and some old students, one could argue that these variables are 
confounding variables since the students were on average younger than workers 
(M(age)students=23y; SD(age)students=3.44 ; M(age)workers=46.3y; SD(age)workers=11.43). 
Nonetheless, no significant interaction could be established between both age and socio-
professional status variables (ANCOVA, F(3,17)=2.9, R2=0.34, p[socio-prof-status]:[age]=0.7).  
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Figure 50 - Graph showing the mean performance of each adult participant during testing according to his/her age (in years). Each 
participant is depicted in a blue filled circle. The line represents the linear regression and the transparent curve indicates the 95% confident 
interval around mean. 
Finally, we did not find any effect of the neuropsychological scores of adult participants on their 
performance during testing. 
5.4 Discussion  
This study explored the effect of another common word learning strategy on the storage of novel 
object names during early childhood and adulthood.  
Referent selection  
Taken together, our results demonstrate that from 2-years of age, children are capable of using 
an inferential strategy to fast-map a novel word to the unique unfamiliar object of a scene, 
which is consistent with the findings of the literature (e.g. Bion et al., 2013; Horst & Samuelson, 
2008). Moreover, here we showed that 4-year-olds succeeded on the referential selection trials 
in a way that was perfectly comparable to that of adults, both in terms of accuracy and speed. 
In contrast, 2-year-olds were on average slower to disambiguate the contexts. As an explanation 
of this result, we evidenced that 2-year-olds spent significantly more time looking at the novel 
object but also substantially more time looking at the familiar items compared to 4-year-olds. A 
perspective to this work would be to continue the recruitment of pre-vocabulary spurt children 
(i.e. 18-month-olds and/or 2-year-olds with low verbal production rates) in order to specify the 
exact role of the language level on solving inferential word-related paradigms. This would either 
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support or refute Bion’s assumption that the emergence of the disambiguation ability coincides 
with the vocabulary spurt phenomenon (Bion et al., 2013).  
Referent retention 
We also wanted to know if being such actively involved in the learning procedure would result in 
an actual storage of the information. In the current study, we showed that 2-year-olds failed to 
recognize the fast-mapped associations after a break of 30-min, which is in accordance with Horst 
and Samuelson’s pioneering work in 2-year-olds after a minimal delay (Horst & Samuelson, 
2008). This finding contradicts the claim that at that age, “fast-mapping” allows a child to rapidly 
acquire new words and increase his/her lexical repertoire (Spiegel & Halberda, 2011). Despite 
this, we did find that when 2-year-old participants fast-mapped at least five times the same 
word to its associated referent during a learning session, actual retention was observed after a 
30-min delay. This finding is in line with a previous word learning model, claiming that the 
referential ambiguity is a situation-time problem that is solved within the context of a single 
inferential event but building long lasting linkages would only be solved over developmental 
time as children encounter multiple presentations of the elements to be mapped (McMurray et 
al 2012). Here, we provide the first evidence that 2-year-olds indeed required multiple inferential 
events to form and maintain in memory the associational link between a word and its object. 
On the other hand, we demonstrated that this learning method was very efficient in 4-year-olds. 
Indeed, we found that they answered as fast as adults during testing and were almost as accurate 
as them to remember the associations after a 30-min delay, even after a single “referent selection” 
event. This study also enabled us to make direct comparisons between age groups with a strong 
age difference despite using exaclty the same protocol, something that has never been done 
before. Hence, we provide a robust proof that learning via inferential reasoning is much more 
powerful at 4 years of age than at 2 years of age. This finding, along with the findings of 
previous studies showing that 3.5- and 4-year-olds could remember the name of a fast-mapped 
object after a delay up to a month (although the interpretation of these results is controversial, see 
Chapter 3), assumes that the developmental shift from simply disambiguating language-
related situations to actual retention of that newly acquired knowledge occurs between 3 
and 4 years of age (e.g. Markson & Bloom 1997, Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012; Waxman & Booth, 
2000). 
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Underlying mechanisms 
Undeniably, a central underlying question is what accounted for the success of the 4-year-olds to 
remember the names of the fast-mapped objects and concurrently the lack of success of the 2-
year-olds on this same task? What are the putative underlying mechanisms? Are object names 
learned via ostensive labeling processed differently from object names acquired via an inferential 
strategy? According to our opinion, three main hypotheses could explain the discrepancy.  
First, the difference may be attributable to the size of the lexical repertoire of 2- and 4-year-olds 
and to their respective past experience with language. Here we did not find evidence that verbal 
production skills influenced 2-year-olds’ ability to select the referents and to remember the 
mappings. As an explanation, most 2-year-olds are already post-vocabulary spurt children. 
Unfortunately, the receptive vocabulary couldn’t be evaluated since no specific questionnaires for 
children of 2-years of age are available in the French language. Four-year-old participants 
completed an ELO test (i.e. Evaluation du Language Oral) but since no equivalent test exists for 
2-year-olds, we could not make rigorous comparisons between these two age groups based on the 
language level. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that 4-year-olds are endowed with a 
larger lexical repertoire than 2-year-olds, for the simple reason that they acquired a larger 
experience with language since birth (see Fenson et al., 1994). As a consequence, and thanks to 
their higher expertise with language, it may have been easier for 4-year-olds to rapidly tag the 
familiar items as distractors and to rapidly discard them during the “referent selection” trials, 
because they already encountered numerous instances of objects belonging to those subordinate 
categories in the past. A model indeed suggested that successful fast-mapping is partially driven 
by a well-developed representation of the object categories prior to the “referent selections” 
(Mayor & Plunkett, 2010). In contrast, we found that the 2-year-olds spent significantly more time 
looking at the distractors, which could be explained by the fact that they required more time to 
identify the subordinate category to which they belong to in order to tag them as distractors. 
Ultimately, during the “referent selection” trials, 2-year-olds were perhaps also learning 
information from the familiar objects (e.g. learning a new cup shape, a new car brand, etc.). If 
so, their neural system was presumably encoding and storing information about the three images 
and not only about the novel one. Such multiple learning could have interfered with the 
consolidation process of the visual features of the novel object. On the other hand, 4-year-olds 
are probably already provided with more concept-neurons (or “category-neurons”) (Quiroga et al., 
2005), and thus do not require a profound treatment of the visual properties of the familiar items.  
Our second hypothesis is related to the attentional resources. We postulated that the 2-year-olds 
were perhaps less attentive than the 4-year-olds when learning the new information, which would 
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not have allowed them to encode the information as efficiently as the 4-year-olds. Along with this 
idea, we suggest that the attention allocated to each object during the “referent selection” trials 
may play a key role in the encoding process. Together, we predicted that if the 4-year-olds spent 
on average more time looking at the novel objects during learning than the 2-year-olds, they 
would have had more chances to encode the visual features of these objects. On the contrary, we 
found that the 2-year-olds were those who spent the longer time attending at the novel objects. 
Thus, they should have been the most likely to encode the visual properties of the targets, but 
conversely they were those who failed the most during testing. Moreover, the number of visual 
saccades was similar for the two age groups, ruling out the possibility that 2-year-olds were more 
distracted during learning (each time a participant looked away from the screen was counted as 
one saccade). In sum, there was no evident diminished attentional resource in 2-year-old 
participants, which allows us to claim that the difference in performance during testing cannot be 
attributed to a lack of attention during learning of these participants. Thus, we can relatively 
serenely put this hypothesis aside.  
Consequently and lastly, we hypothesized that the impaired performance of 2-year-olds may not 
arise from a default in encoding but rather from a default in the consolidation process of the 
information. If so, the discrepancy in accuracy between 2- and 4-year-old children may be caused 
by a significant differential in the maturational stage of the brain structures responsible for a 
successful “fast-mapping” (in the sense of remembering the names of objects acquired through 
an inferential strategy). Remember that, in our first study using ostensive labeling as a word 
learning method, we speculated that the absence of difference in accuracy between 2- and 4-year-
olds was presumably due to an absence of significant enhancement of maturation of the 
underlying brain structures. At least, this was not measurable at a behavioral level following a 
30min delay. 
Hence, this would mean that these two word learning methods are processed differently and do 
not rely on the same brain structures. Specifically, learning words via ostensive labeling would be 
supported by brain areas that are already functional early in life (i.e. around two years of age 
regarding our results), whereas learning words via an inferential method would be mediated by 
brain areas that maturate only later on (i.e. around 4 years of age regarding our results). But 
which brain regions could it be? As reviewed in Chapter 3, in the overall literature there is a huge 
debate about whether both word learning strategies are dependent on the hippocampus or not.  
In typical “fast-mapping” studies carried out on healthy adults or amnesic patients (Coutanche & 
Thompson-Schill, 2014; Greve et al., 2014; Sharon et al., 2011), the authors directly compared the 
effect of “ostensive labeling” vs “referent selection” on word retention and tried to localize the 
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underlying brain areas using fMRI. As reviewed previously, in those studies participants were 
explicitly told to remember the names of the objects taught via ostensive labeling (e.g. “remember 
the mangosteen”) whereas they were not for the associations acquired through an inferential 
reasoning (e.g. “is the numbat’s tail pointing up”?). So, in those paradigms, “ostensive labeling” is 
defined as an explicit learning process, while on the contrary, “referent selection” refers to an 
implicit (or incidental) learning process. Some of the authors found that explicit word learning 
was mainly hippocampus-dependent while implicit word learning was mostly reliant on 
extrahippocampal neocortical regions (Atir-sharon et al., 2015; Sharon et al., 2011). These 
neocortical regions encompassed essentially lateral and anterior temporal lobes, the inferior 
prefrontal cortex and anterior parahippocampal structures (Atir-sharon et al., 2015). However, 
other authors found contradicting results and claimed that the hippocampus was admittedly not 
essential for the disambiguation task (“referent selection”), but was necessary for the 
maintenance of the arbitrary associations (Warren & Duff, 2014; Sakhon et al. 2018).  
These findings, in addition to being contradictory, cannot be directly transposed to a child 
population for the simple reason that children, whatever the paradigm, always learned the new 
associations implicitly. Indeed, in the context of ostensive labeling, in contrast to the paradigms 
developed for adults and amnesic patients, children were not instructed to remember the 
associations, neither told to pay a special attention on what the stimuli because of a following 
“test”. Consequently, the dichotomy between explicit versus implicit word learning, that is 
typically make in adult paradigms, does not apply in children setups. So, for children, what makes 
these two word learning strategies different? In the context of ostensive labeling, children 
passively observe an experimenter (or an adult in everyday life) performing actions with the 
object to learn while pointing at it and simultaneously labeling it. In the context of inferential 
learning, children actively disambiguate the situations by eliminating distractors. There, learning 
consists in a more active process that may result in a deeper processing of the information. Indeed, 
the benefits of “depth of processing” on retention of new information have been demonstrated and 
largely studied in human memory (Craik & Tulving, 1975). Moreover, an active disambiguation 
of the information appeals to executive functions (see Robinson & Pascalis, 2004 for a 
discussion). Given that executive functions are essentially mediated by prefrontal regions such as 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are the latest parts of the brain to maturate, it can be 
assumed that only 4-year-olds remembered the fast-mapped associations because their prefrontal 
cortices are significantly better developed (though they do not reach adult levels of maturation) 
than those of 2-year-olds. 
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Nonetheless, this assumption does not exclude a probable involvement of the hippocampus in 
the consolidation processes of the associations following both learning methods. As reviewed 
previously, the hippocampus is known to play a critical role in binding and linking facts and 
details together (Eichenbaum et al., 1996; Mcclelland, 2013; Mcclelland et al., 1995; Squire & 
Zola-morgan, 1991). However, the slow and prolonged maturation of some components of the 
hippocampal system (see Chapter 1), especially the dentate gyrus, prevents the hippocampus from 
being fully functional early in life (for example, consider the phenomenon of infantile amnesia). 
Consequently, it can be proposed that the immature hippocampal system that is in place at 2 years 
of age would be sufficient to support the retention of associations acquired via ostensive 
labeling but not via an inferential method. The maturational processes that occur between 2 
and 4 years of life (e.g. increased connectivity within the hippocampal structure and in relation 
with extra-hippocampal structures, diminished pruning events, etc. (Jabès & Nelson, 2015)) may 
confer on the hippocampus a maturational status that is sufficient to promote the retention of 
fast-mapped words around 3 or 4-years of age. In other words, only a more mature 
hippocampal system (though adult levels of maturation are not reached at 3-4 years of age) may 
be required to support long-term retention of associations acquired via a disambiguation process. 
This would fit with Warren & Duff’s claim that the hippocampus is not essential for the online 
disambiguation process (since 2 year olds are able to disambiguate the associations) but 
required for the maintenance of the knowledge in memory (Warren & Duff, 2014). Another 
argument in favor of this hypothesis is that the age of 4 years is generally considered as the offset 
of the infantile amnesia phenomenon, thus the possibility for children to retain information for 
their entire lives. This suggests that most hippocampal functions are already operative from that 
age and should be able to support retention of information acquired by an inferential process.  
Finally, we cannot either rule out the alternative option that extrahippocampal structures were 
responsible for the binding and consolidation processes of fast-mapped words, as reported by 
Sharon at al. in healthy adults and few amnesic patients (see Chapter 3)(Sharon et al., 2011). 
Consequently, not only the hippocampus, but also the anterior temporal lobe could be involved 
in linking associative knowledge together. It might be that word learning through inferential 
reasoning was rather supported by these extrahippocampal structures that may reach a satisfactory 
level of maturation around 4 years of age but not at 2 years of age.  
Moreover, word learning is by definition semantic. As reviewed and discussed previously, there is 
still uncertainty about the neural correlates of semantic information. The dominant view is that 
semantic knowledge would be less dependent on the hippocampus but would rather recruit the 
cortices surrounding the hippocampus (perirhinal and entorhinal cortices), as well as neocortical 
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structures (temporal and temporo-parietal regions. It can also be speculated that the hippocampus 
is not involved at all in the whole encoding and consolidation process of word-object pairs. 
According to this viewpoint, word learning would occur outside of the hippocampus and would 
mainly depend on the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices along with neocortical regions, structures 
that also display progressive maturational stages across development.  
Obviously, the only way to reconcile these various hypotheses about the neural correlates of 
word-object pairs acquired through an inferential process across development would be to use 
neuro-imagery techniques, such as fMRI. Functional MRI studies require an awake state of the 
participants and for the reasons reported earlier are rarely conducted on young children. To date, 
no fMRI study has investigated the brain regions involved in the consolidation process of fast-
mapped words in young children. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This study was firstly designed to investigate whether 18-month-olds, 2-year-olds, 4-year-olds 
and adults would be capable of inferring an unknown word to its referent by logically excluding 
known items, using our touch-screen apparatus. Except for the 18-month-old group (work in 
progress), children as young as 2 years of age successfully solved the task, confirming our 
hypothesis that the 2-year-old participants who underwent our first study may have used this 
strategy for correctly identifying the word-object pair to which they were exposed only once.  
The main contribution of this study is that it allowed us to directly compare the ability of 2 and 4-
year-olds and adults to retain the information after a delay, since they were all exposed to the 
same material to learn (plus same environment, same experimenter, same apparatus). We showed 
that 4-year-olds and adults outperformed 2-year-olds on the retention test, and demonstrated that 
this learning strategy was not efficient at age 2 years to durably remember the associations except 
when the children were facing the disambiguation problems many times (at least 5 times). We 
provided three potential explanations for this developmental shift in retention of fast-mapped 
words between 2 and 4 years of age. Among them, children’s background with language and the 
maturational stage of the underlying brain structures are the most likely factors. 
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CHAPTER V.  
ONGOING EXPERIMENTS… 
 
1 FOURTH EXPERIMENT. Ostensive labeling versus “fast-
mapping”: which strategy is the most efficient to promote word 
retention during childhood? 
1.1 Introduction 
Combining the results of our first and third studies, we demonstrated that two completely different 
learning strategies were equivalently effective to induce a successful retention of novel word-
object pairs in 4-year-olds and adults, whereas only one of the two triggered significant retention 
in 2-year-olds. This latter consisted of passively watching short videos displaying isolated novel 
objects that were manipulated by an experimenter’s arm and subsequently labeled three times in a 
row in an ecologically valid sentence. This learning paradigm, defined as ostensive labeling, 
mimics in a certain way, the everyday experiences of a young child observing an adult showing 
him a novel object and labeling it. Ostensive labeling is one of the three main word learning 
strategies described in the literature (see Chapter 3) and corresponds to the most unambiguous 
learning situation a child can encounter in his daily life. On the other hand, the other word 
learning strategy we focused on in this thesis corresponds to the ability to disambiguate language-
related situations by logically excluding known objects when hearing a completely novel word. In 
this referent selection learning strategy, the child is required to actively solve the disambiguation 
problem by fast-mapping the unknown word to the sole unknown object of the scene. This 
learning method did not induce retention in 2-year-olds after a 30min delay. 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to highlight the learning principles and optimal conditions 
required to induce a long-lasting memory of complex sensory stimuli such as word-object pairs 
during development. For example, we would like to know which of these two central word 
learning methods is the most efficient to promote a durable retention of the names of novel objects 
in young children and whether there is a change in efficiency of those methods during early 
childhood. At first glance, it would be tempting to simply compare the effects on word retention 
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that we reported in our first and third studies, and to conclude that an ostensive naming method 
overcomes an inferential learning at 2-years of age and that this pattern of efficiency evolves 
during the 3rd or 4th year of life. However, are we allowed to do so? The answer is clearly no, for 
few reasons that we attempted to summarize in the following figure [Figure 51].  
 
Figure 51 – Graphical summarizing the main experimental differences of the two learning methods utilized in this thesis. 
The apparent higher efficiency of the ostensive labeling method (1st study) over the referent 
selection method (3rd study) reported in 2-year-olds may simply come result major differences in 
the experimental setups. As summarized in Figure 51, children who underwent the ostensive 
labeling experiment had access to causal information about the novel objects (i.e. functionality of 
the objects provided in the video clips) which is known to enhance learning (Booth, 2009a; Booth, 
McGregor, & Rohlfing, 2008; Markson & Bloom, 1997a).  Moreover, the time participants spent 
looking at each novel object was 15sec in the ostensive labeling condition (or a little bit less if 
participants were distracted) against 3.77sec on average for 2-year-olds and 2.71sec on average 
for 4-year-olds in the “referent selection” paradigm, as measured previously (see complementary 
results of the 3rd experiment). Consequently, children who underwent the ostensive labeling 
paradigm had on average four to five times longer to encode the visual properties of the novel 
objects compared to children who participated in the “referent selection” experiment. Moreover, 
children from the “referent selection” paradigm were not only integrating information about the 
novel objects but also about the familiar objects. Furthermore, they had to mentally and actively 
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discard them to solve the task, which appeals to executive functions that were not solicited in the 
ostensive labeling trials. Lastly, the difference in performance may simply be attributed to the fact 
that the novel objects were labeled three times in the row during the ostensive labeling trials 
against just once in the referent selection trials (though the instruction was repeated after a 6sec 
delay if no answer was provided). 
Taken together, all these parameters may have contributed for the significant performance of 2-
year-olds in the ostensive labeling paradigm and concurrently for their lack of success in the 
“referent selection” paradigm. If so, one could argue that the optimal learning conditions were 
simply gathered in the first experiment but not in the third one. Given these numerous 
experimental differences, it would not be fair to conclude on the difference in accuracy just on the 
basis of the learning strategies themselves. 
This is why we developed a fourth study. In the current and ongoing experiment, we attempted to 
standardize our ostensive labeling design on the basis of the “referent selection” setup, so that 
ultimately the two learning conditions are only differentiated by: an unambiguous passive learning 
versus an ambiguous active learning. The current protocol should allow us to objectively compare 
the effect of these two learning strategies on the memory formation of object names. Furthermore, 
it should provide answers to the following questions:  
Did 2-year-olds from our first study take advantage of the causal information about the objects 
provided in the video clips? Did they take advantage of the three successive repetitions of the 
labels and of the longer duration of the learning events to successfully encode the sensory inputs?  
In this more stringent ostensive labeling paradigm, if 2-year-olds will fail to remember the names 
of the objects, this will indubitably mean that participants from our first ostensive labeling study 
took advantage of the parameters mentioned above to form their memories. On the contrary, if the 
2-year-olds do succeed in remembering the associations, it will allow us to argue that the 
difference in accuracy between our 1st and 3rd studies was not due to differences in the 
experimental setups but well and truly to the learning strategies themselves (ambiguous active 
learning vs. unambiguous passive learning). 
So, to standardize the settings, novel objects will not be presented through video clips anymore 
but will consist of the same static images used in the “referent selection” experiment (images of 
the same size). In this way, participants will not have access to additional causal information 
about the novel objects. Furthermore, novel objects will be displayed against two scrambled 
images of familiar objects (see Atir-sharon et al., 2015 for similar methodology). In this way, the 
triangular configuration of the learning trials implemented in the “referent selection” paradigm 
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will be kept, with the distinction that only the image of the unknown object will be meaningful. In 
this way, the non-ambiguity aspect that characterizes the ostensive labeling method will be 
maintained. Moreover, we will adopt the mean looking time to target measured in the previous 
“referent selection” experiment to the current protocol (plus an estimated percentage of looking 
time to the scrambled images, see following methods) and the label will be pronounced only once 
(rather than 3 times in a row). Finally, as in the “referent selection” paradigm, participants will be 
taught three novel word-object pairs, one of which will be presented once, another three times and 
the last five times, in an interspersed fashion. 
This study is in progress and so only preliminary data will be shown. 
1.2 Methods 
 Participants 1.2.1
Participants consist of 18 twenty-four-month-olds and 8 four-year-olds. Data from 4 twenty-four-
month-olds could not be included in the analyses due to fussiness (n=3), systematic response bias 
(i.e. selection of the same object on all test trials, n=1). Note that this experiment is ongoing and 
that we need to recruit more participants in each age group. We also intend to include adult 
participants. Details about the current sample are represented in Table 5.  
 Stimuli 1.2.2
Stimuli consisted of images of three unknown objects associated with their randomly chosen 
pseudo-words and three scrambled images of familiar objects (i.e. distractors). The novel objects 
were chosen prior to the experiment in accordance with the assessment of the caregiver about the 
novelty aspect of the stimuli.  
The scrambled images were generated with a self-developed program under Python software 
which consists of shuffling the pixels (definition: 720x576) of the original image of a familiar 
object, so that the resulting image contains the luminance and color as the original one, but with 
the constraint that it is meaningless [Figure 52]. Ultimately, the same amount of information is 
conveyed to the retina of the participants but no profound treatment is allowed.  
Three familiar objects were also selected prior to the experiment and served for the warm-up 
trials.  
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  Procedure 1.2.3
The learning procedure implements the one used in the previous “referent selection” study, except 
that participants are not required to select an image by excluding images of familiar items. 
Participants launch each trial by pressing a red button situated on the center of the screen [Figure 
52]. Then, they are simply asked to passively look at static images displayed on the screen (the 
image of a novel object is displayed against two scrambled images) while a tape-recorded voice is 
labeling the novel object in an ecologically valid sentence [Figure 52]. The scrambled images are 
meaningless (i.e. distractors) and only the image of the novel object can make sense.  
The duration of each trial corresponds to the mean time participants of the previous “referent 
selection” study spent looking at the novel object, plus half of the mean time they spent looking at 
the familiar items. We presumed that since the distractive images are currently meaningless, 
participants should spend almost half the time looking at them than in the previous experiment 
that involved meaningful images of familiar objects. Consequently, here the duration of each trial 
is 5.27sec (3.77sec + (3.03/2) sec) for the 2-year-old participants and to 3.58sec (2.71sec + 
(1.75/2) sec) for 4-year-olds. 
Exactly 1500ms (2-year-olds) or 1000ms (4-year-olds and adults) after trial onset, a recorded 
voice labels the novel object using a child-directed carrier phrase randomly chosen among three 
options (e.g. “regarde ca c’est un/une [label]”; “tu as vu, ca c’est un/une [label]; “tiens, voilà 
un/une [label]”). The label is pronounced only once. At the end of each trial, the same neutral GIF 
animation as the one used in the former experiment, encourages participants to continue with 
another trial [Figure 52].  
In total, participants undergo 9 trials since the objects to learn are presented either 1, 3 or 5 times 
in a pseudo-random order. 
As in the previous studies, the experiment begins with three warm-up trials involving familiar 
objects. During this familiarization phase, each familiar object (chosen with the caregiver prior to 
the experiment) is displayed on the screen against two scrambled images. Each familiar object 
appears only once on the screen.  
After learning, the children played in the experimental room for a 30-min period. For the same 
time period, adult participants complete the neuro-psychological tests and are asked to fill in a 
survey about their general opinion on the use of touch-screens in preschools.  
 
166 
 
 
Figure 52 - Illustration of the learning procedure (left). Participants initiate themselves each trial by pressing a red button on the center of 
the touch screen. Participants are then presented with 2 scrambled images of familiar objects (randomly chosen among three, see enlarged 
examples on the right) and one novel object. A tape-recorded voice labels the object using an ecologically valid sentence (e.g. “regarde, ca 
c’est une [label]). The label is uttered once per trial. Trial duration is 5.27sec for 2-year-old participants and 3.58sec for 4-year-olds and adult 
participants. One of the three novel objects appears only once, another one on 3 trials and the last one on 5 trials, interspersed. A 3s GIF 
animation showing a moving penguin accompanied by a stimulating sentence encourages participants to continue.  
Testing consists of 3AFC trials involving the three novel objects, exactly as performed in the 
former experiments. Novel objects serve as target three times in an interspersed manner (testing 
session = 9 trials) and any answer can trigger the following trial. 
1.3 Results 
Preliminary results indicate that the 2-year-olds performed significantly above chance 
(M=53.36%, SD=21.13; exact binomial p=9.87e-6***) with a very large effect size (Cohen’s 
d=0.88) [Table 5 & Figure 53]. The 4-year-olds also remembered the associations significantly 
above the level expected by chance (M=77.7%, SD=20.57, exact binomial p=8.56e-15***) with a 
huge effect size (Cohen’s d=2.16). Moreover, we found that 4-year-olds outperformed 2-year-olds 
(GLMM, Z=2.7, p=0.0068**). 
Next, we compared the preliminary results of the two age groups with the performance obtained 
by the participants of the same ages from our 1st and 3rd studies. 
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Table 5 - Details about the composition and results of each age group. 
Age groups 24-Mo 4-Y Adults 
N subjects 14 8  
N females 8 4  
Mean age (±SD) 24.70 Mo (±0.72) 3.9 Y (±0.26)  
N subjects with older 
siblings at home 
4 3 - 
N subjects exposed to  
another language at home 
3 3  
IFDC voc in production  
(%) (±SD) 
76 (±18.02) - - 
Mean overall accuracy  
(% correct trials) (±SD) 
53.36 (±21.13) 77.7 (±20.57)  
P (exact binomial tests) 9.87e-6 8.56e-15  
Cohen’s D 0.88 2.16  
Mean RT (sec) (±SD) 6.13 (±4.15) 2.45 (±0.72)  
Mean Accuracy 1 REP 
(% correct trials) [95%CI] 
45.24 [30-61] 83.33 [63-95]  
P 1 REP  
(binomial tests) 
0.1  5.5e-7  
Mean Accuracy 3 REP 
(% correct trials) [95%CI] 
51.78 [35-67] 75 [53-90]  
P 3 REP  
(binomial tests) 
0.01 3.08e-5  
Mean Accuracy 5 REP 
(% correct trials) [95%CI] 
63.09 [47-77] 75 [53-90]  
P 5 REP  
(binomial tests) 
8.06e-5 3.08e-5  
Mean RT 1 REP  
(sec) (±SD) 
6.39 (±4.81) 2.53 (±0.60)  
Mean RT 3 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
5.61(±3.19) 2.56 (±0.68)  
Mean RT 5 REP 
(sec) (±SD) 
6.41(±4.54) 2.27 (±0.89)  
 
 
Figure 53 - Boxplots representing the performance of the 2- and 4-year-olds during the 3AFC retention task. Boxplots show the median 
(full-line). Dashed lines represent the 33% chance level (dark grey) and the 95% confidence interval around chance (light grey). Each 
individual mean performance is depicted in a circle. 
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2-Year-olds: Interestingly, no significant differences in accuracy were established between the 2-
year-old participants who underwent this experiment and those who underwent the previous 
ostensive labeling condition (GLMM, Z=0.77, p=0.44) [Figure 54]. This result indicates that 2-
year-old participants performed as well in the previous ostensive labeling study as in the current 
one. Moreover, participants from both ostensive labeling methods exhibited significantly higher 
scores of accuracy than those who underwent the “referent selection” study (GLMM, Zost lab static-ref 
selec=-1.95, p=0.05*; Zost lab videos-ref selec=-3, p=0.003**). ). Note that the composition of the 2-year-
old samples is highly similar across studies regarding the following variables: age, gender, 
proportion of subjects living with older siblings at home, proportion of subjects exposed to 
another language and IFDC score [Table 1, Table 3, Table 4 & Table 5].  
4-year-olds: there was no significant difference in accuracy between the 4-year-olds who 
underwent the previous ostensive labeling experiment and the 4-year-olds who underwent the 
current experiment (GLMM, Z=1.17, p=0.26). Furthermore, 4-year-olds are similarly accurate 
during testing whatever the learning method (GLMM, Zost lab static-ref selec=-1.4, p=0.16; Zost lab videos-ref 
selec=-0.36, p=0.7) [Figure 54]. 
 
Figure 54 - Barplots summarizing the mean performance (%, ± SEM) during testing of the three age groups according to different learning 
strategies (“ost lab static”, i.e. ostensive labeling with static images of the objects = current study ; “ost lab video”, i.e. ostensive labeling 
through short videos = study N°1 and “FM”, i.e. “fast-mapping” = study N°3). The dashed lines represent the 33% chance level (dark grey) 
and the 95% confidence interval around chance (light grey). Stars indicate the level of significance (*, p≤0.05; **, p≤0.01; ***, p≤0.001). 
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Finally, we did not statistically analyze the mean performance of each age group according to the 
number of presentations during learning, and nor did we examine in detail the RT during testing, 
since the sample sizes are still too small, especially for the 4-year-old group. However, for the 2-
year-old group, it can be noticed that the mean performance increased with the number of 
presentations during learning [Table 5] in a very similar way than the increase reported in study 
N°1 [Table 5]. This suggests that participants similarly benefitted from the repeated presentations 
of the pairs, and on the whole exhibited the same level of accuracy whatever the ostensive 
labeling method employed. 
1.4 Discussion 
This study aimed to know whether the difference in performance between our 1st (ostensive 
labeling) and 3rd study (“fast-mapping”) may not simply be due to high differences in the 
experimental settings. Specifically, the fact that 2-year-olds seemed to have outperformed in the 
former ostensive labeling experiment (1st study) in comparison to the “referent selection” 
experiment (3rd study) may simply be explained by an enhanced access to the material to learn in 
the 1st study (e.g. longer exposition to the novel objects, three repetitions in a row of the labels, 
causal information available, manipulation of the objects, etc.). Here, we wondered whether 2-
year-olds would be equivalently accurate when removing all these putative learning enhancers. 
Furthermore, by standardizing the learning methods, we are now allowed to objectively compare 
the efficiency of the two learning strategies on the emergence of a memory trace.  
To those aims, in this 4th study we applied the exact same parameters than those employed in the 
“referent selection” study (i.e. stimuli were static images, same size of the images, same amount 
of time to visualize the novel objects, same number of verbal repeats (1/trial), same neutral 
animation between trials, etc.). Nonetheless, what makes the main difference between the current 
study and the former “referent selection” one, is the learning method per se. Here, participants 
passively looked at the images of the novel objects being unambiguously displayed on the screen 
among two meaningless images and listened to the labels. In the previous “referent selection” 
experiment, participants had to actively disambiguate ambiguous trials by excluding the images of 
two familiar objects when hearing an unknown name.  
Did 2-year-olds similarly learn from the two ostensive labeling learning methods? 
Although this experiment is not fully completed, our preliminary data strongly suggest that 2-
year-olds did not take advantage of the experimental procedure settled in our previous ostensive 
labeling study. For example, it does not seem that a video clip is more efficient for memorizing 
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the name of an object than a still image of that object. This is in accordance with a previous study 
showing equivalent results between children who were taught labels for moving images of objects 
and those who were taught labels for still images (Houston-Price et al., 2005). It also suggests that 
the three verbal repeats provided in the former ostensive labeling were not the source of success. 
Consequently, it can be reasonably claimed that ostensive labeling, whatever the labeling 
manner, is a very powerful learning method that can allow the establishment of a durable 
memory trace between an object and its associated name in 2-year-olds. This finding is 
however surprising in regard to other studies from the literature that emphasized the importance of 
providing functional or causal information about the novel object, as well as non-verbal gestural 
cues (e.g. gazing at or pointing to the object, manipulation of the object, etc.), for enhancing the 
memorization of the name of that object (Booth, 2009; Booth, McGregor, et al., 2008; Markson & 
Bloom, 1997). These authors reported that learning improved with greater redundancy among 
cues, suggesting a strong role for socio-pragmatic factors on word learning in children from 28 to 
31 months of age (Booth, McGregor, et al., 2008). Our current preliminary findings appear to 
contradict these results and instead suggest that a brief visual exposure to an object 
unambiguously accompanied with its label is sufficient to enable retention of the pair. Now, it 
would be interesting to examine whether the two pairs that were presented several times (3 and 5 
repetitions) were important for the results or whether children of 2-years of age would also be able 
to remember pairs displayed and labeled only once without any external support (i.e. a replication 
of our study N°2 with this ostensive labeling design).  
2-year-olds: why do they fail to retain fast-mapped associations? 
Taken together, results from our first and current experiment show that 2-year-olds can succeed in 
learning the names of novel objects that were unambiguously taught, even when the learning 
conditions were more rigorous. Conversely, results from our third study demonstrated that 2-year-
olds failed to remember the names of “fast-mapped” associations that followed the same rigorous 
conditions. Consequently, it can be argued that it is precisely the disambiguation act that 
prevented 2-year-olds from remembering the associations after a delay. Likewise, the 
difference in performance may be explained by the presence of distractors during learning. A 
study revealed that the number of competitors (2, 3 and 4) did not affect 30-month-olds’ ability to 
form the initial word-object mappings, but only children who encountered the lowest number of 
competitors (i.e. 2) during learning, demonstrated significant levels of retention after a 5-min 
break (Horst et al., 2010). In line with this idea, in another study, authors showed that highlighting 
the target object and/or reducing the salience of the distractor objects promoted retention 
(Axelsson et al., 2012). Accordingly, here, our preliminary results suggest that 2-year-olds 
171 
 
remember new words even better if there are zero (or only meaningless) competitors during 
learning. Altogether, these findings indicate that at that age, word learning is maximized when 
ambiguity and distractions are minimized or absent. In other words, a passive unambiguous 
word learning method could be more efficient than being actively engaged in learning.  
What about the 4 years old? 
Four-year-old participants performed well whatever the learning method. At that age, having a 
direct and unambiguous access to the meaning of a novel word or being actively engaged in 
mapping the words to their corresponding items by using inferential strategies triggered the same 
outcome on memory.  
This finding goes against the unique study in the literature that compared the memory of 3.5-year-
olds for words learned via inference or instruction (i.e. ostensive labeling) (Zosh et al., 2013). In 
that study, participants were taught six novel word-object pairs either in an inferential context 
(e.g. “point at the [label]”; note that here the target was pitted against a unique distractor) or in an 
instructional context (e.g. “this is a [label]”; no other object was present). In both cases, objects 
were images displayed on a screen for about 7sec and appeared only once during learning. Testing 
occurred immediately after learning and involved real 3-D versions of four out of the six novel 
pairings (i.e. 4 AFC task). Only one object among the four was queried during testing (i.e. testing 
= 1 trial). Children’s comprehension of the associations was measured by pointing to the target 
object after label onset. The authors found that the children who underwent the inferential 
learning context chose the target object significantly above chance, whereas those who underwent 
the instructional learning context performed at chance levels. This observed difference in 
performance was not attributed to a lack of attention during the learning trials since children 
looked longer to the novel object when it was presented in an instruction context (i.e. same 
analyzes as we did in the previous study). In a within-subjects replication of the design, 3.5 years 
old were taught 3 pairings in each context and exhibited similar results (Zosh et al., 2013, 
experiment 2). In contrast to our results, the authors found that children failed to retain novel 
object names learned via unambiguous naming and that only a disambiguation context favored 
word retention. Consequently, the authors concluded that the presence of a single distracter object 
may be more beneficial for 3- to 4-year-old word learners than with no competitors or with too 
many of them (Horst et al., 2010). They also pointed out a possible change of strategy across 
development. 
The discrepancy between our finding (though preliminary) and theirs could arise from four major 
differences in the experimental design:  
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(i) The delay between learning and testing: we tested our participants after a 30-min 
break, whereas Zosh et al tested their participants immediately after learning. 
(ii) The number of test trials: in our study, participants underwent 9 test trials and were 
tested on 3 word-object associations (3 test trials/association) against a unique test 
trial in Zosh et al’s study (only one association was tested). Obviously our testing 
procedure was more demanding. In their paper, the authors indicated that pilot work 
suggested that performance declined with repeated testing (i.e. when children were 
tested on more than one association). But is it really fair to simplify as much a testing 
protocol to get a desired result? Unlike to their pilot observations, we did not find 
either negative or positive effects of a repeated testing across our different protocols. 
(iii) The number of presentations during learning and the number of associations to learn: 
our subjects had 3 associations to learn (against 6 in Zosh et al’s first between-subjects 
design and 3 in their second within-subjects design). Moreover, our participants were 
exposed respectively 1, 3 and 5 times to the associations. In the study of Zosh et al, 
children participants were exposed only once to each pair. 
(iv) The number of distractors in the inferential condition: we pitted two competitors 
against the target object against one in Zosh et al.’s study. Note that in real life, 
children who are facing an ambiguous context often have to deal with many more 
distractors than only one or two. 
 
Sadly, Zosh et al did not replicate their experiment on 2-year-olds which would have allowed 
them to investigate a possible developmental change in strategy if 2-year-olds would have 
exhibited the opposite pattern of result.  
Obviously, the discrepancy between their finding and ours indicates that the effect of the different 
word learning strategies on memory formation for object names across development is not yet 
resolved and requires further investigation. Currently, we aim to complete our study by including 
at least 6 more 2-year-old subjects, 12 more 4-year-olds and a whole group of adults (~20 naïve 
participants) before drawing strong conclusions. We also need to measure the time children spent 
looking at the target during learning in order to assess whether it is truly equivalent to the mean 
time allocated to the target in the former inferential condition.  
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2 FIFTH EXPERIMENT. Immediate versus delayed memory in 
children 
2.1 Introduction 
So far, we were interested in highlighting the effect of different learning conditions and learning 
strategies on cross-modal memory formation during development (i.e. passive vs active word 
learning). We also investigated the effect of repeating the information during the learning session. 
We showed that overall, the more the participants encountered the sensory inputs to learn, the 
better there were at retaining this knowledge, irrespective of the learning method. We also showed 
that a single exposure to an object unambiguously labeled three times in a row was sufficient to 
induce a memory trace after a 30-min delay. 
In this new ongoing study, we intend to foster our understanding of the factors that contribute to 
enhance the mnesic capabilities of children across development in the context of word learning. 
What could make them memorize better? Are the principles that drive the formation of long-
lasting memories in human adults already operative in early-developing brain systems? In the first 
place, we question the importance of time between learning and recalling the newly learned 
information. For instance, it is now well established that sleep (overnight sleep or even a short 
nap) plays a critical role in the consolidation process of newly learned information in adults (e.g. 
Diekelmann, Wilhelm, & Born, 2009; Rasch & Born, 2013 for reviews). Sleep as a memory 
enhancer has now also been established in children (Backhaus, Hoeckesfeld, Born, Hohagen, 
& Junghanns, 2008). A recent study demonstrated that children who napped after learning 
exhibited enhanced retention of the words recently encountered compared to children who 
remained awake after learning (Axelsson, Swinton, Winiger, & Horst, 2018). In this thesis, we 
would have liked to implement an overnight or even a 45min nap interval between learning and 
testing, but for practical reasons (unavailability of the parents) this was unfortunately not feasible. 
We were however able to re-test the memory of subgroups of participants after longer-term delay 
(see study N°6 below). Although we could not implement a period of sleep prior to the testing, in 
the current experiment, we wonder whether the 30-min resting period during which children were 
engaged in other activities (thus potentially in novel learnings) was beneficial or conversely 
detrimental for the consolidation process of the recently learned material.  
Specifically, we wanted to know whether reducing the delay between learning and testing would 
benefit the formation of memories. In other words, would our results have been improved if the 
delay between learning and testing would have been shortened? Could the discrepancy between 
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our finding and that of Zosh et al (discussed above) be predominantly attributed to differences in 
latency between learning and testing? 
Intriguingly, in the literature, very few studies related to word learning in children tested memory 
after a delay superior to few minutes. As reviewed in Chapter 3, most studies tested children’s 
comprehension of the meaning of the newly learned words either immediately after learning (e.g. 
Bion et al., 2013; Gurteen et al., 2011; Schafer & Plunkett, 1998; Zosh et al., 2013) or after a 
maximum of 5min delay (Axelsson et al., 2012; Axelsson & Horst, 2013; Horst & Samuelson, 
2008; Horst et al., 2010; Kucker & Samuelson, 2012). Surprisingly, a study revealed that 3-year-
old children, who were taught new words for unfamiliar objects or animals using causal 
information, performed at chance when tested immediately after training, but succeeded when that 
testing occurred several days after training (Booth, 2009). The authors attributed this finding to 
the enhancing process of sleep on consolidation. But even more surprising, in pilot work, the same 
authors reported successful retention after only a 10-min delay (and still performance at chance if 
the test occurred immediately after learning). The authors proposed that when children undergo 
intensive training (e.g. being taught too many novel words during a single learning session), they 
may be overwhelmed by fatigue and require time to refocus their attention on the task. 
Given our persuasive finding that a single exposure to an object ostensively labeled three times in 
a row trigged retention after a 30-min delay in children as young as 2-years of age (Study N°2), in 
the current study, we addressed the question of the effect of time by testing participants 
immediately after learning and by comparing this result to that obtained in study N°2 (i.e. after a 
30-min break) 
This study is in progress, and only preliminary results will be shown below. 
2.2 Methods 
 Participants 2.2.1
At the moment, participants consist of 8 twenty-four-month-olds, 6 four-year-olds and 7 adults. 
Details about the current samples are summarized in Table 6. 
 Procedure 2.2.2
This study is a replication of study N°2 with the unique distinction that testing occurred 
immediately after learning rather than after a 30-min break.  
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2.3 Results 
Table 6 - Details about the composition and results of each age group. 
Age groups 24-Mo 4-Y Adults 
N subjects 8 6 7 
N females 2 4 5 
Mean age (±SD) 25.3 Mo (±0.72) 3.96 Y (±0.30) 24.73 Y (±2.95) 
N subjects with older 
siblings at home 
2 3 - 
N subjects exposed to  
another language at home 
0 3 - 
IFDC voc in production)  
(%) (±SD) 
68 (±42) - - 
Mean overall accuracy  
(% correct trials) [95%CI] 
38.8 [27-51] 29 [18-43] 85.7 [74-93] 
P (exact binomial tests) 0.31 0.66 <2.2e-16 
Mean RT (sec) (±SD) 6.3 (±4.53) 3.8 (±2.03) 2.52 (±1.01) 
 
In this study, participants were ostensively taught 3 novel word-object pairs introduced only once 
to them through short video clips and testing occurred immediately after learning. Preliminary 
results indicate that children participants of either 2 or 4 years of age poorly retained the names of 
the objects during the 3 AFC test trials [Table 6]. In contrast, adult subjects performed highly 
above chance in this condition (M=85.7, exact binomial p<0.001***). Although more individuals 
need to be included in each age group, preliminary results suggest that only adult participants 
recognized the associations when testing immediately follows training.  
 
Figure 55 - Barplots summarizing the mean performance (%, ± SEM) of the three age groups to remember the names of objects seen once 
through a short video clip, according to the time that elapsed between learning and testing (0min = “immediate” (yellow) or 30min (brown)). 
The dashed line represents the 33% chance level (dark grey) and the grey shadow represents the 95% confidence interval around chance. 
176 
 
Next, we compared the preliminary results of this experiment to those obtained by participants of 
the same age who underwent a 30-min break before testing (i.e. study N°2, brown bar on Figure 
55). Although there seem to be a dramatic drop in accuracy for the 4-year-olds who were tested 
immediately after learning compared to those who were tested after a 30-min break, no significant 
difference in accuracy could yet be established (GLMM, 4-year-olds: Z=1.8, p=0.07). No 
significant difference could either be evidence in 2-year-olds, although they seem to exhibit the 
same decrease in accuracy than the 4-year-olds when no time elapsed between learning and 
testing (GLMM, 2-year-olds: Z=0.65, p=0.51). Interestingly, the opposite pattern seems to govern 
the performance of adults (GLMM, adults: Z=-0.6, p=0.54) [Figure 55]. Naturally, more subjects 
should be included in each age group before interpreting in depth these data. Note that for now, 
the mean RTs in this condition are relatively similar to those measured in the 30-min break 
condition [Table 3 & Table 6]. 
2.4 Discussion 
This ongoing study intend to determine whether implementing a delay before testing young 
children on what they recently learnt is beneficial or not. To that purpose, we replicated the 
protocol we used in our study N°2 - namely exposing 2 and 4-year-olds and naïve adults to short 
video sequences displaying novel objects that are manipulated by an experimenter’s arm and 
labeled three times in a row – but tested the subjects immediately after learning. The performance 
of each age group was compared to the performance of participants of the same ages who were 
engaged in other activities before being tested (results of our study N°2).  
Interestingly, our preliminary results suggest that children fail to recognize the word-object 
associations if they are tested right after learning while they succeed if the test phase is delayed 
for about half an hour. Conversely, adults seem to perform equally well or even better if they are 
tested immediately after learning. 
These interesting findings, though preliminary, may help understand why numerous studies failed 
to demonstrate word comprehension in young children who underwent test trials directly after 
learning (e.g. Bion et al., 2013; Horst & Samuelson, 2008, Zosh et al. 2013). It can be speculated 
that adding a delay before testing, would have improved the retention capabilities of those 
participants.  
 
 
177 
 
Why would immediate testing be detrimental compared to delayed testing? 
First, as suggested by Booth, depending on the task complexity, children may suffer from a 
diminished arousal and may require time to refocus their attention on the task (Booth, 2009). 
Second, immediate testing does not target the same memory type than delayed testing, and the 
difference in performance may simply be explained by the fact that two distinct brain areas and 
mechanisms are recruited. Immediate testing refers to short-term memory. Short-term memory 
is defined as the ability to mentally retain information over short periods of time (from few 
seconds to few minutes), which is different from the ability to mentally manipulate the 
information (working-memory), though the distinction between short-term and working memory 
is still a matter of debate. The neural basis of short-term memory is still also uncertain but the 
governing assumption is that short-term memory (as well as working-memory) is supported by 
regions of the prefrontal cortex. As reviewed above, the prefrontal cortex shows a prolonged 
course of development compared to most other cortical regions. Consequently, the steady 
development of the prefrontal cortex coincides with the steady increase of short-term memory 
abilities measured at a behavioral level from the preschool years through to adolescence 
(Gathercole & Hitch, 1993; Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004). This helps 
explain why our young children showed impairments on our current short-term test whereas 
adults, with a mature prefrontal cortex, succeeded when tested immediately after learning. It may 
also help explain why Zosh et al. found negative results for ostensively labeled associations but 
significant ones for fast-mapped associations (Zosh et al., 2013). As discussed above, the 
“referent selection” process probably requires the involvement of prefrontal structures to logically 
disambiguate the task. It might be that because those structures were already recruited during 
learning, it benefitted short-term recall.    
Then, if a sensory stimulus is arousing and relevant enough, the information may be consolidated 
and gradually transferred from short-term into long-term memory. This phenomenon occurs at 
many organizational levels in the brain (see Chapter 1) and involves cellular and molecular 
changes which typically take place within the first minutes or hours of learning. Ultimately, it 
results in structural and functional changes in various sets of neurons and neuronal circuits, such 
as the restructuring of existing synaptic connections or the growth of novel ones. Hence, during 
the 30-min distractive period, the cascade of different metabolic events that constitute the 
consolidation process was already triggered. 
To summarize, immediate versus delayed testing simply tap into different types of memories. 
In the first case, the memorization process per say did not yet take place and children relied on 
their fragile maintenance abilities of recently encountered information while in the second case, 
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memory was well and truly tested. Remember that before 7 years of age, spontaneous rehearsal 
does not reliably occur, so the performance reported after a 30-min break cannot be attributed to 
an ability to maintain the information active for a longer period of time (Gathercole & Hitch, 
1993). 
Despite this, if our preliminary findings are confirmed with the inclusion of more participants, this 
would have a direct and influential implication for educational purposes. It would suggest that 
immediate tests disrupt learning and that applying a delay benefits the consolidation process of 
newly learned information. It would also mean that assessing word learning immediately after 
learning is probably not an adequate method in early childhood. 
3 SIXTH EXPERIMENT. Long-term memory of word-object 
pairs in children 
3.1 Introduction 
In this ultimate study, we aimed to know if memory can survive longer delays during early 
childhood. The M4 project attempts to examine the principles and factors that promote the 
establishment of long-lasting sensory memories in human beings. A central goal of this project is 
to determine whether few exposures to a novel sensory input are enough to form a memory that 
can last a lifetime. Previous studies from colleagues working on that project revealed that decades 
after the initial exposure,  adults were able to recall audio-visual stimuli (TV programs) that could 
not have been re-experienced in the intervening period (Christelle Larzabal et al., 2017). In 
another astonishing study, the same first author showed that young adults were capable of 
recognizing above chance level drawings that had been presented three times, two seconds each 
time on average, approximately 12 years earlier (Larzabal, Tramoni, Muratot, Barbeau, & Thorpe, 
2018).  
But do durable memories also exist in young children? Considering the phenomenon of juvenile 
amnesia (though mainly related to episodic memories), the possibility that children of 4-years of 
age could retain sensory information after a delay of several months than after a delay of 30min is 
uncertain. In the literature, only a handful of studies examined the question of the strength of the 
memory trace for complex bimodal information in 4-year-olds, especially in the context of “fast-
mapping”. They all demonstrated that 4-year-olds successfully recognized the name of an object 
they fast-mapped 1 month ago (Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Markson & Bloom, 1997b; Vlach & 
Sandhofer, 2012; Waxman & Booth, 2000). However, as already discussed earlier, since they had 
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only one object to fast-map, it is unclear whether those children truly retained the name of the 
object or simply recognized which object was given a special treatment during learning (during 
testing, the target object was pitted against few completely novel objects).  
To disambiguate this issue, in the current study, children participants were tested on three word-
object associations. Specifically, we tested children from any of our previous studies whose 
parents have agreed to bring them back into the lab were re-tested on their knowledge for novel 
word-object pairs after a delay of either one month or six months. Since we used pseudo-words 
and pseudo-objects, the possibility that children participants were re-exposed to those stimuli 
during the time interval was unlikely. Parents were instructed not to talk about the experiment 
with their child during the entire intervening period. Moreover, prior to the re-test, we asked the 
parents if their child spontaneously recalled the labels or talked about what they have experienced 
in our lab since the last visit. If so, we did not include their data in the following results. Thus, the 
absence of potential re-exposure to the material was strictly controlled since we wanted to explore 
if a memory trace could remain dormant for few months in young children.  
Long-term performance of 4-year-olds was compared to that of adult subjects who were also 
unexpectedly re-tested after either one month or six months. As only few participants from each 
learning condition came back to the lab, we pooled the data of participants, whatever the learning 
condition they underwent. Overall, irrespective of the learning condition, we expect adults to 
outperform 4-year-olds, especially after a 6-month interval. We also expect 4-year-olds to perform 
at chance on those long-term test trials. 
3.2 Methods 
 Participants 3.2.1
During initial recruitment, caregivers could decide to bring their child either once (learning and 
testing on the same day) or twice (second test after either one or six months) at the lab. Those 
criteria were not imposed on the caregivers because we were afraid that most of them would 
decline to enroll their child in our study. Parents who accepted to come back for another visit were 
instructed not to talk about the experiment at home during the entire time interval and were 
explained how this criterion was important for our scientific purposes. At the beginning of the 
second visit, parents were asked if their child spontaneously recalled the labels at home. None of 
the children in the following sample did so. Adults who were tested a second time were mostly 
acquaintances since it would have been difficult to justify a return to the lab to strangers who 
already “fell into our trap” during the first memory test (i.e. they were not aware about the 
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memory test). If we would have told them that the request would be about a long-term memory 
test, they would probably have tried to develop strategies to remind themselves about the 
associations. Since we wanted children and adult participants to be in the closest learning and 
testing conditions to enable trustworthy comparisons, the long-term memory test had to be 
unexpected for both the children and the adults.  
The current sample consists of 28 four-year-olds and 26 adults. Eighteen 4-year-olds were re-
tested after a 1-month delay and ten were re-tested after a break of 6 months. Twenty-one adults 
were tested after a break of 1 month and 5 adults were re-tested after a 6-month delay. Among the 
21 adult participants who were tested after a 1-month break, 9 did not perform a first memory test 
after a 30-min break (i.e. they performed the long-term memory test without having being tested 
at all). Too few 2-year-olds came back for another memory test, and so we did not include their 
data in the current study. 
Not all 4-year-old and adult participants of the current sample underwent the same type of 
learning. Instead, the sample consists of a few participants from each learning condition. 
Specifically, the sample of 4-year-olds consists of: 10 participants who underwent our 1st study 
(ostensive labeling with video clips, multiple exposures/associations), 4 participants who 
underwent our 2nd study (ostensive labeling with video clips, 1 exposure/associations), 9 
participants who underwent our 3rd study (“Fast-mapping”, i.e. FM, multiple 
exposures/associations) and 5 participants who underwent our 4th study (ostensive labeling with 
static images, multiple exposures/associations) [Table 7].   
The adult sample consists of: 11 participants who underwent our 1st study, 4 participants who 
underwent our 2nd study and 11 participants who underwent our 3rd study [Table 7].  
 Procedure 3.2.2
Participants were tested on the associations taught either 1 month or 6 months earlier. They had 
not been re-exposed to the objects or to the pseudo-words prior to the test. No warm-up trials 
preceded the test. The memory test implemented the same procedure than the test performed after 
a 30min delay, i.e. 3 test trials/associations (9 trials). 
 Analysis 3.2.3
After each latency (1 month and 6 months), the performance of each age group was compared to 
levels expected by chance (i.e. 33%). Generalized linear mixed-models (GLMM) were used to 
assess whether differences in performance could be established between the different latencies 
and between the two age groups. 
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Given the low number of participants arising from each type of learning, it was not possible to 
compare the effect of the different types of learning neither the effect of the number of 
presentations during learning on longer-term retention. For both 4-year-olds and adults, data were 
pooled but a color coding helps distinguishing the type of learning accomplished by each 
participant [Table 7]. 
3.3 Results 
Children whose parents have agreed to come back to the lab, underwent a long-term memory test 
after a delay of either one month or six months. Some adult participants who underwent a first test 
after a 30min break were unexpectedly re-tested after the same amounts of time. In order to 
explore whether the first memory test benefitted long lasting retention, another group of adult 
subjects did not undergo any test between the learning phase and the long-term testing phase. 
Results are represented in details in Table 7 and in Figure 56. 
Overall, the mean performance of the 4-year-old participants who make up this sample was highly 
above chance level after a delay of 30min (M=69.43, SD=28.12, exact binomial p=2.2e-16***). 
Those of them who were re-tested after a break of 1 month still performed significantly above 
chance (M=58.64, SD=27.7, exact binomial p=2.5e-11***). A significant difference in 
performance could be established between the two latencies, indicating that those 4-year-olds 
were significantly better at recognizing the associations after a 30min delay than after a 1month 
delay (GLMM, Z=-2.3, p=0.018*).  
In contrast, the 4-year-olds who underwent a 6-month time interval with no re-exposure to the 
material completed the second memory test at levels expected by chance (M=33.33, SD=23.2, 
exact binomial p=1) [Figure 56]. Additionally, those 4-year-olds performed significantly worse 
during this second memory test than during the first test completed 30-min after learning 
(GLMM, Z=-3.42, p=0.0006***). They also performed significantly worse than the 4-year-olds 
who underwent their second memory test after a break of 1 month (GLMM, Z=-2.4, p=0.016*). 
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Table 7 – Details about the composition of the two samples (4-year-olds and adults) who underwent a long-term memory test.  
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Adults that make up this sample performed highly above chance level after a delay of 30-min 
(M=90.04, SD=17.7, exact binomial p=2.2e-16***). Adult participants who were re-tested after a 
break of 1 month still completed the test highly above chance level (M=70.37, SD=30.09, exact 
binomial p=2.56e-15***) but they performed significantly worse than after a 30min delay 
(GLMM, Z=-4.55, p=5.27e-6***) [Figure 56]. Adult participants who did not undergo a first 
memory test after a 30min delay similarly recognized the associations 1 month after learning 
(M=61.72, SD=33.8, exact binomial p=1.57e-7***). No significant differences could be 
established between the performance of adults who underwent a first memory test after a delay of 
30min and those who did not (GLMM, Z=0.31, p=0.75) [Figure 56]. 
Finally, the adult participants who underwent a long-term memory test after a delay of 6 months 
also recognized the associations greater than what would be expected by chance (M=66.2, 
SD=33.4, exact binomial p=4.31e-6***) but succeeded comparatively worse than they did after a 
30min delay (GLMM, Z=-2.07, p=0.038*). No significant differences could be established 
between the performance of adults who underwent a second memory test 1 month after learning 
and those who underwent their second memory test 6 months after learning (GLMM, Z=-0.4, 
p=0.68). Note that more adults need to be re-tested, especially after a 6-month delay, to enable us 
to draw solid conclusions. 
 
Figure 56 – Boxplots representing the performance of 4-year-old and adult participants to recognize word-object associations after a 30-
min delay (left), a 1-month delay (middle) and a 6-month-delay (right). One group of adults did not perform a previous test after a 30min 
break (i.e. “1 month without recall”). The ID numbers correspond to those utilized in the former table (i.e. refer to table for more details 
about each subject). The green boxes correspond to the 4-year-olds and the blue boxes to the adults. The mean performance of each 
participant is represented by a filled circle with a color coding that corresponds to the type of learning (light yellow=ostensive labeling via 
video clips (1,3 and 5 presentations), 1
st
 study ; dark yellow=ostensive labeling via static images (1, 3 and 5 presentations), 4
th
 study ; 
pink=ostensive labeling via video clips (1 presentations), 2
nd
 study ; turquoise=”fast-mapping”, 3rd study). The grey dashed line represents 
the level expected by chance and the 95% confident interval. 
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When comparing the long-term retention skills of 4-year-olds with those of adults, no significant 
differences could be established after a delay of 1 month (GLMM, Z=1.12, p=0.26). However, 
after a delay of 6 months, adults significantly outperformed 4-year-olds (GLMM, Z=2.33, 
p=0.02*). 
3.4 Discussion 
This study addressed the question of the robustness of the memory of 4-year-olds to recognize 
cross-modal stimuli a long time period after initial learning without reactivation of the 
information in-between. To that aim, a sample of 4-year-old participants were re-tested on the 
word-object associations they learnt either 1 month or 6 months earlier and their accuracies were 
compared to those they accomplished 30-min after learning. Moreover, retention skills of 4-year-
olds were compared to these of adults who were similarly unexpectedly re-tested after the same 
lengths of time. 
Although this study is ongoing, current results suggest that 4-year-olds are indeed capable of 
recognizing word-object associations after a 1 month intervening period but not after a 6-month 
delay. In contrast, adults were as accurate to recognize the associations after a 1-month break as 
after a 6-month break. Four-year-olds were as accurate as adults to recognize the associations 1 
month after learning but were significantly worse than adults after a break of 6 months with no 
reactivation of the information in-between. 
First of all, these preliminary results support the assumption that children of 4 years of age are 
capable of remembering the names of objects presented a very few times - or even only once - 1 
month ago. Previous studies demonstrated that 4-year-olds could recognize an association that 
was fast-mapped one month earlier (Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Markson & Bloom, 1997b; Vlach & 
Sandhofer, 2012; Waxman & Booth, 2000). If our preliminary results are confirmed with the 
inclusion of more participants, this would definitely attest that 4-year-olds are capable of 
maintaining at long-term (at least 1 month) the memory of not only one but several word-object 
associations. 
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that this result is mainly attributable to the first 
memory test our participants underwent 30-min after encoding. Indeed, the critical role of 
retrieval practice in long-term retention is now well-established (Roediger & Butler, 2011 for a 
review). Retrieval practice plays the role of a powerful mnemonic enhancer, producing even often 
larger gains in long-term retention relative to repeated studying (Roediger & Butler, 2011). We 
have started to address this issue with a first sample of adult participants who did not undergo any 
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test trial between the encoding phase and the long-term testing performed 1 month later. Our 
preliminary results suggest that adult participants did not benefit from the first memory test since 
no significant differences were established between the subjects who underwent a first test after a 
30min break and those who did not. Whether this finding would also hold for 4-year-olds is still 
unclear. Clearly, this condition should now be tested with young children as well. 
Second, this ongoing work suggests that although retention is reported after a delay of 1 month in 
young children, the memory trace seems to vanish during the following months if no reactivation 
occurred. Indeed, we found that after an intervening period of 6 months after last practice, the 
performance of the 4-year-olds as a group to recognize the associations was not significantly 
different from the level expected by chance, although few of them (three) seemed to have 
performed a slightly better than the rest of the sample (i.e. outliers). In contrast, adults as a group 
still recognized the associations after a 6-month delay, suggesting that unlike children, the 
memory trace remains stable at long-term in adults which is in accordance with the findings of 
previous studies (Larzabal et al., 2018; Larzabal et al., 2017). This result is particularly interesting 
regarding the phenomenon of juvenile amnesia. Here, we suggest that a memory for complex and 
abstract bimodal associations (sound patterns arbitrary paired to visual items) can survive at least 
one month but less than 6 months in preschoolers without re-exposure. This would mean that not 
only episodic memory but also semantic knowledge is affected by this phenomenon. Many studies 
reported the cases of adults who emigrated or were evacuated from their native country (because 
of a war for example) as children and who never returned in their inborn country since (e.g. 
Mattsson, Maliniema-Piispanen, & Aaltonen, 2015; Portes & Hao, 1998). Intriguingly, all of them 
completely lost their mother tongue (Mattsson et al., 2015) or were no longer fluent in their 
parental languages (though there were wide variations among immigrants in the extent of their 
parental linguistic retention) (Portes & Hao, 1998). In Mattsson et al’s work, the majority of 
adults were aged between 2 and 4 years by the time of the evacuation (another one was aged 5 
years and a last one 7 years) (Mattsson et al., 2015). Although the emotional trauma may have 
played a critical role in the loss of the mother tongue of those persons, it may also be possible that 
the absence of re-exposure to the native language for such a long time period made the 
information inaccessible.  
A perspective to that work would be to test children after latencies of 2, 3, 4 and 5 months to 
establish whether the memory strength declines linearly with time or brutally after a certain time 
delay. It would also be very interesting to test 2-year-old participants after such longer delays in 
order to highlight potential differences between 2 and 4-year-olds in their ability to keep the 
memory of bimodal sensory information “dormant” in their brain. A recent study demonstrated 
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that 30-month-olds were able to retain the names of objects presented four times each over a week 
(participants also underwent a first memory test soon after learning) (Wojcik, 2017). It would now 
be interesting to explore whether similar results could also be found after a delay of at least 1 
month in 2-year-olds. 
At the moment, we do not have enough participants in each learning condition to allow fair 
comparisons of the results according to the type of learning. Nevertheless, at first glance, it would 
appear that the results are fairly homogeneously distributed regarding the type of learning (e.g. 
participants arising from the “ostensive labeling with videos” learning condition were not 
systematically worse or better than those arising from the “fast-mapping” learning condition). In 
adults, one observation caught our attention. It seems that the adult samples can be fairly divided 
into two subgroups whatever the delay of testing (1 month or 6 months) and whatever the learning 
method: those who well-recognized the associations (hits>80%) and those who did not (hits≈33%, 
chance level). There seems not to be in-between results in adults. This would suggest that some 
adults perfectly maintained the information in memory and were accurate from the first trial, 
while others completely “lost” the information or at least had not access to the information 
anymore. In contrast, one explanation for the results of children who performed “in-between” is 
that they failed on the first trials, but then were able to use a completion strategy to increase their 
performance across trials (for example, they may have randomly attributed objects to the first two 
labels they heard during testing, then they truthfully recognized the object corresponding to the 
third label and finally adjusted their response choices during the following test trials). This 
mechanism of pattern completion involves the CA3 field of the hippocampal system which 
operates as an auto-association network providing completion of the whole memory during recall 
(e.g. Rolls, 2010, 2013 for reviews). Given the prolonged maturation of the hippocampal system, 
it might be that 4-year-olds can rely on this mechanism to improve their performance and to recall 
a significant part of their memories after a one-month delay, but not anymore after a 6-month 
delay. If too little information is accessible after a prolonged time interval (weak synaptic 
weights), pattern completion may not help 4-year-olds to recover the memory.  
Finally, when looking a little longer at individual performances, it can be noticed that most 4-
year-olds who perfectly succeeded (88-100% accuracy) during the first memory test similarly 
well-recognized the associations after longer delays which would suggest that once an information 
is reliably and robustly encoded, that knowledge does not decay much with time. Those who 
relatively well-performed (55-77% accuracy) during the first test, either performed in a similar 
range at long-term or completely failed to recognize the pairings. Finally, the 4-year-olds who 
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mostly failed during the first memory (22-44% accuracy) test non-surprisingly similarly failed at 
long term. 
To conclude, this experiment - though in progress – clearly suggests that a small number 
exposures to novel cross-modal information are enough to induce the consolidation of that 
knowledge into more permanent representations in children as young as age 4 years. The 
memory trace can survive longer delays without rehearsal but seems to have disappeared less than 
half a year after encoding. This is in line with the assumption that long-lasting memories are 
unlikely in early-developing brain systems that undergo heavy brain maturational changes. This 
would mean that for semantic information acquired during early childhood to survive until 
adulthood, the information may need to be updated (in the sense of reactivated) perhaps many 
times spaced in time. To test that hypothesis, it would be interesting to compare long-term 
retention skills of two groups, one provided with a rehearsal of the material to learn during the 
time interval while the other not. In contrast to children, here we showed that adults can form and 
maintain at very long-term, memories for arbitrary stimuli encountered very few times during a 
single learning session. 
4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this first part of my thesis, we investigated the ability of young children and adults to remember 
the names of newly learned objects, as well as the effect of different factors and learning 
strategies on the formation of those memories. To reach these aims, we developed a tightly 
controlled but playful and ecologically valid design. For the first time, participants from different 
age ranges (18-month-olds, 24-month-olds, 4-year-olds and adults) underwent learning 
procedures (either (i) ostensive labeling with video clips, (ii) ostensive labeling with static images 
or (iii) “fast-mapping”) under the exact same conditions (stimuli, apparatus, experimenter, 
experimental room, delay, number of repetitions, etc.) allowing direct comparisons between age 
groups and between learning conditions which had never been done before at such a large scale. 
To conclude on the main results we obtained through our six studies (though 3 are still in 
progress) and to link our findings with the issues of the M4 project, it can be said that from 2 
years of age human beings can recognize complex cross-modal stimuli they encountered only 
once half an hour ago. Moreover, we highlighted the importance of providing repetitions during 
the encoding phase and showed that even after only a 30min delay, the strength of the memory 
increased roughly linearly with the number of presentations, whatever the learning method. Thus, 
it can be suspected that repetition is even more important for a memory trace to survive longer 
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delays during childhood. Indeed, recognition after a delay of 1 month was possible in 4-year-olds 
for whom the memory was not refreshed during the intervening period, but recognition was absent 
if the delay was increased up to 6 months. This finding has presumably to be linked with the 
maturational processes that occur early in life (e.g. synaptic pruning within the brain regions 
involved in memory formation), since the memory of adults in our experiments was much less 
affected by an absence of reactivation during a 6-month delay. According to my opinion, during 
early childhood, a neuron does not necessarily loose its selectivity and perhaps remains “dormant” 
for a long time period, but in the absence of regular (direct or indirect) re-exposures to that 
particular material, it is the neural pathway that is damaged or pruned. Only the neural networks 
that are frequently activated would be preserved, and thus at a behavioral level, only the 
information that are often renewed would be maintained at long-term. This hypothesis makes 
sense with the fact that children will not be able to recall personal events when adults, but in 
contrast will show a preserved semantic memory for information that they encountered many 
times (remember that in the absence of re-exposures to general knowledge, even a semantic 
information will not survive until adulthood; e.g. people exposed to another language early in 
life). However, our finding that even a single visual exposure was sufficient for children as young 
as 2 years of age to remember object names after a 30min delay seemed at first glance surprising 
regarding the literature and Hebbian theories. Nevertheless, we discussed the possibility that 
multiple very brief visual repetitions occurred during the trial sequence and also suggested that 
repetitions are still required for the information to survive longer delays. We also assumed that 
recognition of these pairings following a single exposure was specific to the learning strategy 
implemented. 
Indeed, we also demonstrated in this thesis that not all learning methods were efficient to promote 
the formation of a memory trace during childhood, highlighting the extreme importance of using 
adequate and age-fitted methods when teaching knowledge to young children. In the context of 
word learning, we showed that there is a developmental change in the efficacy of an active 
learning procedure and that this shift occurs between 2 and 4 years of age. While younger children 
mostly disambiguate a situation for their immediate communicative requirements, being actively 
involved in the learning process is a very powerful method in older children (4-year-olds). 
Interestingly, the efficacy of such a learning method is also sustained in young adults but then 
declines with age during adulthood. 
In addition, we showed that the amount of extra-cues (object manipulation, object functionality, 
length of exposition, number of verbal repeats, etc.) does not seem to be vital in post-vocabulary 
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spurt children who are instead able to extremely rapidly learn and maintain in memory the names 
of novel objects provided that they are unambiguously presented and labeled.  
Finally, we also tried to understand some of the potential mechanisms that could have accounted 
for the results we obtained. We assumed that a minimal threshold of attentiveness and language 
skills (i.e. word comprehension and production) are required to rapidly form a memory between 
both an object and its associated label. The results showed that 18-month-olds who were on 
average the significantly less attentive participants compared to the other age groups and who 
were predominantly pre-vocabulary spurt children, failed to recognize the pairings after a 30-min 
delay unless the associations were presented at least 5 times. Moreover, we also suspect that our 
findings were largely driven by the maturational stage of the underlying brain structures. As 
reviewed in detail in the chapters 1 and 3, and as already discussed in earlier discussions, there is 
still a debate about the brain structures involved in the consolidation process of semantic 
information during early childhood. There is also an active debate about the implication of the 
hippocampus in the “fast-mapping” learning process and the question of whether ostensive 
labeling and “fast-mapping” depend on similar mechanisms and brain structures. To briefly 
summarize,  some researchers postulate that word learning essentially relies on extrahippocampal 
neocortical regions, especially antero-temporal and temporo-parietal regions (Atir-sharon et al., 
2015; Schmolck et al., 2002; Sharon et al., 2011; Vargha-Khadem, 1997). According to them, 
semantic memory is only acquired through a slow consolidation process that requires statistical 
regularities (Mcclelland, 2013). However, under certain conditions (e.g. “fast-mapping”), the 
neocortex may be capable of rapid learning independently of the hippocampus (Atir-sharon et al., 
2015; Mcclelland, 2013). 
Other researchers consider that the first stages of word learning are mediated by slow processes 
independent of  MTL structures, and reliant on repetitions (~procedural learning), but later fast 
word learning would truly and primarily depend on the declarative memory system (i.e. especially 
the MTL structures) (Friedrich & Friederici, 2011a).  
Finally, other authors assume that the declarative memory system supports word learning from its 
beginning and that the behavioral shift from a slow, repetition-based learning to a fast, trial-
unique word learning is mainly attributable to the maturation of specific MTL structures 
(especially the dentate gyrus) (Jabès & Nelson, 2015; Nelson, 1995). According to this last 
viewpoint, in the first stages of language acquisition, word learning would be sustained by a 
hippocampus-dependent “pre-explicit” memory system. Only neuroimaging studies may help 
reconcile these different points of views, although fMRI studies involving young participants are 
known to be very challenging to carry out.  
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Abstract 
In the past, animal studies have rarely given interest to memory, which has always been perceived 
as a “higher order mental process”. Aristotle’s assertion that animals are incapable of higher 
mental processes, in addition to the solid traditional view arising from the behaviorism, were until 
recently, predominant in general view. In the late 1970s, advances in human memory research 
attracted many animal researchers and psychologists, who initiated experiments and transferred 
memory models developed in humans to the study of animal cognition. Specifically, researchers 
attempted to discover if cognitive principles or mechanisms, still believed to be unique to humans 
(e.g. language, memory, etc.), may be ultimately shared with other living creatures. Despite this, 
there is still currently a huge gap in our knowledge about animals’ long-term memory skills and 
the underlying mechanisms. Therefore, this second experimental project was dedicated to testing 
the generality of some memory principles that form the heart of the M4 project to a distantly 
related animal model: the domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris). Since a handful of studies 
showed that individual dogs were capable of learning the referential relationship between words 
and objects, we decided to focus our investigations onto long-term memory in dogs on that 
specific complex cross-modal paradigm.  
The first chapter will be devoted to the state-of-the-art about canine cognition, and will show why 
dogs represent nowadays a model of choice in animal cognition research. In a second chapter, we 
will present our findings about long-term memory for word-object pairs in a heterogeneous 
sample of dogs. More precisely, 40 dogs initially naïve about the task were recruited and 
underwent a six months training period to acquire the word-object associational concept. 
Comprehension tests were carried out at the end of the training phase and memory was assessed 
after a break of three months without rehearsal during the intervening period. We also explored if 
dogs’ cognitive processes follow similar rules to those of humans, such as an age-sensitivity to 
learning and remembering a novel abstract task at long-term. In the last chapter, we will present 
the series of exploratory experiments we conducted with our best word-trained dog, which should 
enhance our comprehension about the conditions required for memorizing novel information, such 
as novel object names. It should also help better characterize the nature of the word-object 
paradigm in dogs, allowing suppositions about the underlying type of memory and thus about the 
recruited brain systems. To reach these aims, we reproduced the learning strategies employed with 
children to examine their hypothetical extensibility to this unrelated animal and their efficiency on 
learning and memorizing new words. Lastly, we will discuss the meaning that could be given to 
“word learning” by dogs and relate recent findings that encourage us to believe that dogs do create 
internal representations of sensory information.  
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CHAPTER VI.  
CANINE COGNITION RESEARCH:  
STATE-OF-THE-ART 
 
For thousands of years, dogs have shared humans’ daily lives. As the oldest domesticated species, 
dogs, more than any other species, have acquired the ability to understand and communicate with 
humans and there is a general consensus that most people like dogs. However, despite their high 
prevalence in modern human societies, very few have found them interesting from a scientific 
perspective. Nevertheless, dogs’ impressive social and non-social skills, shaped by millennia of 
cohabitation with humans and of intense selective breeding, have only caught the attention of 
researchers in the last two decades or so. This chapter will provide an overview of canine research 
from the origin of the process of dog domestication to the neural correlates underlying canine 
cognition.  
1 Origins and evolutionary social skills of the “man’s best 
friend” 
The dog is a young species on the current phylogenetic tree as evidenced by mitochondrial DNA 
sequence analyses. Indeed, dogs originated a proper clade about 100,000 years ago, as they 
evolved away from the common ancestor they shared with wolves (Vilà et al., 1997). The dog is 
the first domesticated species. Dogs have lived alongside humans since the Upper paleolithic 
period (~ 35,000 years BP) and evolved in an extraordinarily large range of phenotypes according 
to natural and artificial selection. Firstly, the change around 10,000 to 15,000 years ago from 
nomadic hunter-gatherer societies to more sedentary agricultural populations may have imposed 
new selective regimes on dogs resulting in adaptive phenotypic changes (Vilà et al., 1997). 
Secondly, evidence from genomic DNA studies shows that dogs and wolves continued to 
exchange genes after the origin of dogs from a lupine ancestor. These backcrossing events may 
have enriched domestic dogs through periodic interbreeding and consequently played a critical 
role in the diverse evolution of dog breeds (Vilà et al., 1997). By the time of the Ancient Egyptian 
civilizations (~ 3,000 years BP) distinctive breeds of dogs had been characterized and were 
selectively bred for precise purposes. Specifically, dog breeds served as hunters, guards or  life 
companions (Galibert, Quignon, Hitte, & Andre, 2011) [Figure 57]. 
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Figure 57- Illustrations of dogs throughout Human history. Upper left corner: Renegade Canyon, California, about 4000 BP. Upper right 
corner: Dog of Fo, Chinese polychrome statuette, about 960–1000. Burchard gallery. Lower left corner: Artemis goddess, greek oenochoe. 
From Athens, about 450 BC, Louvres Museum. Lower right corner: ‘‘Très riches heures du duc de Berry, janvier’’, details. Limbourg 
brothers, 1416. From Galibert, Quignon, Hitte, & Andre, 2011. 
The fragmentation of several hundred various breeds took place during the Middle-Age and 
Renaissance periods as well as during the more recent centuries as a consequence of an intense 
selective pressure on dogs to produce phenotypes that were better adapted to human purposes 
(Galibert et al., 2011). Many breeds were indeed developed to perform multiple additional tasks 
[Figure 58] such as herding, helping the physically impaired, identifying diseases, rescuing 
people, helping to maintain public safety by finding drugs and explosives, etc. (see Bensky, 
Gosling, & Sinn, 2013 for a review) [Figure 58]. 
                 
Figure 58- Illustration of the numerous functions dedicated to dogs during the ancient civilizations and nowadays. Such specific functions 
follow an intensive selection on dogs to generate purpose-adapted breeds. 
Noticeably, this selective pressure favored the emergence of social-cognitive capabilities of dogs 
(Hare, Brown, Williamson, & Tomasello, 2002). Indeed, the roles dedicated to dogs - including 
companionship - are cognitively challenging. To achieve such tasks, dogs need to learn numerous 
environmental and social contingencies and extend this knowledge to a wide range of contexts, as 
well as problem solving and decision making. The way dogs process information has also been 
profoundly impacted, enabling them to understand human social and communicative behaviors in 
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unique ways as shown by multiple studies (e.g Frank, 2011; Hare et al., 2002; Hare & Hare, 
2007). 
In an object-choice paradigm, domestic dogs, semi-socialized wolves and chimpanzees had to 
find under which of two opaque containers a food reward was located by using conspicuous 
communicative cues provided by the experimenter (for example looking at, pointing at, tapping 
on, or placing a marker on the correct container, Figure 59) (Hare et al., 2002). The results 
demonstrated that dogs were more skillful at using human social cues than one of humans’ closest 
extant primate relatives - chimpanzees. In this study, dogs also outperformed their closest 
evolutionary relatives - wolves. Finally, dog puppies were as skillful as dog adults to solve this 
human-guided paradigm, irrespective of their age and rearing history with humans, ruling out the 
training hypothesis (Hare et al., 2002). Altogether, this research supports the evidence that dogs, 
unlike chimpanzees, developed human-like skills at understanding human communicative 
signals and that these skills likely evolved during the domestication process, as they are neither 
learned nor inherited from wolves (see also Hare & Tomasello, 2005 for a review).  
 
Figure 59- Dogs are more skilled than chimpanzees at using human behavioral cues (e.g. pointing). The experimenter points in the 
direction of the correct cup and lets the dog choose a cup. From Hare & Tomasello, 2005. 
A replication of this study with higher controlled socialization levels to humans refined the 
conclusions on this topic; It showed that socialized wolves raised in similar rearing conditions to 
dogs were indeed able to learn about human cuing, but significantly less well than dogs (Miklósi, 
Kubinyi, Topál, Gácsi, Virányi, & Csányi, 2003). Similarly, opponents of the domestication 
hypothesis to explain understanding of human communicative signals by domesticated dogs 
argued that some cases of non- or less-domesticated species (or at least individuals of those 
species) showed high levels of comprehension of human cues (e.g. the well-known case of a horse 
“Clever Hans” as being able to “count and read”; Candland DK, 1993) (see Miklosi & Soproni, 
2006 for a review). As their key message, these authors advised to be highly cautious when 
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comparing cognitive abilities of broad species: one should consider both the individuals’ 
heterogenic history and previous experience with humans as well as the experimental design 
before reaching firm conclusions. 
Despite the lack of  scientific consensus about which hypothesis is more likely to explain social 
cognitive evolution in dogs, such capacities remain unique in the cross-species relationship 
domain and could have converged with those of humans through a phylogenetic process of 
evolutionary and ontogenetically constraints (i.e. selective pressures on specific traits and 
artificial selection during domestication) and/or through convergent cognitive evolution with 
humans as a result of thousands of years of cohabitation (i.e. similar derived traits in distantly 
related species).  
2 The ontogeny of lab research on canine cognition 
2.1 Canine research in few figures 
Dogs have become a fascinating model of research in understanding the evolutionary aspect of 
complex forms of dog-human communication. Not only this, they have also spurred an increasing 
interest in overall canine cognition over the last 20 years. From 1995 to 1999, only 14 articles 
about canine cognition were published (Bensky et al., 2013). This number has grown significantly 
between 2000 and 2004 and this increasing progression continues nowadays [Figure 60].  
 
Figure 60 - Articles on dog cognition published every five years since 1965. Publications are divided into nonsocial and social 
publications. Projections through 2014 are based on the average number of articles published each year between January 2010 and December 
2012. From Bensky, Gosling, & Sinn, 2013. 
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In brief, most of the studies about canine cognition focused on the visual sensory modality 
(~73%), while fewer used auditory related protocols (~19%) or olfactory manipulations (~8%) 
(Bensky et al., 2013).  
Intriguingly, relatively few canine cognition studies recruited working-dogs (~9%). Instead, it 
appears that most of the subjects were pets volunteered by their owners (~71.9%) and relatively 
few were raised specifically for laboratory research purposes (~19%) (Bensky et al., 2013). 
Additionally, Bensky et al. reviewed that a higher proportion of dog subjects were above one year 
of age (i.e. sexually mature adults; 87.7%) and fewer were below one year old (i.e. puppies; 
13.4%). Moreover, only 12.6% of the studies focused on developmental research using cross-
sectional or longitudinal techniques (Bensky et al., 2013). 
Since the year 2000, wide scientific disciplines have illuminated research on canine cognition 
including ethology, developmental psychology, evolutionary anthropology, behavioral analytics 
and neuroscience. They have covered very broad topics including both social and nonsocial 
cognition.  
To briefly summarize, canine social cognition comprises three major subcategories of research: 
(1) responses to human cues and dog-to-human communication (i.e. factors of effectiveness 
explaining how humans and dogs communicate with each other); (2) perspective taking (i.e. dogs’ 
ability to evaluate and behave differentially depending on the perspective of others), and (3) 
social learning (i.e. how demonstrators and social interactions impact learning and expression of 
behaviors). Nonsocial cognition aims to investigate how dogs develop mental representations of 
physical stimuli from their surrounding environment and how they use them to solve a wide 
variety of tasks. To date, nonsocial cognition includes research on discrimination learning, 
object permanence, object learning, categorization and inferential reasoning, object 
manipulation in problem solving, quantitative understanding, spatial cognition and memory 
(for a review see Bensky et al., 2013). The research studies are driven by a major interest in 
canine social cognition as shown in Figure 60, but there is a notable trend toward nonsocial 
cognition in the last fifteen years (Bensky et al., 2013). 
2.2 Brain correlates of canine cognition 
Since 2012, research on canine cognition is no longer restricted to behavioral studies, owing to the 
fact that notable improvements in the methods and equipment have recently permitted 
investigations on the underlying brain mechanisms. Indeed, electroencephalography (EEG) and 
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fMRI approaches in awake dogs have provided a unique opportunity to probe the neural 
underpinnings of the social and nonsocial capabilities of dogs. Although these methods are in 
their early stages, many discoveries have underpinned current knowledge, especially about the 
unique dog-human social bonding described above.  
For example, it has recently been demonstrated that dogs are capable of discriminating 
emotional expressions in human faces (Muller, Schmitt, Barber, & Huber, 2015). The authors 
controlled that this ability did not merely depend on simple visual cues but instead did truly 
depend on extensive interaction with humans and/or domestication. Similar results were 
established in a cross-modal paradigm involving sensory emotional information (faces and 
vocalizations) (Albuquerque et al., 2016). Together, this suggests that dogs have developed high 
level cognitive representations of human faces. Such a remarkable performance is likely due to 
a face-selective area within the ventral-posterior region of both temporal lobes of dogs, shown 
to specifically respond to images of dog and human faces (Cuaya, Hernández-pérez, & Concha, 
2016; Dilks et al., 2015). These findings provided evidence that a neural mechanism dedicated 
to face processing is not unique to primates and offers one possible explanation about the 
sensitivity of dogs toward human social cues, such as emotional states. Note that face selective 
neurons have also been reported in the temporal cortex of sheep, and that the responses of the 
highly selective cells were similarly probably influenced by factors related to social interaction 
(Kendrick & Baldwin, 1987).  It can therefore be assumed that a face-selective area is not 
restricted to primates.  
Another study demonstrated that dogs were able to discriminate a specific human scent from 
others. In this research, the ventral caudate was shown to be maximally activated to the scent 
of the human with whom the dog had a positive experience during the experiment (not 
necessarily the dog’s handler) compared to self, strange human, familiar dog or strange dog scents 
(Berns, Brooks, & Spivak, 2014). Moreover, the nucleus accumbens was significantly more 
active to reward-predicting stimuli irrespective of the reward type, food or praise, relative to 
control unrewarded stimuli, supporting the evidence that this nucleus serves as a neural predictor 
of reward in dogs (Berns, Brooks, & Spivak, 2013; Cook, Prichard, Spivak & Berns, 2016). In 
humans, the corresponding primary reward regions (consisting of dopamine neurons of the ventral 
tegmental area that projects to the nucleus accumbens, a part of the ventral striatum) also 
consistently respond more strongly to rewarded than unrewarded stimuli (e.g. Haber & Knutson, 
2009), suggesting analogies between the brain mechanisms in humans and dogs. 
Other studies suggest that dogs present analogous brain functions with humans and/or developed 
apparent brain functions tuned to human properties. This has been particularly investigated in the 
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field of cross-species vocal communication, since the evolutionary processes not only enhanced 
dogs’ ability to engage in acoustic communication with humans (Pongrácz, Molnár, & Miklósi, 
2010; Pongrácz, Molnar, Miklosi, & Csanyi, 2005) but also enabled them to develop sensitivity 
to human vocalizations (e.g. Gibson, Scavelli, Udell, & Udell, 2014; Scheider, Grassmann, 
Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2011). In 2014, the first comparative neuroimaging study of dogs and 
humans demonstrated that for both species, auditory regions coding for voices were more 
strongly activated for conspecific vocalizations than for heterospecific vocalizations or nonvocal 
sounds (Attila Andics, Gacsi, Farago, Kis, & Miklosi, 2014) [Figure 61]. Interestingly, dogs also 
presented auditory subregions responding preferentially to human vocalizations (13% of all 
auditory voxels) or nonvocal sounds (48%). In humans, the subcortical medial geniculate body 
(MGB) responded stronger to dog sounds than to other sound types (10%). 
 
Figure 61 - A. Dog lying on a scanner bed, being rewarded with food and socially by the owner ; B.  The tested dog is praised while 
receiving earphones from an experimenter ; C. The upper element of the coil is fixed with strips on the top of the dog’s head ; D. Schematic 
representations of sound-sensitive perisylvian regions in dogs and humans, superimposed on rendered brains. Dog abbreviations: c, caudal; 
m, middle; r, rostral; ESG, ectosylvian gyrus; ESS, ectosylvian sulcus; SF, Sylvian fissure; SG, Sylvian gyrus; SSS, suprasylvian gyrus; TP, 
temporal pole. Human abbreviations: a, anterior; m, mid; p, posterior; IFC, inferior frontal cortex; SF, Sylvian fissure; STS, superior 
temporal sulcus; and TP, temporal pole ; E. Auditory regions as determined by the all sounds versus silence contrast in dogs and humans, 
thresholded at p < 0.001, FEW corrected at the cluster level, using the uncorrected voxel threshold p < 0.001 for dogs (in a whole-volume 
search space of 90 cm3) and p < 0.00001 for humans (in a whole-volume search space of 1,277 cm3). Color heatmaps indicate t values, 
superimposed on rendered brains and selected axial slices ; F. The same auditory maps as in (E). The color code refers to the sound type that 
elicited the maximal response in each voxel. Adapted from Andics et al., 2014. 
The authors also identified regions sensitive to emotional valence in both dogs and humans. 
Conspecific and heterospecific emotional vocalizations perceived as more positive elicited 
greater neural responses near to the right primary auditory cortex, but no regions responded 
stronger to negative vocalizations. Their findings suggest that a similar mechanism may be used 
to extract and process affective information from heterospecific vocalizations in both species. In 
another fMRI study the same authors disentangled lexical information (praise words, neutral 
words) and intonational information (praised intonation, neutral intonation). They showed that 
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awake unrestrained dogs presented left-lateralized cortical responses for lexical information 
but no specific intonational effects in this hemisphere, supporting the evidence of a left 
hemispheric bias for processing intonation-independent meaningful words (A. Andics et al., 
2016). The acoustic cues of affective speech intonation were processed in the right middle 
ectosylvian gyrus independently of word meaning. As with dogs, speech perception and 
emotional intonation processing in humans involves distinct brains regions (Belin et al., 2014; 
Farago et al., 2014).  
Altogether, this study revealed functional analogies between dog and human brain mechanisms 
for lexical and intonational information processing. This raises the question of whether this 
ostensibly shared characteristic arises from an evolutionary history dating back to the common 
ancestor of dogs and humans (~100 million years ago) or from convergent evolution. 
Furthermore, although neural evidence for lexical processing in nonhumans is scarce, the neural 
capacity to process humans’ spoken words does not appear to be a uniquely human specificity. 
As broader evidence, humans’ word comprehension by nonhuman species has also been 
established at a behavioral level. 
3 Word comprehension by dogs 
3.1    Word learning within the animal kingdom  
Words could be defined as arbitrary sounds sequences mapped to a precise meaning. Words 
are the basic building blocks of human languages. What makes humans unique is their verbal 
ability to produce and combine words into complex sentences and syntax, which represents a 
powerful communicative tool. Although this striking capacity of meaning abstraction and 
flexible associations is restricted to humans, vocal learning capacities are also patchily found in 
nonhuman vocal communicative systems. Indeed, only few taxa are able to produce sounds 
learned by imitation from a model: three distantly related groups of mammals (bats, elephants and 
some cetaceans) and three clades of birds (parrots, hummingbirds and songbirds) (Doupe & Kuhl, 
1999; Janik & Slater, 1997; Knornschild, Nagy, Metz, Mayer, & Von Helversen, 2009). 
Nevertheless, whether or not nonhuman vocal learners produce sound-specific meanings that 
could be flexibly elicited according to various contexts is less clear. There are only few cases of 
nonhuman animals being able to associate arbitrary vocalizations with specific meanings. For 
example, meaningful lexical compositions are found in Campbell monkeys: they combine basic 
loud calls each associated to a highly specific meaning (e.g. designation of specific predators) into 
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different sequences and/or contexts, which influences the behaviors of the other members of the 
group (see Collier, Bickel, van Schaik, Manser, & Townsend, 2014 for a review). 
While vocal learning is only sporadically found within the animal kingdom, learning and 
discriminating heterospecific arbitrary sound sequences seems to be a little more widespread. 
Here we will specifically focus on the ability of nonhuman animals to learn some aspects of 
human language. Word (or sign) learning has been clearly established in nonhuman animals that 
lived in close contact and interaction with humans and that were subjected to training on 
human linguistic skills (words, sign language, symbols, etc.). A few chimpanzees (e.g. Gardner, 
Gardner, & Van Cantfort, 1989), bonobos (e.g. Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994), gorillas, sea 
lions (Schusterman & Krieger, 1984), bottlenose dolphins (Herman & Wolz, 1984), African grey 
parrots (Pepperberg, 2002) and more recently domestic dogs (Kaminski, Call, & Fischer, 2004; 
Pilley & Reid, 2011) have successfully decoded unique or multiple-item “sentences” composed 
of words (or signs) for locations, actions, objects, objects features, recipient, etc., spoken or 
elicited in variable combinations.  
In 1984, two sea lions (Zalophus californianus) (a 6-year-old female, Rocky and a 3-year-old 
male, Bucky) were reported as being able to discriminate distinctive gestural signs (produced 
by movements of a trainer’s arm and hand) referring to types, attributes, locations of objects and 
actions to be taken in symbolic communication experiments (Schusterman & Krieger, 1984).  
 
Figure 62 - Rocky orienting to a gray Clorox bottle. Other objects floating on the surface of the water include black and white Clorox 
bottles and black, white and gray water wings. The blindfolded trainer is holding the gestural sign referring to Clorox bottle until the sea lion 
returns it on the toe of the experimenter’s boot. The trainer had already transmitted the gesture referring to gray in a three-sign construction 
GRAY CLOROX BOTTLE MOUTH. From (Schusterman & Krieger, 1984). 
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Rocky and Bucky had a comprehension vocabulary of 20 and 16 signs respectively. They 
accurately decoded 3-sign combinations, such as black-ball-mouth, for “go over to the black ball 
(and not the gray or white balls) and place your open mouth on it” [Figure 62]. In each case, at 
least six objects varying in color and shape (e.g. balls colored in black, white or gray and baseball 
bats colored in black, white or gray) were present in the scene. These abilities required nearly 24 
months and 20 months of training for Rocky and Bucky, respectively. 
In another study, two bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), Akeakamai and Phoenix, were 
taught specific sounds (generated by a computer-controller system projected underwater) and 
gestures for agents, objects, actions or modifiers of place or direction. They accurately responded 
with up to 5-sounds randomly recombined, which represented hundreds of uniquely meaningful 
“sentences” (Herman & Wolz, 1984). But, probably one of the most impressive language 
comprehension skills is attributed to great apes, who learned to decode sign language. 
Beginning in the 60s, the first sign language-trained chimpanzee, Washoe, a female common 
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), inspired decades of research on the significance of human-like 
language abilities in apes. The Gardners reported that Washoe acquired 132 distinct and 
meaningful signs after 51 months of training (Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Gardner et al., 1989; 
Miles, 1991). After many years, she learned approximately 350 words of sign language. Over her 
entire life, she signed about objects present or absent, she made contrasts as in “same/different”, 
used negation, signed combinations, used signs to communicate new information, was able to 
generalize and, more impressively, invented her own signs. Her trainers, the Gardners, stated that 
such abilities share great similarities with those of very young children. Another famous ape, a 
male bonobo (Pan paniscus) named Kanzi, was known as having acquired spontaneous 
language, without being reinforced nor rewarded (e.g. Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994). He 
was reported as being able to understand spoken English even though he had never been trained 
to, and initiated responses to English requests by using a keyboard composed of plastic 
visuographic symbols (lexigrams). Savage-Rumbaugh and colleagues claimed that such 
performances are at similar levels to that of a two and a half year old child.  Later on, consistent 
results for sign-language were also demonstrated with gorillas and orangutans.  
More recently, researchers revealed that not only are large-brained marine mammals or the closest 
human phylogenetically species, such as the great apes, capable of word learning, but that Grey 
parrots (Psittacus erithacus), a human distantly related species with a very small brain size, also 
compete in this field. Indeed, a Grey parrot named Alex developed remarkable word 
comprehension skills after many years of training. He knew the labels of more than 50 objects, 7 
colors, 5 shapes, 3 categories (color, shape and material), etc. (Pepperberg, 2002). 
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Obviously, these human language-trained animals also inspired a vast and still topical debate 
about whether it reflects real “language-like communication skills”,  results from reductionist 
“operant conditioning” learning rules, or from other non-defined processes, a topic that will be 
further discussed in a later section. 
3.2 Word learning by dogs 
 The word-referent concept: dogs retrieve objects by name 3.2.1
Considering the growing evidence about canine cognitive competences, the presumably 
domestication-based high sensitivity of dogs to human communicative signals described 
previously, and the functional analogies between dog and human brain mechanisms for lexical 
processing, one would easily expect dogs to show word comprehension skills, like the other 
linguistically trained animals presented above. Dog owners often boast that their dogs obey 
multiple words for specific actions or requests, or that they understand few words referring to 
objects. However, such apparent skills have to be disentangled from gestural cues that owners 
explicitly or unconsciously address toward their pet dogs (e.g. pointing or looking at the object, 
wearing a coat while saying “let’s go for a walk”, etc.). Therefore, until recently, word 
comprehension by dogs suffered from a lack of controlled experiments that rigorously 
demonstrate this presumed ability. 
In their pioneering study, Kaminski et al. provided the first evidence that a dog is indeed capable 
of language-learning abilities. A 9-year-old Border collie, Rico, was reported by his owners to 
know the labels of over 200 items (mostly children’s toys and balls) that he progressively 
acquired since he was 10 months of age, and which he apparently correctly retrieved upon 
request. A tightly controlled experiment was designed to discard any potential “Clever Hans” 
effects19 that might accounted for his performance. The experiment consisted of assigning 20 sets 
of 10 different objects randomly chosen among the 200 items reported as being familiar to the 
dog. The objects of each set were dispersed in an adjacent room, thus neither the dog nor his 
owner had visual access to the objects. Rico was requested to fetch randomly chosen objects by 
name from the separate room (one object after the other). The highly significant results of this 
experiment indeed confirmed that Rico knew the name of these items and that this performance 
could not be attributed to subtle or visual cues that guided his behavior (Kaminski et al., 2004). 
Thus, this experiment demonstrated for the first time that a dog is able to acquire a receptive 
“vocabulary size” comparable to that of the language-trained animals described above.  
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In a second pioneer study, another Border collier named Chaser learned the names of over 1000 
proper objects over a 3-year period of intensive training since her early puppyhood (Pilley, 2014; 
Pilley & Reid, 2011). Her owner, the retired psychologist John Pilley, aimed to investigate 
whether Rico’s acquisition of over 200 words represented an upper limit of word learning by 
dogs, or whether an intensive training could extend this genuine skill. Since Chaser was 8 weeks 
old, she was provided 4-5 hours of daily training. She was first taught general obedience, classical 
and operant conditioning on discriminative and associative tasks, herding, agility and tracking 
behaviors. In her fifth month, she was first introduced to fetching items by name, and was 
rewarded only with play and praise each time she retrieved a correct object upon request. She was 
taught one or two proper-nouns per day and had daily rehearsal testing for the objects for which 
she already knew the name. Therefore, she gradually increased her “receptive repertoire”. Over a 
period of 3 years, she acquired proper names for over 800 cloth animals, 116 balls, 26 Frisbees 
and over 100 plastic items. All objects differed in size, weight, texture, color, shape, etc. In 
rigorous experiments, analogous to those used by Kaminski with Rico, her ability to retrieve 
objects exclusively on the basis of verbalized names was positively confirmed. 
A few other dog cases brought light to this field. Interestingly, a Yorkshire terrier case, a lap dog 
species that has not been bred neither for work nor for command obedience, was capable of 
learning a large vocabulary of spoken names (>120) (Griebel & Oller, 2012). This case study 
contributed to refute the speculation that only working dogs (like Border collies), specifically 
selected for their ability to understand human signals were able to associate labels to referents. 
The case of a mongrel dog able to respond to verbal requests composed of two independent words 
(object-action) also argues against this speculation (Ramos & Ades, 2012).  
19
Clever-Hans effect: in the beginning of the 1900s, an Orlov Trotter horse was claimed as being 
able to solve arithmetic and other intellectual tasks. During a formal investigation, a psychologist 
discovered that the horse was actually not performing any mental task but simply “decoding” 
subtle cues that were unconsciously provided by the body of his owner or of the audience. In the 
absence of these involuntary cues, the “Clever horse” was no longer clever anymore. The discovery 
of this artifact led to a better control of the methods used in animal research. It is of major 
importance to rigorously control this effect in dog research, because dogs are gifted at attending to 
and interpreting subtle human social cues (e.g. Lakatos et al., 2016). 
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 Multiple-items “sentence” comprehension by dogs 3.2.2
Kaminski’s pioneer study about Rico triggered massive debates about the “linguistic-like” 
abilities of dogs that she had emphasized. Soon after her publication in Science, Bloom conveyed 
his skeptical perspective about the nature of referential understanding by dogs (Paul Bloom, 
2004). To him there is no proof that dogs reliably understood the label-referent concept. 
Alternatively, their abilities might be limited to specific contexts (e.g. the owner is the only one 
who pronounced the requests) and specific routines (fetching items). For example, in the 
utterance “fetch the sock”, Bloom wondered about Rico’s ability to separately treat the sound 
“sock” as referring to the specific sock item and the sound “fetch” as a behavior he should 
produce toward this specific item. Instead, he might have treated this sound as a one-word 
proposition command “fetch-the-sock”, which would have little to do with language learning 
in a human sense [Figure 63]. Therefore, Bloom claimed that further experiments were needed to 
help resolve these issues. More precisely, he addressed the following questions: “would a dog 
learn a word for something other than a small fetchable object?”; “can a dog display knowledge 
of a word in some way other than fetching?”; would a dog be able to recognize an object with 
instructors other than those involved in the initial training process?; do dogs appreciate, like 
children do, that words can also refer to categories? Another underlying question was related to 
dogs’ ability to disentangle words from actions in a two- or multiple-word utterance (Paul Bloom, 
2004). 
 
Figure 63 - Illustration of Bloom’s concerns about Rico’s ability to treat the utterance “fetch the sock” as two separated identities: one 
referring to the object and the other to the action to produce toward this specific object. If so, Rico might effectively understand that the word 
“sock” refers to a category of objects in the world and “fetch” (or the rest of the verbal command) refers to the fetching action. Alternatively, 
Rico’s understanding of this utterance might be limited to associating the word spoken by his owner with a specific behavior such as fetching 
a sock. Bloom, 2004. 
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To address Bloom’s concerns, Pilley & Reid tested whether Chaser treated the name of an object 
independently from the given command (Pilley & Reid, 2011). The authors randomly paired 
different familiar commands (take, paw and nose) and familiar proper nouns (e.g. Lips, ABC, 
Lamb) that Chaser had never heard in combination prior to the tests (e.g. “take Lamb”, “nose 
ABC”, etc.). Testing was carried out in a double-blind procedure across 14 independent trials. In 
that experiment, Chaser performed without any errors, demonstrating that she could reliably 
produce the required responses oriented to each target object independently. This first evidence 
ruled out Bloom’s concern and rather supported the evidence that Chaser brilliantly dissociated 
independent meanings for references from verbal commands (Pilley & Reid, 2011). In a 
succeeding study, the first author demonstrated that Chaser was even capable of appropriately 
treating each word of sentences embodying three elements of grammar, namely a prepositional 
object, a verb and a direct object (e.g. “to ball take Frisbee”) (Pilley, 2013). She was similarly 
successful when confronted with objects that had never been used in the training of three elements 
of grammar sentences. The author claimed that, considering these findings, she demonstrated 
syntax and semantic understanding. 
In another study, the case of the mongrel dog already introduced earlier, provided further 
empirical evidence about the ability of dogs to appropriately respond to combinatorial 
“sentences” composed of a word designating an action and a word referring to an object (Ramos 
& Ades, 2012). Moreover, this dog also performed above chance when the experimenter inverted 
the order of the sentence items. According to the authors, this demonstrates that the performances 
were due to the learning of the sound sequences as single discriminative stimuli (Ramos & Ades, 
2012).  
 Word generalization abilities by dogs 3.2.3
 Word generalization to categories of objects 
As described in the section above, another concern addressed by Bloom pointed out dogs’ 
restricted ability to learn proper nouns, i.e. sound sequences referring to a particular object. He 
wondered whether dogs, like children, would be able to treat words as common nouns, i.e. sound 
sequences referring to a category of objects. 
In the last few decades, it has been widely demonstrated that categorization is a widespread 
cognitive ability within the animal kingdom, including dogs. As an example, Heffner’s pioneer 
work demonstrated that dogs were able to categorize auditory stimuli based on their source 
(i.e. “dog” versus “nondog” sounds) and showed successful transfer to novel instances of these 
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categories (Heffner, 1975). Another study using a computer-automated touch-screen technology 
revealed that dogs successfully distinguished natural pictures of dogs from pictures of landscapes 
in a forced two-choice task procedure (Range, Aust, Steurer, & Huber, 2008). Dogs also 
successfully extended these categories to novel stimuli. The features used by dogs to solve this 
sort of task are poorly known, but data from other taxa may provide insight into how dogs might 
treat salient visual cues (e.g. Aust & Huber, 2001; Fabre-Thorpe, 2003). Furthermore little is 
known about the ability of dogs to form categories identified by the name of objects. 
Pilley & Reid were the first to demonstrate that dogs could learn labels for categories (Pilley & 
Reid, 2011). Chaser was indeed successful in discriminating by name objects belonging to two 
subcategories of her toys sharing relatively similar visual properties: “balls” (round shape objects) 
and “Frisbees” (disk-shaped objects). More interestingly, she was also accurate in recognizing 
items from a “toy” category, thus objects that differed widely in their physical features, but that  
shared an abstract function: Chaser had been allowed to play with those “toys” in contrast to many 
other available objects with physically similar features with which she was forbidden to play, 
considered as the “non-toy” category [Figure 64]. “Balls” and “Frisbees” were two subsets of 
“toys”. Therefore, Chaser learned the label “toy” and “ball” for 116 different bouncy balls as well 
as each of their proper names. Similarly, she knew that the label “Frisbee” designated the 26 disk-
like objects, for which she also learned each proper name as well the “toy” category label.  
 
Figure 64 - Photographs showing the three categories of objects for which Chaser knew the common nouns. In the left photograph, the 16 
objects used to test Chaser’s comprehension of the common noun “ball” (8 balls and 8 non-balls); in the middle photograph, the 16 objects 
used to test her comprehension of the common noun “Frisbee” (8 Frisbees and 8 non-Frisbees); in the right panel, the 16 objects used to test 
her comprehension of the common noun “toy” (8 toys (the tagged objects on the photograph) and 8 non-toys). Adapted from Pilley & Reid, 
2011.  
The testing procedure consisted of arranging sets of eight random exemplars of a category with 
eight random non-exemplars of the category (e.g. eight balls and eight non-balls) in an adjoining 
room out of the vision of both Chaser and the experimenter. Chaser was asked to retrieve each of 
the exemplars representing the category upon request, one after the other (e.g. “fetch a ball”, 
“fetch another ball”, etc.). For the three categories Chaser had never made any error. These results 
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indicate that Chaser mapped one common noun (“ball”, “Frisbee” or “toy”) onto many objects. 
She also demonstrated that she could map up to three meaningful labels onto the same object 
(e.g. the name of the functionally defined category “toy”, the name of the subcategory “ball” and 
the proper names of each corresponding balls). In humans, although there is a statistical tendency 
for words to be mutually exclusive, young children rapidly learn to break this word learning 
principle (e.g. a “cat”, “kitty” and “pet” designate the same referent), which might contribute to 
the rapid growth of their receptive vocabularies (Markman & Abelev, 2004). Mutual exclusivity 
is a default principle that is widespread in general cognitive tasks, i.e. not restricted to language or 
to humans. Therefore, Chaser’s demonstration of one-to-many or many-to-one label-referent 
mappings is a relevant support for the referential understanding by dogs. In addition, it suggests 
that mutual exclusivity was not the assumption by default that drove her performances. 
 Word generalization to novel items 
Unfortunately, Pilley & Reid did not test whether Chaser was able to extend her word knowledge 
to novel instances of the known categories or, in the case of proper nouns, to unfamiliar objects 
sharing similar features. In another case study, a Border collie reported to know 54 object names 
was tested on the physical features that drove his word generalization ability to novel items (Van 
der Zee, Zulch, & Mills, 2012). The testing procedure consisted of presenting the dog with objects 
that varied in size (smaller vs same size vs bigger), texture (smooth vs rough) and shape (2 
different shapes) relative to previously introduced objects. The testing took place either after a 
brief familiarization with a novel word-object pair (~10 min) or after an extended familiarization 
with the novel pair (~39 days). The results showed that when briefly familiarized with novel 
word-object mappings, the dog tended to generalize the word to objects with the same size. 
However, after a prolonged familiarization phase, the texture seemed to be the most important 
physical property that accounted for the dog’s retrieval choices. These results appear to contrast 
with the shape bias for word generalization observed in humans (L. B. Smith & Jones, 1988) but 
have to be cautiously considered as the authors only replicated the experiment twice, i.e. only 
tested generalization to novel items for two introduced objects (Van Der Zee et al., 2012).  
 Word generalization to novel voices and accents 
The experiments described previously provided evidence that dogs are able to generalize known 
objects to categories of items shaped by physical or abstract properties. Moreover, during the 
generalization process, dogs seem to rely on information about texture for well-known objects and 
conceivably about size for newly introduced objects. Here the authors investigated whether dogs 
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could generalize their recognition of words to novel voices, thus to different voices than those of 
their trainers (Griebel & Oller, 2012).  
In this experiment, similarly controlled forced-choice task trials were designed to assess the dog’s 
performance. In a first case, a female with a German accent requested the dog to fetch random 
objects by name. In a second case, a male Native American English speaker ordered the retrievals. 
Both were novel speakers with novel accents from the dog’s perspective. The results were highly 
significant for both speakers and thus clearly suggest that this dog (another Border collie) was 
able to recognize words from his “receptive repertoire” even when emitted by unfamiliar 
voices (Griebel & Oller, 2012). This demonstration put to rest Bloom’s concern about word 
recognition with new speakers (Paul Bloom, 2004). 
 Decontextualized generalization 
There are a few more findings in the literature claiming that dogs’ performances were not 
restricted to one specific training context. At least one dog was shown able to generalize his 
“knowledge” to novel conditions. Indeed, the mongrel dog introduced earlier, was capable of 
obeying verbal commands in a large range of contexts: 1) when he had no visual access to the 
eyes or mouth of the experimenter (which is in contrast with previous findings (Fukuzawa, 
Mills, & Cooper, 2005)); 2) when the requests were pronounced by an unknown person; 3) 
when the spatial location of the objects was changed; and 4) when testing happened outside 
the laboratory (Ramos & Ades, 2012).  
To summarize, although it is necessary to remain cautious as all these reported cases are, to date, 
isolated cases of trained dogs showing intriguing “language-learning” skills, they have shed light 
on their putative capacity to extract and process relevant verbal and visual features in a 
relative independence from contextual parameters. 
 “Fast-mapping” abilities by dogs 3.2.4
We already reported numerous advanced skills of dogs in social and nonsocial cognitive tasks and 
we especially focused on their ability to learn the relation between both a word and its referent. 
Such skills, almost unique within the animal kingdom, may be inherited from the domestication 
process and/or from thousands of years of narrow cohabitation with humans. Researchers on 
canine cognition even claim that these abilities resemble “language learning” in humans and allow 
comparisons between the word learning aptitude of dogs and that of a 2 year old child (Kaminski 
et al., 2004; Pilley & Reid, 2011). Obviously this inspired animated debates and commentaries in 
the scientific community- as already discussed above (Bloom, 2004; Markman & Abelev, 2004). 
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Another effervescent point of debate comes from the nature of the word-referent concept per 
se. Unlike children, dogs’ referential understanding seems limited to mapping words to referents 
after intensive training, which could be purely attributed to mere associative learning 
mechanisms, according to these later authors. If dogs indeed appreciate this complex concept, 
then they should be able to go beyond fetching routines with familiar objects, by at least showing 
abstract reasoning abilities about this concept. 
In her pioneer study, Kaminski was the first to address this question. She tested whether Rico 
would be able to infer the referent of a new word on the principle of exclusion reasoning (i.e. the 
ability to base a decision on the exclusion of potential alternatives), that is to “fast map” and to 
retain this new mapping over time (Kaminski et al., 2004). The authors placed a new object along 
with seven familiar ones in an adjacent room. In the first one or two trials, Rico was asked to 
retrieve a familiar item. In the second or third trial, Rico was asked to fetch an object for which he 
had never heard the label. By excluding objects that did already have a label, Rico successfully 
retrieved the novel item in most of the cases (7 out of 10 sessions involving new sets of objects 
each time). One month after this single exposure, Rico’s retention of the relations between the 
words he accurately mapped to the novel items was tested. During retention testing, each target 
item was placed together with four completely novel and four familiar items in a separate room. 
Again, in the first or first two trials, Rico was asked to retrieve a familiar item and in the second 
or third trial to retrieve the target one. The dog correctly retrieved 3 out of the 6 target items he 
mapped by exclusion one month previously (one target item was not tested for retention one 
month later). When retention occurred only 10 min after selecting the objects by exclusion (for 
other sets of objects), Rico performed slightly better as he correctly retrieved 4 out of 6 target 
items. Pilley & Reid obtained similar results with Chaser. Using the exact same paradigm, Chaser 
also successfully mapped novel words to novel referents by exclusion. She was equally successful 
in retrieving the newly named objects when tested immediately or 10 min after learning (she 
found 5 out of 8 objects after this time delay). However, she showed no sign of retention when 
tested with a 24 hours delay (1 out of 8) (Pilley & Reid, 2011). 
According to these results, the authors assumed that their dogs acquired the abstract concept that 
things can have names for two main reasons. First, dogs’ accuracy to map new words to their 
referents by exclusion could not be explained by associative learning mechanisms, because the 
name and the referent were not presented together in temporal contiguity (Pilley & Reid, 
2011). Second, Rico stored the name of at least some of these referents in long-term memory, 
which suggests that extensive training is not the only parameter that drives word learning in 
dogs (Kaminski et al., 2004). 
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Nevertheless, the validity of Rico’s pioneer demonstration of exclusion learning was questioned 
by Markman and Abelev (Markman & Abelev, 2004). According to them, there are two potential 
issues that could compromise the results. First, they pointed out a lack of control for baseline 
preference. It is well known that human and animal subjects show neophilia (i.e. “novelty biais”) 
when facing novel and familiar stimuli (Kaulfuß & Mills, 2008). Thus, Rico could have retrieved 
each novel object just because they were more salient, rather than making cognitively complex 
decisions based on a “Novel Name-Nameless Principle” for example (cf. Part 2. for more 
details) (Kaulfuß & Mills, 2008; Markman & Abelev, 2004). Fischer et al. argued that Rico did 
not make any error when retrieving the familiar items prior to the new one. Thus if neophilia was 
influencing Rico’s choices, he had at least exhibited an ability to inhibit any novelty preferences 
when accomplishing the familiar retrievals (Fischer et al., 2004). As a further reply to this 
concern, Pilley & Reid proposed a paradigm where they arranged two novel and eight familiar 
objects in an adjacent room and successively asked Chaser to retrieve each of the familiar items, 
one at a time. This procedure was replicated eight times with eight different sets of objects. 
Chaser never brought a novel item back, showing that her baseline rate for choosing objects based 
on novelty alone was null (Pilley & Reid, 2011). 
Second, Markman & Abelev draw attention to the reward given to Rico subsequently to the 
correct referent selection trials as it could have mediated the retention trials. They questioned 
whether long-term retention following reasoning via exclusion would be possible with no positive 
feedback given to the dog (Markman & Abelev, 2004).  
Finally, the authors stressed the fact that the procedure used to assess retention by both Kaminski 
et al. and Pilley & Reid may be controversial. To measure retention, they displayed the target item 
together with four familiar and four novel objects in a separate room. However, Rico’s success 
could be merely attributed to a sort of “extended exclusion” (Griebel & Oller, 2012). Indeed, if 
he retained that the newly mapped object had been rewarded previously, he may have excluded 
the unrewarded objects (i.e. the novel ones), and the known items (i.e. those for which he already 
learned a label) when he heard the target label (Griebel & Oller, 2012). According to these last 
authors, a similar forced choice task where the items that had been successfully identified by 
exclusion were pitted against each other would be a more appropriate testing design. This 
procedure is the one typically used for measuring retention of fast-mapped words in children (e.g. 
Bion et al, 2013; Horst & Samuelson, 2008; Kucker & Samuelson, 2012; Axelsson et al. 2012). 
To conclude this section, it is important to keep in mind that, although there are several studies 
showing reasoning by exclusion in nonhuman animals (e.g. Aust, Range, Steurer, & Huber, 2008; 
Herman & Wolz, 1984; Marsh, Vining, Levendoski, & Judge, 2015; Pepperberg, Koepke, 
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Livingston, Girard, & Hartsfield, 2013; Schusterman & Krieger, 1984), the specific cross-modal 
“fast-mapping” ability displayed by dogs appears to exceed that seen in nonhuman 
primates. However, undoubtedly, further experiments on “fast-mapping” are required and should 
provide insight on whether this remarkable skill translates a human-like understanding of the 
referential concept by dogs or if it only results from mere exclusion and working-memory skills.  
4 Memory in dogs 
The theoretical models of memory developed for humans struggle to have equivalences in models 
deprived of verbal production. In the absence of language, employing the term “declarative 
memory” can rationally be questioned. Given the lack of alternative animal-adapted models of 
memory, most researchers are still attached to studying animals’ memory abilities from a human 
perspective. Researchers also often directly compare memory skills of animals to those of 
humans, in order to investigate whether functions of memory systems are shared between humans 
and nonhuman animals. This comparative cognitive research has led to long-running debates. The 
most notable debates stand around episodic memory in animals. Indeed, for animals to fulfill 
the behavioral criteria for episodic memory, they should demonstrate an explicit recollection of 
knowledge about “what”, “where” and “when” an event occurred, as well as a “mental time 
travel” ability to internally replay the memory (Tulving, 1972). Therefore scientists cautiously 
talk about an “episodic-like” memory when examining this type of memory in animals. However 
bringing to light memory systems that handle incidental memory such as episodic memory could 
be very important for elucidating the degree to which memory functions depend on language. 
4.1 Behavioral research on memory in dogs 
 Working memory 4.1.1
Memory is a major component of animal cognition. However, investigations on memory in dogs 
are seriously lacking. Currently, only working-memory and episodic-like memory have received 
actual attention. Working memory is a limited capacity responsible for temporally holding 
information available for processing. Working memory allows a mental maintenance and 
manipulation of the information as long as the subject requires this information, usually for 
a limited time delay (from seconds to minutes or hours according on the circumstances, 
paradigms and species). Being endowed with such cognitive aptitude could well be critical for 
animals to survive in the wild; For example, hunting often requires the predator to track and locate 
hiding prey. Fiset et al. replicated this phenomenon in an object permanence task (Fiset, Beaulieu, 
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& Landry, 2003). They applied various time delays between the disappearance of a moving object 
behind a box and the subsequent search for this box by the animal (amongst a choice of 4). Up to 
a 240s intervening period, dogs’ accuracy to find the correct box was above chance levels but 
declined as a function of the length of the retention intervals (respectively 0, 30, 60, 120 and 240s) 
[Figure 65].  
 
Figure 65 - Mean percentage of successful trials as a function of the retention interval in the object permanence task developed by Fiset et 
al. The experiment was designed to evaluate the limits of working memory for disappearing objects in dogs. From Fiset et al., 2003. 
Delayed-NonMatching-to-Sample tasks (DNMS, i.e. avoid the stimulus presented prior to the 
delay and choose the novel one) have also been used to determine the duration of dogs’ working 
memory. Intriguingly, dogs had difficulty acquiring a visual version of this task, especially aged 
dogs compared to younger ones (Milgram, Head, Weiner, & Thomas, 1994). However those who 
reached the 10s criterion within the 400 trials were subsequently tested for retention using 
variable delay intervals ranging from 10 to 50s. Most of the dogs performed significantly above 
chance irrespective of the delay intervals. The authors indicated that only a small correlation 
between accuracy and time delay was observed (Milgram, Head, Weiner, & Thomas, 1994). A 
spatial version of the DNMS task, the Delayed-NonMatching-to-Position (DNMP) task, 
demonstrated that dogs were more gifted to reach the 10s criterion in this case which suggests the 
pre-eminence of spatial information on visual cues in dogs (e.g. Chan et al., 2002; Head, 
Mehta, Hartley, & Kameka, 1995; Milgram et al., 1999). Those dogs who reached criterion still 
remained above chance levels for delay intervals up to 110s but their performances gradually 
deteriorated as the delay interval increased. Moreover, aged dogs showed analogous impairments 
to acquire the task and to perform higher than chance with increasing time intervals, as in the 
DNMS task presented above (e.g. Chan et al., 2002; Head, Mehta, Hartley, & Kameka, 1995; 
Milgram et al., 1999). These results suggest that cognitive functions like visual or spatial 
working-memory seem to be similarly age-sensitive in dogs as it is commonly described in 
humans and nonhuman primates or rodents.   
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The decrease in the dogs’ performances as a function of the retention intervals both in object 
permanence tasks and in DNMS or DNMP tasks supports the hypothesis that dogs relied on 
mental representations to encode and memorize spatial or visual information. In 2014, a study 
demonstrated deferred imitation of novel and familiar actions in dogs for the first time (Fugazza 
& Miklósi, 2014). Deferred imitation is the ability to learn from the observation of the behavior of 
another in order to later reproduce this behavior; thus to encode, retain and reproduce a 
demonstrated action after a delay. In their study, dogs accurately reproduced the observed actions 
with retention intervals ranging from 0.4 to 10 min in different conditions and also if they were 
engaged in several distractive activities during the time interval (Fugazza & Miklósi, 2014). From 
a cognitive perspective, imitative behaviors that occur after a minimum delay of 1 min cannot be 
considered as contagion, reflexive behaviors or response facilitations but would rather be the 
fruit of representational abilities (e.g. Zentall, 2006). However, if dogs effectively rely on 
internal representations to solve these types of tasks, the underlying mechanism is still unclear. 
One could speculate that dogs used a mental rehearsal of the information but no one has yet 
investigated this explanation. Others are reluctant to draw such conclusions based on procedures 
where animals are repeatedly and actively trained to retrieve their memory traces. According to 
them, dogs could have developed such specialized and outdoing skills as a mere result of an 
extensive training (Fujita, Morisaki, Takaoka, Maeda, & Hori, 2012). In contrast, the question of 
whether dogs are able to form an incidental memory of a single experience, also defined as 
episodic memory, appeared as a more central framework of research for these authors. 
 Episodic-like memory 4.1.2
As briefly introduced above, establishing episodic memory in animals is one of the most 
challenging issues of current research. It requires the animal to recollect knowledge about the 
content of an event (“what”), the location where the event took place (“where”) and details about 
when it occurred (“when”). The subject should also be able to mentally travel through the event 
by recalling details about the source, and about previous or later episodes; thus to precisely 
situate the event in a timeframe. Pioneer foraging tasks have been used to tackle the question of 
the existence of episodic memory in animals, specifically in scrub jays (Aphelocoma 
coerulescens). Using two different types of food rewards, including one that was preferred by 
scrub jays but time-sensitive (wax worms versus peanuts), these birds selectively foraged for the 
two rewards based on the length of the time interval since their last visit to the site (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998). Thus, scrub jays appeared able to remember what they were searching for, 
where it was located and when it was initially cached. 
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Recently, researchers questioned whether dogs could also demonstrate episodic-like memory. To 
date, such studies mainly focused on the what and where components. Kaminksi tested two dogs, 
including Rico, by asking them to retrieve several objects by name from two separate rooms after 
being given a chance to initially view the location of each object (Kaminski, Fischer, & Call, 
2008). Both reliably retrieved the correct objects by their names, thus displaying an ability to 
remember what, but only Rico’s search pattern indicated potential integration of information 
about the object’s location, thus the where. Although the second dog manifested a more 
stereotyped search strategy, at least one dog subject provided evidence for remembering 
knowledge about both what and where. 
Other studies focused on the retrieval of memory incidentally formed during a single past 
experience related to a foraging context (Fujita et al., 2012). Owners were instructed to walk their 
dogs - all experimentally naïve to the setup - to four baited food containers. Dogs were allowed to 
eat from two of them chosen at random. After a 10-min walk, dogs “unexpectedly” returned to the 
experimental room and could freely explore the containers. Interestingly, dogs firstly visited one 
of the containers where they had not been allowed to eat the treat. To exclude an odor-based 
choice in the test phase, the containers were all replaced with identical but empty counterparts, but 
the arrangement of the objects was kept the same. Physical or inadvertent cues from the owner 
were also discounted to explain the results as the dogs were unleashed as soon as they entered the 
testing room and were turning their back to their owners. 
If the dogs relied on operant learning strategies to solve the task, they would presumably have 
first visited the containers from which they obtained a reward during the exposure. Conversely, it 
appeared that such association learning did not take place in this case as they explored 
significantly more the containers from which they were not allowed eating previously. This search 
pattern clearly suggests that dogs retrieved and adaptively utilized knowledge from their past 
experience as they correctly remembered from where they could collect more rewards.  
In a further experiment, 39 new dog subjects had access to four novel containers: two containing 
food in but only one of them is allowed to be eaten from, one containing an inedible item and one 
being empty (Fujita et al., 2012) [Figure 66]. After a similar 10-min walk, the dogs returned to 
the room and searched freely. Thirty out of the 39 dogs first visited the containers that originally 
contained food (e.g. containers 1 and 3 on the example below). Nineteen of them went to the 
container that they had initially not been allowed to eat from (e.g. container 1 on the example 
below) and eleven chose the container where they had already eaten the treat (e.g. container 3 on 
the example below). According to their results, the authors claimed that these dogs demonstrated a 
memory about what and where previous food treats were located. In the wild, being endowed 
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with such episodic memory could increase the animals’ ability to successfully collect uneaten 
food. 
 
Figure 66 – (a) A schematic top view of the arrangements of the apparatus; (b)-(d) a schematic drawing of the testing procedure. During 
the exposure phase, two containers contained edible items (e.g. 1 and 3) and the dog was allowed to eat from one (e.g. 3), one container 
contained a non-eatable food (e.g. 4), the last one was empty. Adapted from Fujita et al. 2012. 
Despite this evidence for dogs conceptualizing both what and where components, the defining 
feature of episodic memory involving time representation and “mental time travel” in dogs is 
sparse. A study revealed that dogs were affected by the amount of time left home alone, as they 
demonstrated significantly more greeting behavior (tail wagging, lip licking, body shaking) 
toward their owners upon reunion after longer separation durations (2 and 4 hours) relative to 
shorter ones (1/2 hour) (Rehn & Keeling, 2011). Another study indicated that different delay 
periods affected dogs’ willingness to engage in a cooperative exchange task (dogs could choose 
not to eat a small valued food item in order to exchange it later for a much larger item) (Leonardi, 
Vick, & Dufour, 2012). The results showed that dogs anticipated delay duration as they were 
less willing to cooperate (to wait in order to make the exchange) if the required time was too long 
(>40s). 
Clearly, research on episodic memory and more particularly “mental time travel” and the 
conceptualization of when by dogs will need more robust investigations but this fruitful area of 
research is truthfully only at its beginning.  
Nevertheless, the delay between learning and testing encountered in all those studies ranged 
from seconds to minutes (or to a few hours in one study). Whether dogs are able to remember 
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knowledge or information about events days, months or years later is not yet well documented. 
Although this species is believed to remember familiar people after long time periods of absence, 
or traumatic events months after they happened (e.g. an injection at the veterinary clinic), 
empirical evidence for long-term memory capacities in dogs remain missing. 
 Long-term memory in dogs 4.1.3
In the past, animal studies have rarely been directly aimed at the problem of long-term memory, 
which has always been considered as a “higher order mental process”. To date, only a handful 
of studies contributed to the actual knowledge about long-term memory in animals. The majority 
of them tested memory for various abstract concepts in nonhuman primates. In 1973, Johnson and 
Davis reported that eight rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) retained abstract oddity tasks (i.e. 
discrimination among novel sets of stimuli based on the perceptual “difference”; symbolically: 
ABB, ABA, BAA, etc.) nearly perfectly when retested 7 years later on the same task (C. K. 
Johnson & Davis, 1973). Burdyn et al. documented that three squirrel monkeys (Samiri sciureus) 
trained on an oddity concept also showed evidence of retention on this relational concept over two 
years later (Burdyn, Noble, Shreves, & Thomas, 1984). Finally, gorillas (Gorilla g. Gorilla) that 
had demonstrated a win-stay, lose-shift strategy during training on a series of discrimination 
reversal problems were posed this same problem again after 2.5 years (T. L. Patterson & Tzeng, 
1979). Their performances were comparable to their best prior performances. For these three 
studies, it was clear that the problem-solving frameworks established during training were 
remembered by individuals over very long periods of time. 
The first report of long-term conceptual memory in a non-primate species dates back to 2002 
(Reichmuth Kastak & Schusterman, 2002). This study reported the case of a sea lion tested for 
memory for an associative concept (non similarity-based classes of stimuli in a simple 
discrimination repeated-reversal procedure) one year after the last practice and for a relational 
concept (generalized identity matching) after about ten years. The memory tests revealed no 
decrement in performance in either of the two problem-solving strategies. Later, another study 
demonstrated that horses accurately remembered stimuli they were trained on during 
discrimination and categorization learning that originally occurred between six years to a decade 
earlier (Hanggi & Ingersoll, 2009). These horses also recalled and applied a relative size concept 
rule that they had learned seven years prior to the test.  
Finally, the first evidence that dogs could remember a task after a long time period opened the 
door of this new and certainly fruitful area of research. In one study that used a touch-screen 
apparatus, dogs were tested on a clip art picture discrimination task 6 months after they 
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acquired the task (Wallis et al., 2016). A discrimination task consists of a forced choice procedure 
where two stimuli (in this case colored clip art pictures) are simultaneously displayed on the 
screen, one being the positively reinforced stimulus (S+) and the other the negative stimulus (S-) 
[Figure 67]. Over the trials, dog subjects learned to selectively choose S+ and avoid S-. In this 
experiment, the learning criterion was set at 87.5% correct choices (≥28 correct first choices in 32 
trials) in five out of seven consecutive sessions.     
               
 
Figure 67- Schematic drawing of the apparatus (a) photograph of a dog working on a visual discrimination task in the testing niche with 
one side open. From Wallis et al., 2016. 
Among the 82 dogs who reached the learning criterion, 46 participated in the memory test after a 
6 month interval. Forty-two of them scored significantly higher than chance level (i.e. 0.5) in the 
first testing session (≥22 correct first choice out of the 32 trials). The results revealed dogs’ 
aptitude to discriminate between visual stimuli such as clip arts displayed on a screen, and 
demonstrated memory skills for recognizing reinforced stimuli at long term based on their 
visual properties exclusively (Wallis et al., 2016).  
In another study, laboratory dogs (beagles) were trained on a traditional obedience task (i.e. to go 
to the basket and stay) by means of operant conditioning and shaping (Demant, Ladewig, Balsby, 
& Dabelsteen, 2011a). Dogs’ retention of the task was tested four weeks after acquisition and 
revealed a high level of recall irrespective of the frequency of training they were exposed to. The 
authors suggested that once a task is learned, dogs are likely to remember it for a period of at least 
one month after the last practice. 
Finally, as described in the previous section, at least one dog, Rico, showed retention of object 
labels mapped via inferential strategies one month earlier (Kaminski et al., 2004).  
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To the best of our knowledge, no other evidence for long-term retention abilities by dogs are 
currently reported in the scientific literature.  
4.2 Canine brain anatomy of the mnesic system 
The canine brain recapitulates many important structural aspects of the human brain, including an 
over-developed neocortex, gyral folding patterns and a lobar organization [Figure 68]. 
Although brain anatomy in dogs is relatively well described, the functions underlying each 
brain region are less clear. However, as the basic relations between principal structures of the 
brain remain similar from mouse to human, it can be speculated that dogs’ brain areas that 
anatomically equate to the human homologous areas share similar functions. Nevertheless, 
the brain areas responsible for encoding, consolidating and retrieving information in humans 
reveal, for a part, structural differences in a dog’s brain. 
 
Figure 68 - Drawing of a dog frontal section showing the development of the telencephalon. From the Veterinary neuroanatomy and 
clinical neurology, De Lahunta. 
As already described earlier in this manuscript, in humans, the hippocampus is one the major 
components responsible for these cognitive functions. It is part of the medial temporal lobe in 
primates, whereas for other mammals it is located under the cerebral cortex (De Lahunta, 
Glass, & Kent, 2014). Dogs exhibit “two hippocampi” per hemisphere, an upper “rodent-like” 
and lower “human-like” hippocampus [Figure 69].  
In dogs, the hippocampus is an internal gyrus, an area of cerebral cortex that has been rolled 
into the lateral ventricle during development, and that is not visible on the external surface 
(archipallium) [Figure 68 & Figure 69]. As with humans, it is located close to the amygdaloidal 
body and belongs to the limbic system. In dogs, the hippocampus extends in a curve with a C like 
shape, starting from the amygdaloid body ventrally in each piriform lobe and progressing caudally 
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and dorsally and then rostrally over the diencephalon [Figure 69]. It forms part of the medial and 
dorsal wall of the lateral ventricle ventrally, and part of the medial and ventral wall of the lateral 
ventricle dorsally (De Lahunta et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 69 - Transverse brain section from the rostral part of a dog’s brain. White matter has been stained and appears black; grey matter is 
relatively unstained. Adapted from the Veterinary neuroanatomy and clinical neurology, De Lahunta. 
5 Conclusion of the chapter and presentation of the experimental 
project 
There is considerable current interest to shed light onto complex cognitive functions in nonhuman 
species. The dog has become an inspiring model of nonhuman cognition research which now 
spreads beyond the narrow scope of studies conducted on rodents and primates. In contrast to 
primates, a dog is a much more cooperative model to work with. The thousands of years of 
cohabitation with humans in addition to a stringent selection of specific physical and behavioral 
traits, that definite most of the current breeds, conferred to dogs unusual social and unsocial skills 
in which the scientific community finally showed an interest.  
Nowadays, the domestic dog is no longer just the daily life companion of humans. Dogs have 
become a promising model of research that have already revealed numerous of their remarkable 
and sometimes unexpected aptitudes over the last years. As detailed in this chapter, in many tasks, 
dogs have been shown able to outperform our closest primate relatives. Moreover, the unrelated 
genetic pattern between dogs and humans - and thus the evident disparity between the brain 
anatomy of dogs and humans - also inspired research on the evolutionary emergence of some 
cognitive abilities shared by both species. Comparative studies are not only specifically designed 
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to merely compare cognitive aptitudes between species; they sometimes also help us to 
understand where the roots from complex cognitive functions might originate. 
In this thesis, we will focus on an apparent communicative ability that some dogs have already 
been shown able to acquire, namely the word-referent concept, in order to examine long-term 
memory abilities by dogs. As developed above, this cognitive function has been poorly 
documented in dogs. However, it is of major importance to investigate whether learning principles  
considered as the building blocks for memory formation in humans are similarly shared by 
unrelated species like the domestic dog. At a behavioral level, if the conditions that drive 
memory formation in humans follow similar rules in distantly related animals, like dogs, this 
might offer an interesting approach to better understand the origins of the underlying brain 
mechanisms.  
So, the central goal of this thesis is to test the generality of the repetition-based memory 
mechanism, which constitutes the heart of the M4 project as introduced in the first part of the 
manuscript.  
More precisely, in the context of a complex cross-modal paradigm (the word-referent concept), 
we first aimed to know if dogs would be able to exhibit long-term memories for such complex 
information as humans are able to. The impressive cases of Rico and Chaser who are able to learn 
the names of hundreds of objects suggest that they could remember such complex associations for 
long periods of time. However, there is no clear evidence of their retention ability for object 
names after a prolonged intervening period of months or years, without being exposed to the 
stimuli during the time interval. We will firstly focus on this crucial question in this thesis. 
Furthermore, we will draw a special attention on the heterogeneity of dogs’ cognitive 
performances on this task, and we will try to find reliable explanations of this phenomenon.  
The second goal of this experimental project was intended to examine the effect of a repetition-
based learning process on memory formation. Would dogs’ memory performances be 
correlated with the number of presentations of the pairings during learning? Moreover, in a case 
study we tested the minimum number of repetitions the dog required for storing such bimodal 
sensory information in memory.  
Third, we started to investigate whether the efficiency of the learning strategies encountered 
with young children would be equivalent in dogs. Therefore, we applied learning conditions using 
either ostensive labeling, fast-mapping or reinforcement learning, similarly to those that children 
encountered, to examine their effects on dogs’ retention of novel object names.  
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CHAPTER VII.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF LONG-TERM MEMORY 
OF WORD-OBJECT PAIRS IN DOGS 
 
General introduction 
This project was designed to test whether dogs are able to form long-term memories for complex 
information after a long period of time without rehearsal. This project also intended to 
investigate whether the conditions for long-term memories to be formed and survive after a delay 
follow similar rules in nonhuman animals to those reported in humans. This would help us to 
understand to what extent the memorization processes that is already well-defined in humans 
might be generalizable to other animals. The domestic dog appeared as an interesting model of 
research for this aim firstly because dogs are genetically distant from humans, in contrast to 
nonhuman primates. Secondly, because they are usually keen to cooperate with humans. This 
means they easily agree to perform tasks when asked by humans, in contrast to any other wild or 
domesticated animals. And finally, because the impressive communicative abilities they 
developed to understand human signals enable us to teach them cognitively complex tasks. 
Therefore, our long-term memory experiments on dogs involved complex cross-modal 
associations, specifically the names of objects, as previous studies showed that dogs seem able to 
acquire this word-referent concept. This concept is particularly demanding from a cognitive 
perspective, because it requires encoding the visual features of the objects, the auditory sound 
sequences that constitute the labels and the associative link between each specific item and label. 
The recruited dogs were all naïve about this task. Therefore, the first challenging part of this study 
was to teach them the word-referent concept, which constituted the 6-month “training phase” of 
the experiment. We considered that dogs had reliably acquired the task as soon as they displayed 
abilities to retrieve an object by its name, in various contexts and among various sets of objects. 
For rigorous scientific purposes, accuracy was measured through a stringent setup, similar to the 
one originally developed by Kaminski et al. (2004). Then, we conducted a series of experiments 
in order to explore the central questions addressed in this project. 
In a first experiment, we directly addressed the question of whether dogs are able to form long-
term memories for complex information such as cross-modal associative stimuli. Dog participants 
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underwent a 3-month intervening period with no visual nor auditory access to the pairings 
before memory test. Moreover, we focused on the effect of age on the acquisition and retention 
of this cognitively complex task. We attempted to figure out whether age would influence 
learning and memorizing new information in dogs as it does in humans.  
In a second phase, we carried out a series of short exploratory experiments on our best 
experimented dog, which constituted a case study. We tried to understand whether a repetition-
based learning strategy would influence learning and long-term memory formation. If so, what 
would be the minimum number of exposures to an object associated with its label for the dog to 
reliably remember it after a delay? We also aimed to know if memory remains stable over time 
or if it declines as a curve of forgetting after a certain delay. Finally, in this case study we also 
attempted to highlight whether learning techniques used in humans can also help the acquisition 
and retention of new knowledge in dogs. For instance, we compared the effect of ostensive 
labeling, fast-mapping and reinforcement learning on word learning. 
1 FIRST STUDY. Age effect on the acquisition and retention of a 
high-order cognitive task in dogs: the word-object pair paradigm  
1.1 Introduction 
Previous case studies demonstrated the remarkable aptitude of some dogs to learn hundreds of 
words referring to particular objects (e.g. Kaminski et al., 2004; Pilley & Reid, 2011). This ability 
appeared not to be exclusive to Border collies - considered for a long-time  as being the cleverest 
species of dog- since two recent studies have reported that a Yorkshire Terrier and a mongrel dog 
were also capable of associating words to referents (Griebel & Oller, 2012; Ramos & Ades, 
2012). This inspired the idea that perhaps any dog might be able to acquire this complex task. A 
recent study explored the brain regions for novel word detection in twelve dogs originating from 
various breeds, who were trained on the word-referent concept (Prichard, Cook, Spivak, 
Chhibber, & Berns, 2018). By implementing Pilley’s protocol (Pilley, 2014; Pilley & Reid, 2011), 
dogs were trained over a period of 2 to 6 months to map two words to their corresponding 
referents and were then tested in an fMRI imaging experiment. Authors’ learning criterion was set 
at 80% correct retrievals for at least one object with the other at or above 50%. The number of 
objects taught to the dogs as well as the learning criteria required by the authors was much lower 
than the impressive performances of dogs reported in the other studies. It might be argued that 
higher levels of performance were not necessary for the purpose of this study. But perhaps the 
dogs had problems performing the task, and were unable to learn more object names, which 
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would suggest that cross-modal referential understanding is perhaps difficult for dogs to 
apprehend.  
To test this hypothesis, the following experiment examined whether any dog belonging to any 
breed and with any life history would be able to acquire the complex word-referent task. To that 
aim, we replicated Pilley’s protocol on a heterogeneous group of dogs and tested their abilities to 
retrieve objects by name after a 6 month training period. We expected to observe a disparity in 
the ability of dogs to learn the task and hypothesized that the variability could partly be attributed 
to similar parameters than those found in humans. Specifically, we presumed that age would play 
a crucial role in the ability to learn a novel task. In humans, it is assumed that learning is a 
cognitive process that increases rapidly from infancy to early adulthood and steadily declines 
during adulthood (e.g. Baltes, 1987). Age-related learning impairments are reflected by an 
increased number of trials to reach a learning criterion as well as increased perseverative 
responding (e.g. Craik & Salthouse, 2008; Salthouse, 1996). If learning is similarly age-sensitive 
in dogs, then young dogs should acquire a novel task better and faster than adult dogs, an idea 
suggested by some previous studies. For instance, relatively old laboratory beagles (>5 years of 
age) showed impairments to reach the learning criterion of DNMS and DNMP tasks compared to 
younger beagles (<2 years of age) who were typically able to perform above chance (criterion not 
reached within 400 trials at a 10-s delay within the group of older dogs) (e.g. Chan et al., 2002; 
Head, Mehta, Hartley, & Kameka, 1995; Milgram et al., 1999). Similarly, in a discrimination 
learning task (i.e. a two-choice procedure displaying two stimuli and only one led to a reward), 
Wallis et al. found a significant effect of age on the number of trials dogs needed to reach 
criterion (as age increased, discrimination learning ability decreased) (Wallis et al., 2016). 
Moreover, all those studies reported a high degree of perseveration in the older dog groups 
(e.g. old dogs developed a side preference and/or showed persistent responding to previously 
rewarded stimuli) which contributed to the deficits to acquire the discrimination learning tasks 
(e.g. Milgram et al., 1994; Wallis et al., 2016). If these patterns are generalizable to other types of 
learning, and if age is truly a critical parameter in the acquisition of a novel task in dogs, we 
expect our younger dogs to demonstrate higher levels of performances in comparison to older 
dogs.  
The second purpose of this study was to benefit from this cognitively demanding task to 
investigate whether dogs not only learned, but also stored this knowledge in memory. Currently, 
very little is known about long-term memory formation in dogs. Dogs have been shown to be able 
to recognize visual stimuli that were positively reinforced 6 months prior to the test in a 
discrimination learning task (Wallis et al., 2016). In the current study, we also addressed this 
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question by measuring dogs’ ability to recognize the objects they were trained on (thus positively 
reinforced objects) amongst distractors (not positively reinforced).  
Furthermore, we aimed to test if dogs also stored the entire mapping information between 
objects and words in memory. Did they only remember the perceptual properties that 
characterized the target objects (e.g. color, texture, shape, etc.) in order to recognize them among 
distractors or did they also memorize the sound sequences that referred to the objects during 
training? We examined this question by conducting retention tests after a 3 month intervening 
period with no rehearsal of the material during this time delay in order to prevent reactivation of 
the memory. For these tests, we also expected to record inter-individual differences. If age is 
similarly critical for the consolidation and retrieval processes in dogs as it is in humans, the older 
dogs would be less likely to remember the names of the objects compared to younger dogs. In 
Wallis et al.’s visual discrimination task, there was no difference in performance in any of their 
age groups after the 6 month break (Wallis et al., 2016). One explanation is that object 
discrimination tasks are not difficult enough to highlight age effects. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that our complex associative design would emphasize the appearance of age effects, if age is a 
responsive parameter to memory formation and maintenance in dogs.  
1.2 Materials and methods 
        Collaborations 1.2.1
Since 2016, we have established two major partnerships in order to achieve this project. The 
first involved the Veterinary School of Toulouse, namely “l’Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de 
Toulouse” (ENVT). Nathalie Priymenko, veterinarian and lecturer at the ENVT, and Elisabeth 
Jeunesse, research engineer at the ENVT, helped with the recruitment, offered access to the 
facilities where the experiments took place (neutral rooms or classrooms of the ENVT), and  gave 
appropriate advice about the procedures according to their expertise.  
Second, Lucie Negro, a professional dog trainer since 2006 and manager of the company “Chien 
Complice” devoted a lot of time to supervising the training sessions at the Vet School. Together, 
we developed the training procedure of the protocol, according to the methodologies of previous 
studies that we had to adjust to each dog. She also gave precious advice to the owners to help 
them with teaching the task to their dogs at home.  
In 2017, we also started a collaboration with the “Ecole Chiens Guides d’Aveugles” (ECGA) of 
Toulouse in order to replicate our setup with dogs of the same breed (i.e. Labradors) and from the 
same working environment. The aim was first to enlarge the number of individuals in the cohort, 
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and second to examine whether this relatively homogeneous group of dogs would generate less 
variability in performances. Unfortunately, 3 months after the beginning of the protocol, we had 
to put an end to this collaboration, as most of the dogs had to quit the experiment for various 
reasons as detailed in a later section.  
 Ethics Statements 1.2.2
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee in Animal Experimentations “Science et 
Santé Animales N°115” (SSA N°115) of Toulouse, under the Number SSA_2016_012. Owners 
freely enrolled in this study and gave written consent for their dog’s participation in the 
experiment.  
 Recruitment 1.2.3
Subjects were pet dogs recruited from owners who volunteered to participate in the project. 
Owners were predominantly vet students in their first years of studies at the ENVT. Recruitment 
took place at the ENVT and at the ECGA. Due to the time requirement to supervise each dog-
owner couple efficiently, two cohorts of dogs were recruited over two consecutive years: October 
2016 – September 2017 and October 2017 – September 2018. The experimental setup as well as 
the training conditions (i.e. facilities, time period of the year, access to the dog trainer’s advices, 
etc.) were identical for both cohorts. For both cohorts, recruitment took place at the end of 
October 2016 and 2017 at the ENVT (and at the end of October 2017 at the ECGA).  
Announcements distributed per email firstly invited potentially interested owners to attend a 
meeting at the ENVT (and at the ECGA). The meeting detailed the objectives, procedure, 
inclusion criteria and required investment from owners to achieve the task during the following 
year. At the end of the meeting, owners who enrolled in the study were later met individually with 
their pet dogs. During this subsequent session, each dog’s behavior was scrupulously evaluated 
according to Mrs. Negro’s behavioral evaluation grid. It consisted of measuring dogs’ general 
obedience, natural interest in playing and fetching objects, ease of being manipulated by unknown 
individuals (e.g. experimenters), absence of signs of aggressiveness, etc. Only dogs who fulfilled 
at least 15 out of the 21 behavioral points were allowed to participate in the protocol.  
    Subjects 1.2.4
Subjects were pet dogs recruited at the ENVT and ECGA of Toulouse over two consecutive years. 
Dogs had to fulfill several inclusion criteria to integrate the study:  
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(1) All types of breeds were admitted except dogs from the 1st and 2nd category as defined by the French 
Rural Code, art. 211-1 of the Law 99-5 of 06/01/199 concerning dangerous and stray animals (i.e. 
“attack dogs” such as for example Staffordshire terrier, American Staffordshire terrier, Mastiff, Tosa 
types, etc.; and guard dogs and molossoids such as Rottweiler, for example). 
(2) Both genders were included except gestate females. Non-sterilized females could not participate in the 
weekly working sessions when they were in heat. 
(3) There was no age limit to participate in the study. However, dogs above 7 years old were only included 
if they had undergone a recent medical examination including a blood test with no suspect issue.  
(4) All dogs had to be identified (chip or tattoo) and vaccinated against the Kennel Cough, Canine 
distemper (also called Carre’s disease or hard pad disease), Infectious Canine Hepatitis (ICH), 
Leptospirosis, Canine Parvovirus and rabies. 
(5) Dogs had to fulfill at least 15 out of the 21 behavioral points measured by Mrs. Negro.  
Forty companion dogs of owners who volunteered to participate in the experiment respected 
these criteria (ENVT, N=35; ECGA, N=5). The experiment lasted about one year and required 
owners to train their dog at home three times a day and half an hour a week under the 
supervision of the experimenters. Due to a lack of time to satisfy these requirements, several 
owners abandoned the study before the end of the training phase (N=9). One owner moved from 
Toulouse with his dog during the time period of the study (N=1), another interrupted the study 
because his dog became suddenly critically ill (N=1) and a few abandoned for unknown reasons 
(N=3). The five dogs recruited at the ECGA had also to leave the study as they were removed 
from the ECGA because of major behavioral or health troubles. Altogether, from the 40 dogs 
originally recruited, only 21 performed the final comprehension and retention tests. Therefore, 
the following data only involved these dogs. 
The 21 remaining dogs came from various breeds, as detailed in Table 8. Except for one dog 
(Yuki), all dogs were “medium sized breeds” that had relatively similar life expectancies and 
developmental periods. 
When the training phase began, dogs ranged in age from 3 months to 8 years (see Table 8). The 
dogs were split into 2 age groups, namely puppies and adults, taking into consideration the main 
developmental periods of “medium sized dogs”. The cutoff was established at one year old and 
was partly based on sexual maturity which stands at around one year of age for most of the 
recruited breeds. 
Finally, all of the dogs were experimentally naïve to the task prior to the experiment. None of 
them had previously learned words to refer to specific items. However, most of them knew words 
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for specific actions (e.g. “sit”, “lie down”, “wait”). Furthermore, some of the dogs evolved in 
various environmental conditions and were exposed to various enrichments (e.g. agility, cani-
cross, dog training, etc.) that could not be controlled in this experiment. 
Table 8 - Table indicating participants’ ID number, name, age, age group, breed, sex and number of objects pitted against each other on 
floor during testing.  
N° ID Name Age 
(months) 
Age 
group 
Breed Sex Number of 
objects on 
floor 
1 Fenrir 14  Adult Husky M 4 
2 Aleombre 12 Puppy German x Tervueren shepherd M 5 
3 Miko 12 Puppy Korthal M 5 
4 Alaska 12 Puppy Australian shepherd F 6 
5 Oreo 3 Puppy Border collie M 5  
6 Nova 5 Puppy Border collie x malamute F 4 
7 Neurone 7 Puppy Beagle M 6 
8 Nami 9 Puppy German shepherd F 4 
9 Mango 12 Puppy Border collie x white shepherd M 5 
10 Nayla 8 Puppy Golden retriever F 5 
11 Nausicäa 18 Adult Border collie x Husky F 3 + 4 
12 Jeika 24 Adult Border collie x Bernese mountain F 3 + 4 
13 Harley 96 Adult Labrador x hunting dog F 4 + 4 
14 Happy 54 Adult Labrador F 4 + 4 
15 Tanga 72 Adult Mix Shepherd F 3 + 4 
16 Hyuri 54 Adult Springer spaniel x Border collie M 2 + 3 
17 Yuki 30 Adult Boston terrier M 4 
18 Alba 11 Puppy Mix Shepherd F 4 
19 Moka 6 Puppy Hunting dog M 8 
20 Glee 60 Adult Australian shepherd F 5 
21 Elis 84 Adult Border collie M 3 + 4 
 
  Stimuli 1.2.5
Stimuli consisted of toys for children (soft toys) or for dogs (e.g. plastic toys, stuffed animals, 
knotted ropes, rubber toys, squeaked toys, etc.) as illustrated in Figure 70. The objects differed in 
size, weight, shape, texture, color, design and material. Despite some similarities, each object was 
characterized by unique features enabling discrimination. For each dog, there were no duplicates 
of the objects.  
A distinct proper name was attributed to each object. Labels were pseudo-words composed of 
two identical syllables (e.g. “lili”, “dudu”, etc.), two phonologically distinct syllables (e.g. 
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“rivou”, “peno”, “tuda”, etc.), or consonant-vowel-consonant constructions (e.g. “BUX”, “ZAV”, 
“PIM”, etc.) [Figure 70]. As with young children, the use of pseudo-words ensured that dogs had 
no auditory access to these stimuli during the time interval that separated learning from memory 
tests.  
 
Figure 70 - Photographs of some objects with their associated labels, belonging to the dog Moka.  
 Procedure 1.2.6
The experimental setup first consisted of a 6-month training period since the recruited dogs 
were naïve about the concept that words can refer to items. First of all, owners attended a meeting 
that explained the theoretical framework of the training procedure they had to apply at home. 
Then, three times a day (3 x 5min) they taught the word-referent concept to their dogs by 
scrupulously following the protocol. Short training sessions spaced in time were shown to be 
more efficient for dogs to acquire a task than working sessions performed in a row (Demant et al., 
2011a). Owners were asked to record in detail each of their working sessions in an experimental 
book provided by the experimenter. Owners had to transcribe the schedule and duration of their 
sessions, the objects they worked with, any issue they encountered and the fetching scores 
obtained by their dogs. Moreover, owners met the experimenter and the dog trainer once a week 
at the ENVT. It consisted of individual and personalized training sessions. A session lasted 
about 30 minutes and was essential to track the dogs’ progression [Figure 71]. During this 
working-session, owners were asked to reproduce the exercises they performed at home in front 
of the experimenter and the dog trainer. Both could appraise each dog’s progression and often had 
to adjust the original protocol to each dog according to the difficulties encountered. Sometimes, 
the experimenter or dog trainer took advantage of this session to train the dogs themselves which 
also constituted an opportunity for the owner to clarify the teaching procedure. Owners were then 
given personal advice and received an individualized training program for the following week. 
The entire training protocol and its main steps are detailed in the later section.  
Exactly 6 months after the beginning of the training phase, the dog’s ability to retrieve objects by 
name was evaluated using a tightly controlled procedure. The testing occurred at the ENVT and 
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included two to four consecutive sessions, in order to reflect in the most appropriate way the 
dog’s comprehension of the task. Indeed, dogs (and more largely animals) are very sensitive to 
environmental changes that can easily disrupt their motivation to engage in a task or their level of 
concentration (e.g. physical environment such as noise in the corridor, unusual odors in the 
experimental room, etc.). Internal state might also account in the performances (e.g. physiological 
status or mood (being tired, bored about the task, too excited), etc.). These external and internal 
parameters have to be considered when evaluating an animal’s performances. Therefore, 
comprehension of the task was measured as the mean score obtained over two to four test sessions 
performed at the end of the 6 month training period. Five dogs could only be evaluated once 
because their owners were unavailable.  
Following this comprehension test, dogs underwent a 3-month period during which they had 
neither visual access to the objects nor auditory exposure to the pseudo-words [Figure 71]. 
Retrieving objects by name was not rehearsed with other items during this time interval either. 
Furthermore, dogs had no access to the experimental room, which could have reminded them of 
the task.   
After the 3 month intervening period, dogs were first tested on a discrimination task. It consisted 
of recognizing the objects that they were trained with amongst a set of distractor objects (i.e. 
dogs’ unlabeled toys) that dogs had not seen for the same amount of time. During this 
discrimination test, target objects were not labeled. Next, retention of the word-object 
associations was measured using the same tightly controlled procedure as for the 
comprehension tests [Figure 71]. The memory test included a single testing session.  
 
Figure 71 - Schematic of the experimental setup for evaluating dogs’ memory performances to remember object names after a 3 month 
intervening period. The design was conducted during two consecutive years, starting from October 2016 and October 2017. 
230 
 
1.2.6.1 Word-referent training procedure 
During a 6 month period, dogs were taught object names and trained to retrieve items by their 
corresponding labels. The training took place in familiar environments (e.g. at home) and with 
well-known individuals (e.g. the owner or owner’s partner) to make dogs feel confident about the 
task. Most of the training procedure implemented Pilley’s protocol that he established for Chaser 
(Pilley, 2014; Pilley & Reid, 2011). As Pilley did with Chaser, owners dedicated a great part of 
the training sessions playing tug and fetch with their dog and the objects while verbally 
reinforcing the names of those objects. Next, the word-referent concept per se was mostly taught 
by means of classical and operant conditioning associated with positive reinforcement. 
Rewards were play, praise and/or food, depending on each dog. For example, excited dogs 
were typically provided a neutral food pellet instead of play which would have been too 
stimulating for them. In contrast, dogs that mainly focussed on the food reward rather than on the 
task were reinforced with praise and play (see Prichard, Cook, Spivak, Chhibber, & Berns, 2018 
for equivalent methodology). Moreover, dogs were taught the clicker training method since the 
click provides a more neutral signal of accuracy than a voice signal. This classical conditioning 
method consists in clicking each desired or accurate behavior that will be subsequently reinforced 
by a reward. Thus, from a dog’s perspective, each click predicts a reward that will be delivered in 
a short time window. The clicker is an efficient method as it enables the capture of desired 
behaviors precisely when they occur which helps subjects to rapidly comprehend what the 
targeted behavior consisted of.  
The first object was introduced to the dog, who was allowed to freely play with it, while its owner 
verbally repeated the pseudo-word allocated to this object. The owner also held and pointed to the 
object while labelling it. These playing while labelling sessions lasted three days. Then, the object 
was placed at a distance of 4-5m and the owner instructed the dog to “go get [object]” or “where 
is [object]” or simply “[object]”. No other objects were available on the floor for retrieval, so 
errors were unlikely. As soon as the dog grasped the object in his mouth, the owner reinforced 
that behavior by a click and the associated reward as described above. Then, the dog was 
progressively rewarded for fetching and bringing the object to his owner’s feet rather than simply 
grasping it. After retrieval, owners provided several rehearsals with the associated label. 
Following this initial training in the absence of other objects, the newly introduced object was 
placed on the floor among dogs’ familiar toys that had never been labeled by the owner before. 
The dog was instructed to retrieve the newly learned object exactly in the same manner as when 
displayed alone. The dog was equally first rewarded for grasping the target object and as soon as 
it was confident with this novel configuration of the task, it was required to bring the object to the 
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owner’s feet in order to get the reward. When the dog was 100% accurate on this task, the second 
object was introduced following the same procedure. At this step, the second object was always 
presented isolated from the first labeled item. As soon as the dog was equally accurate in 
retrieving this second object among familiar unlabeled toys, the owner alternated between both 
introduced objects every succeeding training session.  
Next, both newly learned objects were pitted against each other among familiar toys serving as 
distractors. The owner randomly requested one of the objects by uttering the same instruction as 
previously (e.g. “go get [object1]”). The dog was rewarded only for correctly selecting the target 
object if it was his first selection. Otherwise, if the dog selected the wrong object, the owner 
remained neutral, made neither remark nor gave punishment, recalled his dog and gave him 
another opportunity to fetch the requested item. If the dog similarly failed to retrieve the object 
upon command on the second or third trial, the owner removed the other objects and gave his dog 
additional training on an easier configuration to reinforce the word-object mapping. Owners had 
to always remain attentive and ready to rehearse easier exercises in order not to lose their dog’s 
interest and motivation to engage in the task. When the dog successfully retrieved the target object 
placed beside the other newly learned object, it was removed and the dog was requested to fetch 
the second item upon command. This procedure without replacement of the objects facilitated 
the dog’s comprehension of the concept. Indeed, since an object was correctly retrieved, the 
probability for dogs to retrieve this reinforced object in the consecutive trial is high. To minimize 
errors, the second trial of the sequence only involved the remaining learned object among 
distractor toys. Objects were then rearranged to limit learning by position and another sequence 
could start. The order of the targets was also randomly counterbalanced to avoid learning a 
sequence. A training session always ended with a correct performance. Dogs were also always 
given the opportunity to play with the objects at the end of the session as objects were not 
available to dogs aside from in the training sessions. 
Novel objects were only introduced when few errors were made on the fetching tests of learned 
objects. Thus, each dog could progress at their own pace. The same procedure of teaching the 
names of novel objects was applied for each newly introduced object. Familiar toys serving as 
distractors were removed as soon as the dog knew 4 or 5 object names. 
Complementary exercises were established in accordance with the dog trainer and were especially 
designed for dogs who had difficulties in acquiring the task. For many dogs, the sole act of 
interacting with an object constituted a source of reward whether or not the object was the target. 
Thus, some dogs preferred interacting with their favorite object rather than fetching the requested 
one, even though it would not have brought a reward afterwards. To avoid this behavior 
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happening, two complementary exercises were designed. The first consisted of holding two newly 
learned objects in the hands - one in each hand - facing the dog who sat in front of his owner 
about 1m apart [Figure 72]. The owner looked straight away and randomly instructed his dog to 
fetch one object (e.g. “where is [object2]”). If the dog selected the target object at first, he could 
interact with the object and get the reward. Instead, if he went to the wrong object first, the owner 
rapidly closed both hands thereby not allowing his dog to interact with the object. This method 
helped the dogs make fewer errors, in addition to reinforcing correct retrievals.  
 
Figure 72 - Photographs illustrating the complementary exercises designed to help dogs in comprehending the word-referent concept. The 
dog stands about 1m apart from his owner waiting for the fetching request (panel A & D). The dog correctly selects the target object at first 
and is allowed to interact with (B & E). The dog selects the wrong object at first and is not allowed to interact with (C & F). One exercise 
consists of holding the objects in the hands (A, B & C), while for the second exercise the owner displays the objects in front their knees (D, E 
& F). Pictures are photographs from the dog trainer and her dog (not included in the sample). 
As unconscious cues might have been utilized by dogs to solve the task, a second exercise 
consisted of displaying the objects in front of the owner’s knees. Similarly, the owner could easily 
prevent his dog from making an error and from getting self-rewarded [Figure 72]. Nevertheless, 
inadvertent cues might also have accounted for the dog’s accuracy in this configuration. To ensure 
dogs accurately comprehended the task and to control for any “Clever Hans effects”, a black panel 
was introduced about 3.5 months after training began and that separated the dog and its owner 
from the objects. Thus, dogs also became accustomed to the stringent testing procedure that 
occurred at the end of the 6-month training period as well as after the 3-month intervening period. 
1.2.6.2 Word-referent testing procedure 
At the end of the 6 months of training, dogs’ were tested on their ability to discriminate between 
the trained objects upon command. Performance was measured as a score of correct retrievals. 
The testing procedure also followed Pilley’s methodology (Pilley, 2014; Pilley & Reid, 2011). 
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The experimenter randomly displayed the objects behind an opaque panel out of view of both the 
owner and the dog. The owner was thus naïve about the distribution of the objects. Only newly 
learned objects were pitted against each other. There were no familiar unlabeled objects among 
them. For a few dogs, the set of trained objects was divided into two groups: a group that 
contained only the favorite objects and a group composed of the neglected objects. For these dogs, 
when objects of both groups were placed beside each other, they always fetched the preferred 
object and ignored the others whatever the label was. This behavior merely reflects fussiness and 
an absence of application of the task. In order not to exclude theses dogs from the sample and for 
them to still get a chance to demonstrate their acquisition of the task, they were tested on their 
favorite and less preferred objects separately. 
The dog was positioned beside his owner and both were facing the panel [Figure 73]. Both had no 
visual access to the randomly displayed objects. This rigorous experimental control ensured that 
dogs selected objects exclusively on the basis of their verbalized names as they could not rely on 
inadvertent cues provided by the owner. For the same reason, the experimenters turned their 
back away from the objects and did not look at the dog [Figure 73]. They stood about 1m apart 
from the dog plus owner, and launched the computer program. A self-developed program 
generated through Python Software randomly designated a target object for each trial. Each object 
was only tested once during the session. For each trial, the experimenter wrote the name of the 
elected object on a white board readable by the owner who verbally instructed his dog to fetch 
that object (e.g. “go get [object4]” or simply “[object4]”). Only the object that the dog brought 
from behind the panel counted as a correct or wrong answer. The objects the dog potentially 
pointed to or grasped in his mouth without bringing them back to the owner’s feet were not taken 
into consideration in the analyses. A camera stabilized on a tripod videotaped each testing session. 
The dog got feedback for his response which was either a click associated with a reward when he 
accurately retrieved an object (i.e. praise, play and/or food) or a neutral remark when he made a 
mistake (e.g. “let’s try again”). When he failed on one trial, the dog was given another opportunity 
to select the correct item, although this second trial did not account in the analyses. The trial was 
considered as successful or incorrect according to the first retrieval. Since the testing procedure 
was designed without replacement, objects correctly retrieved were not replaced after selection 
(see Pilley & Reid, 2011 for equivalent methodology). The objects were not rearranged from one 
trial to another during the entire session. The dog was instructed to fetch all objects until the last 
one which was not taken into account in the analysis since the dog had 100% chance of retrieving 
it without error (see Kaminski et al., 2008 for equivalent methodology). 
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Figure 73 - Illustration of the experimental set up during testing. The dog and his owner (O) were placed about 1m behind an opaque panel 
that separated them from the objects. For each trial, the experimenter (E) launched the computer program that randomly generated the name 
of one object. E transcribed the elected name on a whiteboard readable for O. O instructed his dog to fetch the targeted object by verbal 
command. The dog had to bypass the panel to access the objects. The object brought by the dog was considered as the dog’s selection, and 
was counted either as a success (correct retrieval) or as a mistake (incorrect retrieval). A camera (C) fixated on a tripod videotaped the entire 
testing session.  
 Analyses, modelling and statistics  1.2.7
Performance was calculated using the mean proportion of correct retrievals discarding the last 
trial (100% chance of being correct). For dogs who performed more than one test - for instance 
when comprehension tests were repeated or when the set of objects was divided into two distinct 
subgroups as explained above – performance corresponded to the mean score obtained across 
those multiple tests. The calculation of a dog’s mean performance of an entire testing session 
followed this formula: 
 
Legend. N: number or objects; i: trials; x: subject’s responses (0=error or 1=success) 
In order to determine whether or not dogs acquired the task, performances were compared to a 
theoretical probability to complete the task by chance. Since the tests were carried out without 
replacement of the objects, the probability of success (i.e. the probability of correctly selecting 
the target object by chance) varied for each trial, following a hypergeometric distribution. We 
simulated this distribution using a Monte-Carlo algorithm (see Grassmann, Kaminski, & 
Tomasello, 2012 for equivalent methodology). It consisted of modelling random object selection 
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for each trial by implementing different chance values resulting from not replacing the objects 
after each selection. Thus, in this model, we implemented the deterministic probability of 
success by chance for each trial according to the number of objects available on the floor. 
The model considered N number of objects available on the ground, N-1 number of trials (since 
the last was not taken into account), and x the response for each trial (i.e. 0=error or 1=success 
according to the binomial law).  
The following formula summarizes the theoretical mean probability of success of the entire 
experiment according to the initial number of objects available for retrieval:  
 
Legend. N: number or objects; i: trials 
The simulation of the Monte-Carlo algorithm was repeated a large number of times (2,000 
simulations) to generate the theoretical distribution of the performances due to chance. To 
facilitate interpretation, the simulation could be represented by a curve of success expected by 
chance according to the number of competing objects (see results section). 
Next, the level of performance of trained dogs was compared to the level of the simulated 
distributions (i.e. chance level) as calculated above, using adapted binomial tests that were 
revised in accordance with a hypergeometric law (see Griebel & Oller, 2012 for the use of 
equivalent adapted binomial tests): 
 
Legend. N: number or objects; i: trials; x: subject’s responses (0=error or 1=success) 
The first argument of such a binomial test corresponds to the number of successes observed 
across the experiment (i.e. number of correct retrievals); the second reflects the number of 
possible successes of the entire experiment (i.e. the number of trials) and the last argument 
indicates the mean probability of success by chance. The last argument is the one we adapted to 
our design since it was carried out without replacement. This adapted version of the binomial test 
was used to assess comprehension and retention of the task at a group level and also at an 
individual level.  
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When comparison between subgroups was required (e.g. females vs males, puppies vs adults), 
generalized linear mixed-models (GLMM) were conducted. These models consider repeated 
measures on individuals as random effects, performances as binomial data (which had to be 
specified in the model) and the variable(s) to investigate as the fixed effect(s). 
1.3 Results 
 Comprehension of the word-referent concept by dogs 1.3.1
In order to determine whether dogs were reliably able to associate words to referents, performance 
was tested at the end of the 6-months training period during tightly controlled comprehension 
tests as described above.  
For each dog, one to four test sessions took place according to owners’ availability (1 test-session: 
N=5; 2 test-sessions: N=9; 3 test-sessions: N=3; 4 test-sessions: N=4). For dogs who performed 
more than one test, results from each test session were considered. Moreover, dogs acquired a 
heterogeneous number of object names during the training period (M= 5.66; SD= 1.42; range: [4-
8]). Learned objects were pitted against each other during testing, except for few dogs for whom 
two subgroups of objects were tested separately (cf. Table 8 in the methods). In this case, results 
obtained for each subgroup of objects were conserved.  
Testing consisted of retrieving objects from behind a black panel upon verbal commands. For 
each trial, the object brought by the dog was scored as a correct (i.e. 1) or mistaken (i.e. 0) 
response. Since objects were not replaced after retrieval, the probability to retrieve the target item 
by chance increased from one trial to another following a hypergeometric distribution. Thus, 
adapted binomial tests were used to compare dogs’ performances to levels expected by 
chance according to a fluctuating number of objects pitted against each other. Results 
showed that dogs, as a whole, performed significantly greater than chance (binomial test, 
p<0.001) [Table 9]. Although binomial tests had to be adjusted to the design, it remained the most 
conservative statistical tool as it preserved the performance of each trial of each individual. One-
tailed univariate t-test against chance - which gives a less refined statistical outline of the 
results as it is based on the mean performance – indicated the same level of significance of the 
results (t=3.75; p=0.0012). 
Table 9 - Table indicating the number of subjects, total number of trials performed, number of overall correct retrievals, mean expected 
chance level (in %), p-values from adapted binomial tests, mean performance and CI95% allocated to each group. 
Age groups N subjects N trials N successes Mean expected 
chance level% 
P-values Mean 
performances%  
CI95% 
All 21 171 86 33 4.11e
-6 50 43-58 
Puppies 10 99 55 30 9.85e
-8 56 46-66 
Adults 11 72 31 37 0.32 43 31-55 
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To go further, a Monte-Carlo algorithm simulated the experiment 2,000 times in order to 
visualize the distribution of the performances that would have been expected by chance, according 
to the number of objects available for retrieval at the first trial. As shown in Figure 74, the 
majority of trained dogs appeared to have performed above the chance levels generated by 
the algorithm. Nevertheless, when the performance of each dog individually was compared to its 
corresponding mean expected chance level, only a small number of dogs displayed significant 
results (binomial tests; dog N°4, p<0.05*; N°7, p<0.05*; N°10, p<0.05*, N°11, p<0.05* and 
N°19, p<0.0001***). Four of these five well-performing dogs were puppies. Moreover, only one 
dog demonstrated knowledge of eight object names and was highly accurate to retrieve these 
objects by their names (dog N°19). Interestingly, this dog was the third youngest dog of the 
sample when training began.  
Thus, we observed that the notable between-subjects heterogeneity to acquire the task is not only 
reflected by accuracy but also by the number of object names dogs were able to learn in 6 months. 
Further analyses tried to shed light on this variability. To test whether age affected the ability of 
dogs to learn object names, the sample was divided into two age categories: puppies who 
comprised dogs below one year old by the time they enrolled on the experiment and adults 
composed of dogs above one year old. The one year old cutoff corresponded to the median of the 
sample.  
For each age group, performance was first compared to levels expected by chance using similar 
adapted binomial tests. Results showed that puppies performed significantly above chance 
(binomial test, p<0.0001) [Table 9 & Figure 74]. In contrast, the performance of adults as a 
group was not significantly different from chance level (binomial test, p=0.32) [Table 9 & 
Figure 74]. To ensure that the significant result demonstrated in puppies was not merely due to a 
higher number of data available – which might have increased the power of the statistics – since 
they performed more trials overall, an algorithm randomly selected the same number of trials 
amongst all as performed by the adults. Each time the algorithm was run it revealed that the mean 
performance was still highly significant.  
Second, heterogeneity was also evidenced by the difficulty of the task, since dogs did not have the 
same number of competing objects at the first trial. Comparison between puppies and adults 
revealed that puppies had on average significantly more competing objects at the first trial 
compared to adults (Mpuppies= 5.3 objects; SDpuppies= 1.16; Madults= 3.7 objects; SDadults= 0.6; 
Kruskal-wallis, X2 = 10.99, p<0.001).  
238 
 
 
Figure 74 - The left graph represents the mean performance of dog participants to correctly retrieve objects by name during the 
comprehension tests performed 6 months after training began, according to the number of objects pitted against each other at the first trial. 
Circles depict the mean performance of each individual dog identified by its ID number. Puppies are represented in red (red circles), and 
adults in blue (blue circles). The mean probability of success expected by chance according to the initial number of objects available on floor 
is indicated by the gray line (mean of 2,000 repetitions of a Monte-Carlo algorithm). Dashed gray lines indicate the upper and lower limits of 
the standard error of the dispersion. The plot on the right recapitulates the mean performances of puppies (red) and adults (blue) as distinct 
age groups. Dashed lines represent the chance levels (calculated as the mean chance levels according to the numbers of object s on floor at 
each trial for each age group separately). Standard errors are indicated. Stars indicate significant differences against chance (***, p<0.0001). 
In order to assess whether performance was age-category dependent, a generalized linear mixed-
model was conducted including age group (categorical variable: puppies vs. adults) and difficulty 
of the task (i.e. number of objects on the floor at first trial (continuous variable)) as fixed effects, 
repeated measures on individuals as random effects, and accuracy as binomial data. The model 
revealed a significant effect of age on the performances; puppies showing significantly higher 
rates of accuracy (GLMM, Zage_categ= 2.31, p=0.02*). There was no significant interaction 
between the “age-category” and “number of object on floor” variables.  
Finally, no sex effect was established (GLMM, Z=1.15, p=0.2). 
 Long-term retention of object names by dogs 1.3.2
Dogs came back to the experimental room 3 months after last practice and were first tested on 
their ability to discriminate the target objects. This involved displaying each of the objects they 
had been trained with during 6 months behind the opaque panel beside 2 or 3 distractors (i.e. 
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familiar objects (dog’s toys) that had never been associated with a label). As for the target objects, 
dogs had no access to the distractors during the intervening period, to exclude choices being 
simply based on “novelty”. For each trial, dogs were instructed to “go get” and no label followed 
the command, nor was the label uttered after retrieval. They were as many trials as the number of 
objects dogs acquired during training. Each trial involved different distractors. Dogs were highly 
accurate in discriminating the target objects (M=95.1%, SD=10.7, binomial test, 
p<0.0001***). 
Table 10 - Table indicating the number of subjects, total number of trials performed, number of overall correct retrievals, mean expected 
chance level (in %), p-values from adapted binomial tests, mean performances and CI95% allocated to each group. 
Age groups N subjects N trials N successes Mean expected 
chance level% 
P-values Mean 
performances% 
CI95% 
All 21 98 48 34 0.002 49 39-59 
Puppies 10 49 28 30 0.0001 57 42-71 
Adults 11 49 20 37 0.65 40 27-56 
 
Next, retention of the associations between objects and labels was examined. Performance was 
measured by the mean proportion of correct retrievals compared to levels expected by chance as 
for the comprehension tests. Results demonstrated that dogs as a whole performed significantly 
above chance (binomial test, p=0.0018**) [Table 10 & Figure 75]. At an individual level, 
however, only one dog, a puppy, was significantly more accurate than chance (dog N°19, 
binomial test, p<0.001**). 
Accuracy was also examined separately for each age group. Puppies showed significant 
retention of the object names (binomial test, p<0.001**) whereas adults were at chance 
(p=0.65). A GLMM that included age and number of competing objects at first trial as fixed 
effects revealed that puppies had significantly better retention scores than adults (GLMM, 
Zage_categ= 2.25, p=0.024*). 
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Figure 75 - The left graph represents the mean performance of dog participants to remember the associations between words and objects 3 
months after the last comprehension test, according to the initial number of competing objects. Circles depict the mean performance of each 
individual dog identified by its ID number. Puppies are represented in red (red circles), and adults in blue (blue circles). The mean 
probability of success expected by chance according to the initial number of objects available on the floor is indicated by the gray line (mean 
of 2,000 repetitions of a Monte-Carlo algorithm). Dashed gray lines indicate the upper and lower limits of the standard error of the 
dispersion. The plot on the right recapitulates the mean performance of puppies (red) and adults (blue) as distinct age groups. Dashed lines 
represent the chance levels (calculated as the mean chance levels according to the numbers of objects on the floor at each trial for each age 
group separately). Standard errors are indicated. Stars indicate significant differences against chance (***,p<0.0001). 
1.4 Discussion 
This study first intended to investigate whether dogs originating from various breeds, ages and life 
histories would be equally able to acquire the cognitive concept that words can refer to objects, as 
demonstrated by a few dogs previously (e.g. Griebel & Oller, 2012; Kaminski et al., 2004; Pilley 
& Reid, 2011). Since Kaminski’s pioneer study with Rico in 2004, other authors have published 
on this topic and revealed that the ability to learn object names is not limited to just Border 
collies. Indeed, a Yorkshire terrier and a mongrel dog have also provided robust evidence of their 
abilities to learn words as object referents (e.g. Griebel & Oller, 2012; Ramos & Ades, 2012). But 
for all that, are they isolated cases of genius dogs or do these findings support the assumption that 
perhaps, with a minimum training, any dog might by skilled to learn word-object associations? To 
tackle this question, we recruited a heterogeneous group of dogs composed of numerous breeds 
and ages. Moreover, dogs were companion dogs recruited from owners who volunteered to 
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participate in the study meaning the dogs grew up in different environments and were all 
differently educated.  
Acquisition of the word-referent task 
Dogs were trained on the word-referent concept during a six month period by implementing 
Pilley’s protocol (Pilley, 2014; Pilley & Reid, 2011). They were mainly trained by their owners at 
home during short daily sessions and once a week by an experimenter and a dog trainer in a 
neutral room. Dogs’ acquisition of the task was tested at the end of the training phase by 
performing tightly controlled comprehension tests. Results showed that dogs as a whole 
performed significantly greater than chance levels. Nevertheless, when focusing on individual 
performances, only a small number of dogs seemed to have acquired the task. Several reasons 
might explain the discrepancy between our results and the impressive performances of dog cases 
reported in the literature.  
First, dogs recruited in our experiment were all initially naïve about the task and benefited from 
short daily training sessions over a six month period compared to three years of intensive training 
for Chaser (4-5 hours a day) (Pilley & Reid, 2011). Rico (another border collie) was taught this 
concept since he was 10 months old while the experiments were conducted as he reached 9 years 
of age (Kaminski et al., 2004). Similarly, Bailey (the Yorkshire Terrier) was reported to already 
know 120 object names by the day she participated in Griebel’s study (Griebel & Oller, 2012). 
Thus, these dogs were already very familiar with the task and knew hundreds of object names 
when they enrolled the experiments. This also constituted a major asset because these dogs were 
tested on a much larger number of objects. In comparison, our dogs acquired between 2 and 8 
object names in six months, which is much less likely to produce significant results. Indeed, the 
low number of trials performed by our dogs (since less objects were pitted against each other 
during testing) considerably reduced the power of the statistics. For example, dog subject N°2 
demonstrated remarkable fetching scores (75% correct retrievals) but as he performed a single 
testing session which consisted of only four trials, his performances were unlikely to trigger a 
significant result.  
Secondly, a notable difference stands in the age of acquisition of the task. Dogs from previous 
studies were all in their first year of life when they were initially taught object names (Chaser was 
5 months old, Rico 10 months old and Bailey 2 months old). In contrast, the dogs recruited in our 
experiment ranged from 3 months to 8 years when they were first trained on this task. As with 
human infants, puppies might be more plastic to learning. Results from previous studies suggested 
that learning is similarly age-sensitive in dogs as it is commonly described in humans and 
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nonhuman primates or rodents (e.g. Chan et al., 2002; Head, Mehta, Hartley, & Kameka, 1995; 
Milgram et al., 1999; Wallis et al., 2016). Moreover, laboratory dogs are considered as relevant 
animal models for human aging diseases (e.g. Alzheimer disease) as they develop similar age-
related neuropathologies, and exhibit similar decline with age in sensorimotor abilities, selective 
attention, executive functions, etc. (e.g. Adams et al., 2000; Head et al., 1995; Milgram et al., 
1994). Thus, according to the literature, cognitive functions in dogs seem to be similarly sensitive 
to development and aging as it is for humans. Our results also support this hypothesis since four 
out of the five well-performing dogs of our experiment were puppies. The fifth was one of the 
youngest adults of the sample (18 months olds).  Moreover, we demonstrated that only the group 
of puppies performed significantly above chance whereas the group composed of adults 
performed at chance. The difference between puppies and adults also arose out of the number of 
objects in competition during retrieval, which reflected the difficulty of the task. We showed that 
adults had on average significantly fewer objects placed beside each other compared to puppies. A 
generalized linear mixed model that included the difficulty of the task as a co-variable revealed 
that puppies were indeed significantly more accurate at completing the task than adults. 
Altogether, our results, in addition to previous findings, strongly suggest that adult dogs encounter 
heavy difficulties in learning novel concepts, tasks or complex information. This finding has 
substantial implications for dog trainers as it indicates that teaching new tricks, tasks, general 
obedience, etc. may only be really efficient if done during puppyhood, which may represents a 
sensitive period for learning in dogs. 
Nevertheless, puppyhood is actually difficult to define. Sexual maturity is often considered as the 
criterion that distinguishes a puppy from an adult. However, dog breeds have heterogeneous life 
expectancies and thus reach sexual maturity at different ages (in months). Previous studies that 
tested the effects of aging on the acquisition of novel tasks in pet dogs split their dog subjects into 
4 or 5 age groups (late puppyhood, adolescence, early adulthood, middle age and late adulthood) 
(Milgram et al., 1994; Wallis et al., 2016) according to Siegal and Barlough’s nomenclature which 
aimed to reflect the main developmental periods of dogs (Siegal & Barlough, 1995). Originally, 
we aimed to transpose these age categories to our study. Unfortunately, as explained in the 
methods, almost half of the recruited dogs left the experiment before its end and too few dogs 
conducted our comprehension tests to be split into so many age groups. Each age group would 
have only consisted of a few dogs which would have been statistically inappropriate. Therefore 
we divided our dog sample into two age groups. The cutoff was established at one year old as 
sexual maturity stands around one year for most of the breeds recruited in our experiment. 
Nevertheless we are aware that the high variability in age within the adult group ([14-96 months]) 
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constitutes a limit of interpretability of our results. Future experiments investigating cognitively 
demanding tasks would be helpful to bring more insight about age effects in dogs. 
Why did adults fail to learn the task? 
Nonetheless, the results give rise to another important question: why do dogs, and especially 
adult dogs, have such difficulty in learning this novel task? At a behavioral level, most adult 
dogs presented strong stereotyped behaviors and reduced flexibility to adapt their responses 
according to prior feedback. More specifically, almost all adult dogs manifested a preference for 
either an object or a side position or even for both. In the majority of the cases, the preference 
was for a soft object (rarely for a plastic toy), and/or for the object located at the extreme left or at 
the extreme right position. When the favorite object was removed from the sample because the 
dogs were making too many errors, these dogs shifted their preference to another object. 
Therefore, for some dogs, we had to divide the set of objects into two subsets during testing; one 
composed of the favorite objects and the other of the neglected ones. Note that this only happened 
for adult dogs. Previous studies found similar side-bias, object-bias and/or perseverative 
responding in older dogs that contributed to their deficits to acquire a task (e.g. Prichard et al., 
2018; Wallis et al., 2016). One could argue that more neutral stimuli (e.g. basic shapes stimuli) or 
apparatus (e.g. touchscreen) could have prevented these stereotypical behaviors from happening 
and future experiments would be required to investigate this hypothesis. Another explanation is 
that older dogs may require more time or more trials to understand a novel task. Previous studies 
showed that older dogs reached learning criteria after a substantially higher number of trials than 
younger dogs (Head et al., 1995; Milgram et al., 1994). In our experiment, the practice frequency 
as well as the duration of the training phase might not have been long enough for adults to 
comprehend the task. It would have been interesting to continue the teaching for a few more 
months but this option was unfortunately not conceivable for owners. 
Another potential influencing parameter is related to the teaching of the task per se. Dogs were 
recruited from owners who volunteered to participate and were mainly trained by them at home. 
Thus it was impossible to control owners’ assiduity and regularity to teach the task although 
weekly practice sessions in front the dog trainer enabled us to verify the precision of their 
teaching method. Nevertheless, this parameter could not be evaluated as a possible explanation for 
heterogeneity, and we are aware that it might have accounted for dogs’ performances.  
Following on from this idea, dogs’ own assiduity, concentration and motivation during training 
presumably also played a role in their comprehension of the task. We observed a high variability 
in dogs’ temperament (e.g. excited dogs, fussy dogs, nonchalant dogs, etc.) even between dogs 
244 
 
of the same breed and sometimes even between two sessions for the same dog. This factor could 
not be objectively measured to be considered as a variable in the analyses. Moreover, dogs were 
rewarded differently according to their character. For each dog, the type of reward was kept 
throughout the training phase. Rewards consisted of play, food treats and/or praise. At first glance, 
the use of different reward types might be questionable. Nevertheless it appears unlikely to 
explain the inter-subject differences in performances. Indeed, an fMRI study conducted on fifteen 
awake dogs showed that dogs have analogous neural mechanisms for preference and reward as 
humans and demonstrated roughly equal or greater brain activation to praise versus food (Cook, 
Prichard, Spivak, & Berns, 2016). This suggests that praise was almost as efficient as food to 
provide influential feedback of accuracy in our experiment. Likewise, Chaser was only rewarded 
with praise whereas Bailey received a mix of food, play and petting as positive reinforcements 
(Griebel & Oller, 2012; Pilley & Reid, 2011).  
Finally, intrinsic factors relative to genetics might also have accounted for the inability of 
several dogs to acquire the task. In this experiment we asked whether dogs coming from any 
breed could be capable of learning word-object pairs. However, dogs represent one of the most 
morphologically diverse species on Earth with exceptional systematic variation between breeds 
(e.g. Byosiere, Chouinard, Howell, & Bennett, 2017; Wayne, 1986). Heterogeneity between 
breeds is reflected by a diversity of morphologies, behaviors and cognitive aptitudes. Thus, 
some breeds may be more better at comprehending complex cognitive tasks than others. In fact, 
breeds that were not genetically selected to solve problems and/or to comprehend human 
vocalizations may be more exposed to difficulties when confronted to these types of situations. 
Previous studies on word comprehension by dogs mainly reported cases of border collies. Apart 
from them, only a Yorkshire Terrier and a mongrel dog have shown similar word learning 
abilities. Another study investigated brain activity for human words processing after teaching the 
same word-referent protocol to a heterogeneous group of dogs (Prichard et al., 2018). Dogs were 
expected to learn two object names with an arbitrary performance criterion set at 80% correct 
retrievals for one object and at least 50% for the other. Such performances, as well as the number 
of objects learned by these dogs, are far from providing convincing evidence that they acquired 
the word-referent concept. Nevertheless, dogs reached the learning criteria set by the authors after 
a period of 2 to 4 months of training, which suggests that dogs originating from various breeds 
appear to be able to discriminate between two cross-modal associations. Intriguingly, in our 
experiment, border collies or mixed breed border collies were not the best performing subjects. 
The dog that exhibited the highest level of performance according to accuracy and number of 
objects placed beside each other was a mixed breed hunting dog essentially composed of the 
English Pointer breed. A Beagle also performed significantly above chance. Thus we provide the 
245 
 
first evidence that hunting dogs appear also capable of learning object names. This is not 
surprising as these breeds have been selected to cooperate with humans during hunting and to 
respond to human signals. 
Conclusion about the acquisition of the word-referent task 
In conclusion, the hypothesis that perhaps any dog would be skilled enough to acquire words 
as object referents after a minimum training seems doubtful. This reveals the extreme 
difficulty of this task while dogs have been shown remarkably talented in numerous other 
paradigms (cf chapter state-of-the-art). Several factors might have played a significant part in this 
result but it was challenging to isolate and investigate the role of each potential parameter. 
Amongst them, age appears to be a critical factor that could to explain a great part the 
discrepancy of performances between dogs. Dogs seem less flexible in learning a complex task 
after puppyhood. However, it is very much likely that cognitive skills - like learning a novel task - 
depend on the interactions between environmental, genetic (including age and breed) and social 
factors, in dogs as it does in humans (e.g. Baltes, 1987).  
Lastly, and also interestingly, dogs seem more gifted to learn words for action commands than 
for object names. In an unpublished study, Ramos et al. submitted dogs to training procedures 
similar to those used to teach object names and indicated that while dogs were all able to acquire 
correct responses to action commands, most failed to master word-object associations (Ramos & 
Mills, 2009). We observed a similar pattern in an analogous experiment conducted on a few dogs 
(not reported in this thesis). From a dog’s perspective, learning words as verbal commands for 
actions may be more ecologically valid than learning them as labels for objects.  
Long-term memory of  word-referent pairings 
The second aim of this experiment was to examine whether dogs not only encoded but also stored 
this knowledge in memory. We hoped to understand if humans’ distant animal relatives also 
display long-term memory skills for complex information. Thus, we tackled the question of long-
term memory formation by dogs on the basis of this cognitively demanding task. We also 
investigated whether some parameters underlying long lasting memory formation in humans are 
similarly shared by dogs. 
 Long-term recognition of the target objects 
To these purposes, retention tests were carried out after a 3-month intervening period with no 
rehearsal of the material to remember during this time delay. A first discrimination test 
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demonstrated that dogs could very accurately recognize the objects that were positively 
reinforced during training when dispatched among distractors (i.e. dogs’ toys) that had not been 
seen for the same amount of time. Older dogs were as accurate as puppies to solve this test. These 
results demonstrate that discrimination based on perceptual sensory modalities (e.g. vision) in 
dogs is robustly maintained after a long time interval independently of age. A previous study 
investigated aging effects on cognitive functions in dogs and provided similar results (Wallis et 
al., 2016). Dogs were trained to discriminate clip art pictures in a forced two choice procedure (S+ 
and S-) involving a touchscreen apparatus and were tested after a six month break. Results 
indicated that long term memory was maintained into old age, with no difference in performance 
in any of the five age groups. It can be reasonably claimed that this type of memory which only 
involved one sensory modality (e.g. the visual modality) is more likely to withstand aging. But 
are dogs equally gifted in memorizing more complex information, like bimodal information, for 
the same amount of time? 
 Long-term retention of the target names 
In order to assess if dogs also remembered the names of these reinforced objects, we conducted 
the same stringent word-object associative tests used after the end of the training phase. Results 
showed that dogs as a whole performed significantly above chance levels. This finding 
suggests that dogs consolidated and stored the entire information that they could later retrieve 
upon command. This is consistent with the impressive ability of previous dogs shown as being 
able to retrieve hundreds of objects by name (e.g. Kaminski et al., 2004; Pilley & Reid, 2011). 
Although their memory performances had not been directly investigated by the authors, memory 
processes must have been partly responsible for their remarkable skills. For instance, Chaser, who 
acquired a high number of object names (>1,000), got only monthly rehearsals of the associations 
since her owner tested her on each object only once-a-month (Pilley & Reid, 2011). Her high rate 
of performance during these tests confirms the assumption that she stored this knowledge in 
memory. There is little other evidence of retention of higher-order cognitive information by 
unrelated species after a considerable amount of time reported in the literature. A sea lion was 
shown capable of remembering abstract problem-solving strategies after one year and up to ten 
years for a relational concept (Reichmuth Kastak & Schusterman, 2002). Another study revealed 
that horses can remember stimuli they encountered during discrimination and categorization 
learning tasks six years to a decade earlier (Hanggi & Ingersoll, 2009). The horses also recalled a 
relative size concept rule that they had learned seven years prior to the test. Together, our findings 
in addition to the previous evidence suggest that once an animal has learned a conceptual task 
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and stored this information in memory or learned sensory inputs from uni- or multi-
modalities, the knowledge later remains stable for a long period of time. 
Next, when focusing on the performance at an individual level, only one dog showed significant 
retention over three months (dog N°19). This dog was also the best of the cohort to acquire the 
task, according to the number of objects in competition and the performances during the 
comprehension tests. First, it is not surprising that dogs who did not learn the task and failed 
during the comprehension tests would be equally unsuccessful three months later. Furthermore, as 
for the comprehension tests, the small number trials made it difficult to obtain significant results 
in some dogs. For instance, three dogs mastered the task with high scores of accuracy (75% 
correct retrievals for dog N°2, N°10 and N°20) but as the memory test consisted of only four trials 
for each of these dogs, the statistical tests were unlikely to be significant. For the same reason, we 
did not analyze the evolution of the performance of each dog individually, but it appeared that few 
enhanced their fetching scores after a three month break (9 dogs), whereas the performances of 
others declined (7 dogs) or remained stable (5 dogs). One explanation for the increase in 
performance for a few dogs could reflect the lack of rehearsal during a long time period. Several 
dogs were appeared to be tired with the repetitive frequency of training on the same task and lost 
motivation to complete the comprehension tests. Their arousal and concentration was noticeably 
superior after the long intervening period. In contrast, dogs who were keen to do the task 
efficiently during training were, in some cases, very excited to interact with the objects again after 
the long break. Thus, they were more willing to fetch a random object to play with it behind the 
black panel than to complete the task appropriately. This constituted a limit of our design. In a 
future experiment, it would be interesting to use more neutral stimuli or a more standardized 
apparatus in order to explore the question of long term memory abilities by dogs. For example, a 
touch screen apparatus might be more appropriate and less subject to interfering variables.  
We also aimed to know if age had similarly accounted for the memory performances as it did for 
the acquisition of the task. To address this question we analyzed the performances of both age 
groups (puppies versus adults) independently. We found that puppies as a group performed 
significantly above chance levels whereas performance of adults as a group were not 
significantly different from chance. A generalized linear mixed model that included the 
difficulty of the task as a co-variable (i.e. number of competing objects) demonstrated that 
puppies were significantly more accurate in remembering object names than adults. In 
contrast to visual recognition paradigms, this cross-modal task appeared to be sensitive to age. 
It could be that age effects are better detected in more complex tasks. Indeed, the word-object 
testing procedure is particularly challenging cognitively as it requires working-memory abilities 
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(maintaining the name of the target object pronounced by the owner actively in memory until the 
fetching act), selective attention toward each object, sensory skills (i.e. the sensory modalities 
used by dogs must be unimpaired to solve the task (e.g. vision, olfaction, taste)). As previously 
established by a few studies, old dogs can develop similar age-related deficiencies to humans, 
especially for sensorimotor abilities, selective attention, working-memory and executive functions 
(e.g. Adams et al., 2000; Head et al., 1995; Milgram et al., 1994). Therefore, it is not surprising to 
observe aging effects for this type of memory task that are not evident in easier paradigms. In 
humans, aging effects are task or information dependent. Indeed, memory either improves 
(especially for semantic information), remains stable or declines with age (especially for episodic 
memories) (e.g. Baltes, 1987).  
Conclusion about long-term memory abilities by dogs on the word-referent task 
To conclude on this second part of the study, we provide here the first evidence of dogs’ ability to 
remember higher-order cognitive information over an extended period. Our results indicate 
that dogs successfully recognized items based on their perceptual properties (color, shape, 
texture, etc.) and seemed also skilled in remembering the names of the objects that have been 
seen for the last time three months earlier. Nevertheless, the low number of trials performed by 
each individual dog constitutes a limit in making unequivocal conclusions. Some factors 
responsible for learning and memory formation in humans appear to be similarly shared by 
dogs, notably age. However, the principles and mechanisms underlying cognitive processes - like 
learning and memory formation – in dogs, are poorly documented and warrant further 
investigations into this aspect. 
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CHAPTER VIII.  
MOKA, A CASE STUDY TO UNDERSTAND THE 
LEARNING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING LONG-
TERM MEMORY FORMATION OF WORD-OBJECT 
PAIRS IN DOGS 
 
General introduction 
The previous study resulted in a small number of dogs who reliably demonstrated their aptitude to 
retrieve objects by name during comprehension tests that occurred six months after initial training. 
Amongst them, Moka, the third youngest dog of the cohort was the only one capable of correctly 
retrieving eight objects in a row upon verbal instruction with very few errors. This constitutes the 
first evidence that a hunting dog is also able to acquire words as object referents. Next, once a 
meaningful concept is established, it is interesting to understand if and how it is remembered over 
a long time scale.  
In this second experimental project, we aimed to characterize the precise conditions required 
for long-term memories to be formed in dogs. Are they comparable to those required by 
humans? More precisely, we questioned whether we can detect equivalents in the efficiency of 
different learning strategies between humans and this unrelated species. Therefore, in a series of 
exploratory experiments, we attempted to explore the learning principles underlying memory 
formation for word-object pairs in our best performing dog subject. First, we intended to 
examine whether memory decays as a curve of forgetting according to different retention 
intervals. In a second experiment, we directly addressed the question of the minimum number of 
exposures required by this dog to reliably remember the label of a novel object. We also explored 
the effects of different learning strategies on the acquisition and consolidation of newly learned 
objects. Specifically, we compared the efficiency of (i) ostensive labeling alone, (ii) ostensive 
labeling coupled with retrievals followed by a feedback of accuracy, and (iii) retrievals 
followed by a feedback of accuracy alone, on the retention of object names. Memory tests were 
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carried out after two time intervals: two weeks and one month. In a last experiment, we examined 
whether Moka was able to generalize his knowledge to novel instances in order to evaluate to 
what extent his learning is flexible and semantic-like.   
Before getting to the heart of the matter, we would like to emphasize that this second 
experimental part of the dog project is a single case study. All learning and testing sessions were 
carried out in a neutral room at the ENVT and were scattered in time over a one year period 
according to the availability of Moka’s owner. Although we put a lot of effort in controlling all 
parameters and in designing stringent protocols to investigate these questions, we are aware that 
the following studies are first of all exploratory as they involve a unique dog subject, and 
sometimes suffer from a shortage of replication (or trials) due to time constraints. When we 
started this project on long-term memory in dogs, we had hoped that at least a third of the dogs we 
recruited would actually acquire the word-object associative concept to continue the research on 
this second and more interesting experimental part of the project. Initially, our inclusion criterion 
for being enrolled in this second stage of the study was to reliably retrieve at least 10 objects by 
names without (or with very few) errors. Unfortunately, none of the dogs who underwent the six 
months training phase reached this learning criterion. Therefore we reduced our inclusion 
criterion to 8 objects and extended the project with only one dog. Thus, we are conscious that only 
partial interpretations can be drawn from the following studies and that future experiments will be 
required to consolidate our preliminary findings. 
2 SECOND STUDY. Memory maintenance across time 
2.1 Introduction  
Despite several successful demonstrations of concept or complex task acquisition by animals, 
subsequent memory formation of that knowledge has not been well studied. The first reason 
comes from the difficulty to assess memory in animals deprived of language. Hence, 
researchers cannot simply apply experimental paradigms developed in human memory research to 
the study of animal behavior. Protocols have to fit with the purposes of investigation of a specific 
type of memory in animals (e.g. episodic-like memory, working-memory, spatial memory, etc.). 
Researchers also need to adapt the experimental designs of each animal model to its ecological 
living conditions, by reproducing those conditions as appropriately as possible. However, they 
also need to isolate and control specific parameters in order to investigate their effects on the 
resulting behavior. The second reason is related to the time constraints needed to perform 
longitudinal studies. Animals have to be kept at the laboratory for the required time period, or if 
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they belong to private individuals, then the owners have to be available again in the distant future. 
Moreover, the animals have to avoid interfering protocols or tasks during the whole time interval 
which is not easy to control for animals that are not hosted at the laboratory. Furthermore, 
researchers have to ensure that no rehearsal of the materiel to remember was provided during the 
time delay. 
Nevertheless, since previous studies brought significant insights into some animals being able to 
recall abstract concepts or reinforced stimuli after considerably long time intervals (Burdyn et al., 
1984; Hanggi & Ingersoll, 2009; C. K. Johnson & Davis, 1973; T. L. Patterson & Tzeng, 1979; 
Reichmuth Kastak & Schusterman, 2002), the assumption that the first domesticated species - 
already shown to be gifted for higher-order cognitive skills - might also excel in memory tasks 
appears to be a rational hypothesis that deserves attention. Dogs already demonstrated memory 
abilities for recognizing stimuli based on their perceptual properties after six months (Wallis 
et al., 2016) and for remembering a behavior instructed one month earlier (Demant et al., 
2011a). In our previous study, we showed that, overall, dogs performed significantly better than 
chance to remember names of objects encountered three months earlier. Altogether, this 
evidence suggests that long-term memory abilities for sensory information are probably not 
restricted to humans. In contrast, this cognitive trait is perhaps more widely distributed within the 
animal kingdom than originally thought. If so, are the mechanisms responsible for memory 
formation in animals similar to those established in humans? Moreover, does memory require 
similar conditions and rules to be formed and maintained in animals? To date, animal research 
typically lacks the advanced technologies needed to investigate these questions at a neural level, 
even though the first fMRI experiments on awake dogs have recently been launched. In the 
meantime, memory formation in dogs can be scrutinized at a behavioral level. 
This first experiment addressed the question of memory maintenance over time in dogs. More 
precisely, we aimed to investigate whether memory strength declines as a curve of forgetting 
in dogs as it does in humans (e.g. Conway, Cohen, & Stanhope, 1991; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996). 
This experiment involved the retention of complex cross-modal stimuli (word-object pairs) and 
was addressed to the dog subject, Moka. 
Moka, who acquired eight object names during a six-month training period underwent a 
prolonged training phase of one and a half years to learn more object names. Concurrently, his 
memory for object names was tested after various time intervals, specifically immediately, two 
weeks, one month, three months and six months (ongoing for the latter). If memory strength for 
stimuli involving two sensory modalities and associative bindings degrades with time in dogs, we 
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expect to observe diminished performances after longer time intervals. In contrast, if memory 
continues to be stable, no significant changes in memory recall should be measured.  
2.2 Materials and methods 
 Subject 2.2.1
The subject is a one year old hunting dog belonging to a veterinary student of the veterinary 
school of Toulouse, France. This dog, Moka, was taught object names during an initial six month 
period and pursued training for another year and a half after the first memory tests was conducted. 
Moka knew 24 object names (20 soft toys, 3 plastic toys and 1 knotted rope) when the experiment 
ended.  
 Stimuli 2.2.2
Stimuli were 3D objects, particularly toys for children or for dogs, as described in the previous 
chapter. Stimuli consisted of 8 objects randomly chosen among Moka’s set of objects. Objects 
were associated with pseudo-words composed of two dissimilar syllables, two identical syllables 
or consonant-vowel-consonant constructions (cf section “materials & methods” of previous 
chapter for more details).  
 Procedure 2.2.3
The entire experiment was conducted in a neutral room of the Vet school. Memory tests took 
place after various time intervals, precisely immediately, two weeks, one month, three months and 
six months after last training. For the first four time delays, two memory tests involving eight 
objects each were conducted. For now, only one memory test has been performed after a six-
month time interval. Time delays were randomly assigned across the experimental year. In other 
words, the memory tests did not follow the gradual increase of the latencies of retention in any 
particular order (e.g. 1st memory test occurred after a three month break, 2nd after a two weeks 
break, 3rd immediately after a training session, etc.). 
No rehearsal was provided during the intervening periods. Neither further experiments nor 
training to retrieve objects by names were conducted during the intervening periods, to avoid 
interferences and to exclude the possibility of an internal rehearsal of the information or of the 
concept. However, the teaching process of novel object names continued outside of these 
restricted periods (i.e. the only time the teaching process did not occur was during the break 
periods).  
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Each memory test consisted of retrieving eight objects upon verbal instruction without 
replacement of the objects. The eight objects were randomly chosen among the set of objects 
known by the dog at the time of the experiment (e.g. the 1st memory test involved the eight sole 
objects known by Moka, the 2nd involved eight objects randomly selected among fifteen objects 
Moka had already acquired, etc.). Few objects were involved in different memory tests. Thus each 
memory test consisted of objects with heterogeneous training and testing histories (i.e. some being 
more anciently acquired by the dog than others). 
Testing followed the same tightly controlled procedure as described in section Materials & 
Methods of the previous chapter. 
 Analyses 2.2.4
For each latency, performance corresponded to the mean proportion of correct retrievals 
discarding the last trial (100% chance of being correct) over the two testing sessions (or a single 
testing session for the 6 months latency). Performance was compared to levels expected by 
chance, calculated on the basis of a hypergeometric distribution, since objects were not replaced 
after retrieval (refer to section Materials & Methods of the previous chapter for a detailed 
description). Adapted binomial tests were used to assess significant differences between observed 
and expected data. A generalized linear model was used to assess potential differences in the 
performance between the five time intervals.  
2.3 Results 
Moka’s ability to remember object names was tested after various latencies. One corresponded to 
an immediate test, performed at the end of a practice session while others took place after 
different intervening periods with no rehearsal of the task in between. For each latency, except for 
the six month time interval (ongoing testing), performance consisted of the mean proportion of 
correct retrievals calculated across two testing sessions. The 95% confidence interval (CI95%) 
was given by the binomial tests, considering the two (or sole) test sessions. 
Table 11 - Table indicating Moka’s performance according to different delays between last training and testing. After each latency, two 
memory tests involving 8 objects placed beside each other were performed, except for the 6-month interval (ongoing experiment). For each 
time delay, the table reports the total number of trials performed, the number of successes, the mean expected chance level (calculated on the 
basis of a hypergeometric law, i.e. no replacement of the objects), the p-values, the dog’s mean performance (in %), the 95% confidence 
interval and the Z score and p-value calculated with a generalized linear model (GLM). 
Latency N trials N 
successes 
Mean chance 
level% 
P-values 
(binom test) 
Mean 
performance% 
CI95% GLM  
Z score 
GLM 
p-value 
Immediate 14 11 25 3.25e
-6 79 0.49-0.95 1.89 - 
15 days 14 9 25 0.002 64 0.35-0.87 -0.45 0.65 
1 month 14 9 25 0.002 64 0.35-0.87 -0.45 0.65 
3 months 14 9 25 0.002 64 0.35-0.87 -0.45 0.65 
6 months 7 3 25 ns 42 0.09-0.81 -1.33 0.18 
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Moka performed significantly above levels expected by chance when tested immediately after 
practice or after delays of two weeks, one month or three months (see Table 11 and Figure 
76). Only one memory test had already been conducted after a six month interval. Although 
performance measured during this test appeared not to be significantly different from chance 
levels, interpretation of this result will only be possible when all the data has been collected (a 
second memory test is scheduled). However, for two objects mistakenly retrieved at first trial 
during this test, Moka automatically corrected his response on the second chance that was given to 
him (i.e. he was accurate on the second trial (not included in the analysis)). Similarly, errors made 
at first trial during all other memory tests, were systematically rectified by Moka, either on the 
second trial (44%, i.e. for 8 objects) or third trial (44%, i.e. for 8 objects) (not counted in the 
analysis). In only 11% of the times (i.e. 2 objects), he needed more than three trials to find the 
target item.  
Next, a generalized linear model (GLM) compared the performance obtained at the different time 
delays (including the six month interval), considering the mean performance of the immediate 
latency as the baseline. The model did not establish any significant difference in performance 
between the delays of retention. 
 
Figure 76 - Graphical showing the mean performance (squared) obtained by Moka during two testing sessions that occurred either 
immediately after last practice (“immediate”) or after delays of two weeks (“15 Days”), “1 month” and “3 months”. The grey shadow 
represents the 95% confidence interval given by the binomial tests. The mean expected chance level is shown by the dotted red line. 
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2.4 Discussion 
In this experiment, we attempted to evaluate Moka’s memory strength for word-object 
associations after various delays without rehearsal. Moka underwent stringent memory tests 
during which he was required to retrieve objects by name upon verbal command.    
Results demonstrate Moka’s high level of accuracy to complete the task irrespective of the 
delay between last rehearsal and testing. Firstly, Moka’s high performance rate measured 
directly at the end of training sessions confirms that he reliably comprehended the task. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that Moka’s knowledge about object names persisted 
unaltered for a period of at least three months. Since no rehearsal was provided during the 
intervening period, it can be reasonably assumed that to solve this experiment, the information 
had to be stored and retrieved from long-term memory.  
Currently, no serious interpretation can be drawn from the memory score obtained after a break of 
six months, given the small number of trials performed. A second memory test following this time 
delay is scheduled. Nevertheless, the first results are promising given that Moka correctly 
retrieved almost half of the objects on the first trial and accurately adjusted his response when 
another chance was given to him. Overall, the results demonstrated by Moka in this experiment 
furthered the findings of previous experiments on long-term memory in dogs that were restricted 
to visual discrimination tasks. This current finding promotes the hypothesis that this dog has 
created a whole memory by incorporating visual and auditory sensory inputs and by durably 
associating them together.  
However, a non-trivial parameter affected the performance recorded during the delayed tests. 
Indeed, to prevent the information from being recalled during the time intervals, Moka had neither 
visible nor physical access to the objects, and no rehearsal of the task was performed with other 
objects. Thus, during the various delayed testing sessions, Moka was very cheerful to interact with 
his toys again as well as to perform the fetching task again. Undoubtedly, the longer the time 
interval was, the more the dog was excited. Observations made from the videotaped recordings 
revealed that in many cases, Moka ran straight to the first object he saw behind the panel and 
played with it without looking at the other objects. This was even more noteworthy for the most 
recent objects he acquired. His owner was instructed to wait at least five seconds before repeating 
the verbal command, since the dog sometimes required time to analyze each object before making 
his choice. After a substantial waiting time, his owner repeated the name of the target object, but 
Moka often simply brought the object he was playing with, which was logically counted as an 
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error. The use of stimuli that are emotionally strengthened presumably conducted Moka to this 
behavior which constitutes a limit in our design. 
Considering the encouraging results obtained after several months without rehearsal, future 
experiments would be required, first to reinforce the present results and second to test Moka’s 
memory after longer delays. Unfortunately, this was not feasible within the time allocated to this 
thesis but it would be interesting to conduct similar retention tests after a latency of a year or even 
more. It is possible that the absence of significant differences between the different latencies 
applied in this experiment arose from the robustness of the memory, which may only decrease 
after longer time scales. If so, it can be suggested that in dogs, once information is learned, it can 
be stored in memory and recalled months later without significant decay. 
3 THIRD STUDY. Efficiency of various learning strategies in 
learning and memorizing novel word-object pairs 
General Introduction 
Do dogs learn and retain information as humans do? This question has not yet been directly 
investigated, but is of major importance to foster our understanding of a potential expansion of 
these cognitive processes to unrelated species. This second experimental project conducted with 
Moka was aimed at understanding how a dog learns and retains novel information such as 
object names. More precisely, we wanted to know which word learning strategy would be the 
most appropriate for this dog, to lead to a successful comprehension and retention of a novel 
object name.  
As demonstrated in the previous part of this thesis and in numerous studies from the literature, 
young children rely on different strategies to acquire vocabulary (e.g. Markson & Bloom, 1997). 
For instance, they learn and retain new words that are ostensively taught by an adult (e.g. Schafer 
& Plunkett, 1998; Woodward, Markman, & Fitzsimmons, 1994). They can also track co-
occurrence regularities across multiple ambiguous situations (Smith & Yu, 2008). Finally, they 
have also been shown skilled to incorporate new vocabularies to their lexicon when facing a 
problem that involved reasoning abilities to logically exclude items by deduction, i.e. “fast-
mapping” (e.g. Carey & Bartlett, 1978). Moreover, this thesis, in accordance with previous studies 
from the literature, showed that the efficiency of those strategies is age-related and inclined to 
evolve during development (e.g. Bion, Borovsky, & Fernald, 2013, Zosh et al. 2013). But would 
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these learning strategies be also appropriate for dogs to learn and retain novel object 
names?  
This second study carried out with Moka consisted of a series of short experiments designed to 
shed light on those issues. Remember that the following experiments are merely exploratory;  
further replications and investigations would be required in order to build upon our pioneering 
findings. Moreover, for ease of reading, this section does not follow the formal format of an 
article but will rather report our work, findings and interpretations in a more informal manner. 
First, we addressed the question of whether ostensive labeling alone could induce learning in our 
dog subject, Moka. We also examined whether he was able to fast-map new words to their 
corresponding referents by using a deductive strategy (i.e. “referent selection”). To examine 
these questions, novel object names were taught to Moka using either ostensive labeling or 
referent selection by exclusion and acquisition of that knowledge was tested during subsequent 
comprehension tests.  
Next, we aimed to explore if the learning conditions required for memory to be formed in 
humans are relatively equivalent for dogs. Does long-term memory formation in dogs similarly 
require an initial memorization phase, during which memory strength would increase linearly 
with the number of presentations as we showed in young children? Does memory formation 
also primarily rely on repetitions in dogs as it does in humans? If so, how many exposures to the 
novel information would be enough to form a memory trace that can last in time? We tackled 
these questions by rehearsing learning during successive sessions until Moka reached a criterion 
of accuracy which would indicate the number of exposures he required to reliably incorporate 
these new object names in his “lexicon”. Once acquired, these objects were then integrated as any 
other well-known object in the memory tests performed in the “memory maintenance across time” 
protocol described previously. 
Nonetheless, this experiment cannot tell whether learning was primarily attributable to 
ostensive labeling or to the reinforcing consequences of the positive feedbacks received after 
retrieval during the comprehension trials performed at the end of each session. Thus, to foster our 
understanding about Moka’s learning skills, we also examined the effects of three learning 
strategies on the retention of object names at long-term. We compared the efficiency of (i) 
ostensive labeling alone; (ii) ostensive labeling coupled with the reinforcing consequences of 
positive feedback during subsequent comprehension tests; and (iii) learning from the positive 
reinforcement received during comprehension tests alone, on the retention of object names. 
Memory tests were carried out after two time intervals: two weeks and one month.  
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3.1 Does ostensive labeling induce word learning in a dog? 
 Introduction 3.1.1
The remarkable abilities of Rico and Chaser to acquire hundreds of object names and to infer the 
referent of a novel word by exclusion caused intense debate in the scientific community (Paul 
Bloom, 2004; Markman & Abelev, 2004). Among them, the actual comprehension that words can 
refer to objects by dogs was questioned. Some authors speculated whether or not dogs simply 
formed basic associative learning following an extensive training, which would have little to do 
with word learning per se. Bloom argued that children can learn words from overheard speech, 
even if nobody is trying to teach them (Paul Bloom, 2004). He wondered whether dogs would be 
able to learn a new word by simply being shown an object and hearing a person name it. Current 
knowledge about word learning by dogs is far from bringing a robust reply to Bloom’s issue. 
Neither is the following study trying to answer this deep question. Nevertheless, one could claim 
that if a dog actually comprehends the abstract concept that words correspond to objects rather 
than a mere learning of isolated sound-item associations, he should be able to acquire new object 
names simply from ostensive labeling as young children do. In other terms, once a dog acquired 
the word-referent concept, is he able to learn new object names without the need of positive 
reinforcements through operant conditioning? Here we aimed to understand if our dog subject, 
Moka, who showed skill on the word-object pair concept, would be able to learn new words 
without extended training or reinforcement but merely from basic ostensive labeling during 
playing activities. We also intended to know if he could use other strategies to solve the word-
object task, such as logical exclusion. 
 Material and methods 3.1.2
3.1.2.1 Subject 
The subject is a one year old hunting dog, Moka, living with his owner in Toulouse, France. Moka 
was trained during a six month period to learn word-object associations and knew around ten 
object names when this experiment was launched.  
3.1.2.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli were novel objects, especially toys, as described in the section Materials & Methods of 
the previous chapter. Stimuli used in this experiment were scrupulously chosen with Moka’s 
owner to ensure that none of them resembled Moka’s toys at home. Moreover, each object had to 
be equally salient for the dog. Thus, the owner firstly had to assess the attraction his dog would 
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develop towards each object. The experimenter then randomly chose objects that were rated by 
the owner as similarly salient for the dog. Objects were associated with pseudo-words that were 
very different from the labels already known by the dog (cf. section Materials & Methods of 
previous chapter for more details).  
3.1.2.3 Procedure 
The entire experiment took place in a neutral room at the ENVT. The experiment involved 
investigating the effect of different learning strategies on the acquisition of novel object names by 
Moka. This experiment focused on the following learning strategies: 
 Ostensive labeling 
In this case, a novel object was given to the dog and the owner ostensively labeled this object 
while holding it and while his dog was playing with it. The owner repeated the pseudo-word 
associated to this object a few times in a row (maximum three times). Since the dog was deeply 
engaged in the playing activity, and probably less or even not at all focused on the corresponding 
label, the owner was instructed to throw the object away and to ask his dog to fetch it by 
incorporating the novel label in an utterance, such as “Moka, go fetch [label]” or “Moka, bring me 
[label] back”, as he would naturally do during a playing game [Figure 77]. The owner repeated 
this throwing game twice in a row. Finally, the owner hid the object alone without other stimuli 
behind the panel and similarly asked his dog to find it and to bring it back to him upon similar 
verbal commands. This was repeated twice and it was essential for Moka to understand that this 
novel item was now part of his set of known objects rather than a simple toy. Indeed, at the 
beginning of the six month training phase, the dogs’ own toys were considered as distractors 
(refer section Materials & Methods of previous chapter) and were never positively reinforced 
when dogs mistakenly selected those objects. Thus, dogs rapidly learnt to ignore their toys during 
the informal tests performed at home or at the vet school. Pilot experiments revealed that newly 
introduced objects were systematically considered as distractors by the dog (i.e. considered as 
basic toys) if they were not displayed at least once in the configuration of the formal tests (i.e. 
behind the black panel) and positively reinforced at least once after retrieval in this configuration. 
In the current experiment, in total, the name of the object was repeated between five to ten times, 
and the dog interacted with the object for about five minutes. Reward was only provided when the 
dog brought the object back to his owner, as the owner would usually reward his dog for general 
obedience. 
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Figure 77 - Figure illustrating the ostensive labeling procedure completed by Moka’s owner when introducing a novel object. He first held 
the object in front of his dog and labelled it three times in a row while Moka was allowed to play with it (A); he then initiated a throwing 
game:  he threw the object twice and asked his dog to fetch it (B) and finally he hid the object alone behind the panel and instructed Moka to 
bring it back to him upon command (C). 
Ten to twenty minutes elapsed between this labeling procedure and the subsequent comprehension 
test. During this time delay, Moka laid-down to get some rest, went outside for a short walk or 
played short non-interfering games with his owner. Moka then completed a comprehension test to 
assess whether he correctly mapped the previous unknown label to the novel object introduced to 
him. For this test, the previously introduced object was placed together with three familiar objects 
already known by Moka (i.e. randomly chosen among the set of Moka’s objects that already have 
names) behind the panel. In the first trial, the owner always asked Moka to bring a familiar item 
and in the second or third trial he asked for the newly introduced object using the same verbal 
instruction as for the familiar ones. This way of testing controlled that Moka’s response was not 
due to an inherent saliency preference toward the recently introduced object in comparison to the 
familiar ones. Moreover, for these test trials, objects were always replaced behind the panel after 
retrieval, so that the probability of success remained stable at 0.25 for each trial (i.e. chance level 
set at 25%). Finally, the recently introduced object was requested only once during the testing 
session since the positive feedback that followed Moka’s retrieval would have reinforced the 
mapping, and thus strengthened the learning. This would have constituted a bias if Moka were to 
have been tested again on that word-object association. This protocol was replicated five times 
(each time with different items) spaced over five sessions scheduled over one year. Performance 
was analyzed using binomial tests. 
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 Referent selection by exclusion (i.e. “fast-mapping”) 
To assess whether a dog is able to map a word to its referent by exclusion, the referent selection 
procedure involves a unique choice trial in which the subject is provided a novel name and is 
expected to choose the sole unnamed object arranged amongst a set of familiar objects that 
already have names. Moka’s ability to infer a novel word to its referent by exclusion was 
examined by implementing Kaminski’s pioneer procedure (Kaminski et al., 2004) but with a 
restricted number of competing objects since Moka knew much less object names than Rico by 
the time he performed this task. Moreover, as we aimed to directly compare ostensive labeling 
and referent selection by exclusion, the novel object was similarly introduced to Moka prior to the 
test except that no label was provided. Precisely, the owner was instructed to similarly play 
throwing and fetching games with that object during a five minute period with the difference that 
no label accompanied the verbal commands (same procedure than shown on Figure 77 without 
the label). The referent selection test was similarly carried out after a ten to twenty minutes break. 
Likewise, the novel unnamed object was pitted against with three familiar objects behind the 
panel. Moka was first requested to bring familiar objects upon command (on the first or first and 
second trials) before being asked for the novel object. Once again, this procedure controlled that a 
correct retrieval of the novel item was not merely due to novelty or saliency preference. Objects 
were always replaced behind the panel after retrieval, so that chance level was equally set at 25% 
for each trial. The protocol was replicated 9 times (each time with a novel object) spaced in time 
over a one year period. Performance was analyzed using binomial tests. 
 Results and discussion 3.1.3
Moka’s ability to grasp the associative link between a word and its referent after being only 
briefly introduced to the novel object was examined. In this condition, the novel object was 
ostensively labeled while Moka interacted with it during playing and fetching games. A 
comprehension test carried out about ten to twenty minutes after learning involved three familiar 
objects (i.e. objects that already have names) and the recently introduced one.  
The results indicate that Moka accurately retrieved the target object upon request during testing in 
four out of the five replications of the experiment (binomial test, p<0.01**) [Table 12 & Figure 
78]. Moreover, Moka almost never failed on the familiar objects that were requested on the first or 
first two trials. This excludes the possibility that the correct retrievals for recently introduced 
objects were due to an impulsive behavior caused by personal attraction preferences.   
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Table 12 - Table recapitulating Moka’s performance to remember the names of recently labeled objects (ostensive labeling and ostensive 
labeling + distractor) and to disambiguate referential situations (referent selection). Table indicates the number of replications of each 
condition (only one test trial performed for each novel object); the number of successes (i.e. number of correct trials); the expected chance 
level; the p-values, Moka’s performance and the 95% confident interval given by the binomial test. 
Conditions N replication 
(1trial/object) 
N successes Expected chance 
level (%) 
P-value Performance 
% 
CI95% 
 Ostensive 
labeling 
5 4 25 0.016 80 28-99 
Referent 
selection by 
exclusion 
9 5 25 0.049 56 21-86 
Ostensive 
labeling + 
distractor 
7 2 20 0.63 29 4-71 
 
Nevertheless, it cannot be advanced that this result was mediated by the ostensive labeling 
procedure itself. The option that Moka logically excluded the objects that already had names to 
solve the task cannot be discarded. To test this hypothesis, Moka’s ability to map a novel word to 
a referent by deduction was also tested.  
To allow comparison with the ostensive labeling method, objects were similarly introduced to 
Moka during playing activities, except that no labeling was provided. Hence, during the 
subsequent “referent selection” trials, the targets had the same “novelty history” as the objects 
used in the ostensive labeling condition.  
Results reveal that Moka accurately retrieved the unnamed objects by exclusion in five out of 
the nine replications of the experiment which is slightly significantly above chance (mean 
accuracy: 55%, p=0.049) [Table 12 & Figure 78]. This confirms that Moka is capable of logical 
reasoning skills to map a novel word to its referent by deduction. No significant difference 
could be established between the results obtained here and the previous ostensive labeling 
condition (GLM, Z=0.892, p=0.37). This suggests that Moka may not have benefitted from the 
ostensive labeling procedure that occurred in the previous condition but rather that he achieved 
the former tests by using a logical exclusion strategy.  
To verify this hypothesis, we carried out a third condition which involved two novel objects. 
Both were introduced to the dog as described in the methods but only one of them was labeled. 
Note that this procedure replicates traditional word learning paradigms developed with children 
(e.g. Woodward, Markman, & Fitzsimmons, 1994). Precisely, for the unlabeled item (called 
“distractor”), the owner used the same verbal commands without incorporating any name (e.g. “go 
fetch”; “bring back”, etc.). The owner interspersed the presentation of the two objects in a random 
order (e.g. obj1-obj2-obj2-obj1-etc.). In total, the dog spent about 5 minutes with each object. We 
also controlled that Moka had no innate preference for one object which would have biased the 
following test. To this end, both objects were simultaneously displayed on the ground in front of 
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the dog and we scrutinized his behavior toward each object during one minute. If he similarly and 
alternatively interacted with both, we continued the experiment; otherwise we discarded both 
objects and started the experiment again with a novel set of two items. Once again, ten to twenty 
minutes elapsed between the last interaction with the objects and the test. Testing consisted of 
placing the newly named object (target), the novel unnamed distractor and three familiar objects 
that already had names beside them behind the panel [Figure 78]. In this configuration, “referent 
selection” by exclusion was unlikely to occur since two objects were “novel”. The five objects 
were pitted against each other and replaced after retrievals, which sets the chance level at 0.2. 
Again, the first or first two trials involved familiar objects and the second or third asked for the 
newly labeled one. The whole procedure was replicated seven times scattered in time; each time 
with novel sets of objects. 
For this third condition, our hypotheses were the following: if Moka learnt the name of the object 
that was ostensively labeled, he should accurately retrieve it during testing. Conversely, if 
ostensive labeling did not constitute an efficient learning strategy, Moka should randomly retrieve 
one of the two newly introduced objects when requested for the target item.  
Results reveal that Moka’s performance to retrieve the target object upon command was not 
significantly different from chance in this condition (binomial test, p>0.05, see Table 12 & 
Figure 78). This confirms that Moka did not learn any linkage between the label that was 
pronounced during learning and the object that was presented at the same time. It also 
suggests that about five tokens of the label and a-five minute exposure to the object were not 
sufficient for him to properly integrate this new mapping into his “lexicon”. It should be noted 
that very few errors were made when Moka was asked for familiar objects, putting aside the 
possibility that the low performance obtained in this last condition was merely reflecting a lack of 
comprehension of the task as a whole.  
Originally, if significant results had been reached, we had intended to foster our comprehension 
about Moka’s reasoning abilities by examining whether he would have retrieved the distractor 
when using a novel word. Would he have attributed an unknown word to the sole object that had 
never been labeled before? Unfortunately, since both newly introduced objects seemed not to have 
been attributed a label from Moka’s perspective, it made no sense to conduct this further 
investigation.  
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Figure 78 - Illustration of the testing configurations of the four conditions and their corresponding results. The first condition (left)  
involved a single newly introduced object (T=target) labeled approximately 5 times prior to the test, and placed beside three familiar objects 
(F1, F2 and F3). The experiment was replicated 5 times over independent sessions scattered in time (N=5). Each target object was requested 
only once. Performance consisted of the percentage of correct retrievals over the 5 sessions. The second condition (“fast-mapping”) 
corresponded to a replication of the first condition except that no labeling was provided during the former presentation of the target object. 
The experiment was replicated 9 times, and consisted of one test trial per target. The third condition (Ost.labeling + distractor) involved two 
novel objects, one being labeled approximately 5 times prior to the test (T) whereas the other was not (D=distractor). The experiment was 
replicated 7 times, with different sets of objects each time. Each target was requested only once. The last condition (right) examined Moka’s 
ability to learn three novel objects at the same time. Each object was labeled approximately 5 times before testing. All three objects were 
placed beside each other during testing. The experiment was replicated 3 times with three different sets of objects, each target being 
requested twice in a testing session. Dotted lines represent the levels expected by chance. 
Finally, one could have argued that this type of testing configuration could also be solved by 
extended logical reasoning abilities. Indeed, in case of significant results, the alternative 
explanation that the dog first excluded the objects that already had names and then excluded the 
one that had never been named would have constituted another logical interpretation. Aware of 
this potential confounding explanation, in parallel to the three other conditions, we conducted a 
fourth condition which consisted of teaching three novel object names during a single 
learning session. Note that this configuration reproduces the experiment we developed with 
children and somehow allows comparison between both models. The three objects were 
alternatively introduced to Moka - as described in the Material & Methods of this study - and each 
object was attributed a label. Moka heard the three novel labels about five times each during 
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learning. Learning lasted approximatively 15 minutes, namely a total of 5 min per object (1 
min/presentation interspersed). After a break of about 10-20 minutes, a testing session was carried 
out and only involved the newly learned objects that were pitted against each other behind the 
panel [Figure 78]. In this configuration, the probability of retrieving the correct object by chance 
was established at 33%. On each trial, the owner randomly requested one object (a generator 
randomly designated the object to request at each trial), and each object was requested twice. This 
4th condition was replicated three times, each time with three novel objects. Overall, Moka’s 
performance was not significantly different from chance (mean performance: 22%, binomial test, 
p>0.05, see Table 12), indicating that he was not able to learn three novel object names during 
a single learning session that used ostensive labeling. This 4th condition of the experiment 
confirms that brief exposures with novel objects that are ostensively labeled are not sufficient 
to induce word learning in our dog, Moka. 
This result is far from what was previously demonstrated in 2-year-olds. Remember that in 
study N°2, each of the three objects was presented to the participants during a unique 15s video 
clip and labeled three times in a row using an ecologically valid carrier phrase. Nevertheless, 
making direct comparisons would be unwise given substantial differences in (i) the apparatus 
utilized (movies displayed on a touchscreen vs. real objects), the number of participants 
(twenty-three 2-year-olds vs 1 dog) and the length of experience with this abstract concept. As 
reviewed earlier, children usually acquire the word-referent concept during their first year of life. 
Consequently, the 2-year-olds we recruited had at least a one year experience with the concept 
and thousands of words in their receptive repertoire when our protocol began. In contrast, Moka 
reliably comprehended the mapping concept between words and objects only few months before 
this experiment started and had a receptive “lexicon” of barely more than ten words. 
 Conclusion 3.1.4
To conclude on this experiment, we showed that Moka was not capable of learning the names of 
novel objects through few ostensive labeling repeats provided during basic playing activities. 
Even when only one novel object among two was attributed a label, Moka did not manifest 
retention of this association after a delay of about half an hour. On the other hand, when being 
taught a single novel object, significant retention was evidenced. We showed that this finding was 
probably due to Moka’s ability to map a word to his referent by using an elimination process. In 
sum, our dog subject does not seem to have the ability to learn the name of an object following 
ostensive naming, comforting Bloom’s assessment that only children can learn words from 
overheard speech, even if nobody is trying to teach them (Paul Bloom, 2004).  
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3.2 Is memory formation related to the number of exposures in dogs? 
 Introduction 3.2.1
This leads us to one central issue at the heart of the M4 project, namely the question about the 
minimal number of exposures that are required for a subject to form a memory trace that 
will last in time. Would a dog be capable of remembering any situation, person or sensory 
stimulus a long time period after they encountered it for the last time? If so, how many exposures 
to the information would be required for them to remember it at long term? Unfortunately, since 
animals are deprived of language, it is challenging to explicitly demonstrate memory recall 
in nonhuman animal models. As discussed earlier, laboratory research has to develop tasks and 
protocols that fit with the animal model and that are replicable for statistical constraints. In most 
of the cases, the animal model will firstly have to be trained on a specific task. It has been shown 
that the number of trials needed to acquire a novel task is inherent to each task and to each subject 
(e.g. young subjects learn novel tasks more rapidly than older subjects). But once a task is 
properly understood by an animal, how many repeats of novel instances related to the task 
would be required for the animal to recall those specific sensory inputs after a substantial delay? 
This would constitute a reliable and replicable way to examine the minimal number of exposures 
underlying long-term memory formation for sensory inputs in animals. To date, and to the best of 
our knowledge, there is no clear evidence related to this question in dogs. 
In the context of the word-referent concept, one should disentangle visual from auditory sensory 
inputs. Remember that the participant must encode the physical features that compose the referent 
and the auditory sound pattern that refers to this particular referent. Accordingly, with this specific 
paradigm, the number of exposures corresponds to the number of times the animal hears the label 
and the number of times he sees its corresponding item. Previously, we showed that Moka was 
unable to retrieve a novel object by name, if it was ostensively labeled about 5 times during five 
brief presentations that occurred in the same session. Personal explorations suggested that 
increasing the number of repetitions of the label during the learning session did not lead to 
successful retention. It might be that for dogs, learning has to be distributed in time in order to 
induce a robust memory. Pilley indicated that each time he gave Chaser a novel name to learn, he 
first held the object and repeated the associated new label a few times (Pilley & Reid, 2011). 
Then, Chaser engaged in several playing periods during which the experimenter repetitively 
verbalized the name of the object 20-40 times each session. Next, the object was placed on the 
ground amongst objects that already had names and Chaser was tested on her ability to retrieve 
the newly introduced item by name. Pilley indicated that Chaser underwent this daily labeling and 
testing rehearsals over a period of 2-4 weeks. Unfortunately, Pilley gave no indication about 
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Chaser’s accuracy when completing the informal tests performed at home all along this training 
period. Therefore, this only gives us an imprecise idea of the amount of training and repetitions 
Chaser needed to reliably incorporate the name of a novel object into her “lexicon”. In another 
study, authors investigated how long it took to a female Yorkshire terrier, with a “lexicon” of over 
120 objects names, to learn the name of a novel object (Griebel & Oller, 2012). To do this, they 
taught the dog the names of two novel items during numerous learning sessions and tested her 
comprehension of those names during a two-choice identification task at the end of each session, 
as well as during formal exclusion test trials until the cumulative total of correct trials was 
significantly better than chance. In total, the dog had been given more than 150 trials of informal 
two-choice retrieval tests in addition to considerable formal tests with the items over a period of 
more than a month. This supports the idea that dogs require a huge number of trials to form a 
memory about the associative link between novel bimodal stimuli. It should also be noted that 
here, authors investigated the learning rate this dog needed to learn only two novel word-object 
pairs. It would have been interesting to rehearse the protocol with more items. Furthermore, in this 
study, the dog exhibited a strong preference toward one of the two objects which biased the 
results of most of the tests. Therefore, only a rough interpretation of this finding can be 
established.  
On the other hand, Kaminski et al. demonstrated that Rico remembered the names of half of the 
objects he successfully mapped during a single selection by exclusion trial performed one month 
earlier (Kaminski et al., 2004). Although the testing design developed by those authors raised 
several criticisms (e.g. performance could have been attributable to the reinforcement Rico 
received after initial retrieval (Markman & Abelev, 2004) or to a basic ability to process extended 
exclusions (Griebel & Oller, 2012)), results remain impressive and unique, and still strongly 
suggest that a memory can be formed after very few, or even a single visual and verbal exposure, 
by a dog. 
In the following experiment, we decided to continue the teaching process of the objects involved 
in the 4th condition of the previous experiment over multiple ostensive labeling sessions spaced 
in time until a learning criterion was reached, as assessed by comprehension tests that followed 
each learning session. To achieve this, Moka underwent a 3AFC (alternative forced-choice) 
testing procedure at the end of each learning session. Our criterion was set at 66% accuracy, 
which corresponds to double the accuracy expected by chance. 
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 Material and methods 3.2.2
3.2.2.1 Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of the three triplets of objects introduced to Moka in the 4th condition of the 
previous experiment and their associated pseudo-words. 
3.2.2.2 Procedure 
Learning sessions were spaced in time according to the availability of Moka’s owner, basically 
one to three learning sessions per week. Learning consisted of ostensive labeling as described in 
the previous section [Figure 77]. Each object was always presented and labeled in isolation, but 
the owner interspersed the order of presentation of the three objects (e.g. obj3-obj2-obj1-obj2-
obj3-etc.). In total, one learning session consisted of 5x1min visual exposure to each object, and 
5-10 verbal exposures to the associated label. Each session involved one triplet of objects (fatigue 
would have impaired learning if two or three triplets of objects would have been taught during the 
same session). About 10-20 minutes after learning, a 3AFC comprehension test was run. The 
three objects previously labeled were placed beside each other behind the panel. A generator 
randomly designated which object was the target at each trial. Moka received a feedback of 
accuracy after each retrieval. If he didn’t find the target object at first trial, another (or a 
maximum of two other) chance(s) was given to him, but correct responses on second or third trial 
were not included in the current analyses. Objects were replaced after retrieval. Thus, Moka had a 
33% chance to bring the correct object by chance at each trial. Binomial tests were used to assess 
accuracy according to a probability of success set at 0.33. 
 Results and discussion 3.2.3
Moka’s knowledge about the names of newly introduced objects was measured during 3AFC 
comprehension tests performed at the end of each learning session. As already demonstrated at the 
end of the previous experiment (4th condition), the first testing session led to inconclusive 
demonstration of comprehension of the recent knowledge (mean performance: 22%, p>0.45, see 
Table 13 & Figure 79). None of the nine objects (3 triplets of objects) was retrieved without error 
at the end of the first testing session, except one that was clearly Moka’s favorite object among 
the triplet. Although the systematic pre-tests of preference did not demonstrate any specific 
preference bias, it is possible that Moka established this strong preference from the first test trial. 
Indeed, when tested on that triplet, the dog systematically brought this particular object at first on 
each test trial. We did not exclude this result from the analysis but we discarded this triplet of 
objects from the experiment thereafter. 
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Table 13 - Table indicating the number of triplets of objects taught and tested during each session (in brackets the number of test trials that 
involved each object is specified). For each session (1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
), the table also reports the total number of trials performed and the 
number of successes achieved. The expected chance level, p-values, mean performance and 95% confident intervals are also reported  
Teaching + 
testing 
sessions 
N triplets 
(N test trials/ 
object) 
Nb of overall 
trials during 
testing 
Nb of 
overall 
successes 
Expected 
chance 
level % 
P-values Mean 
performance % 
95% CI 
 1
st
 session 3 (2) 18 4 33 0.45 22 6-48 
2
nd
 session 2 (3) 18 10 33 0.047 56 31-78 
3
rd
 session 1 (1) 3 2 33 0.25 66 9-99 
 
Since Moka did not exhibit overall learning of the mappings, a second learning session was 
scheduled for the two remaining triplets of objects. It followed the same ostensive labeling 
method as used during the first learning session. Similarly, comprehension of the mappings was 
tested about 10-20 minutes after the last labeling trial. At the time of this second test, Moka had a 
cumulative number of about 15-20 verbal repetitions of the label (i.e. including the repetitions 
provided during the first test session) and 10-15min visual exposure to the object (i.e. including 
the visual exposure provided during the first test session). In this second test session, each object 
was requested three times in a random order. Moka was reinforced after retrievals. Moka’s mean 
performance was higher than for the first test session and slightly significantly above chance 
(M=56%, exact binomial p=0.047*, see Table 13 & Figure 79). However, as he didn’t reach the 
learning criterion that we established (mean performance ≥ 66%), a third learning session was 
scheduled.  
 
Figure 79 - Graphical showing Moka’s performance during the 3AFC comprehension tests performed at the end of each learning session. 
The red dotted line indicates chance level. 
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Because of experimental errors, one of the two triplets of objects couldn’t be further utilized and 
the third learning session only involved the remaining triplet of objects. Each of these three 
objects was similarly labeled by implementing the same method as in the previous learning 
sessions. Testing was similarly carried out after a break of the same length of time. Each object 
was requested only once. This time, performance reached our learning criterion of 66% accuracy 
(i.e. Moka correctly retrieved two out of the three objects) [Table 13 & Figure 79). These 
preliminary results suggest that about 25-30 verbal utterances of the label and 20-25min 
visual exposure to its associated referent, distributed over three sessions (including both 
learning and testing), allowed learning to be demonstrated.  
Obviously, this result does not yet bring a robust demonstration of the minimum number of 
exposures needed to form a memory that will last in time. Firstly there were a number of 
experimental biases, such as a varying number of triplets involved during each test session, a 
varying number of trials performed during each test session and the strong object preference 
Moka developed toward one specific object. Secondly, the small number of items encompassed in 
this experiment lowers the impact of these results. Future replications of this protocol will be 
required to build conclusions upon these preliminary findings. 
Despite this, our results bring an interesting matter of reflection. First of all, it confirms the idea 
that the number of (visual and verbal) exposures required to form a reliable mapping between a 
word and its referent is subject-dependent. Indeed, results from this experiment, in addition to 
our personal observations about how long it took for Moka to reliably acquire each of his novel 
word-object pairs, are far from the hundreds of trials reported by Griebel et al. (Griebel & Oller, 
2012). Nonetheless, it is also far from the hypothesis that a single trial could be enough for a 
consistent encoding of such cross-modal stimuli. At least, it seems not to be the case for objects 
acquired through an ostensive labeling learning method. At first sight, this finding would 
effectively rule in Bloom’s favor, as he argued that only human children are able to learn words 
from overheard speech, even when adults are not trying to teach them those words (Paul Bloom, 
2004). This is actually true for children who have a wide lexical repertoire. But currently, as far as 
we know, and as a direct implication of our work on young children, there is no proof that an 
infant provided with a ten to twenty receptive vocabulary lexicon is able to successfully acquire 
new words after a single (or even very few) exposure(s) without extended external cues. Indeed, 
in their initial stage of receptive vocabulary learning, infants require dozens of ostensive 
repetitions accompanied with non-verbal cues such as object manipulation, eye gaze or 
pointing to the object, in order to show comprehension on immediate tests (Gurteen et al., 2011c; 
Hollich et al., 2000; Oviatt, 1980; Schafer & Plunkett, 1998b; Woodward et al., 1994b). Moka’s 
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receptive vocabulary “repertoire” is roughly equivalent to the one of a 6-9 month old infant, 
which corresponds to the beginning of the comprehension of the word-referent concept by 
human infants (e.g. Fenson et al., 1994; Oviatt, 1980). For our dog, word learning appears to be a 
time-consuming process, exactly as is the case for infants in their initial stages of language 
acquisition. However, there is no doubt that young children with larger vocabulary repertoires 
comprehend new words from overhead speech and without the need of repetition (e.g. as a direct 
illustration of this claim, see our findings on Part 1, study N°2). The question is whether this 
would also be the case for expert dogs provided with a receptive “lexicon” of thousands of words? 
It would be interesting to rehearse this protocol with an expert dog. But for now, there is 
undoubtedly still a major step before claiming that dogs understand human words in a human 
way.  
Next, this study, in addition to Pilley’s or Griebel’s previous reports about the word learning 
process their dogs had to undergo to acquire the names of novel object, suggests that learning has 
to be spaced in time to be efficient. Apparently, a single ostensive labeling learning session 
(with multiple verbal and visual exposures to the material to learn) is not sufficient, even if the 
label is extensively repeated during this session. It might be that, to optimize the acquisition of 
novel information, learning has to be split into short sessions spaced in time. In a previous study, 
laboratory dogs were trained on a traditional obedience task and were divided into four groups 
that were differentiated in frequency and duration of the training sessions (Demant et al., 2011). 
Results demonstrated that dogs trained 1-2 times per week had significantly better acquisition 
rates than daily trained dogs. Moreover, a daily training session rehearsed over a three day period 
led to significantly better acquisition rates than three training sessions performed in a row by 
those dogs. Thus, the authors argued that spaced training was better than massed training for 
dogs to acquire a task, which is similar for humans. Indeed, rest periods and especially sleep are 
undeniably of great importance and probably the principal mechanism behind this spacing 
effect (e.g. Axelsson et al. 2018; Born, Rasch, & Gais, 2006; Friedrich, Wilhelm, Born, & 
Friederici, 2015; Wilhelm, Born, Friederici, & Friedrich, 2015). Indeed, spaced training offers 
more possibility for subjects to mentally replay or rehearse the information outside of the 
learning sessions and involuntarily during sleep. Sleep has been identified as a state that 
optimizes consolidation of newly acquired information. Therefore, it can be reasonably 
assumed that when a night separates two learning sessions, consolidation of the information 
acquired the day before already occurred in dogs (as it does in humans), which leads to enhanced 
performance compared to two training sessions massed on one day. Interestingly, training 
schedule established by Demant et al.’s did not affect long-term retention of the learned task as all 
of their dog groups remembered the exercise well after a four-week break. 
272 
 
Finally, the current results did not truly answer our initial question related to a hypothetical 
correlation between memory strength and number of presentations during learning. Previous 
studies suggested that once a behavior (or a specific sensory stimulus) is accurately learned by a 
dog subject, his memory for that knowledge will remain relatively unimpaired even after a long 
time period (e.g. Demant et al., 2011; Wallis et al., 2016). But would this also have been the case 
if only a small number of repetitions were provided during learning? Originally, we had planned 
to measure Moka’s long term retention skill for the object names used in this experiment. 
Unfortunately, considering the low number of objects that were left when the learning criterion 
was reached, and since it was impossible to replicate the protocol with new sets of objects because 
of time constraints, we were unable to pursue our initial objectives. However, without further 
extensive training, the three objects that remained were integrated into Moka’s set of known 
objects and served in other experiments, such as in the memory tests performed after different 
latencies shown previously. Therefore, we did not report Moka’s memory accuracy according to 
the length of experience with each object, but we nevertheless observed that most of the errors 
were made on the most recent objects. Specifically, we observed that Moka had a tendency to 
attach a preference toward the most recent objects he learnt, perhaps because they appeared more 
salient to him, which biased the results for a few trials. As these mistaken retrievals were not 
positively reinforced during the testing, Moka often decided not to retrieve these items anymore, 
and thus failed when these objects became the targets. 
Conclusion 
To conclude on that experiment, we found that learning the names of novel objects has to be 
spaced in time to be efficient, at least for a dog subject provided with a small receptive 
“repertoire”. Successful retention was achieved after about 20-30 verbal exposures to the label 
and 20-25min visual exposures to the object, which is a very encouraging preliminary result given 
the reports of most previous studies from the literature on ostensive labeling. Nonetheless, it is far 
from the very few (or even single) learning events children require to demonstrate accurate 
retention of object names. A replication of this protocol with an expert dog would bring more 
insight in this field.   
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3.3 Which learning strategy is the most appropriate to induce a long 
lasting memory of an object name?  
 Introduction 3.3.1
The previous experiment involved an ostensive labeling learning method and revealed that at least 
three learning sessions spaced in time, each followed by a testing session, allowed an acceptable 
acquisition of the material to learn by our dog subject, Moka. But what accounted for the 
enhancement of the performance we observed from one session to another? Did Moka mainly 
learn and consolidate the knowledge from the ostensive labeling learning sessions or 
essentially from the comprehension tests as feedback on his performances were delivered to 
him? Results from our previous work strongly suggested that Moka did not learn anything from 
the very first ostensive labeling session. But in spite of this, does it mean that ostensive labeling 
was totally inefficient and that learning only arose from the reinforcements Moka received? It 
would be very interesting to understand the origin of the learning and the conditions required for 
memory formation in dogs. Finally, it would also help in understanding if Markman and Abelev’s 
reluctance to accept Rico’s fast-mapping abilities as compelling because of the reinforcements he 
received after the initial retrieval of the novel objects, is warranted (Markman & Abelev, 2004). 
As the first step towards elucidating this issue, we developed an experiment that disentangled 
these two parameters. Specifically, pairs of novel objects - one associated with a label while 
the other remained nameless - were divided into three groups. Objects from the first group were 
taught to Moka using ostensive labeling and were then tested during a comprehension test (L+T 
= Labeling + Testing). Objects from the second group were similarly taught to Moka but no tests 
followed the labeling sequence (L = Labeling). Objects from the third group were not taught to 
Moka but were directly incorporated within a comprehension test (T = Testing). The overall 
procedure was repeated four times. For each group, a final test assessed Moka’s accuracy to 
map the labels to their corresponding items.  
Our hypotheses were the following: if ostensive labeling does not induce learning at all, we expect 
Moka to perform at chance during the final test that involves the objects of the second group 
(Labeling group). On the other hand, if learning is only attributable to the reinforcements 
delivered during testing or to the testing effect per se (see Roediger & Butler, 2011 for a review), 
we expect the mean performance involving the objects of the third group (Testing group) to be 
equivalent to the one of the first group (Labeling + Testing group). Finally, if Moka is learning 
from both – ostensive labeling and reinforcements received during testing - we should observe a 
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higher performance for the final test that involves the objects of the first group since they were 
implicated in both learning strategies.  
Next, we intended to know which learning strategy would be the most appropriate for the 
formation of a robust memory trace. Hence, for the three groups, we carried out retention tests 
after a delay of two weeks and one month. 
 Material and methods 3.3.2
3.3.2.1 Stimuli 
Stimuli were novel objects, never seen and never labeled before. Objects were grouped in pairs 
according to Moka’s owner appraisal about the “affinity” his dog would develop for each object. 
Specifically, objects belonging to the same pair had to be equally salient for the dog with no 
obvious biases during a pre-test of preference. During this test, the two objects were displayed on 
the ground for one minute. Moka spontaneously interacted and played with them. We scored the 
time Moka spent with each object and the number of interactions toward each object. If a clear 
preference for one object was noticeable, we discarded this pair of objects and started again with 
two novel objects. 
3.3.2.2 Procedure 
During an initial learning phase (t0), Moka was introduced to six pairs of objects. For each pair, 
only one object was associated with a label (T=Target) while the other remained nameless 
(D=Distractor). The object that was attributed a label was randomly chosen among the two by a 
third person. The six pairs were not introduced to the dog during the same session because it 
would have been too tiring for him. Thus, these initial learning phases were scheduled over 
different days. During the initial learning phase, objects of each pair were presented to Moka five 
times each in an interspersed manner [Figure 80].  
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Figure 80 - Illustration of the experimental set up developed in this experiment. It consisted of an initial learning phase (t0), where two 
novel objects were introduced to Moka in an interspersed manner. Only one object – randomly chosen by a third person - was associated 
with a label (T=Target), while the other was similarly introduced to Moka but was not labeled (D=Distractor). The six pairs of objects were 
divided into three groups: L+T= Labeling + Testing (i.e. learning rehearsal followed by a comprehension test (T requested three times during 
a test)); L=Labeling (i.e. learning rehearsal but no subsequent testing); T=Testing (i.e. no learning rehearsal, but only comprehension tests (T 
requested three times during a test)). For each learning condition, the procedure was implemented four times, spaced in time. A final test 
performed 30 min after last practice assessed Moka’s accuracy of the mappings. 
Then, the pairs were randomly assigned to one of the following groups (2 pairs per group):  
-  L+T= Labeling + Testing group: each learning session consisted of five presentations of 
the two objects of a given pair interspersed, during which only the target was accompanied by its 
label. Learning was systematically followed by a comprehension test, which occurred after a 
break of about 10-20min. Comprehension tests involved both objects along with three familiar 
items randomly chosen among Moka’s set of known objects. During testing, among requests of 
familiar objects, Moka was instructed three times to bring the labeled object. Objects were 
replaced behind the panel after each trial. Moka received feedback of accuracy after each 
retrieval. If he mistakenly brought an untargeted object, he got another (or maximum two other) 
chance(s) to find the correct object. 
-  L= Labeling group: objects of each pair were presented to the dog five times each in an 
interspersed manner (again, only the target was labeled) as during the initial learning phase. In 
this condition, no testing followed learning.  
276 
 
-  T= Testing group: objects from this group were never presented to the dog again and the 
target was never ostensively labeled anymore. The sessions directly started with comprehension 
tests that involved both novel objects and three familiar objects. Testing was carried out exactly as 
described above. 
The overall procedure was repeated four times and a final test was carried out 30min after the last 
comprehension test (or after the last teaching trial for the Labeling group). The final 
comprehension test was conducted for each pair separately and was equivalent to the 
comprehension tests performed during training (though with different familiar objects). 
Next, to evaluate whether Moka formed a robust memory of those word-object mappings, long-
term retention tests were carried out after a delay of two weeks and one month without rehearsal 
between the time intervals [Figure 81]. The retention tests replicated those implemented during 
the final comprehension test but only one test trial was performed in this case, since it would have 
generated a rehearsal of the mappings.    
 
Figure 81 - Illustration of the whole experimental set up including the two retention tests, one carried out after a delay of two weeks (15d) 
and the second after a delay of one month (1Mo) from this last test. During these retention tests, the target was requested only once. 
 Results and discussion 3.3.3
Moka underwent three learning conditions, each involving two pairs of objects. Although results 
seemed at first glance relatively similar for the three groups (Mean(L+T)=66.66%; 
Mean(L)=49.5%; Mean(T)=50%, see Table 14 & Figure 82), the highest percentage of correct 
retrievals involved the objects from the Labeling + Testing group, which was the only group to 
reach significant results (exact binomial, p=0.017*). Even if it is too preliminary to draw 
convincing interpretations, from this finding it can be speculated that Moka benefitted from both 
learning strategies to acquire the novel object names. 
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Table 14 - Table detailing the number of trials, number of successes, expected chance level, p-values and mean performance (in %) during 
the tests conducted after last practice (i.e. 30min), after a delay of 15days and after a month delay. The table reports the results for the three 
learning strategies (L+T=labeling + testing; L=labeling; T=testing). 
Learning 
strategies 
Latency N trials N successes Expected chance 
level 
P-values Mean 
Performance% 
L+T 
30 min 6 4 20 0.017 66.66 
15d 2 2 20 0.04 100 
1Mo 2 2 20 0.04 100 
L 
30 min 6 3 20 0.09 49.5 
15d 2 0 20 1 0 
1Mo 2 0 20 1 0 
T 
30 min 6 3 20 0.09 50 
15d 2 1 20 0.36 50 
1Mo 2 2 20 0.04 100 
 
However, since the objects of this first group were submitted to comprehension tests that provided 
feedback of accuracy, one could argue that Moka merely learnt the associations from the 
reinforcements themselves. This hypothesis was not clearly established since he correctly brought 
the targets especially on the first test trials (out of the three test trials). Nevertheless, future 
replications of this protocol would be required to strengthen these preliminary findings.  
 
Figure 82 - Moka’s mean accuracy in recalling the names of the objects measured after three latencies (i.e. 30min, 15d and 1Mo). Objects 
were taught using one of these three learning strategies: L=labeling (green curve); T=testing (blue curve); L+T=labeling + testing (red 
curve). Dashed line indicates the chance level. 
When focusing on Moka’s performance after longer delays, there are some points that are 
particularly interesting. While each learning strategy seemed to have at least slightly facilitated 
Moka’s comprehension of the mappings when tested after a relatively short time interval after last 
practice (i.e. 30min), noteworthy differences arose after longer delays. Indeed, Moka failed to 
remember the names of the objects that were exclusively taught with ostensive labeling. After a 
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break of two weeks, his failure was not attributable to a higher preference for the distractor, 
because he rather fetched a familiar object in both cases. Interestingly, after a break of one month, 
analyses of the video recordings revealed that his choices went for the distractor. Hasty 
interpretations of this finding would be unwise, but it suggests at least that Moka did not always 
mix the target up with the unnamed distractor but also sometimes with objects that already had 
names. This finding is interesting given that some authors have pointed out the difficulty of 
choosing an appropriate chance level when facing this kind of testing configuration (Griebel & 
Oller, 2012). Indeed, they discussed the fact that, when the target is requested, the dog should 
ignore the well-known objects and only choose between the remaining options. Thus, in our case, 
should the probability of success by chance include the familiar items as potential competitors? Or 
should we apply a more conservative chance level value of ½? This interrogation remains open 
since the mistakes did not always concern the distractor.  
In contrast to Moka’s incapacity to remember at long term the names of the objects that belonged 
to the Labeling group, Moka successfully retrieved one of the two objects taught exclusively with 
positive reinforcement after a two-week delay (Testing group), and both objects without error 
after a one month delay. He also never failed to retrieve the objects that were ostensively labeled 
and positively reinforced during learning (Labeling + Testing group).  
But did Moka truly retain the names of those objects? The criticisms of Kaminski et al.’s and 
Pilley et al.’s testing procedures could also apply in this case (Griebel & Oller, 2012). Indeed, 
nothing excludes the possibility that Moka reasoned by extended exclusion to complete this task. 
He could have solved the task by excluding the familiar objects at first because they already have 
names, and then the object that was not reinforced during the previous test trials. Moreover, as in 
children’s word learning paradigms, the alternative option that he only retrieved the one of the 
two objects which was given  special treatment cannot be ruled out. To put this alternative 
explanation to rest, it would have been interesting to pit the targets of each group against each 
other and to randomly ask Moka to retrieve each of them (see Grassmann, Kaminski, & 
Tomasello, 2012 for related methodology). Unfortunately, we didn’t progress to this control test. 
We considered that the objects were, from that moment, properly acquired and we incorporated 
them into Moka’s set of well-known objects that served for other protocols (e.g. “memory across 
time”, “playbacks”, etc.). We did not notice that Moka had greater difficulty with those objects 
compared to older ones. Thus, our personal observation and intuition goes in favor of an actual 
memory formation of these pairs but further replications with stringent controls are still necessary.  
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Conclusion 
Taken together, from this experiment, it can be proposed that a dog with a small “vocabulary 
lexicon” like Moka, does not take advantage of an ostensive labeling learning method, at least not 
to form a long lasting memory of a novel word-object pair. On the other hand, the sole reinforcing 
consequences of the positive feedback received after retrievals (or simply the retrieval effect) had 
no evident impact at a “relative short term” (~30min) on the acquisition of novel word-object 
associations. However, reinforcing the correct behaviors during learning seems to be a key 
component for long term memory formation. Further replications of this experiment in addition to 
supplementary investigations about possible extended reasoning by exclusion strategies, should 
enlarge our understanding of this phenomenon. This would constitute a major advance for dog 
trainers and dog owners. Finally, these preliminary findings do not challenge Rico’s and Chaser’s 
long term memory abilities to remember the mappings they acquired by logical exclusion one 
month earlier. These expert dogs might have formed the associative links in one trial even without 
the need of the reinforcements that were provided. Needless to say that replicating our design with 
expert dogs would undoubtedly help better understand the mechanisms underlying such cognitive 
processes.  
4 FOURTH STUDY. Generalization of Moka’s knowledge to 
novel stimuli 
4.1 Introduction 
One poignant argument in favor of actual word learning abilities by dogs would come from the 
capability in generalizing their knowledge to novel instances of voices or objects. Bloom stressed 
the possibility that Rico’s referential understanding was limited to specific routines and to distinct 
stimuli (Paul Bloom, 2004). Moreover, he argued that if a dog really comprehends word-object 
mappings, it should not matter who the speaker is. Few studies started to bring light to these 
issues.  
First, Pilley & Reid provided evidence that their dog, Chaser, was not only learning labels as 
proper nouns to designate specific referents, but that she could also learn labels for common 
nouns, like categories (Pilley & Reid, 2011). She understood at least three labels for categories, 
namely “toy” (i.e. objects she was allowed to play with, in contrast to objects she was forbidden to 
play with), “Frisbee” and “Balls” (i.e. two subcategories of her toys determined by specific 
physical features, like shape). Thus, she was able to map one label onto many objects that she 
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could discriminate based on common physical properties or functionality (for the “toy” category). 
Moreover, it illustrates that she could also learn up to three different labels for the same object 
that referred to different levels of categorization (e.g. the name of a proper Frisbee (i.e. item-
unique level), the word “Frisbee” (i.e. basic level), and the word “toy” (i.e. subordinate level)). 
Chaser’s demonstration of one-to-many and many-to-one word-object mappings was a clear proof 
of her extensibility skills, which contradicts Bloom’s comment about dogs’ having learning 
abilities restricted to an item-unique level (Paul Bloom, 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that 
in order to generalize their knowledge to novel items, dogs presumably rely on size properties 
when only briefly familiarized with a novel word-object pair and on texture when familiarized 
with a pair for a longer time (Van Der Zee et al., 2012). More recently, another study 
demonstrated that a dog could also generalize their knowledge of words to novel voices (Griebel 
& Oller, 2012). The authors reported the case of a dog who successfully retrieved objects by 
names pronounced by novel speakers. One speaker was a female with a German accent while the 
other was a male, native American English speaker with a Californian accent. This finding 
illustrated that this dog was capable of extensive verbal recognition, as she recognized words in 
her repertoire even when pronounced by novel voices (see also the results of Grassmann et al., 
2012 for familiar labels requested by an unfamiliar person). This research lends weight to the 
groundbreaking findings of Kaminski et al. and Pilley & Reid (Kaminski et al., 2004; Pilley & 
Reid, 2011). It also directly replied to Bloom’s reluctance to accept Rico’s word learning abilities 
as compelling because he only received verbal commands from his owner.  
In the following study, we wanted to investigate to what extent a dog provided with a small word-
object “lexicon” would be able to generalize his knowledge to novel voices or novel objects. 
Moreover, a dog’s ability to recognize words pronounced by natural and artificial voices recorded 
beforehand and delivered through loudspeakers has never been studied. It would be very 
interesting to know if a dog can recognize words originating from various speakers, contexts, and 
devices (like for example from a TV clip). This would tell us a lot about his actual word learning 
skills. Furthermore, if he is accurate with such a device, it would strongly suggest that neither 
visual nor auditory cues are provided by the owner to help him solve the task.  
To explore those questions, we compared Moka’s accuracy to retrieve objects by name when the 
verbal instructions were given (i) by the owner, (ii) by a playback of the owner’s voice, (iii) by a 
playback of a female’s voice and (iv) by artificial playbacks generated by synthetic voices of 
females and males. Next, we also examined his ability to generalize his knowledge about word-
object mappings to novel objects.  
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4.2 Materials and methods 
The dog subject was Moka, a hunting dog of one year old, provided with a “lexicon” of about 15-
20 word-object pairs when this experiment started. 
Moka’s performance to retrieve objects by name was measured using a tightly controlled method 
as described in the previous sections. For each audio generalization condition, five familiar 
objects were placed beside each other and Moka was randomly requested to bring each object 
upon command (each object was requested only once). A generator randomly selected the target 
object at each trial. Objects were not removed from the set after each trial (i.e. with replacement). 
Thus, the probability of success by chance was 1/5 on each trial. The experiment was carried out 
during several succeeding sessions, and sessions involving different conditions in an interspersed 
fashion. In this way, the task did not gradually increase in difficulty over the sessions, which 
would have biased the results since Moka would have become accustomed to the playback 
apparatus. In the case of the object generalization condition, we replicated the experiment twice, 
one involving four novel objects and the other three. Thus, respectively four and three novel 
objects were pitted against each other. As they all had the same history of novelty, the probability 
of success by chance was ¼ (for four trials) and 1/3 (for three trials), thus 0.27 on average. . 
The five testing conditions were as following:  
- Verbal instructions provided by the owner.  The owner stood next to his dog and verbally requested 
the object designated by the random generator at each trial. Five replications of the experiment 
were carried out, involving different objects each time. The mean performance obtained through 
this condition corresponded to Moka’s baseline of accuracy (i.e. familiar label baseline).  
 
- Verbal instructions provided by playbacks of the owner’s voice. The voice of Moka’s owner was 
recorded prior to the experiment. An audio file for each object label was generated. At each trial, 
the generator randomly selected a target and launched the corresponding tape recorded playback. 
The transcribed verbal request originated from the loudspeakers connected to the computer. The 
owner stood next to his dog in order to preserve a similar testing configuration. At each trial, Moka 
was expected to bring an object back into his owner’s hand. As usual, the owner gave  feedback of 
accuracy. This experimental condition was replicated four times, involving different sets of objects 
each time. 
 
- Verbal instructions provided by playbacks of a female’s voice. A female native French speaker 
(unfamiliar to Moka), with a southern French accent recorded herself uttering the names of the 
objects. The same procedure as described above was applied: the owner stood next to Moka, and at 
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each trial the generator randomly selected the target and launched the corresponding audio file. 
Four replications of this experiment were performed, each time with different sets of objects. 
 
- Verbal instructions provided by artificial playbacks of synthetic females’ and males’ voices. 
Artificial playbacks were generated with the multilingual vocal synthesizer ‘Hear it first” software, 
hosted by Microsoft. The male and female voices were accent-less and with a robotic-like 
consonance. The experiment was carried out as described for the previous conditions. Six 
replications of the experiment took place, 3 involving male synthetic playbacks, and 3 female 
synthetic playbacks. 
 
- Novel objects provided with resembling physical features. In this condition, seven novel stimuli 
that resembled Moka’s original objects were found. These copies shared at least one physical 
feature with the original objects: size, shape, color or texture. Only copies were placed beside each 
other during testing. Thus, Moka had never seen either of them before the test. Two replications of 
the experiment were carried out, one involving four objects and the other the remaining three 
objects. Each object was requested only once. Moka’s mean accuracy on this task was compared to 
the one he reached with the original objects. This corresponded to the baseline of accuracy (i.e. 
familiar objects baseline). 
 
Figure 83 - Illustration of the original items (A, B, etc.) and their corresponding replicas (A’, B’, etc.) used from the object generalization 
condition. Replicas that were correctly selected at first trial are ticked with a green check mark. Replicas incorrectly retrieved at first trial are 
marked by a red cross. Replicas that were correctly retrieved at second trial were C’ and E’.  
4.3 Results  
Moka’s accuracy to map labels to their corresponding referents was highly significant when the 
verbal commands were uttered by his owner (exact binomial, p=2.66e-7***, Table 15 & Figure 
84). This control condition served as a baseline of accuracy. Moka similarly performed highly 
when the requests originated from transcribed playbacks of his owner’s voice (exact binomial, 
p=1.85e-6***, Table 15 & Figure 84). No significant difference was established between these 
283 
 
two conditions (GLM, Z=0.14, p>0.05). However, Moka’s mean accuracy drastically dropped 
when provided with playbacks of either a novel female voice (♀Pb) or of synthetic voices 
(SynPb) [Table 15 & Figure 84]. In both cases, the mean performance was significantly below 
Moka’s baseline of accuracy (GLM, Z♀Pb=-2.16, p=0.03*; ZSynPb =-2.5, p=0.02) and did not 
significantly differ from chance level (exact binomials, p♀Pb=0.098 and pSynPb= 0.17 [Table 15 & 
Figure 84]. 
Table 15 - Moka’s performance according to four audio conditions and two object conditions are reported. For each audio type and each 
object type, the total number of trials, total number of successes, expected chance level, p-value, mean performance (in %) and 95% 
confident intervals are detailed. 
Conditions N trials N successes Expected chance 
level 
P-value Mean 
performances% 
CI95% 
Owner 
(male) 
25 17 20 2.66e-7 68 46-85 
Owner’s 
playbacks 
20 14 20 1.85e-6 70 46-88 
Unknown 
female’s 
playbacks 
20 7 20 0.098 35 15-59 
Synthetic 
playbacks 
30 9 20 0.17 30 15-49 
Original  15 14 27 1.2e
-7
 93 68-99 
Copy 7 3 27 0.39 42 9-81 
 
Next, Moka’s generalization ability was also measured for novel objects. Moka was highly 
accurate to find the original objects upon command (M=93%, p=1.2e-7***,Table 15 & Figure 
84). When tested with copies that resembled the original items, his mean performance 
significantly declined from this baseline (GLM, Z=-2.27, p=0.02*). In this case, Moka’s mean 
accuracy did not significantly differ from the mean level expected by chance (adapted binomial 
test, p=0.39, Table 15). Note that this condition corresponded to only seven trials (since only 7 
copies of the original objects were found) and that more trials should be conducted to truthfully 
conclude on this result.  
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Figure 84 - Graphical showing Moka’s mean performance +/- 95%CI in retrieving objects by name when the verbal commands were given 
by his owner (i.e. familiar label baseline) (left); by playbacks of his owner’s voice; by playbacks of a novel female speaker’s voice and by 
synthetic playbacks generated by a multilingual vocal synthesizer software. Moka’s performance to generalize his knowledge to copies that 
resemble the original objects but that have never be seen before was measured and reported on the right side of the graphical (familiar objects 
baseline and copy condition). Illustrations of the experimental settings are drawn below each bar plot. Dashed lines represent the expected 
chance levels. 
4.4 Discussion 
This study aimed to better understand whether dogs are learning stimulus-specific associations or 
labels for larger categories of objects that share physical features. Moreover, this work intended to 
foster previous investigations about dogs’ ability to extend their knowledge to sound patterns that 
share close auditory features with the original words. 
Results from this experiment demonstrate that Moka performed just as well when confronted with 
playbacks of his owner’s voice than with his owner himself. This finding entirely rules out the 
possibility that the owner was providing Moka with subtle auditory cues when asking him to fetch 
the objects. Indeed, in this testing configuration, Moka’s trainer was admittedly present but 
remained completely neutral and silent. A previous study evaluated the effect of varying non-
verbal features, like the distance of location of the trainer, the posture of the trainer or the eye 
contact and it showed that it moderated dogs’ responsiveness to the commands and sometimes 
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affected their willingness to complete a well-known task (Fukuzawa et al., 2005). Considering 
these findings, we kept the testing configuration that Moka was familiar with (i.e. the owner 
standing next to his dog). Nevertheless, since the experimenter located the objects behind the 
panel himself and since the generator randomly selected and launched the auditory playbacks at 
each trial, the owner was totally blind about which target object would be chosen and where it was 
situated. This attests that Moka could only rely on his mental representations of the mappings to 
achieve the task. 
However, when hearing playbacks from a novel speaker or from artificial voices, Moka failed to 
recognize the words. His mean performance was similar to the level expected by chance and 
significantly below the score obtained in the baseline condition. Our results are in agreement with 
previous studies that used tape-recorded verbal commands and that similarly established a 
significant decline of the performance for a well-known task (e.g. Fukuzawa et al., 2005). One 
explanation might arise from the device itself. Such apparatus involving loudspeakers and 
transcribed voices probably goes beyond ecologically valid conditions, which might have 
disturbed our dog subject. Personal observations suggest that Moka tried to locate where the 
sound came from and seemed disturbed by the unusual configuration of the task. It can be 
speculated that the absence of certain key non-verbal cues (e.g. lip movements) affects vocal 
perception in dogs as it does in humans (e.g. Moore, 1989). In addition, certain features of the 
glottal source signal are absent in a tape recorded voice, resulting in a sound that will not have the 
same frequency composition, or harmonics, and will lack resonance compared to a human-
generated vocal signal (e.g. Howard & Angus, 1996). Nevertheless, as Moka provided convincing 
aptitudes when exposed to playbacks of his owner’s voice, a second more likely explanation 
would suggest that he truly did not recognize the words. The intonation of the labels provided by 
both the female and the synthetic playbacks was clearly different from the pronunciation of 
Moka’s owner. He might not have distinguished the words and therefore attributed a random 
object to them. It is worth remembering that Moka’s word-object repertoire is greatly below those 
of previous dog cases reported in the literature. It is possible that a dog requires a longer 
experience with the concept and a larger “lexical repertoire” to develop such generalization skills. 
Authors asserted that cognitive abilities depend upon previous learning experiences and/or past 
exposures to demanding training regimes (Herman & Wolz, 1984). The dog that showed aptitudes 
to retrieve objects by name verbalized by novel speakers had a 120 words “lexicon”, acquired in 
twelve years (Griebel & Oller, 2012). Originally, we did not plan to test an equivalent condition 
involving an unknown live speaker, but considering our current results, it would have been 
interesting to carry out this condition as well. This would help understanding if, despite the 
current results, Moka still has auditory generalization abilities. Undoubtedly, it would also be 
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interesting to replicate this whole experiment with an expert dog in order to uncover if the absence 
of convincing generalization aptitudes established here are primarily attributable to the short 
history of familiarization with the word-referent concept that Moka suffered from. 
In parallel, we also examined his ability to generalize his knowledge to novel objects that 
resembled the original ones. Since most of the objects were obtained from second-hand trades, 
gathering copies that shared at least one physical property was challenging. We managed to 
collect seven objects that resembled the ones Moka was trained with for months. Thus, testing 
consisted of two sessions, one involving four copies and the other three copies. Moka successfully 
retrieved three out of these seven copies at first trial. For two objects incorrectly retrieved, he 
automatically adjusted his response on the second trial he was offered. Together, even so Moka 
did not demonstrate conclusive object generalization abilities, he succeeded in finding five out of 
the seven novel objects at first or second trial. This result is very encouraging considering the 
notable difficulty of the task. Indeed, in this configuration, Moka was facing four (and three) 
novel objects he had never encountered before. It means that at each trial, he had to figure out 
which object best matched his mental representation of the targeted association. Although it has 
been shown that dogs are skillful at using life-sized or miniature replicas to identify the object a 
human wanted them to fetch (Kaminski, Tempelmann, Call, & Tomasello, 2009), such a design 
had never been used before and deserves to be replicated with more objects to fortify our 
preliminary results.  
Additionally, if this ability could be straightforwardly confirmed, it would also clearly 
demonstrate that dogs do not rely on odors to solve this kind of task but well and truly on visual 
features. It has not been clearly established yet that dogs from previous studies (as well as Moka) 
relied on visual features rather than on scent cues when completing their tasks (see Kaminski, 
Tempelmann, Call, & Tomasello, 2009's discussion for a related discussion). Although a 
considerable increasing number of studies assessing canine cognition utilize paradigms that are 
heavily reliant on vision, little is known about how dogs visually perceive their external 
environment. In general, the visual system of dogs appears to be worse than that of humans 
(see Byosiere, Chouinard, Howell, & Bennett, 2017 for a review). First, dogs appear to be more 
scotopic than humans, since they are especially adapted to dim light conditions and less sensitive 
to color perception. Dogs have two types of cone photoreceptor cells (against three for humans) 
that typically correspond to short-wave (a spectrum of blue) and long-wave (a spectrum of 
yellow) sensitivities. Moreover, 3% of dogs’ retina cells are cone photoreceptor cells in contrast to 
roughly 5% in humans (Byosiere et al., 2017). Nevertheless, dogs’ ability to distinguish different 
colors remains controversial and studies often provide conflicting results. As evidence, some 
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studies have suggested that dogs have dichromatic color vision and have trouble perceiving 
differences between green, yellow and red color cues (Neitz, Geist, & Jacobs, 1989), although 
others have claimed appropriate identification of all primary colors by dogs (e.g. Rosengren, 
1969; Tanaka, Watanabe, Eguchi, & Yoshimoto, 2000). Secondly, it has also been estimated that 
dogs’ visual acuity is around 20/75, meaning that from 20 feet away, a dog could perceive an 
object that a human being could differentiate from 75 feet away (Miller & Murphy, 1995). Such 
diminished visual acuity possibly reflects a higher difficulty in discriminating fine details by dogs. 
Currently, there is no consensus about the perceptual cues that dogs utilized to differentiate 
between objects, but being accurate when faced with a sample of copies of objects never 
encountered before, can reasonably discard the assumption that they relied on odor cues. 
Conclusion 
This study shows that Moka is successful on this task when confronted to his owner’s voice or 
to recordings of his owner’s voice, suggesting that no visual nor auditory cues influence 
Moka’s decisions when solving the task. Nonetheless when confronted with unknown 
recorded voices, Moka failed to recognize the associations, which is likely due to the apparatus 
or to a default of generalization abilities to novel auditory instances. Finally, he demonstrated 
encouraging generalization abilities to novel visual instances that shared at least one visual 
property with the trained object. Further replications of this finding would confirm that dogs are 
capable of relying on visual cues despite their presumed lower visual acuity.  
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION  
In the last 20 years, a myriad of research has been conducted and uncovered a variety of behaviors 
and abilities that make dogs an important model for studying cognition. This can be essentially 
attributed to their unique social cognitive aptitude and comprehension of human communicative 
intentions. For instance, dogs outperformed all other non-human animal species in locating hidden 
food based on human-given cues (e.g. Bräuer, Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2006; Hare 
et al., 2002; Kaminski, Tempelmann, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). Dogs have also been shown to 
understand human words, a complex cognitive trait that served as the basis for our research on 
canine long-term memory formation. Since very little research has examined if and how animals 
form long lasting memories, the central issues of this thesis were 1) to investigate if a non-
primate species do create memories for complex stimuli that can last in time; 2) to 
characterize the precise conditions required for a long-term memory to be formed for this 
animal model and for this specific cross-modal paradigm and 3) to understand whether these 
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conditions and learning strategies are similar to those currently established in human 
adults.  
To address these questions, we recruited 40 dogs that were trained on the word-referent concept 
during a six month period. Only about half of them passed the training phase and underwent the 
comprehension and retention tests. Then, the best performing dog of the cohort was subjected to a 
series of exploratory experiments which started to shed light on those issues and truly constituted 
an avenue for future research.  
Overall, our results revealed that the word-object concept is a complex task for dogs, since only 
a very few of them reliably acquired it. Acquisition of such a demanding task appeared to be age-
sensitive in our dog sample, which was reflected both in terms of accuracy and number of 
assimilated stimuli during the allocated time. Nevertheless, we provided evidence that dogs are 
capable of creating long-term memories for this knowledge, as they significantly remembered 
the mappings after a delay of three months without rehearsal in between. This underpins previous 
findings showing that animals can form a sensory memory or a memory for an abstract task that 
can last in time (e.g. Burdyn et al., 1984; Demant et al., 2011b; Johnson & Davis, 1973; Patterson 
& Tzeng, 1979; Reichmuth Kastak & Schusterman, 2002; Wallis et al., 2016). However, our work 
fosters our understanding about memory formation in animals, since it demonstrates that a non-
primate animal can store and retrieve an entire knowledge such as “semantic-like” information. 
Indeed, dogs not only recognized the objects and the auditory labels, they also remembered the 
relational links between objects and words, suggesting that they created internal representations 
of this knowledge to solve the task, a point that will discussed later on. Nevertheless, as for 
humans, we observed an age-dependent decline in remembering the information in the long 
term. This suggests that dogs share intrinsic mechanisms underlying memory formation and 
recall with humans.  
Next, we showed that once a dog is familiar with a task, learning novel instances related to this 
task, is reliant on the number of repetitions. In contrast to humans, a dog may not be capable of 
acquiring “semantic-like” information after a single learning trial. In dogs, learning seems to be 
a repetition-driven process, at least regarding arbitrary cross-modal information. Our study 
also supports the idea that repetition must be distributed in time for learning to be efficient 
and for a memory trace to be formed. We did not directly test whether the memory strength 
increased linearly with the number of presentations encountered during learning, but basically the 
longer the dog was familiar with an item, the better he retrieved its associated name during the 
subsequent memory tests.  
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Additionally, our results strongly suggest that a dog with a relatively small word-object 
“lexicon” is not learning from ostensive labeling. However, repeated sessions of ostensive 
labeling spaced in time induce acquisition of novel information but not the creation of robust 
memory traces lasting in time. Conversely, our pioneering experiments propose that the 
consolidation process primarily relies on the reinforcements provided during the retrieval 
exercises and/or to the retrieval effect itself. 
Finally, we showed that a dog with a fairly recent history of familiarization toward such an 
abstract concept is already able to demonstrate reasoning by exclusion skills and to exhibit 
encouraging capacities of generalizing his knowledge to novel stimuli that share similar visual 
features. However, he did not seem capable of extending his knowledge to novel voices that were 
tape-recorded and generated by loudspeakers. Dogs from previous studies who were greatly 
accustomed to this concept demonstrated overall larger generalization skills (e.g. Griebel & Oller, 
2012; Pilley & Reid, 2011; Van Der Zee et al., 2012). Thus it can be assumed that generalization 
is mostly possible when the subject is provided with a substantial experiential background, 
in other words with an important expertise in the task domain. 
In order to generalize, an animal should be able to decontextualize the knowledge he acquired 
during training and to extend this knowledge to novel situations, stimuli, contexts, etc. If so, it can 
be claimed that the given animal developed a semantic-like memory of that information and that 
he created an internal representation of that information.  
In this discussion, I would like to debate these two assumptions, taking account of the word-object 
pair concept. First, I questioned myself whether word learning by dogs reflects a real processing 
of words in a human sense and with a semantic-like component. And second, I wondered whether 
dogs create internal representations of object names which would inform us about the underlying 
type of memory. 
In 1984, Herman et al. defined a word as “a unique, independent semantic entity; entities are 
agents, objects, action or modifiers of place and direction” (Herman & Wolz, 1984). Findings 
from previous studies in addition to the preliminary empirical evidence provided by our work 
represent a giant leap in the understanding of word learning by dogs. It already replied to some of 
Markman & Abelev’s and Bloom’s concerns (Paul Bloom, 2004; Markman & Abelev, 2004) but 
future investigations are still needed to better comprehend the mechanisms underlying word 
learning by dogs. Do dogs learn the meaning of a specific word on the basis of inherent 
cognitive processes, of low-level associative processes induced by the reinforcements, or of a 
combination of both? Intensive training combined with systematic reinforcement may produce 
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the desired behavior in the end but maybe not any understanding of language with a sense-making 
component. If so, succeeding in mapping words to items or to actions would have, at first glance, 
little to do with word learning. 
Nevertheless, in an admittedly more natural way, a newborn human will also be similarly exposed 
countless times to the objects of their environment that will be labeled in a temporal contiguity 
before grasping the sense of this word and the fact that the two agents are related. As reviewed in 
the previous part of this thesis, in preverbal infants, initial word learning is characterized by a 
slow process that requires multiple repetitions combined with co-occurring non-verbal gestural 
cues (e.g. pointing to the object, holding the object, gazing at the object, etc.) and implicit 
reinforcement (e.g. mother’s smile). During their 6th to 8th month of life, infants acquire the 
referential understanding that words can refer to objects, actions, people, properties, etc. 
Thereafter, what makes the main difference, as well-described by Bloom, is the wide range of 
vocabularies children acquire and the amount of novel words they learn per day, even from 
overhead speech or when nobody is trying to teach them (Paul Bloom, 2004). Obviously, even an 
expert word-trained dog will never reach such a level of aptitude. However, Bloom acknowledged 
the possibility that Rico’s learning of object names may be qualitatively similar to that of a 
child, differing only in degree, not in kind.  
To illustrate this idea, let’s take the example of a farmer who trains his dog to work with him in 
herding sheep. When let loose with the sheep herd for the first time, the dog will spontaneously 
initiate behaviors. On the basis of positive or negative vocal feedback given by the farmer, he will 
progressively learn to infer correct behaviors. Additionally, the farmer will label the expected 
behaviors each time his dog will perform them (e.g. “turn right”, ”stop here”, etc.) so that in the 
course of time, the dog will achieve a distinct behavior upon command even without the farmer in 
view. Consequently, the dog learned merely from daily experience without intensive explicit 
training. Thereafter, he may also appropriately respond to the words in various contexts and 
perhaps also if pronounced by different people. This greatly suggests that the dog gradually and 
naturally assigned a semantic-like meaning to each distinct word, exactly as defined by Herman.  
To promote this assumption, one empirical study demonstrated a dog’s combinatorial 
understanding of words referring to objects, namely a preposition object, a verb and a direct 
object (e.g. “to ball take Frisbee”) (Pilley, 2013). Since the dog was similarly successful with 
objects never encountered before, performance could not be explained by rote memorized strings 
of words. In contrast, it clearly demonstrates that this female dog could appropriately extend her 
knowledge to novel instances and contexts without additional learning.   
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Furthermore, inferential reasoning abilities by dogs go also beyond basic associative 
processes. Indeed, selecting a referent by exclusion corresponds to “the selection of the correct 
alternative by logically excluding other potential alternatives” (Aust, Range, Steurer, & Huber, 
2008). Thus, such choice responses cannot be based on mere associative learning mechanisms 
because the name and the referent haven’t been presented together in this single trial prior to the 
inferential selection. Alternatively, it clearly suggests that dogs are endowed with some inherent 
word learning principles to succeed, as described previously with children. For instance, they 
must at least have acquired the “whole object”, “mutual exclusivity” and “novel-name-
nameless” principles (Baldwin & Markman, 1989; Grassmann et al., 2012; Mervis & Bertrand, 
1994).  
Lastly, dogs’ integration of the word-object referential concept seems facilitated by an ease of 
interpreting verbal and gestural information from humans. For instance, dogs are sensitive to 
co-reference of pointing and naming in order to determine the referent of a spoken word, but only 
if pointing does not conflict with their previous knowledge of a given word (Grassmann et al., 
2012). This skill is close to referential understanding of the co-occurrence of multimodal referring 
cues observed in babies (e.g. when a mother points to an object and says “look, this is a cup”). 
Similarly, dogs seem to understand the representational nature of objects since they successfully 
decode new iconic communicative signs provided by humans to identify desired objects, often 
from the first trial. Since apes require extended training to accomplish this type of task, it is likely 
that only dogs are able to grasp the communicative frames of humans which explains the 
flexibility and rapidity with which they acquire new abstract tasks (Kaminski et al., 2009). This 
stregnhtens the hypothesis that word learning by dogs is perhaps not merely reflected by a 
relatively simple instrumental response but that some inherent cognitive processes (probably 
ancestral or inherited via the domestication process) drives their exceptional comprehension of 
human language. 
In sum, in my opinion, dogs learn the word-referent concept mainly by means of positive and 
negative reinforcement (either implicitly for dogs working daily with humans or explicitly for 
specific purposes) but are yet equipped with probable ancestral or inherited intrinsic 
principles that drive their behavior and facilitate the acquisition of such abstract concepts. I 
also suggest that once a dog is capable of generalizing and decontextualizing, the knowledge 
they have been trained on acquires a semantic-like component. In my opinion, this is only 
possible if the animal developed internal representations of the abstract concepts and their 
related contents. 
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This leads us to the second point I wanted to discuss here, namely the possibility that dogs create 
mental representations of sensory information.  
For nonhuman animals, concept learning is considered as the highest degree of abstraction 
attainable (Reichmuth Kastak & Schusterman, 2002). Concepts can be centered on common 
perceptual, relational or associational properties. Perceptual concepts include categories of stimuli 
that are perceptively similar, relational concepts are based on common abstract relationships 
shared by sets of stimuli (e.g. sameness or oddity concepts), whereas associative concepts are 
formed when disparate arbitrary stimuli are linked together on the basis of common relations 
(Reichmuth Kastak & Schusterman, 2002). A conceptual behavior is demonstrated when an 
animal appropriately responds to novel problems or situations on the basis of the common 
properties/relations gained via prior experience (either implicitly or explicitly as discussed 
earlier). In order to overcome such novel situations efficiently and more rapidly, one could claim 
that the animal must have relied on internal representations of these common properties/relations. 
Fortunately, one study examined this proposal. To test this hypothesis, researchers have modified 
methods originally developed for research on preverbal infants to investigate mental 
representations in dogs. As described in the previous part of this thesis, studies demonstrated that 
human infants would look longer at unexpected stimuli compared to familiar ones if displayed 
simultaneously. In a similar dog-designed paradigm, Adachi et al. presented a photograph either 
of the dog’s owner face or of an unfamiliar person’s face, after playing back a voice that either 
matched (congruent condition) or mismatched (incongruent condition) the face stimulus (Adachi, 
Kuwahata, & Fujita, 2007). The results demonstrated that when the displayed face contradicted 
the auditory stimulus, dogs spent significantly more time looking at this incongruent photograph 
compared to the looking time toward the face in the congruent pairings. The authors suggested 
that dogs had expectations about visual events based on auditory information. Dogs may have 
activated internal representations of their owner’s face when they heard their owner’s voice. If so, 
specific brain regions allocated to internal representations of sensory information could exist.  
In humans, the neural regions responsible for detecting auditory novelty and for discriminating 
between competing auditory sensory stimuli (studied by means of oddball paradigms) include the 
primary auditory cortex along with a broader attentional network (e.g. Cacciaglia, Escera, Slabu, 
Grimm, & Sanjuán, 2015; Linden et al., 1999). Moreover, a typical ERP (event-related potential) 
component called the mismatch negativity (MMN), a negative deflection that peaks 
approximately 160-220ms post novel stimulus onset, is believed to be related to discrimination of 
unattended stimuli (e.g. Näätänen, Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007 for a review). Using a 
minimal invasive procedure (multi-unit intracranial recordings), one study demonstrated a 
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negative peak of the ERP at 180ms after infrequent deviant stimuli in dogs, but not after standard 
stimuli (Howell, Conduit, Toukhsati, & Bennett, 2012). This result suggests that dogs detected a 
difference between the tones and processed the discriminable changes in auditory stimuli with 
relatively similar mechanisms as humans. Furthermore, one fMRI study revealed a hemispheric 
bias for praise words versus neutral words, suggesting for the first time, semantic-like processing 
of auditory stimuli by dogs (although there was a subsequent correction in which right and left 
were reversed) (Andics et al., 2016). 
Very recently, researchers probed the neural basis for auditory discriminations, and more 
specifically for internal representations of trained words, using an awake-fMRI approach 
(Prichard et al., 2018). This study is particularly influential for our understanding of 
representations of object names by dogs given that dogs were trained to select objects based on 
their associated labels. Dogs had to appropriately discriminate between two trained objects (with 
80% correct responses for one object and 50% or above for the other) before being tested using an 
MRI scan. The MRI protocol consisted of an event-based design that included four trial types: (1) 
trained label-expected object; (2) trained label-unexpected object; (3) pseudoword-novel object 
and (4) random reward trials. The authors described auditory novelty detection areas in the 
domain of human speech; specifically greater activation in the right parietotemporal cortex to 
novel pseudowords relative to trained words. The authors argued that such novelty detection may 
be explained either by less frequent exposures to the pseudowords (i.e. similarly to the oddball 
paradigm) or to a lack of meaning associated to those pseudowords (i.e. lexical processing). In 
humans, meaningful words typically result in higher activity within the so called “semantic 
network” relative to non-evocative pseudowords (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009 for a 
review). This semantic network’s anatomical location is ill-defined in humans and is still a matter 
of debate since no consensus has been reached (see the previous part of this thesis). A meta-
analysis of 120 functional neuroimaging studies revealed that this left-lateralized network 
comprises at least seven regions, namely the posterior inferior parietal lobe, the middle temporal 
gyrus, the fusiform and parahippocampal gyri, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the inferior 
frontal gyrus, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate gyrus (Binder et al., 
2009). The entire network is sometimes called the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) or temporal-
parietal-occipital cortex (TPO). In the fMRI study in dogs, follow up MVPA analyses identified 
regions involved in the discrimination of the two trained words, namely the posterior thalamus, 
the amygdala, the left TPJ, the left dorsal caudate nucleus and for seven dogs, the left 
temporal cortex. The authors concluded that such areas are remarkably similar to the conceptual 
component of the “semantic network” in humans. Although these regions were of marginal 
statistical significance, they could correspond to potential sites for receptive word processing in 
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dogs. If so, this finding goes in favor of semantic representations in dogs. Unfortunately, the 
authors did not include a condition in which a trained object followed a pseudoword, or a 
condition in which a trained object was mismatched to a trained word. This would have provided 
supplementary neuroimaging evidence for violation of expected semantic content and would have 
furthered the possibility that dogs do create internal representations of sensory information. 
To conclude, I think that these innovative findings lend weight to the hypothesis that the 
remarkable abilities of dogs to know tens, hundreds or thousands of object names truly depend 
on mental representations of the arbitrary mappings. It also suggests that dogs have access to 
that information when needed by reactivating their internal representations. If so, very interesting 
hypotheses can be advanced about the underlying type of memory and underlying mechanisms. 
Indeed, if dogs really create mental representations and if the long-term memory performance we 
found can truly be explained by an access to these representations, this would appeal to structures 
analogous to the human medial temporal lobe, rather than brain regions involved in 
procedural memories. In other words, this would fortify the assumption that retrieving objects 
by name from memory is not the consequence of a low-level association between an item and a 
reward generated across repeated trials, but truly the formation of unitary integrated concepts. 
If so, it can be claimed that arbitrary word-object pairs are perhaps similarly mediated by highly 
selective “concept neurons” within medial temporal structures. Indubitably, the substantial 
improvement of neuroimaging techniques will truly open a fruitful avenue for research on 
memory in dogs which should help in probing the exact underlying neural mechanisms. For us, 
humans, the validity of long-term memory can be empirically established as we do recall things or 
events over many decades (Larzabal et al., 2017). It is difficult to draw a parallel in animal 
research to substantiate the claim for such long-term memory. Meanwhile, the pioneering and 
promising demonstrations of episodic-like and now semantic-like memory in nonhuman animals 
enlightens the possibility of applying human memory models to animals. It also suggests that the 
cognitive gap between humans and distantly related species is not the chasm it has originally 
believed to be. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION, LIMITS AND PERSPECTIVES 
The two objectives of this thesis were to examine if long-term memories for complex stimuli can 
be established in humans early in life and in a non-primate animal model, and to investigate some 
of the conditions that are required for these memories to be formed. In order to address these 
questions, this thesis especially focused on four of the M4 claims that have already been 
investigated in adult humans, at a behavioral level and in the specific context of the word-referent 
paradigm.  
Using this paradigm, we showed that young children and dogs could recognize cross-modal 
associations that they have not experienced for months (at least 1 month for 4-year-old children 
and at least 3 months for puppies) [#claim 1] and that were not reactivated during the delay 
[#claim N°2], but we were not able to demonstrate that very few presentations were enough to 
sustain these memories [#claim N°4], neither that the memory trace could survive extreme long 
delays without being reactivated.  
Indeed, for humans early in life, we established that from 2 years of age, a single learning event 
was sufficient to observe retention after a 30-min delay, but when re-tested after a prolonged 
delay up to 6 months, older children (preschoolers) failed to recognize the pairings even when five 
learning trials were provided during learning. Moreover, for domestic dogs, we showed that 
information recall was possible after a delay of 3 months provided that the knowledge was 
repeated several times during learning. Indeed, dogs were exposed to the associations almost daily 
during a 6-month training period since there were inexperienced with the word-referent concept 
when learning began. 
The absence of retention after very long delays with only a few repeats can be explained by the 
difficulty of the task and the nature of the stimuli we used - stimuli involving two sensory 
modalities – that depend on one of the most complex structure of the brain. In the general 
introduction of this thesis, we reviewed the work of colleagues who found that only 1 to 3 
exposures to drawings were sufficient for adult participants to recognize these drawings among 
novel ones a decade later, indicating that few exposures are enough for adults to form long-lasting 
sensory memories (Larzabal et al., 2018). The stimuli used by these authors were images while 
here we used word-object associations. Thus, the paradigm implemented in this thesis was much 
more demanding, since it not only required the creation of a representation of a visual stimulus; it 
also required the creation of a representation of a sound pattern, and linking the two 
representations together. As mentioned earlier in this manuscript, linking information from 
different sensory modalities together in order to create a whole concept is probably only possible 
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in brain regions at the top of the hierarchy (i.e. in multimodal association areas and medial 
temporal lobe structures) that are amongst the latest structures to reach maturity in humans. 
Therefore, it might be that a certain level of brain maturation is required for such complex 
representations to be maintained higher up in the hierarchy. These arguments are at least in 
accordance with the phenomena of infantile and juvenile amnesia described in the context of 
episodic memories and that depend on such medial temporal lobe structures.  
However, our work does not exclude the possibility that young children remember things well 
with a few repeats. It might be that retention after a substantial delay following very few 
exposures to unimodal sensory inputs that do not require higher-up structure to bind inputs 
together, is possible in young children and in dogs too. Lower-level brain structures mature 
earlier, and thus may support longer-term memories in unimodal domains. This is something we 
would like to test in future work. Our finding that almost all dog subjects were excellent at 
recognizing the objects after a break of 3 months while many failed to recall the associations 
stresses how challenging our task was and evidences that long-term memories in one modality 
should be longer preserved. 
Secondly, throughout this thesis, we focused on a parameter that is at the heart of the M4 project 
and that is reported to play a key role in the establishment and maintenance of a memory at long-
term as described by Hebbian and STDP rules: repetition. Our results indeed suggest that beyond 
the maturational stage of the brain structures and the difficulty of the task, the number of times 
organisms encounter the stimuli during learning seems to be a critical parameter to form durable 
memories. Indeed, we were able to highlight that the strength of the memory was dependent on 
the number of presentations provided during learning [#claim 3]. Our results are in line with the 
idea that early in life, children (and regarding our findings, probably puppies too) rapidly acquire 
novel information but if not rehearsed, the information is also relatively rapidly lost. This is 
consistent with the fact that synaptic plasticity is increased early in life, allowing young organisms 
to rapidly learn a huge amount of information. Perhaps, all that is needed for young organisms to 
maintain information at long-term is to regularly reactivate the memory traces via repetitions 
distributed in time. It might be that without repetitions distributed in time and without the 
possibility for children or animals to internally rehearse the newly acquired knowledge, the 
information is not accessible anymore (or at least difficult to access later). In this thesis, due to 
experimental constraints, the repetitions occurred over the course of a single learning session in 
children and three learning sessions in dogs (Moka). In future work, it would be interesting to 
explore the effect of scattering the repetitions in time (i.e. one repetition a day during several days 
scattered in time). Since it is now well-established that sleep is crucial for the consolidation 
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process, we hypothesize that few repetitions distributed in time may be enough to maintain such 
complex representations in memory at very long-term during the early life of organisms. 
Overall, our findings that emphasize a repetition-driven learning fit with the theories at a neuronal 
level described in the introduction of this thesis. Indeed, it can be proposed that already early in 
life, neurons can become selective to their preferred sensory stimuli and probably do not fire at all 
until the stimulus is present again. However, in contrast to adults for whom the neural pathways 
are already well-organized, the circuits that are poorly active as well as the synapses that are not 
sufficiently reinforced during learning are pruned during early childhood. Therefore, even if a 
neuron preserves its pattern of selectivity for highly integrated information (e.g. a “concept” 
neuron or even a “grandmother” neuron for a complex representation such as the name of an 
object), it might be that it is “the access” to that neuron that is lost during childhood. Repetitions, 
especially if distributed in time, would reinforce the pathway as well as the synaptic weights of 
the recruited neurons, and thus allow an access to the higher-order neurons that are selective to the 
concept as a whole. As mentioned just above, in this thesis, since we were using cross-modal 
stimuli, we were tapping into neurons that integrate concepts as a whole (e.g. the “rivou” concept) 
and that are localized on the top of the processing hierarchy. However, since no single unit 
recordings have never been performed in a child or a dog brain it is still unclear whether “rivou” 
neurons similar to the Jennifer Anniston’s neuron discovered in adult humans can be formed early 
during development or in another animal species.  
Finally, in the context of word learning, we also highlighted that providing repetitions was not the 
only “ingredient” to promote the creation of a memory: we showed that the attentional resources 
of an individual during learning as well as the learning strategies also played an important role. 
For instance, we showed that for a similar number of exposures, when using an ostensive labeling 
method, 2-year-olds were capable of recognizing the name of newly learned objects, while when 
using a reasoning learning strategy, retention was not observed in children of the same age. 
Likewise, in dogs, we found that for a similar number of exposures to the pairings, ostensively 
naming objects seemed to be less efficient than implementing test trials with feedback of accuracy 
and reward, to induce a memory trace that will last in time (at least 1 month). Furthermore, our 
results indicate that young children and dogs do not rely on the same learning strategies to form a 
memory trace of the name of a novel object. Thus, it might be that the methods implemented for 
acquiring novel information may vary from one species to another, but to be established and 
preserved, memories may depend on similar mechanisms (e.g. neuronal selectivity, synaptic 
plasticity, etc.). Obviously, in this thesis we are far from having enough evidence to claim that the 
mechanisms underlying the formation of long-term memories may be “universal”, but our results, 
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at least, do not go against this idea. However, as discussed earlier, our findings suggest that the 
rapidity with which a memory is formed as well as the durability of that memory in time is 
enhanced in mature and more complex brain systems. According to our opinion, there might be an 
evolutionary aspect regarding the complexity, rapidity and durability of the information an 
organism can acquire. 
Limits 
We are aware that this thesis contains many weaknesses. First, we would like to mention that it 
was the first time that experiments involving dogs were carried out in our lab and only a very few 
number of studies at CerCo included children in their protocols in the past. Therefore, it was very 
challenging to run experiments with these two models of research. We first had to set up 
collaborations and partnerships with specialists from both study models. Then, we had to find 
facilities to carry out the experiments with dogs. Finally, we had to overcome the heavy 
procedures to get all our ethical agreements. It took us more than a year to get our studies 
approved by the CPP (Comité de Protection des Personnes), which was vital to start our 
experiments with young children at CerCo. This is the reason why some of our studies 
encompassing children are unfortunately not totally completed. But we are aware that the main 
flaw comes from our experiments with dogs. We did not expect so few dogs to acquire the word-
referent concept. Indeed, in the literature, apart from the few impressive dog cases, there was no 
large-scale study investigating this concept on a large range of dog species and dog ages (the 
fMRI study from Prichard et al. was only published in 2018 and the criteria for learning were not 
very stringent). Thus, by the time we started our experiments, there was no evidence that this 
concept would be so tough for dogs to acquire. Originally, we expected that at least a third or even 
a half of our dog subjects would reliably know the meaning of about a dozen objects at the end of 
the 6-month training period. Thus, we had initially planned to conduct the series of experiments 
on long-term memory following various learning strategies with a sample of about fifteen to 
twenty dogs, which would have been more relevant for statistical purposes. Unfortunately, as 
explained in this manuscript, only a very few dogs and particularly one was consistently accurate 
during the fetching exercises. Even with this unique dog subject, we had to downgrade our initial 
objectives that consisted of implementing the same protocols used with children, although the 
learning support and environment would anyway have been different (e.g. touchscreen vs real 
objects; neural verbal encouragements between trials vs food reward, etc.). For example, we had 
hoped to teach Moka three novel word-object pair a session and test him on that knowledge 30min 
after learning. As shown in this manuscript, a single learning session was far from enough for him 
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to reliably incorporate the name of three novel items, probably because his degree of expertise 
with the task was not yet sufficient.  
Perspectives 
There are many perspectives to the work done in this thesis. First of all, we obviously need to 
complete our experiments 4, 5 and 6 by including more child and adult participants. Secondly, it 
would naturally be very interesting to examine the formation of (very) long-term memories for 
complex sensory inputs in other animal species, perhaps genetically more distant from humans or 
less keen to communicate with humans. Next, as already mentioned several times throughout this 
thesis, neuroimaging techniques would provide objective evidence about the neural mechanisms 
and brain regions that support the formation of cross-modal sensory memories early in life as well 
as in other animal species. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, it would also be interesting to investigate whether the results 
we obtained are specific to the word-referent paradigm or generalizable to other types of stimuli. 
For instance, we could replicate our experiments with novel faces associated with invented names, 
since it is well-known that early in life, babies are predominantly attracted by faces. One could 
argue that using stimuli with such a positive emotional valence would increase the strength of the 
memory. As also said previously, in future work we would like to replicate the RSVP experiment 
conducted on adults in children, in order to better characterize if repetition-based learning during 
childhood is enhanced when only one modality is involved. We would also like to record ERPs in 
order to underlie the brain correlates during the detection of repetitions in children.                     
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Résumé substantiel 
La vie est partout. Du plus petit organisme unicellulaire à la créature vivante la plus complexe. 
Mais la vie est aussi un enjeu. Pour vivre, les organismes doivent interagir et évoluer dans des 
environnements parfois étrangers voir périlleux. Le processus de sélection naturelle va favoriser 
l’émergence de certaines espèces mais aussi le déclin de d’autres. Pour survivre, être compétitif et 
se reproduire, une grande partie des Etres vivants sont pourvus d’étonnantes capacités 
d’adaptation. L’adaptation comportementale, qu’elle s’effectue de façon consciente ou réflexe, 
exigent des animaux qu’ils « apprennent » de leur environnement. Ils doivent notamment traiter 
une multitude d’informations à chaque instant, et si dotés de cette capacité, conserver ces 
informations pour une utilisation ultérieure. Pouvoir stocker des informations en mémoire confère 
aux Etres Vivants un extraordinaire avantage pour survivre dans la nature. Mais comment des 
espèces aussi diverses et génétiquement éloignées peuvent-elles apprendre et potentiellement 
mémoriser des informations ? Existe-il des principaux généraux de formation de la mémoire ? Y-
a-t’ il des mécanismes communs qui gouvernent les règles d’apprentissage ? Et comment 
pouvons-nous, humains, explorer ces règles et mécanismes chez un large panel d’espèces afin de 
mieux appréhender si le fonctionnement de l’apprentissage et de la mémoire a un caractère 
« universel »? 
Voilà maintenant des décennies voir des siècles que ces questions passionnent les chercheurs. 
Cependant, comprendre comment une information est physiquement traitée puis stockée en 
mémoire n’est pas une mince affaire. Afin d’explorer ces questions, les chercheurs de placent à 
différentes échelles organisationnelles : moléculaire, cellulaire, tissulaire, comportementale, et 
depuis peu, computationnelle. Ils s’intéressent à des espèces très variées, allant d’organismes 
simples à des organismes parfois très complexes, avec à chaque fois la volonté de mieux 
comprendre si ces espèces partagent des traits communs ou bien si l’évolution a façonnée des 
modalités d’apprentissage et de mémorisation très distinctes les unes des autres. D’une part, 
certains chercheurs ont pour objectif de révéler des modèles animaux qui calquent le plus 
fidèlement possible le modèle humain, et ce, essentiellement pour des fins cliniques (par exemple, 
mettre au jour un modèle animal convaincant de la maladie d’Alzheimer afin de mieux étudier 
cette pathologie). D’autre part, d’autres chercheurs ont pour but d’étudier les mécanismes 
d’apprentissage et de formation de mémoires chez l’Homme, et de déterminer s’ils sont propres à 
l’Homme, ou si à l’inverse, ils sont largement répandus au sein du règne animal. D’un point de 
vue évolutionniste, ce type de recherche permet de mieux comprendre comment certains 
mécanismes auraient évolués et se seraient complexifiés au cours de l’évolution. 
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Au cours de cette thèse, nous avons cherché à savoir si certains des principes qui sous-tendent la 
formation de mémoires à long-terme chez l’Homme adulte, trouvent un écho chez des espèces 
animales relativement éloignées de l’Homme, ainsi qu’au cours du développement de l’Homme. 
Plus précisément, cette thèse vise à élucider si certains des principes énoncés par le projet M4 
(Memory Mechanisms in Man and Machine) porté par S.Thorpe et mis en évidence chez 
l’Homme adulte, sont généralisables à d’autres espèces ainsi qu’aux premières années de vie de 
l’Homme. Les travaux de cette thèse ont été effectués à un niveau comportemental. Cependant, 
nous avons tenté de mettre nos résultats en relation avec les connaissances générales sur les 
corrélats neuraux aussi souvent que cela était possible. Cela permet de mieux comprendre les 
mécanismes cérébraux mis en jeu lors d’un comportement donné. C’est pourquoi cette thèse se 
situe à l’interface entre comportement, cognition et neurosciences. 
Pour modèle d’étude, nous avons choisi le chien domestique, car bien que méconnu au sein de la 
communauté scientifique il y a seulement 20 ans de cela, il devient aujourd’hui un modèle de 
choix, notamment grâce à ses incroyables capacités de communications et de coopération avec 
l’Homme. De plus, un florilège d’études récentes ont mis en lumière d’étonnantes performances 
cognitives chez cette espèce, suggérant que malgré des divergences anatomiques, morphologiques 
et fonctionnelles notables avec l’Homme, le chien domestique a sût se parer d’atouts cognitifs 
largement insoupçonnés jusqu’à récemment. Il ne faut pas oublier que cette espèce est la première 
que l’Homme ait domestiquée, et que les millénaires de cohabitation avec l’Homme ainsi qu’une 
sélection génétique accrue effectuée par ce dernier, ont probablement été les principaux 
ingrédients permettant l’émergence de telles capacités cognitives, notamment de communication 
avec l’homme. C’est donc sur des critères de coopération et d’aisance de communication entre 
cette espèce et la nôtre, que nous avons choisi le chien comme modèle d’étude distant de 
l’Homme, pour étudier l’apprentissage et la mémoire de stimuli sensoriels complexes.  
Par ailleurs, la façon dont les humains emmagasinent et stockent des informations précocement au 
cours de leur développement reste largement méconnue. Est-ce qu’un bébé ou un jeune enfant 
apprend et retiens de la même façon qu’un adulte ? A l’inverse, est-ce qu’apprentissage et 
mémoire sont des capacités cognitives qui s’acquièrent progressivement au cours du 
développement et qui dépendraient de corrélats neuraux mâtures et fonctionnels ? 
Pour ces deux modèles d’étude, nous nous sommes tout d’abord demandés si des informations 
sensorielles arbitraires pouvaient être conservées en mémoire à long terme sans qu’il n’y ait eu de 
réactivation en mémoire durant la période d’intervalle. Pour cela, nous nous sommes basés sur un 
concept abstrait complexe que les jeunes enfants mais aussi apparemment les chiens sont capables 
d’acquérir, celui que des mots peuvent désigner des objets. Nous avons notamment exploré 
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certains paramètres susceptibles de faciliter l’encodage et le stockage en mémoire de ce type 
d’information. Parmi eux, nous avons cherché à savoir si le nombre de présentations de nouvelles 
associations mot-objets lors de l’apprentissage avait un effet sur la rétention du nom de ces objets 
après un délai. En effet, un des postulats du projet M4 propose que les poids synaptiques de 
neurones sélectifs (donc la trace mnésique) accroitraient linéairement avec le nombre de 
répétitions de l’information lors de la phase d’encodage. En lien avec ce postulat, pour chacun de 
ces deux modèles d’étude, nous avons essayé de déterminer le nombre minimal de présentations 
d’une paire mot-objet nécessaire au stockage de cette nouvelle information en mémoire à long 
terme. Enfin, pour aller plus loin, l’effet de deux stratégies d’apprentissage sur la mémorisation de 
nouveaux mots ont particulièrement attiré notre curiosité : l’ « ostensive naming » (à savoir le fait 
de nommer ostensiblement un objet nouveau ; dans ce cas l’apprentissage est dit passif) et le 
« fast-mapping » (c’est-à-dire le fait d’inférer un mot nouveau au seul objet inconnu d’une scène 
en utilisant une stratégie de déduction logique ; dans ce cas l’apprentissage est actif). Nous tenons 
à préciser que le but de cette thèse n’était pas de simplement comparer les performances des 
enfants à celles des chiens lors des différentes tâches expérimentales mises en œuvre, mais bien de 
comprendre si des règles communes à ces deux modèles d’études pouvaient être identifiées. 
Mémoire à long terme d’associations mot-objets chez le jeune enfant 
Cette première partie comprend six études, trois étant achevées (études 1, 2 & 3) et trois en cours 
(études 4, 5 & 6).  
Des enfants de deux (et parfois trois) classes d’âge ont été recrutés, ainsi que des adultes naïfs 
quant à l’objectif de leur recrutement. Les âges étudiés étaient ciblées avec précision:  
- 18 mois pour les plus jeunes (étude 1), c.à.d. des enfants ne produisant généralement pas 
plus d’une cinquantaine de mots (i.e. explosion lexicale non effectuée), dont le pic de densité 
synaptique du gyrus denté de l’hippocampe (i.e. un des composant nécessaire à la consolidation 
des informations) n’est pas atteint et dont le système mnésique est immature (amnésie infantile) ; 
- 24 mois (études 1 à 5), c.à.d. des enfants ayant pour la majorité une production verbale 
nettement supérieure à 50 mots (i.e. explosion lexicale effectuée) et ayant atteint le pic de densité 
synaptique du gyrus denté, mais ne possédant pas un système mnésique mature (amnésie 
infantile) ; 
- 4 ans (études 1 à 6), c.à.d. des enfants à la production verbale fluide, et possédant un 
système mnésique davantage fonctionnel mais pas pleinement mature (amnésie juvénile) ; 
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-  adultes de 20 à 60 ans (études 1 à 6, sauf 4),  c.à.d. des individus possédant un système 
mnésique mature et parfaitement fonctionnel (seuls des sujets sains ont été inclus). 
Lors de ces différentes études, l’apprentissage a mis en jeu trois associations mot-objets 
arbitrairement choisies et présentées sur un écran tactile. La capacité des participants à se souvenir 
du nom de ces objets fut systématiquement testée via un test de choix forcé sur écran, faisant 
intervenir les trois associations apprises auparavant.  
L’ensemble de ces études a permis de démontrer que la performance des enfants à retenir des 
noms d’objets était corrélée au nombre de fois que ces associations leur avaient été présentées lors 
de l’apprentissage (étude 1 et 3). Nous avons montré qu’un minimum de 5 présentations d’une 
nouvelle association mot-objet était nécessaire pour qu’un enfant de 18 mois se souvienne du nom 
de cet objet après un délai de 30min, et à condition que cet objet fussent nommé de façon 
ostensive et sans ambiguïté (« ostensive naming », étude 1). Dans ce même contexte 
d’apprentissage, nous avons pu mettre en évidence pour la toute première fois qu’une seule 
exposition à un objet nouveau était suffisante pour qu’un enfant de 2 ans retienne le nom de cet 
objet (étude 1 et 3). Cela suppose, qu’au contraire de tout ce qui avait été promulgué jusqu’alors, 
une mémoire déclarative peut s’établir rapidement et sans requérir de répétitions très tôt dans 
l’enfance. Nous proposons que la diminution significative du nombre de répétitions nécessaire à la 
mémorisation de nouveaux mots observée entre 18 et 24 mois serait due à de meilleures capacités 
attentionnelles (étude 1) et à une plus grande expertise langagière des enfants (la plupart des 
enfants de 2 ans ont déjà effectué leur explosion lexicale, étude 1). Nous suggérons aussi que 
l’ « ostensive naming » est une stratégie d’apprentissage très efficace durant les 2 premières 
années de vie. En revanche, lorsque l’apprentissage de noms d’objets s’effectue de façon active en 
requérant de l’enfant qu’il utilise une stratégie de type déduction logique pour inférer un mot 
nouveau à son référent (« fast-mapping »), des enfants de 2 ans ne manifestent aucune trace de 
rétention de ces associations après un délai de 30min (étude 3). Dans cette thèse, nous avons 
apporté la preuve qu’un apprentissage passif et non ambigu de nouveaux mots (« ostensive 
naming ») est significativement plus efficace pour induire une trace mnésique à l’âge de 2 ans 
qu’un apprentissage actif de type déduction logique (étude 4). 
En revanche, cela ne semble pas être aussi vrai plus tard au cours du développement. En effet, nos 
études ont également permis de mettre en évidence un shift développemental dans l’efficacité des 
stratégies d’apprentissage. Nous avons montré qu’à l’âge de 4ans, un apprentissage actif 
nécessitant un raisonnement logique est tout aussi efficace pour apprendre et retentir le nom d’un 
nouvel objet qu’un apprentissage passif (étude 4). C’est pourquoi, nous proposons que ces deux 
types d’apprentissage seraient médiés par des régions distinctes du cerveau : celle supportant un 
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apprentissage passif serait fonctionnelle plus précocement au cours du développement que celle 
supportant un apprentissage actif. L’hypothèse alternative qu’une seule et même région cérébrale 
serait responsable de la consolidation d’un nouveau mot, mais que seule une forme plus mature de 
cette région permettrait le stockage d’un mot appris via un processus d’apprentissage actif, n’est 
pas exclue. 
Durant cette première partie de thèse, une étude en cours suggère également l’importance de 
laisser écouler du temps avant de solliciter la mémoire des jeunes enfants (étude 5). Nos résultats 
préliminaires supposent que tester des enfants de 2 ou 4ans immédiatement après un apprentissage 
(ce qui est pourtant classiquement effectué dans la littérature scientifique) aurai un effet délétère 
sur le processus de consolidation, ou du moins, ne reflèterait pas les capacités mnésiques réelles 
des jeunes enfants. En effet, il est communément admis que la mémoire à court terme (et la 
mémoire de travail), dépendante(s) des régions préfrontales, sont les plus tardives à s’établir au 
cours du développement de l’Homme. Chez le jeune enfant, il semblerait que lorsque la mémoire 
à court terme est sollicitée, elle amène à des erreurs qui pourraient vraisemblablement être évitées 
si un certain laps de temps (30min au moins) s’écoule après l’acquisition des nouvelles 
informations. 
Enfin, nous avons pu re-tester la mémoire de certains enfants de 4 ans ainsi que de certains sujets 
adultes après un délai d’1 mois ou 6 mois afin d’évaluer le maintien dans la durée de la mémoire 
(étude 6). Précisons que le choix de nos stimuli, à savoir des objets inventés associés à des 
pseudo-mots, ont permis de nous affranchir de tout risque de réactivation de la mémoire chez ces 
participants pendant toute la durée de latence. Nos résultats actuels montrent que la mémoire reste 
relativement intacte 1 mois après l’apprentissage chez des enfants de 4 ans ainsi que chez des 
adultes (étude 6). En revanche, seule la mémoire des adultes semblent survivre à des latences plus 
longues.  
Pour récapituler, il semblerait que dès très tôt au cours du développement, des enfants soient 
capables d’apprendre et mémoriser des informations de nature sémantique, telles que des 
nouveaux noms d’objets, et ce, malgré un très faible nombre d’expositions à ces informations. En 
revanche, la conservation en mémoire à très long terme de ces connaissances semblent 
compromise. Il se pourrait donc que l’amnésie infantile (et juvénile), majoritairement décrite dans 
le contexte de la mémoire épisodique, touche également la mémoire sémantique. Nous proposons, 
que tout comme chez l’adulte, une réactivation régulière des connaissances serait la clef pour 
prévenir d’une inaccessibilité à l’information durant l’enfance. Elle permettrait un renforcement 
des poids synaptiques des neurones mis en jeu et donc un maintien de la trace mnésique dans le 
temps. Dans cette thèse, nous avons également démontré qu’au-delà de la nature de l’information, 
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la stratégie mise en jeu pour acquérir cette information joue un rôle prépondérant dans la capacité 
de rétention de cette connaissance et que l’efficacité des stratégies d’apprentissage évolue au 
cours du développement.  
Mémoire à long terme d’associations mot-objets chez le chien  
Cette deuxième partie de thèse comporte deux études majeures, l’une impliquant un échantillon de 
40 chiens de toutes races et âges confondus (étude 1), et la seconde, une étude de cas, impliquant 
le chien le plus expert de la cohorte. Cette étude de cas est elle-même constituée de 3 études 
exploratoires (étude 2, 3 & 4). L’ensemble des études se sont déroulées en partenariat avec 
l’Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse et une éducatrice canine spécialisée et ont eu lieu au 
sein de l’école vétérinaire de Toulouse. 
A la différence des enfants, les chiens que nous avons recrutés étaient tous naïfs quant au fait que 
des mots peuvent désigner des objets. Il a donc fallu dans un premier temps leur enseigner le 
concept mot-objet. Cela a soulevé la question suivante : tous les chiens sont-ils capables 
d’acquérir le concept mot-objet ? 
La littérature montre que les chiens sont capables d’associer une signification à un mot 
(notamment pour des actions, ex. assis, coucher, debout, vient, stop, tourne à droite, à gauche, 
mords, prends, donne, etc.) essentiellement par le biais de conditionnements classiques et 
opérants. Plus récemment, des études de cas ont montré que des chiens pouvaient également 
associer un mot à un item neutre, et que certains d’entre eux possédaient un « répertoire lexical » 
de plusieurs centaines voire un millier de noms d’objets. Cela amène donc tout d’abord à la 
question de l’extension de la compréhension de concepts humains complexes, tels que le concept 
mot-objet, chez cette espèce non dotée de production verbale.  
Quarante chiens ont été recrutés sur la base du volontariat de leur maitre. Nous n’imposions pas 
de critères de race, de sexe, ni d’âge, mais les animaux devaient avoir un niveau minimum 
d’obéissance et d’éducation (évaluation du comportement général des chien effectuée lors de 
l’inclusion à l’étude).  
Les chiens inclus ont ensuite été entrainé quotidiennement à l’apprentissage du concept mot-objet 
par leur maitre, l’éducatrice canine et moi-même, en suivant scrupuleusement les protocoles mis 
au point par les études pionnières dans ce domaine. Des méthodes complémentaires ont également 
été développés par nos soins. Après six mois d’entrainement, la performance des chiens à 
identifier les objets associés à leur label a été évaluée en conditions contrôlées (i.e. salle 
expérimentale agréée, objets disposés aléatoirement par l’expérimentateur derrière un rideau 
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opaque, générateur aléatoire de l’objet cible à chaque essai, expérimentation entièrement filmée, 
etc.). Nos résultats ont montré que la cohorte de chiens affichait un niveau de performance 
significativement supérieur au hasard (niveau de hasard calculé via des simulations de Monte 
Carlo). Cependant, une forte variabilité interindividuelle était constatée, tant au niveau du nombre 
de noms d’objets appris en 6 mois (de 2.5 à 8) qu’au niveau de la performance en elle-même (de 
20 à 80% de réussite). Nous avons démontré que l’âge était un facteur crucial dans l’acquisition 
d’une telle tâche cognitivement complexe. En effet, nous avons pu mettre en évidence que seul le 
groupe constitué de chiots (chiens <1 an) exécutait la tâche de façon significative. Les jeunes 
chiens avaient en moyenne appris un plus grand nombre de noms d’objets et étaient 
significativement plus performants au test que les chiens adultes. 
En réponse à notre toute première question, il semblerait donc que les chiens ne soient pas tous en 
mesure d’acquérir le concept mot-objet (du moins, pas en 6 mois d’entrainement quotidien) et que 
l’acquisition de ce type de tâche est facilitée au cours du développement du chien, voire réservée 
aux chiots. Cela est concordant avec le fait que chez l’Homme, la plupart des apprentissages 
complexes sont effectués au cours des premières années de vie. On peut alors supposer que le 
chien, tout comme l’Homme, bénéficie d’une plasticité cérébrale accrue au cours du 
développement qui serait très certainement responsable de l’efficacité des apprentissages 
précoces.  
Nous nous sommes ensuite demandés si les chiens pouvaient conserver durablement en mémoire 
les noms des objets appris lors de la phase d’entrainement et si la mémoire à très long terme était 
également âge-dépendante chez cette espèce. Nos résultats démontrent que la cohorte dans son 
ensemble parvenait de façon significative à se souvenir des noms des objets après un délai de 3 
mois (aucune réactivation des informations n’a eu lieu durant ce délai). Pour la première fois, 
nous démontrons l’existence d’une mémoire à long terme pour des stimuli sensoriels bimodaux 
complexes chez le chien. Nous avons également mis en évidence que les chiots étaient 
significativement meilleurs lors du test de mémoire à long terme que les chiens adultes.  
Dans un second temps, nous nous sommes demandés si l’apprentissage et la mémorisation de 
nouveaux mots chez des chiens familiers avec le concept mot-objet suivent des règles similaires à 
celles établies chez l’homme adulte ou chez l’enfant. Afin de pouvoir effectuer un quelconque 
parallèle avec les principes énoncés chez l’humain, il était indispensable de pouvoir contrôler 
précisément le nombre de présentations des nouvelles associations mot-objet à apprendre. Pour 
cela, seul un chien expert de la tâche pouvait faire l’objet des études que nous souhaitions réaliser. 
Malheureusement, à l’issue des 6 mois d’entrainement, un seul chien était suffisamment 
convaincant et constant dans sa capacité à identifier des objets par leur noms. C’est pourquoi, ces 
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expérimentations ont été uniquement menées avec ce chien le plus expert de la cohorte, Moka, et 
ne constituent que des études exploratoires et préliminaires. Ce chien, âgé de 6 mois au début de 
la phase d’entrainement (groupe chiot), avait environ 1 an et un « répertoire lexical » d’une 
dizaine de noms d’objets lorsque ces études exploratoires ont débutées.  
Au cours de ces différentes études, nous avons pu montrer que les performances mnésiques de 
Moka à se remémorer le nom des objets étaient stables au cours du temps (étude 2), suggérant 
qu’une fois l’information acquise, elle pourrait être maintenue en « dormance » des mois, voire 
des années, tout comme cela a été démontré chez l’Homme dans d’autres contextes. 
Nous avons également pu établir que la performance de Moka à apprendre des nouveaux noms 
d’objets était positivement corrélée au nombre de présentations de ces associations (étude 3). En 
revanche, à l’inverse de ce que nous avons pu montrer chez les jeunes enfants, ni une seule ni 
même plusieurs présentations des nouvelles paires mot-objet n’ont suffi à induire une rétention 
après un délai de 30min et dans un contexte relativement similaire d’ « ostensive naming » (étude 
3). Nous avons montré qu’un minimum de 25-30 répétitions des labels en présence de leurs objets 
correspondants, répartis sur trois sessions d’apprentissage distribuées dans le temps et couplés à 
des tests intermédiaires faisant intervenir des renforcements positifs, étaient nécessaires pour 
observer une rétention significativement supérieure au hasard (étude 3). Il n’est cependant pas 
possible de conclure ici qu’un chien, à l’inverse d’un humain (adulte ou enfant) ne puisse 
apprendre une information en un seul essai car la compréhension de la tâche ainsi que le 
« répertoire lexical » de Moka étaient largement inférieurs à ceux de n’importe lequel des enfants 
testés au cours de cette thèse. Une réplication de ce protocole avec un chien ayant un « répertoire 
lexical » plus riche, permettrait peut-être d’élucider si la formation et consolidation d’une 
mémoire sensorielle peut s’effectuer sans répétition chez cette espèce. 
En revanche, nous pouvons affirmer que chez ce chien, l’ « ostensive naming » n’était pas une 
méthode d’apprentissage efficace pour un maintien durable en mémoire du nom d’un objet (étude 
3). Nous avons cependant révélé que l’apprentissage de nouveaux noms d’objets devaient faire 
intervenir des tests intermédiaires avec renforcement positif pour que Moka conservent le nom de 
ces objets après un délai d’un mois (étude 3). 
Par ailleurs, les études de cas rapportées dans la littérature montrent que des chiens possédant un 
répertoire de plusieurs centaines voire un millier de noms d’objets étaient capables d’inférer le 
nom d’un nouvel objet par déduction logique (« fast-mapping ») et de retenir cette information 
après un délai d’un mois. Ici, nous montrons que Moka parvient également, mais fragilement, à 
utiliser une stratégie de type déduction logique pour identifier l’objet correspondant à un nouveau 
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label, malgré son « répertoire lexical » nettement inférieur à celui des cas rapportés dans la 
littérature (étude 3). En revanche, il ne semble pas capable de retenir le nom d’un objet appris de 
cette façon. Chez l’Homme, il est suggéré que l’apparition de ce type de raisonnement serait liée à 
la taille du répertoire lexical de l’enfant. Il se pourrait que cela soit également le cas chez le chien.  
Enfin, nous avons cherché à mieux comprendre l’essence même du concept mot-objet chez le 
chien. S’agit-il d’un apprentissage purement associatif de « bas-niveau », qui ne reposerait que sur 
du conditionnement et qui serait dénué de toute signification sémantique ? Pour tenter d’y 
répondre, nous avons examiné les capacités de généralisation de Moka (étude 4). Nous avons 
démontré qu’il était parfaitement capable de reconnaitre l’objet correspond à son label associé si 
son maître ou des playbacks de la voix de son maître le lui demandait. En revanche, il n’était pas 
capable de généraliser ses apprentissages à des voix inconnues, ni à des voix synthétisées par 
ordinateur (étude 4). Enfin, il affichait des capacités incertaines de généralisation à des objets 
similaires aux orignaux. Il semble donc douteux que Moka ai acquis le concept mot-objet tel que 
définis chez l’Homme. Nous discutons de ce point dans cette thèse ainsi que des mécanismes 
sous-jacent potentiels.  
Pour récapituler, ces études exploratoires nous ont permis de révéler des divergences notables 
dans la façon dont ce chien apprend des informations liées à un concept humain. Il ne semble pas 
capable d’apprendre via une simple dénomination ostensive, mais apprendrait essentiellement par 
essai-erreurs sur la base de renforçateurs. Cependant, nous avons montré que la performance de 
Moka à se remémorer du nom de ses objets ne déclinait pas au cours du temps. Il se pourrait que 
quelle que soit la méthode d’apprentissage, une fois l’information sensorielle acquise, elle serait 
stockée et conservée et façon inaltérée durant de longues périodes, tel que cela fut reporté chez 
l’Homme. 
Dans cette thèse, il a été très frustrant de ne pas pouvoir explorer davantage les mécanismes mis 
en jeu chez le chien ainsi que les principes qui régissent apprentissage et mémoire chez cette 
espèce dans le contexte précis d’un apprentissage associatif mot-objet. Il aurait été souhaitable 
que davantage de chiens aient parfaitement acquis le concept mot-objet à l’issue de la phase 
d’entrainement afin de pouvoir répliquer les protocoles sur davantage de sujets. Il aurait 
également été préférable de disposer d’un chien ayant une expertise de plusieurs années avec la 
tâche, ou une connaissance de plusieurs centaines de noms d’objets afin de pouvoir réellement 
faire la lumière sur d’éventuelles règles communes à ces deux modèles d’études. 
En conclusion, nos résultats confortent le postulat que l’Homme n’est pas la seule espèce capable 
de former et conserver durablement en mémoire une information sensorielle faisant intervenir des 
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stimuli bimodaux et pour laquelle il n’y a pas eu de réactivation durant toute la durée d’intervalle. 
Le maintien à (très) long terme d’une information sensorielle chez le chien, dépendrait, tout 
comme chez l’Homme, du nombre d’expositions à cette information lors de l’apprentissage. En 
revanche, dans le cadre de ce concept précis lié au langage et spécifique à l’Homme, il se pourrait 
que seul l’Homme soit en mesure d’apprendre le nom d’un nouvel objet via une seule exposition 
et ce, dès très tôt au cours du développement. Le chien requerrait quant à lui, de multiples 
expositions et une méthode d’apprentissage différente de celle de l’Homme. Nos résultats 
montrent également que l’âge joue un rôle prépondérant, tant dans l’acquisition de nouvelles 
informations (montré ici chez le chien) que dans l’efficacité des stratégies employées (montré 
chez l’enfant) ou encore dans la conservation de ces informations (montré chez ces deux modèles 
d’étude). 
Il serait intéressant d’examiner si l’ensemble de ces résultats est propre au concept mot-objet où 
généralisable à d’autres types d’informations sensorielles. Il serait également intéressant 
d’explorer si d’autres divergences peuvent être identifiées chez des espèces animales plus 
étrangères au mode de communication des humains et/ou plus éloignées génétiquement de 
l’Homme que le chien. Tester la mémoire après des latences plus longues pourrait également 
constituer une perspective à ce travail. Enfin, l’utilisation de techniques d’imagerie ou 
d’électroencéphalographie permettrait de faire la lumière sur d’éventuelles similitudes ou 
divergences quant aux mécanismes neuraux et neuronaux mis en jeu lors de ce type 
d’apprentissage.  
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Résumé court 
Nous faisons tous l’expérience de nous souvenirs d’informations ou d’épisodes de vie vécus il 
y a fort longtemps. Mais qu’en est-il pour nos jeunes enfants et pour les espèces animales 
éloignées de nous ? Les enfants et les animaux forment-ils également des souvenirs qui 
peuvent demeurer intacts durant de longues périodes ? Et si tel est le cas, la formation de leurs 
souvenirs dépend-elle des mêmes règles que celles actuellement établies chez l’Homme 
adulte ? Cette thèse s’est intéressée à ces questions dans un contexte d’apprentissage 
associatif bimodal complexe: le concept mot-objet; chez le jeune enfant et le chien 
domestique. Pour ces deux modèles d’étude, nous avons exploré certains paramètres 
susceptibles de faciliter l’encodage et le stockage en mémoire de ce type d’information. Nous 
avons notamment cherché à savoir si le nombre de présentations de nouvelles associations 
mot-objets lors de l’apprentissage avait un effet sur la rétention du nom de ces objets après un 
délai, et avons tenté de déterminer le nombre minimal de présentations nécessaire pour 
induire une trace mnésique. Enfin, nous avons exploré l’efficacité de deux stratégies 
d’apprentissage sur la mémorisation de nouveaux noms d’objets et démontrons que 
l’efficacité des stratégies utilisées chez l’Homme évolue au cours du développement de 
l’enfant et ne semblent pas s’appliquer aux chiens. En bref, nos résultats apportent des 
éclaircissements quant à certains principes qui sous-tendent la formation de mémoires 
sensorielles chez un organisme en développement ainsi que chez une espèce animale non 
primate, et nous permettent d’émettre des hypothèses quant aux mécanismes cérébraux sous-
jacents.  
Short abstract  
All of us occasionally remember information or personal events that occurred a long time ago. 
But what about young children and distantly related animal species? Do young children and 
animals also form memories that can last in time? And if so, does memory formation rely on 
the same principles than those established in human adults? This thesis intended to examine 
these questions in the context of an associative learning concept involving complex bimodal 
stimuli: the word-object concept; both in young children and domestic dogs. For these two 
models, we explored some parameters susceptible to facilitate the encoding and storage of this 
type of information in memory. In particular, we attempted to determine if the number of 
presentations of novel word-object associations during learning influenced the retention of the 
name of these objects after a delay. We also aimed to establish the minimal number of 
presentations of the pairs required to induce a memory trace. Finally, we examined the 
efficacy of two learning strategies on the ability to remember the names of novel objects and 
demonstrated that the efficacy of the strategies implemented in humans evolves during 
development and seems not to apply to dogs. In brief, our results enlightened some principles 
underlying the formation of sensory memories in an early-developing brain system as well as 
in a non-primate species, and allow us to make assumptions about the underlying brain 
mechanisms. 
